The Ottoman Middle East

STUDIES IN HONOR OF AMNON COHEN

EDITED BY

EYAL GINIO AND ELIE PODEH

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

The Ottoman Middle East

The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage

Politics, Society and Economy

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Eyal Ginio and Elie Podeh, Jerusalem July 2013.

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INTRODUCTION

Eyal Ginio and Elie Podeh

In 2005, after a long and devoted academic career of teaching and research, Professor Amnon Cohen retired from his position at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His enormous contribution to the study of Ottoman history in general, and to the scholarship of the social and economic history of Ottoman Palestine/Eretz Israel in particular, is well known. Acknowledging his contribution to the study of Ottoman Palestine, in 2007 Amnon Cohen was honoured with the Israel Prize for the study of Eretz Israel—the most distinguished award that Israeli society can bestow upon a scholar. We, his former students and colleagues, would like to celebrate Professor Cohen's productive and stimulating academic career by presenting him with this collective volume. The articles contained here reflect our deep gratitude and appreciation for his scholarship, and indeed, the inspiration we draw from him. We celebrate his past and continuing research on Ottoman history.

Amnon Cohen is a prolific scholar. While the scope of his research includes important studies of other periods and regions as well, his major academic contribution lies in his study of Ottoman Palestine, its relations with the central authorities in Istanbul, and its various groups of inhabitants: Muslims, Christians and Jews. As is well known, the Ottomans ruled Palestine for some four hundred years (1516–1917/18). During this lengthy period, the land changed unrecognizably. These changes and developments were studied in the past mostly through the eyes of European visitors. Indeed, to a large extent, the history of Ottoman Palestine was explored mainly through writings and documents composed by Western travelers and consular representatives of European powers who resided in Palestine. Amnon Cohen was one of the first to attempt to draw a picture of the history of Palestine as seen through sources composed by representatives of the Ottoman state serving there, and by making use of local sources—especially the documents produced by the *shar'i* court of Jerusalem, known as the *sijillat al-qadi* (Arabic) or *kadı sicilleri* (Turkish). These sources—all manuscripts in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish—formed the main textual foundation of his research. Professor Cohen was one of the first scholars to base his research on these sources and to train

generations of students capable of coping with the paleographical challenges of reading handwriting in a language created largely for the Ottoman administration.

Cohen's pioneering research began a new era in the study of Ottoman Palestine and integrated it into the study of the history of the Middle East and of the Ottoman Empire. In this he essentially followed in the footsteps of his teachers, Uriel Heyd (1913–1968), the founder of Turkish and Ottoman studies in Israel, Shlomo Dov Goitein (1900–1985), who pioneered the study of the Cairo Genizah, and Bernard Lewis (b. 1916), who in the 1950s worked in the newly-opened central archives in Istanbul. Most of Cohen's research dealt with general aspects of life in Ottoman Palestine, but through these studies he also shed light on the religious minorities in general, and Jewish communities in particular. His research is a unique and pioneering contribution to the study of the Middle East and to the understanding of the frameworks and patterns of the Ottoman state. His studies of the *sijill* laid the groundwork for the wide-ranging research being conducted today on all of the Ottoman provinces, in Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Arab world, utilizing this source. Amnon Cohen created a new school of study, whose findings are today at the center of debates about the Ottoman state.

The synthesis between Western and Ottoman sources was at the basis of Cohen's doctoral dissertation on Palestine in the 18th century. This dissertation, later published in English as a monograph under the title of *Palestine in the 18th Century*,[1] was based on documents kept at the French chamber of commerce in Marseilles, 18th-century biographies written in Arabic, and Ottoman manuscripts and documents preserved for the most part at the Prime Minister's Archives in Istanbul. This synthesis allowed Cohen to demonstrate the many changes that occurred in Ottoman Palestine during the 18th century, principally the rise of local rulers to power: first Dahir al-'Umar and, then, his more powerful and ambitious successor, Ahmad al-Jazzar. While acting in the name of the Ottoman state and as an integral part of the state machine, these two rulers were able to establish a strong and efficient centralized regime, based on a powerful private military arm, substantial revenues from trade and agriculture, and firm commercial ties with French merchants—to name their main achievements. This book on 18th-century Palestine, published in English in 1973, remains the principal study used by researchers in Israel and abroad.

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[1] Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973).

Five years later, together with Bernard Lewis, Cohen published a study of the demography and economics of 16th-century Palestine. The book *Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine*[2] made use of another kind of Ottoman source—the population censuses carried out by the Ottoman state for taxation purposes during the 16th century. These censuses, known as *tahrir*, are kept in the *tapu* registers in Istanbul and Ankara. The *tahrir* surveys are the product of the work conducted by official commissions dispatched to survey tax-paying populations, lands and revenues in the towns and villages for fiscal purposes. The data collected were gathered in registers (*tapu defterleri*). The accumulated figures provided for the individual taxes represent the authorities' global estimations of what was expected, rather than statements of the amounts and yields actually collected. The registers were handwritten in codes and abbreviations. Cohen and Lewis worked painstakingly to decipher these codes, and the book, that incorporated the extensive data they extracted from these censuses, draws a detailed and original picture of the six major cities of Palestine after the Ottoman conquest. As the registers provide considerable quantities of details, statistics and information covering most of the first century of Ottoman rule over Palestine, their study was concerned mostly with two major themes: population and revenues. In this case, too, the book revolutionized our knowledge of Palestine and its different inhabitants immediately after the transition from Mamluk to Ottoman rule and during the first century of Ottoman presence in the country's urban centers. Indeed, the 16th century—a period of great political and economic upheaval and administrative changes in Palestine—would attract Cohen's attention in many of his subsequent studies.

Professor Cohen's greatest contribution to the study of Ottoman Palestine is probably his researches in the archives of the *shar'i* court of Jerusalem. Apprehending the documents' potential contribution to our understanding of the matrix of life in Ottoman Jerusalem, Cohen was the first researcher, from Israel or elsewhere, to receive official permission to conduct research on the *sijill* registers from the Muslim Supreme Council in Jerusalem, as early as 1968. As in other provincial centers, the *qadi* of Jerusalem and the court's scribes, who were either agents of the political center or local appointees, shaped and compiled these records according to long-established general patterns and traditions lightly seasoned

[2] Amnon Cohen and Bernard Lewis, *Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

by local usage and practices. As state-generated sources, these documents mainly reflect the local administration's concerns and mirror the diversity of the *qadi*'s responsibilities in the Ottoman city. The documents found in the *sijill* most frequently are notarial registrations, litigations, copies of decrees arriving from the Sublime Porte or from other high officials, and registrations of estates. While the *sijill* records do not always yield a detailed and clear picture, still they evidently reflect the perceptions of the local elite and echo some of the initiatives and responses of local residents and their strategies vis-à-vis other groups, local authorities as well as their Ottoman rulers, though the official language of the documents blurs their personal voices.

The *sijill* documents as penned by the court's scribes are, therefore, unique and precious sources for understanding the quotidian life of the various groups composing the urban population of Jerusalem. Cohen's subsequent and long-lasting fascination with the *sijill* is evident in his research and writing. In one of his introductions, he phrases it in the following manner:

> Each new *sijill* entry tempts the researcher to investigate a hitherto unexplored facet of daily life, to follow the fortune or misfortune of a person whose name seems familiar from some earlier innuendo, or whose family affairs we have learned about from previous entries.[3]

The earliest court records from Ottoman Jerusalem are dated 1530/1—less than two decades after the Ottoman conquest of the city. The last entries date from the hasty retreat of the Ottoman army from Jerusalem in December 1917. Therefore, these registers document the long Ottoman rule over the city and the various changes and events that took place within. The registers are 420 leather-bound volumes containing some half-million documents that shed light on life in Jerusalem and its surroundings throughout the Ottoman period. Many varied topics emerge from within the pages of the *sijill*, elucidating aspects of administration, government, society, economics, and the functioning of religious and cultural institutions. Different documents reveal the inner life of the residents of the city and the activities of visitors there; minority-majority relations; the communal organization of Jews, Christians and Muslims; architecture and civic administration; town-village relations; recreational activities; social tensions; natural disasters, and more. These registrations provide us with

[3] Amnon Cohen, *Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 9.

numerous encounters and insights into the lives of Jerusalemites under Ottoman rule. They likewise enable the researcher to discuss broader topics regarding various aspects of Ottoman history. Cohen studied these topics and published his findings in a series of scholarly articles[4] and books. He also guided a generation of young scholars who continued in the path of studying the *sijill* that he paved. Some of their works can be found in this volume.

Most prominent amongst Cohen's many studies of the *sijill* are those focusing on economics in Ottoman Jerusalem and on the Jewish population of the city. In 1989, Cohen published a monograph—*Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem*—that explores modes and aspects of the production and consumption of meat, soap and olive oil, and bread in 16th-century Jerusalem.[5] By studying the production and distribution of these basic commodities, consumed by the majority of 16th-century Jerusalemites, Cohen was able to discuss broader social and economic institutions and topics that reflect the local economy of Jerusalem, such as agricultural production in the vicinity of Jerusalem (and the economic relations with the Bedouin tribes of the Judean desert), transportation, inflation, attempts at price control and supervision, the state's involvement in the city's economic infrastructure and policies (and its limits), urban planning, the close relations between the *waqf* (pious endowments) and the local economy, patterns of trade, professional specialization and guild inter-relationships, the local population's patterns of supply and demand and how they affected and changed economic life in the city, modes of production and technology. On the basis of this intensive study, Cohen was able to demonstrate the impressive demographic and economic growth that characterized much of the first fifty years of Ottoman rule in Jerusalem (and elsewhere in Palestine).

The guild system of Jerusalem, regarded by Cohen as the harbinger of civil society, stands at the focus of another of his studies of Jerusalem: *The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem*.[6] A Turkish version of this book was later published under the title *Osmanlı Kudüsünde Loncalar*.[7] In this book, Prof. Cohen used the proceedings of the local *shar'i* court from the

[4] For some of Cohen's major articles see in his recent collection of articles: Amnon Cohen, *Studies on Ottoman Palestine* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).

[5] Amnon Cohen, *Economic Life*.

[6] Amnon Cohen, *The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

[7] Amnon Cohen, *Osmanlı Kudüsünde Loncalar* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 2003).

early 16th century until the beginning of the 19th century to reconstruct Jerusalem's guild system in the *longue durée*. In this study he sheds light on the historically "silent majority" of Jerusalemites: the members of the professional guilds who controlled much of the economic activity that took place in the city's markets. In Ottoman Jerusalem there were some seventy different professions, organized in about sixty guilds. His study describes the different professions in Ottoman Jerusalem and reveals the systems organizing the marketplace, the production arrangements of the guilds of Jerusalem, and their provision of services. Drawing on the *sijill* registers, the economic and social significance of the guild system to Ottoman Jerusalem is clearly demonstrated.[8]

Cohen's research on the Jewish community as viewed from the pages of the *sijill* registers has led to a real revolution in our understanding of Jewish existence in Jerusalem in the Ottoman period. As tolerated religious minorities, the Jews (like the Christians) maintained their own internal judicial systems, but, being an integral part of the larger society and economy of the Ottoman state, they were bound by many of the Sultanic decrees (*fermans*) and decisions issued by the central authorities, the provincial authorities and the Muslim court. According to Ottoman usage, all of these official documents were registered in the local *sijill*. In addition, as was shown by Cohen, Jews and Christians voluntarily attended the Muslim court for rulings in matters that touched on members of other religions and also, sometimes, in matters related to people of their own community. Other non-Muslims came to the *qadi*, in his capacity of the local notary, to receive a legal document that would confirm deeds, agreements, and contracts.

On the basis of these varied documents Cohen was able to offer a detailed and innovative discussion of various aspects of Jewish life in Ottoman Jerusalem in all their complexity and diversity: communal organization, relations with the authorities and the larger society, economics, demography, emigration, social relations, and more. In a process of comparison, analysis and synthesis of the various historical sources, Cohen was able to advance a novel approach to understanding the Ottoman regulation and perception of Jewish communal life in Jerusalem and the inter-communal relationships in the city, and to reconstruct a rich

[8] Ibid.

living reality hitherto hidden from researchers.[9] In a wide-ranging project, supported by the Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute in Jerusalem, Cohen has published four volumes, each dedicated to a century of Jewish life in the Ottoman city of Jerusalem.[10] These volumes include many documents related to Jews and translated into Hebrew. The documents are annotated and accompanied by extensive commentary, enabling students of the Jewish settlement who are not acquainted with Ottoman Muslim society to make use of the documents in their own research.

The present collection of articles aims to reflect the rich research conducted by Cohen in Ottoman studies over the last decades. Therefore, its various parts deal with four major topics that characterize much of Cohen's work: Ottoman Palestine and its various communities; the neighboring Arab provinces; the Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire, and the social and economic history of the Ottoman Empire in general.

Following his retirement from teaching, Amnon Cohen has not slowed the pace of his academic research. On the contrary, his continuing fascination with the history of Ottoman Palestine, as well his new interest in the current upheavals in contemporary Iraq,[11] have triggered him further to explore documents from the past and to offer innovative insights and interpretations of the region's history. His appetite for scholarship and his dynamism continue to inspire us all. We wish him many more years of good health and intellectual curiosity and creativity.

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[9] Amnon Cohen, *Ottoman Documents on the Jewish Community of Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1976) [in Hebrew]; idem, *Jewish Life under Islam: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); idem, *A World Within: Jewish Life as Reflected in Muslim Court Documents from the Sijill of Jerusalem (XVIth Century)*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: The Center for Judaic Studies, 1994).

[10] Amnon Cohen and Elisheva Ben-Shimon-Pikali in collaboration with Ovadia Salama, *Jews in the Moslem Religious Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XVIth Century: Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1993) [in Hebrew]; idem in collaboration with Elisheva Ben-Shimon-Pikali, *Jews in the Moslem Religious Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XVIII Century: Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1996) [in Hebrew]; idem in collaboration with Elisheva Ben-Shimon-Pikali and Eyal Ginio, *Jews in the Moslem Religious Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XIX Century: Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2003) [in Hebrew]; idem and Elisheva Ben-Shimon-Pikali, *Jews in the Moslem Religious Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XVII Century: Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem*, 2 vols. (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2010) [in Hebrew].

[11] See his recent book, co-edited with Noga Efrati, *Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing Patterns* (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2011).

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND EUROPE

Bernard Lewis

In the six centuries of its history the Ottoman Empire fought a long series of wars, first during the swift advance of the Turks into Europe, then during their slow and hard-fought withdrawal. In most of these wars, they fought alone—sometimes against one, sometimes against several enemies, but virtually without allies. This was natural enough, since in his own perception and that of his people the sultan was the sovereign of the House of Islam engaged in perpetual battle against the unbelievers in the House of War. Occasionally, letters preserved in the Ottoman and other archives show some awareness of European conflicts and rivalries, and even hint at collaboration against a common enemy. A good example is some royal letters from Istanbul to Queen Elizabeth I of England in the late 16th century, referring to their common enemy, Spain. But little if anything came of all of this. Despite this ongoing struggle, the Ottomans showed remarkably little interest in what was happening among the unbelievers inside Europe. Even a major event like the Thirty Years War, just beyond their frontiers, evoked only the briefest mention in the generally very detailed Ottoman historical literature.

Even the very idea of Europe appears to have been unknown. Europe is after all a European idea, conceived in Greece, nurtured in Rome, raised to maturity in Christendom, and, after many vicissitudes, approaching old age in secular, primarily economic community. Asia and Africa are also European ideas, merely European i.e. ancient Greek ways of describing the Other. Asia simply meant not Europe East; Africa meant not Europe South. Obviously, neither constitutes a cohesive entity comparable with Europe, and both names were unknown to the inhabitants of Asia and Africa until they were brought to their attention by Europeans, first, briefly, in antiquity, then, more pervasively and more permanently, during the age of discovery and expansion. With the advent and spread of Islam, this European terminology was confined to Christian Europe. The name Asia disappeared entirely; the name Africa, in the form of Ifriqiyya, survived as the name of the region nowadays known as Tunisia. It was not until the early 19th century that the name Europe, along with other items of Western classification and terminology, appeared in Ottoman

Turkish and, rather later, in other Islamic languages. By now, this Greek invention of the three continents of the Old World has come to be universally accepted.

At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Ottoman Empire found itself militarily involved more than once in European battles, first against Napoleon and then against the British. In these wars the Ottoman Empire had, so to speak, co-belligerents who were waging war against the same enemy, but one cannot speak of a true alliance. By now, the Ottomans, keenly aware of their relative weakness, were trying to modernize, which in practice meant Europeanize, their armed forces, and for this purpose sought the help of European military and naval experts. Some of these European military delegations even amounted to government-appointed missions, but still fell far short of anything that might be termed an alliance.

With the outbreak of the Crimean War between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1853 an entirely new situation arose. A few months later, Britain and France both declared war on Russia and dispatched substantial naval and military forces to the Ottoman Empire to join in battle. For the first time, the Ottoman Empire was involved in a major war, with European great powers as allies as well as enemies. The presence of large numbers of Western Europeans on Ottoman soil and the close involvement with Western allies greatly accelerated and intensified the process of change in the Ottoman Empire.

Some changes were immediate. In 1855 the telegraph was extended to the Ottoman Empire, which was thus brought into immediate contact with the outside world. British and other Western newspapers sent war correspondents to cover the fighting, and, as a spin-off, provided a news service to the Turkish press, whose coverage until then had been limited and intermittent. For the first time Muslim readers in a Middle Eastern society became accustomed to a daily diet of fresh news. The war also gave the Ottoman government, for the first time, access to the money-markets of Europe. A first foreign loan was raised in London in 1854, to be followed by many others. The Ottoman and later the Egyptian governments discovered the opportunities and in time also the perils of international finance. The Ottoman economy, no longer isolated, was now part of the international economic community and subject to all the hazards, as well as the benefits, that this conferred. And in the peace that ended the war, the Ottoman Empire was formally admitted to that concatenation of discords known as the "Concert of Europe." According to article VII of the treaty signed in Paris in 1856: "Her Majesty the

Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe (*du droit public et du concert européens*). Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest."

Amid the smoke of battle and the mists of diplomacy, the outlines of a new era were beginning to appear. But though of profound significance, it was of brief duration, and ended in the course of World War I. In the Crimean War, European powers, for good reasons of their own, had come to the Ottomans' aid in the struggle against Russia. Now, some of them at least expected something in return. They were disappointed.

For the Ottomans, it was an agonizing choice. Their previous allies, Britain and France, were now the allies of Russia, still seen as their most deadly enemy. The Western Powers, aware of this difficulty, asked only for Ottoman neutrality. The Central Powers wanted to involve them as belligerents, primarily against Russia, but also against Britain and France, by now strongly established in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Ottoman government seemed to have decided from the very start to join the Central Powers. A "strictly confidential" message from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul, dated 2 August 1914, makes this clear. The ambassador was told by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior that in the event of war, the dreadnought Osman, one of two being built in British shipyards for the Ottoman fleet, was to go to Kiel, in Germany. It seems very likely that this order, and the policy and decision that it expressed, became known to the British, and probably explains the British decision to impound the two dreadnoughts and add them to the Royal Navy.

British policy at the time was eloquently expressed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in a speech at the Guildhall banquet, reported in *The Times* of 10 November 1914.

> At length Mr. Asquith replied to the toast of 'His Majesty's Ministers' for the seventh time in succession at this board. He first reviewed the new situation created by Turkey's appearance in the field. He showed how the Allies were compelled, in spite of their hopes and efforts and against their will, to recognize Turkey as an open enemy. It was the Ottoman Government which had drawn the sword, and which, he predicted, would perish by the sword.

> 'It is they,' the Prime Minister continued in impressive tones, 'and not we who have rung the death-knell of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe, but in Asia. The Turkish Empire has committed suicide and dug its grave with its own hand.'

The Prime Minister's prediction of the fate of the Ottoman Empire was remarkably accurate. What he did not foresee was the triumphant emergence, from its ruins, of the new Turkish Republic.

PART ONE

OTTOMAN PALESTINE

KING SOLOMON OR SULTAN SÜLEYMAN?[1]

Rachel Milstein

At the center of this short article stands an enigmatic depiction of a saintly figure whom I believe to be Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, in the image of King Solomon (pl. 1, Los Angeles County Museum of Art, The Nasli M. Heeramaneck Collection, gift of Joan Palevsky, M.73.5.446.). On stylistic grounds, this painting may be attributed to one of the illustrated volumes of *Shahname-i Al-i Osman*, and perhaps served as a frontispiece for the *Enbiyaname*, the now dispersed first volume of this famous poetic world history, Ottoman dynastic history and chronicle of Sultan Süleyman. Composed by the poet Fethullah Arif Çelebi and entitled *Shahname-i Al-i Osman*, the multivolume manuscript was copied and illustrated by Ottoman court painters in 1558.[2] In the few surviving volumes from the first section of the series, small illustrations are interspaced among the lines of text. Unlike those texts, the composition studied here seems to be painted alone on its folio, detached from the text, and therefore would appear to be a frontispiece rather than an illustration of a literary passage. An interpretation of its content may corroborate this assumption.

The painting depicts a prophet seated on a *minbar*, or an elevated platform under a high dome, surrounded by other prophets, scholars and angels. Because of the golden, fiery halo around the prophet's head, and in particular his elevated seat, the saintly person is often identified in the scholarly literature as Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam.[3] But this identification cannot be correct, first and foremost because his face is unveiled. A depiction of Muhammad's face would have been unacceptable in 16th-century Islamic art, which from ca. 1500 hid the features of the prophets with either a white veil or a golden halo. If this is not a portrayal of Muhammad, then what is the identity of the prophet seated in a painting higher than all other prophets?

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[1] The content of this article is based on a paper read at a conference in honor of Dr. Filiz Çagman, the director of the Topkapı Palace Museum, on the occasion of her retirement.

[2] A study of the last volume in the series, which contains the chronicle of Sultan Süleyman himself and is better known as *Süleymanname*, was published by Esin Atil, *Süleymanname, Illustrated History of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Washington D.C. and New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1986).

[3] Ibid., fig. 28, pp. 57–62.

Plate 1. King Solomon enthroned. Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Museum of Art, The Nasli M. Heeramaneck Collection, gift of Joan Palevsky, M.73.5.446. (Photo courtesy of Los Angeles County Museum of Art)

The first clue to an answer is given by the *hudhud* bird (hoopoe) on the pinnacle of the dome, which is well known in Islamic literature and miniature painting as the messenger of King Solomon. If this is not enough, an inscription on the wall of the monument within which the group is seated identifies the person as King Solomon. The inscription, a Persian rhymed verse, reads as follows: "He is Solomon of his time; he has the kingdom of Solomon in his days."

Another reference to King Solomon may be found on the roof above the king's head, around the base of the tower. It consists of three gray-yellowish triangles which, together with three other triangles of the unseen, back half of the tower, make a circular configuration of six triangles. This is a typical hexagram, which appears on endless Ottoman monuments and minor objects. It is a most powerful, perhaps the most powerful, and common symbol of the Divine, of magic powers, and of divinely inspired royalty.

As a symbol of royalty, the hexagram appears for the first time in a tiny colored drawing (or xylograph), which can be attributed to the 13th century. Today part of an album in the library of the Topkapı Museum, it depicts King Solomon seated on his lion throne (pl. 2).[4] The king is identified by a small inscription inside the composition, and in accordance with ancient Near Eastern iconography, two angels carry the arch of heaven above his head, thus symbolizing the divine source of his royal legitimacy. The composition includes the wise vizier Asaf, who is said to have great knowledge of mysteries, on the king's right side. To the king's left is the king of the demons, embodying the world of mysteries. The small size of the painting suggests that it was probably produced as a talismanic paper, rolled up and placed in a cylindrical silver box, to be carried around the neck, or placed in the house. This assumption is also based on the inclusion of the demon and the nonsensical, magic inscriptions around the king. The origins of these inscriptions, as of the other talismanic devices, are attributed to King Solomon, who received his scientific and magic knowledge directly from heaven.

This knowledge, according to Late Antique sources, was given to the king in the form of a seal ring—*khatim Sulayman* in Arabic, *mühr-ü Süleyman* in Osmanlı. With this ring on his finger, the king controlled the demons and forced them to carry out work for him that human beings were unable to perform. Thus, according to Jewish legends, the demons

[4] Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 2152, fol. 97a. See Bishr Farès, "Figures magiques," in *Aus der Welt der islamischen Kunst*, ed. R. Ettinghausen (Berlin: Mann, 1959), 155–56.



Plate 2. King Solomon seated on a lions throne. Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 2152, fol. 97a. (Based on R. Milstein, *King Solomon's Seal*, Jerusalem, 1995, p. 34)

built the Temple of God in Jerusalem without using iron instruments. Arabic sources, following the Qur'an, enlarge upon these and on other fantastic tasks that the demons performed for Solomon, such as heating thermal water for a *hammam* built by the king.[5]

If the prophet in the Ottoman painting is King Solomon and not Muhammad, why is he seated higher than the other prophets? First, this description conforms to traditional Islamic texts. Tha'labi, for example, in his *Qisas al-Anbiya'*, writes: "Around his throne were silver chairs of the prophets. . . ." Second, this elevated position was depicted half a century earlier, in what is apparently the first Ottoman representation of King Solomon.[6] This depiction is the right side of a double frontispiece from the Chester Beatty *Süleymanname* by Sharaf al-Din Musa, known as Arzun Firdusi, which was copied ca. 1500, possibly for Sultan Beyazid II. It was discussed by Michael Rogers at the Ninth Congress of Turkish Art, and later published by him.[7]

Here the king is seen seated inside a domed building, at the top of a seven-storied complex. Various categories of creatures are arranged in descending order below the king, relative to their place in the hierarchy of the universe. Haloed prophets are seated just below Solomon, a row of kings below them, then military commanders, angels and demons, and finally the planets. This arrangement combines two Western Judeo-Christian traditions, dating back to pre-Islamic Asiatic sources.

One tradition describes King Solomon's fabulous throne as constructed of seven levels, with pairs of mechanical animals crouching on each of the six stairs, and birds hovering above. Visual depictions of this mechanical device existed in Jewish art from at least the third century, reappeared in the 14th-century tri-partite *mahzor* from Germany, yet again in the 15th-century Spanish Bible of the Duke of Alba, and later on in Hebrew manuscripts linked with the false messiah Shabbetai Zvi, who lived in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century. In all these examples the throne is portrayed as a domed chamber between two towers at the head of

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[5] For the literary sources and the pictorial representations of King Solomon and the demons, see Rachel Milstein, Karin Rührdanz and Barbara Schmitz, *Stories of the Prophets: Illustrated Manuscripts of Qisas al-Anbiya'* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2000), 144–48.

[6] Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, ms. Turk 406, fol. 2b.

[7] Michael J. Rogers, "Solomon and the Queen of Sheba," in *Circa 1492: Art in the Age of Exploration*, ed. Jay A. Levenson (Washington DC: National Gallery of Art, 1991), 201–203; idem, "The 'Chester Beatty' Süleymanname Again," in *Persian Painting from the Mongols to the Qajars, Studies in Honour of Basil Robinson*, ed. R. Hillenbrand (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 187–200.

six stairs or storeys, the same as in the frontispiece of the Ottoman *Süleymanname*.[8] These towers, incidentally, are of the same type as the towers of Bab-i Selam—the second gate of the Topkapı Palace.

The other tradition associated with Solomon recalls a Sassanian palace in the vicinity of Takht-i Sulayman in Western Iran, which served as a reception hall as well as an observatory. This combination, real or legendary, reflects the concept of kingship as divine grace and as a replica of the kingdom of heaven. In Islamic times this concept was transmitted by al-Mas'udi, who in *Muruj al-dhahab* described a temple in the far reaches of China. It had seven floors illuminated by seven large windows and was decorated with precious stones. A treasure of knowledge about the movement and influence of the planets upon the sublunar world was preserved in this temple. An identical description of a temple passed in Hebrew texts from the Near East via Spain to Italy, to be eventually included ca. 1500 in an introduction to the Song of Songs by Rabbi Yohanan Allemano, the Renaissance scholar, within the context of a debate on King Solomon's temple. Allemano added to al-Mas'udi's description that statues of the seven planets were placed in the seven windows, and that the forms contained in this temple could teach the wise man about the forms of the superior world and their relations to the objects of the sublunar world.[9]

Allemano's point of view in his debate was based on neo-Platonic ideas, which led his Italian contemporaries to devise plans for magic towns, following the early Christian tradition of divine wisdom in planning the Biblical Temple. During the Renaissance, when the link between architecture and magic was emphasized, Jewish writers also stressed the great wisdom of the King who had succeeded in building what was a type of supreme talisman, pulling the astral powers toward the lower world. Thus, in Allemano's writings Solomon became an ideal figure, great in all fields of knowledge, both practical and theoretical; embodying all the human attributes which the Renaissance valued. An anonymous kabbalist of Spanish origins, a contemporary of Allemano, claimed that the lost works of Solomon had been revealed to him, and the uncovering of these works was viewed as a sign of the Messianic era.[10]

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[8] All these illustrations are described and reproduced, with the relevant bibliography, in R. Milstein, *King Solomon's Seal* (Jerusalem: The Israel Museum, 1995), 20–28.

[9] Moshe Idel, "Magic Temples and Cities in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: A Passage of Mas'udi as a possible source for Yohanan Alemanno", *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, 3 (1981–2): 185–89.

[10] Ibid. and idem., "About King Solomon as a Magician," in Milstein, *King Solomon's Seal*, 15–17.

Based on the two traditions cited here, it is possible to suggest that the frontispiece of the Chester Beatty manuscript represents King Solomon both as an ideal man according to Renaissance values, as well as a prototype of the messiah. Both ideas fit well into the aspirations of the Ottoman court circa 1500, a court that in the 15th century was receptive to the Italian Renaissance, and in the 16th century developed messianic tendencies.[11]

In the light of all this, it is clear that the prophet depicted in the 16th-century miniature in the image of King Solomon of his time is no other than Sultan Süleyman, who occasionally identified himself as "Süleyman the Second," and was referred to as "Süleyman-i Zaman ("Solomon of the Time"). Gülrü Necipoğlu lists a few examples of these allusions in her book on the Topkapı Saray, and a small *sebil* on the base of the *Arz odası*, probably from the 16th century, is decorated with Persian verses that address the patron as: "Sultan of the worlds, Solomon of his time. . . . ." (pl. 3). To the examples from the royal palace in Istanbul we can add a

Plate 3. A small *sebil* on the base of the *Arz odası*. (Photo by R. Milstein)

[11] See Cornell Fleischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah: The Making of the Imperial Image in the Reign of Süleyman," in *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps. Rencontres de l'Ecole du Louvre*, ed. Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Documentation française, 1992), 159–179.

Plate 4. The Haram of Jerusalem. Illustration from The Haram of Jerusalem, Sayyid ʿAli's *Shawqnamah*, Mecca 1563. Haifa, National Maritime Museum, inv. 4576, fol. 49a. (Photo by D. Silverman)

few inscriptions from Jerusalem. One of them, on a fountain in the Haram al-Sharif, reads as follows: "This *sebil* was erected in the time of the great Sultan, second to Solomon in the kingdom of the world, Sultan Süleyman b. Selim . . ." A composite pattern made of *mühr-ü Süleyman* motifs was inserted in the city wall of Jerusalem, which was rebuilt by Sultan Süleyman together with his reconstruction works at the Dome of the Rock and the Haram al-Sharif. The Dome of the Rock, mixed in the Islamic tradition with the Biblical Temple, is said to have been initiated by King David, completed by King Solomon, and rebuilt by Sultan Süleyman. A list of these patrons appears for example in a guide to holy places along the *hajj* route, from 1563 (pl. 4).[12] The metaphorical identification of the biblical king with the Ottoman monarchs was perpetuated even after Sultan Süleyman's death, as is witnessed in a later inscription on Bab-i Saʿadet, the

[12] This guide book is described in Rachel Milstein, "Kitab Shawq Nameh, an Illustrated Guide to Holy Arabia," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 25 (2001): 275–345.

Plate 5. Inscription on the Bab-i Saʿadet. Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum. (Photo by R. Milstein)

third gate of the Topkapı Palace, reads: "This is from King Solomon and in the name of Allah the Merciful, the Compassionate." (pl. 5)

All the texts and the inscriptions cited above, which illustrate and support the link between the biblical king (and Islamic prophet) and the Ottoman sultan, lead to another piece of evidence: the long face of the saintly person in the painting bears a striking resemblance to that of Sultan Süleyman, as depicted in several of his portraits.[13] If the person seated on top of the stairs is a composite image of Solomon and Süleyman, then who are the other participants in the scene and what does the scene represent?

Two groups of three people each, all wearing elaborate headgear, are located below the king and the group of three prophets. The trio on the left may be identified as either scholars or *ulema* on account of the open manuscript placed in the hand of one of them. The three others are seated in the lower part of the composition, one of them holding an astrolabe.

[13] For example, in the many illustrations for ʿArifi's *Shahname-i Al-i Osman*. See Atil, *Süleymanname*.

As this tool was an instrument in the service of astronomers and navigators, the man who holds it may be identified as either a scientist or an admiral. If the man is an astronomer, and the other members of his group are scientists as well, then the composition may depict a monarch who combines scientific knowledge with religious standing. This combination indeed characterizes King Solomon. If on the other hand, the man holding an astrolabe is an admiral, the scene may be interpreted as a typological image of the Ottoman *divan*, with the sultan present at a higher level. In this case, the tower above the monarch may reflect the concept of the Tower of Justice, as in the Topkapı Palace, with the ruler seated at the base of this tower, immediately above the *divan*. In fact, a path and balustrade divide the composition horizontally into a lower and an upper zone, thus placing the king and the other prophets in an elevated hierarchical standing, both in the courtly idiom and in the spiritual order. Therefore, the picture does not necessarily represent a certain architectural entity, but rather a concept of the Ottoman sultanate.

In this instance, while the tower above the person of the king-prophet and sultan represents the political aspect of the monarchy, the building on the right, where the other prophets are seated, reflects an ideal type of the royal Ottoman mosque. The architectural background of this assembly is, therefore, once again, a combination of the two facets of the sultan's image. Moreover, since the entire assembly is seated in two levels of one architectural space, and since this space reflects the form of the imperial grand mosque, the place where Solomon-Süleyman is seated may refer to his prayer lodge at the left corner of the upper gallery.

In conclusion, from whatever point of departure we analyze the composition and the particular details of this miniature painting, we always arrive at the iconographic and symbolic union of the prophet, the judge, the scholar, the head of a state, and the builder of the Solomonic Temple. This man is Sultan Süleyman, the Solomon of his time, and the painting that depicts his image so well can be considered a frontispiece to the entire edition of his *History*.

THE RENOVATIONS OF SULTAN MAHMUD II (R. 1808–1839) IN JERUSALEM

Khader Salameh

In 1816–1819, during the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, extensive renovations were carried out in the Haram al-Sharif, especially in the Masjid al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock, and elsewhere in Jerusalem and in the Mosque of Ibrahim in Hebron. Details about those renovations are found in two exceptionally informative notebooks in the Islamic Museum in the Haram al-Sharif comprising the expense accounts for the project.

This chapter presents the information about the renovations that the notebooks contain.[1] A much larger study that includes extensive discussion of the renovation project in general with full references has been submitted for publication elsewhere. Here we confine ourselves to details about the administrative and technical staff, the artisans and workers, the stages of the project, and construction materials and supplies that are directly derived from the contents of the notebooks. Because this short article provides only information that is found in the two notebooks, the extensive footnotes called for in a larger study of the renovation project have been dispensed with.[2]

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[1] I want to thank Dr. Robert Schick for translating this article from Arabic to English and for his extensive help in editing the text. An article in Arabic about the renovations was published as Khadir Salama, "Tarmimat al-Sultan Maḥmud al-Thani fi Madinat al-Quds 1232–1234 h / 1816–1819 m.," in *al-Quds al-Islamiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Ghusha (Amman: Ministry of Culture, 2010), 223–75.

[2] Inscriptions in Jerusalem, Hebron and Nebi Musa also refer to the renovation works: Max van Berchem, *Matériaux pour un Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum, Part II: Syrie du Sud-2. Jerusalem "Haram"* (Cairo: IFAO, 1927), nos. 250, 296–298; Yunus ʿAmr and Najaḥ Abu Sara, *Ruqum al-Masjid al-Ibrahimi al-Sharif* (Hebron: Jamiʿat al-Khalil, 1989), 569, 571; Mehmet Tütüncü, *Turkish Palestine (1069–1917)* (Haarlem: Turkestan and Azerbaijan Research Centre, 2008), 55–62, 163–64. Two primary sources that refer to the renovations are: Ibrahim al-ʿAwra, *Tarikh Wilayat Sulayman Pasha al-ʿAdil*, ed. Qustantin al-Basha al-Mukhallisi (Beirut: Matbaʿat Dayr al-Mukhallis, 1936) and Mikha'il al-Dimashqi, *Tarikh Ḥawadith al-Sham wa-Lubnan 1197–1257/1782–1841* ed. Louis Maʿluf al-Yasuʿi (Beirut: al-Matbaʿa al-Kathulikiyya, 1912).

The Notebooks

The two notebooks in the Islamic Museum are mostly intact. The first notebook has thirty-six pages, of which four are blank. The second notebook, which is a continuation of the first one, has twelve pages left, although the first and last pages are blank, and four pages in the middle are missing. The first notebook contains the accounts for the first sixteen months, while the second notebook covers the nine remaining months. The entries for the project expenses are recorded in chronological order, using the *qirsh* or *asadi qirsh* as the monetary unit of account. Sometimes the entries are very general, while at other times details are provided. The total amount spent on the renovation of all of the places was 374,433 *qirsh*, out of which more than 20,000 *qirsh* was spent on the renovations in Hebron. The amount of expenses in the four missing pages of the second notebook can be estimated as 80,000 *qirsh*.

The Administrative and Technical Staff

The administration and financing of the renovations was in the hands of Süleyman Paşa, the governor (*wali*) of Sidon and Tripoli from 1804 until his death on 4 September 1819, about a month after the renovations ended. All the project expenses were paid from his treasury. At the end of the second notebook are recorded the amounts he sent in forty installments. An administrative group and a technical group, mostly coming from outside Jerusalem, supervised the renovations. A chief architect, six masters, and their assistant craftsmen from Istanbul were appointed, including two people to work with lead, two on the inscriptions and two with plaster. Their daily wages and food allowance started when they arrived in Jerusalem.

The administrative group included the supervisor of the project, Hajj Mustafa Ağa ibn ʿAli Effendi from Jerusalem, and his assistants. The salary of Hajj Mustafa is not recorded, but his secretary Jurjis Mansi and his assistant received a monthly salary of 150 *qirsh*. Another secretary for the Hebron project was ʿUthman Ağa.

The head of the project was the architect Khalifa Si Salih Effendi, who worked on the project for twenty-two months with a monthly salary of 250 *qirsh*. Other architects, known as "architects of the sultan," were recorded once. Under the architect were the supervisors (*mubashir*), directors or overseers for each craft, who received daily wages lower than the wages of the master craftsmen. Ibrahim Ağa was a supervisor, most likely of the

project in general. He worked for 216 days for a daily wage of three *qirsh*, while Muhammad Ağa worked as a supervisor of the inscription carvers for 280 days for a daily wage of two *qirsh*. The supervisor of the carpenters was Darwish Muhammad, who worked for a daily wage of 1.5 *qirsh*.

There were also *qalfawat* (singular *qalfa*), a Turkish word meaning someone responsible for a department or its foreman. There was a foreman for the carpenters and another for the masons. The distinction between the foreman (*qalfa*) and supervisor (*mubashir*) of the carpenters is not clear to us, although the foreman may have been in charge of the supervisor and the carpenters. An employee identified as *cukandar* or *cugundur*, also written as *juqadar* or *juqah dar*, a Turkish word meaning "employee" or "deputy," supervised the project in the last seven months for a daily wage of five *qirsh*.

The Stages of the Project

The renovations began on 18 Shaʿban 1232 (2 July 1817) and continued for more than twenty-five months, ending on 15 Shawwal 1234 (7 August 1819). It is possible to follow the stages of the work from the payment of bonuses after the end of each stage. Preparation of a storeroom inside the Haram began in Shawwal 1232 (August 1817). About 400 *qirsh* were spent on that renovation, for supplies and wages and meals of the workmen. A place was also prepared in the Tekkiya of Khasseki Sultan for the workmen to stay. About 500 *qirsh* were spent on removing dirt, "cleaning the nails" (*naqawt mismar*), wages of the workmen, builders and carpenters and the purchase of pots and cups for coffee, copper pots, brooms, bells, water jars, mats for the floor, pillows and blankets and meals for the workmen.

The renovations began with the Masjid al-Aqsa, while preparations were under way for work in other places, including casting lead and making lead sheets, preparing to manufacture tiles, purchasing soil of various colors and building a furnace. The erection of the scaffold for the dome of al-Aqsa Mosque was completed on 2 Dhu al-Hijja 1232 (13 October 1817) and it was dismantled on 22–23 Rabiʿ I 1233 (30–31 January 1818). Between those dates, on 6 Safar 1233 (16 December 1817), a bonus was paid to the gilder after he had finished the dome of the Masjid al-Aqsa, indicating that the renovation of the dome interior took about four months. The inscription carvers and plasterers also decorated the dome with colored plaster. Their work in other places inside the Masjid al-Aqsa ended on 13 Jumada I 1233 (21 March 1818).

The builders finished constructing the upper part of the west wall of the Masjid al-Aqsa on 5 Jumada I 1233 (13 March 1818), the same day that the painter finished his work, and on 11 Jumada 1 1233 (19 March 1818) the new doors of the Masjid al-Aqsa were installed. On that occasion two goats were butchered for the workers. The main work in the Masjid al-Aqsa ended in 1233 (1817), although the day and month were not recorded. It seems that work in the Masjid al-Aqsa continued for over a year. The preparations for placing tiles on the Dome of the Rock started on 10 Ramadan 1232 (14 July 1817). The placement of tiles on the west face ended on 22 Muharram 1234 (21 November 1818), and the tile masters left Jerusalem at the end of Jumada I 1234 (27 March 1819) after they had finished their work, indicating that replacing the tiles took more than four months. The work of the chief architect ended at the end of Rajab 1234 (25 May 1819), based on when he received his last salary, although some work continued that did not require architectural supervision, such as cleaning up debris and collecting the remaining supplies. The last payment of 6,000 *qirsh* arrived from the treasury on 10 Shaʿban 1234 (4 June 1819). We do not know what tasks took place during the following two months until Shawwal, because the four pages that contain those expenses are missing from the second document.

Construction Materials

a. *Lime*

Mortar or lime was purchased from fifteen villages of Jerusalem. The names of the village shaykhs who received payments for the lime were recorded, as were the names of those who sold lime on an individual basis. The villages provided 2,223.5 *qintars*, a weight of more than six hundred tons, for 14,452.75 *qirsh*. A *sijill* document (209:224) records the details of the names of the villages and the individuals and the prices of the lime that was provided for the project of the Haram. The renovations began on 18 Shaʿban 1232 (3 July 1817), and the first delivery of lime was on 21 Shaʿban 1232 (6 July 1817), so the arrangements with the village shaykhs and the production of the material had started several months earlier.

b. *Sand*

The sand used in the project was brought from Hebron, supplied by several contractors. There are some entries for the wages of workmen and

carpenters for milling the coarse sand before it was used. The teeth of the mills were made of oak (*sindiyan*) wood purchased from Ramla. On one occasion 120 teeth were purchased for a *qirsh* each.

c. Qusurmil *(ash)*

The project was supplied with ash from four bathhouses in the city: Hammam al-ʿAyn and Hammam al-Shifaʿ, Hammam Sittina Maryam and Hammam al-Sultan. Some 4,435 *qafiz* of ash were used for the renovations for half a *qirsh* per *qafiz*, meaning that more than two thousand *qirsh* were spent on ash.

d. *Plaster*

The Bedouin villages of the Taʿamira, ʿIbidiyya and Sawahira (the rural areas to the east of Bethlehem) provided plaster through the village headmen or their representatives. Its price was higher than the price of lime, and the villagers received 28,000 *qirsh*. In the beginning, plaster was transported from Jaffa, shown by the fact that the only amounts entered into the notebooks were the costs for hiring transport. But those responsible for the project soon started looking for a local source of production, and an employee (*tufalji*) visited the villages to look for plaster. The first quantities of plaster from the villages were purchased between 12 Shawwal (25 August) and 12 Dhu al-Qaʿda 1232 (23 September 1817) at a cost of 1,641.5 *qirsh*, while the largest quantities supplied to the project came between 21 Dhu al-Qaʿda (22 September) and the beginning of Dhu al-Hijjah 1233 (2 October 1818), for a total of 13,762 *qirsh*. The cost and place and date of delivery for the village plaster were listed, but not the weight, quantity or cost of transportation, in contrast to the plaster from Jaffa. That points to an agreement with the headmen of the area.

e. *Linen*

Linen was purchased in rolls or loads and then cut and added to the lime to keep it from cracking. Linen cutters were hired, while one entry recorded the purchase of linen worth 812 *qirsh* from six merchants for covering the walls of the Masjid al-Aqsa and some other places. Linen for the Mosque of Ibrahim in Hebron and for the Maqam al-Nabi Daʾud in Jerusalem cost half of what was spent for the Masjid al-Aqsa. Some of the linen was purchased from Jaffa, although most was purchased in Hebron. We can deduce that about 500 loads of linen were used, costing 2,147 *qirsh*.

f. *Soil*

The soil used came in many colors and names, mixed with pebbles, chaff, linen and lime. Red soil, brought into reservoirs by water channels or deposited by floods in valleys, came from the neighboring village of Silwan. It was also brought from al-Sawahira, from Solomon's Pools nearby. Transport was paid at the rate of one *qirsh* for a camel and a second *qirsh* for the laborer who filled up the loads. Likewise, red soil came in the form of sherds from Silwan. Another type of soil was identified as *huwwar*.

g. *Stone and Marble*

A variety of stones were used, described in general as large or small and purchased locally. Types of stones are not distinguished other than those for well-constructed walls, for foundations or for pavers. The term *aʿtab* for thresholds as well as lintels was used a number of times, such as when 130 were purchased for the balconies of the Masjid al-Aqsa facade, for two *qirsh* each. Three long *aʿtab* in crescent moons above the doors of the Masjid al-Aqsa were purchased for ten *qirsh*. It cost twelve *qirsh* for four camels to carry eight pieces of *aʿtab* for the lead furnace from the village of Shaʿfat three kilometers north of Jerusalem.

Stones were also purchased for the foundation of the north wall of the Jamiʿ ʿUmar, on the far east side of the south wall of the Masjid al-Aqsa. The 7,590 stones, which cost 1,897.25 *qirsh*, were also used to construct the arches to the south, i.e. al-Madrasa al-Khanthniyya. 1020 stones were purchased for the Dome of the Rock platform and for the *mihrab* of the dome for 255 *qirsh*. The cost of 824 large stone corners for the wall of the Masjid al-Aqsa was 618 *qirsh*. A total of 8,472 stones, described as small stones for the dome of the *sabil* and the repair of the two Gates of Repentance (Golden Gate) and for some other places of the Haram, were purchased for 1,270.75 *qirsh*. Stones for the grave of Muhammad Jawish cost forty-seven *qirsh.* Pavers for the Dome of the Rock platform and some of the prayer platforms were mentioned once without details. A sum of 5,540 *qirsh* was paid for 4029.5 cubits of pavers over a period of fifteen months, purchased most likely by cubit lengths, not square cubits.

Marble was brought to Jaffa by sea and from there to Jerusalem, and the project paid only the costs of transportation. The marble pieces were identified according to shape, such as sixty-two round pieces, seventy-nine small rectangular pieces, six large rectangular pieces and thirty *mahbur* pieces. The pieces were transported in chests, although once two columns of marble were transported from Jaffa for thirty *qirsh* and a bonus of 6.5

qirsh for the escort of horsemen. On another occasion a caravan of fifty camels carried 210 chests of marble. The sale of some marble was also recorded from the village of ʿAnata, in the Jerusalem district.

Bricks were purchased for the lime kilns and the molds for the glazed tiles. One hundred large and small molds were purchased in addition to molds described as *huqq* (hollow) for paint.

h. *Nails*

The project used nails for fastening wood for the scaffolding and for securing the sheets of lead to roofs and domes. About 370 *qirsh* worth of nails were purchased from local merchants, sold by quantity rather than by weight. A Christian merchant named Hanna Nasir was a principal supplier. Different types of nails were used. *Qawalibi* (mold) nails were the most frequently purchased type at seven *qirsh* for one thousand, and the project bought 31,200 such nails on fourteen occasions. At the start of the project 11,000 nails of this type were purchased with 5,000 nails of another type called *salami*, needed for the roof of the dome. The same price was paid for the type called *taqati* and a second type of thin nail; 5,000 nails of each type were purchased once. Limited quantities of 200 each of *suruji* and *qalubi* nails were also purchased. The lowest priced nail was the type known as *qabaqibi*, 1,000 of which were purchased once for 6.25 *qirsh* for the scaffolding for the ceiling of the Mahkama (al-Madrasa al-Tankiziyya). The highest priced nail was the *salami* type, a large-sized nail used for connecting large beams, 5,000 of which were purchased once for 11.25 *qirsh* per thousand. By the end of the project its price had risen to 12.5 *qirsh* per thousand, when the project purchased 360. The project used around 43,000 nails, although additional quantities of nails were shipped via Jaffa.

i. *Iron*

An iron band weighing four *uqiyas* was purchased for the window of Jamiʿ ʿUmar. The tools of the blacksmiths were also iron, such as files, hammers and punches. The iron was purchased by the *uqiya*, the price of which varied for the limited quantities recorded. The recorded amounts spent are exceedingly small, so it seems that most of the iron was transported from Jaffa. It does not seem reasonable that around 4,000 *qirsh* were spent for the charcoal that the blacksmiths used to produce the iron bands, whose price was only about 300 *qirsh*.

j. *Gold*

The inscriptions in the Masjid al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock were gilded, using a specific type of gold. Thirty *uqiya* were purchased four times for 1,200 *qirsh*, along with sheets of paper for the inscriptions, described as Venetian paper according to its color and sold for a *qirsh* for every twenty sheets.

k. *Copper*

A number of copper vessels were purchased for the craftsmen, like a *lakan* (basin) weighing eleven *uqiya* for twelve *qirsh*; a *tasa* (shallow cup) for casting lead for fifteen *qirsh*; a *tanjara* (pan) for working lead for twelve *qirsh*; a copper pan for the marble workers for 16.5 *qirsh*; another one needed by Salih Effendi for 3.5 *qirsh*; a copper scale for the engravers for six *qirsh*, a *suqruq* (a small vessel) for casting lead for 6.5 *qirsh*; and a copper pan for forty-three *qirsh*. Those vessels were purchased from a number of Muslim, Christian and Jewish merchants in Jerusalem. The purchase of the copper was by the *uqiya* or by piece, with each piece sold for 10.5 *qirsh*. Copper was purchased for about 2,500 *qirsh*, while the salary of the *qalfa* Bughus for his work with the copper was 750 *qirsh*.

l. *Lead*

At the time of the renovations, the domes and roofs of the Dome of the Rock, the Masjid al-Aqsa and the Jamiʿ al-Maghariba were covered with sheets of lead. Pieces of lead were also used to join marble columns with their bases and capitals. The old lead on location was melted in the project furnace and cast anew, while new lead that the project needed was brought from Acre. The only expenses recorded are for some materials such as wax, a dressing hammer (*shaquf*), vessels (*suqraq*), cotton and oil to help in melting the lead, preparing to cast it or forming it into sheets.

A *wijaq* (furnace) was used to melt the lead. The master who operated the furnace and the working table (*daska*) to pour the lead received a salary of 17.5 *qirsh*. Melting and casting the lead was done by a master from Istanbul named *ustadh* or *ustaha* Qurashanji, written occasionally as Qarashunji. His daily wage was five *qirsh*, and he was also paid a *kharjara* (food allowance) of 500 *qirsh*. He had an assistant named *qalfah* Si who was paid a daily wage of 3.5 *qirsh*, and a *kharjara* of 350 *qirsh*. They were also paid 500 *qirsh* for the cost of their equipment. After the master died, his assistant Saʿid Ağa finished the work for 2,726 *qirsh*. Another master,

the merchant Hanna Nasir mentioned above, who seems to have been a Jerusalemite, also melted and cast lead with two other people. He received a *para* and a half for every *oqah* of lead that he cast; his wages for casting lead totalled 2,116 *qirsh*, which means that he cast around 170,000 kilograms of lead. The total costs for lead, which included melting and casting, food allowances and wages were 6,200 *qirsh*.

m. *Wood and Charcoal*

Most of the wood of the project was for scaffolding and doors, brought from Lebanon, whereas local wood was for fuel. The price of wood varied according to the size of a load and the type of wood and was determined upon delivery. Six camel-loads of wood were purchased for 50.5 *qirsh*, while twenty-five camel-loads were purchased for 119.75 *qirsh*. Local wood and the leftover pieces of the wood brought from Lebanon that were not usable for construction were used to fire the furnaces for the glazed tiles and lime and for the bread ovens in the Tekkiya of Khasseki Sultan, for heating and for melting lead. Charcoal was used by the blacksmiths and for melting lead. The price of charcoal was about twice that of wood. A camel-load of charcoal cost 18.5 *qirsh*, while a large camel-load of charcoal cost fifteen *qirsh*, and four donkey-loads of charcoal cost twenty-four *qirsh*. The charcoal cost around 4,400 *qirsh* in total, while the project paid 7,500 *qirsh* for firewood.

n. *Tiles*

A special furnace was constructed to produce tiles for the Dome of the Rock. The stones to construct the furnace, seemingly for the floor, were brought from Ascalon, whereas the walls were of bricks. All the soil for the glazed tiles was purchased from a person named Mustafa al-Qastalawi. It is difficult to determine the amount of soil used to produce the glazed tiles, because soil was used for so many other purposes. A chest of glazed tile samples was brought from Acre, apparently so that the pattern of those tiles could be used. Later, tiles made in Jerusalem were sent to Acre, apparently for examination and to insure that they matched the samples. Manufacturing glazed tiles requires various implements. A *batiyya* (a large bowl of wood) was purchased for 3.5 *qirsh*; a copper vessel to cook the glazed tiles for thirty-seven *qirsh*; and copper pans, a strainer and a *saqraq* vessel for fifty-six *qirsh*. Also purchased were a *shalif* (trowel), hemp rope, oil, cotton, pottery vessels of various sizes, the largest of which

were purchased at a price of 37.5 *qirsh* for a hundred, one hundred small molds for twenty-five *qirsh*, and sixty small hollow pieces (*huquq*) for twelve *qirsh*. The items for the work on the glazed tiles cost around a thousand *qirsh*.

o. *Glass*

The glass of the project was brought from Hebron. Plates of varying sizes or dimensions were recorded as *qamari* glass. In one case 2,457 pieces were purchased for 667 *qirsh*, while on another occasion one hundred pieces were purchased for twenty-seven *qirsh*, for an average price of around four pieces per *qirsh*. *Qamari* glass was used in the plaster windows in the Masjid al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock. A second type of glass was purchased by the *qintar*. It was ground up in the glass grinder or mill on the Haram and added to the mixture of the glazed tiles. Four *qintars* of glass were purchased for the glazed tiles at a cost of 158 *qirsh* per *qintar*. The supplier of all the glass for the project was Hajj Muhammad al-Zughbi. The total cost of the glass and the associated expenses for transportation was around 4,500 *qirsh*.

p. *Paint*

A variety of substances were used to prepare paint, especially eggs, and about 4,000 eggs were purchased for one hundred *qirsh*. Other substances like *franji* (Frankish) indigo, hot oil, melted wax, white lead, verdigris, arsenic, naphtha, felt and other materials were used by painters, engravers and *siwaji* workers. The price of an *oqah* of white lead was 4.5 *qirsh*, while an *oqah* of naphtha was 5.5 *qirsh*. Loads of paint were transported from Acre via Jaffa for the project, including for the shrine of Hebron. Other supplies were purchased from local merchants in the city, like al-Sayyid Abu al-Su'ud, the master *shihada*, Mitri Banat and Jirjis al-Zaru.

The Artisans and Workers

a. *Carpenters*

Some master carpenters came from Acre, Beirut and Sidon, in addition to local carpenters, who are recorded under the Ottoman term *yerliya*, meaning "local." The carpenters worked on the scaffolding for the dome of the Masjid al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock. The first salary payment

that the carpenters received was on 9 Dhu al-Qa'da 1232 (20 September 1817), for an amount of 2,596 *qirsh*. The last time that the carpenters of all three cities were mentioned was in Dhu al-Hijja 1232 (October 1817). The daily wages for these carpenters were between two to 2.25 *qirsh*. After the departure of the carpenters from Sidon and Beirut, the remaining carpenters seem to have stopped work for a time. The first wages that the carpenters from Acre received was about fifty days after their departure, and from that date until the end of the project only the carpenters from Acre were mentioned. They comprised fifteen *usta*s, although when the project neared its end, their numbers dropped. They usually received their wages of 750 *qirsh* every twenty days. The total amount that the carpenters received was 10,048 *qirsh*, although their wages varied from person to person. A total of 326 *qirsh* was paid to the Acre carpenter 'Isa al-Talhami and his two unnamed sons. 'Isa and another carpenter named Jirjis were masters and so their daily wages, which exceeded three *qirsh*, were higher than the wages that the carpenters of Acre received, while the daily wage for 'Isa's two sons was around two *qirsh* each. It seems that 'Isa and Jirjis were the only two carpenters from Acre who remained until the end of the project. 'Isa and his son were paid wages for the month of Muharram 1234 (October 1818) that totaled 180 *qirsh*, which equaled 3.5 *qirsh* per diem for the father and 2.5 *qirsh* per diem for the son, who by then had become a master carpenter.

b. *Tile Makers*

A master and three craftsmen or assistants, all from Syria, produced the glazed tiles. They received a daily *manda* (food allowance) of four *qirsh*. The daily wage of the *usta* Hasan was specified at five *qirsh*. With him were two of his sons, Muhammad and 'Umar, and their in-law Muhammad, each of whom received a daily wage of three *qirsh*. The four of them received total wages of fourteen *qirsh* a day, while their food allowance totaled 2000 *qirsh*. Thus, for their work over more than five hundred days, they received 7,498 *qirsh*. Another *usta*, al-Hajj Muhammad, the tile maker, worked for sixty-five days and received 195 *qirsh*.

c. *Glass Workers*

Three people worked on the glass of the plaster windows of the Haram buildings: the master al-Sayyid Salih al-Nami or al-Nasami, with his son and the son of his brother as assistants, who received 1,302 *qirsh* for

124 days' work, the shortest period of any of the craftsmen on the project. The daily wage of the master was 5.5 *qirsh*, while five *qirsh* was divided between the two other craftsmen. At the end of the work they were paid a bonus of 61.5 *qirsh*, which included the hire of the animals to take them to Jaffa.

d. *Painters*

The painters were described sometimes as engravers and sometimes as painters, without any distinction between the terms. On other occasions the document did not distinguish between a *naqqash* (inscription carver), *dahhan* (painter) or *bayraqdar* (gilder), who were described as though they were members of one profession. The inscription writers and painters were Turks, occasionally identified as connected with the city of Istanbul. Muhammad Ağa the painter or engraver worked for a daily wage of two *qirsh* and received a total of 573 *qirsh*, meaning that he worked for 286.5 days before leaving for Acre. With him was Ibrahim Ağa, whose daily wage was three *qirsh* and who received 648 *qirsh* for 216 days of work. On 15 Jumada I 1233 (23 March 1818) the painting of the Masjid al-Aqsa was finished, and a bonus of 100 *qirsh* was paid to those two painters.

e. *Inscription Carvers or Engravers*

Muhammad Ağa and Bir Qadar from Istanbul worked as inscription writers, known in Turkish as *qalamkar naqash*. They worked for a daily wage of 4.5 *qirsh* each for ten months, receiving a salary of 2907 *qirsh* in addition to a bonus of one hundred *qirsh* and a *kharjara* of 1000 *qirsh*.

f. *Plasterers*

An *usta* for making plaster or lime was known by the term *al-siwaji*, also written as *al-suji* or *suhji*. The *siwaji* ʿAbd al-Hamid and his craftsman ʿAli from Istanbul were paid a daily wage of 4.5 *qirsh* each, and they received 2,925 *qirsh* for their work of about 11 months. They were paid a *kharjara* of 1000 *qirsh* divided between them and a bonus of 150 *qirsh*, while another three Armenian *siwajis* were paid a bonus of 19.5 *qirsh*.

g. *Illustrators*

Two illustrator *usta*s are mentioned as *yerliya*, i.e. local Jerusalemites. The daily wage for Salih the illustrator, the local *usta*, and ʿIsa was 2.5 *qirsh*

each, while the daily wage of their workman was one *qirsh*. They were mentioned only three times.

h. *Marble and Stone Workers*

Ten masters and two craftsmen of marble work, most of whom were Christians, came from Syria. Their work on the marble began about five months after the project started. The monthly salaries of the masters were double the wages of the craftsmen: 110 *qirsh* versus fifty-five *qirsh*. The total amount that all the marble workers received was 7,691 *qirsh*, meaning that they worked about 180 days. They left Jerusalem in two groups. The first group of five left for Acre on five animals, hired for 8.25 *qirsh* each; each worker was paid a bonus of 6.5 *qirsh*. The rest left for Jaffa on animals hired for 6.5 *qirsh* each, while the workers each received a bonus of 7.5 *qirsh*. Four Armenian dressers of paving stones were also recorded as having received a daily wage of 4.5 *qirsh* each.

i. *The Expenses for the* Manda

Manda was a term used for a variety of local expenses for the purchase of materials, wages for local workers and craftsmen, coffee, food and transport animals. The wages covered most of the employees who were local laborers, craftsmen, builders, carpenters, painters and *siwajis*. Their wages were mostly paid weekly, based on the arrival of the treasury funds sent from Acre. A total of fifty-nine payments are listed under that heading: the first payment was for 3–9 Dhu al-Qaʿda 1232 (14–20 September 1817), about two and a half months after the project started, while the last payment was on 4 Rabiʿ II 1234 (21 January 1819). The amounts recorded under that heading were the largest amounts paid by the project, totaling more than 130,000 *qirsh* and representing more than 30 percent of the total project expenses.

The value of the coins that were sent was not fixed and changed rapidly. Passages repeatedly recorded shortfalls for the weekly payment of the wages to the workmen, indicating that the amount of silver in the coins was lowered continually, meaning a change in the value of the silver coins sent to the project.

j. *Horsemen*

The horsemen who travelled by the land route of Acre-Ramla-Jerusalem were recorded many times. Hajj Saʿid was mentioned seven times, while

Husayn Siflawi and Saruji were mentioned six times. The horsemen made fifty-three trips, not including the estimated ten trips that would have been recorded in the four lost pages, mostly to transport funds. The land route from Acre to Ramla and from there to Jerusalem was the main route used to transport the treasury, although the arrival of the treasury by way of Nablus and Jaffa is recorded once each. Generally two horsemen escorted the treasury from Acre to Ramla and from there horsemen from Ramla joined them. Their number was not fixed, since occasionally two horsemen escorted it and other times more. The largest number of horsemen from Ramla that escorted the treasury was six. The bonus paid to the horsemen who escorted the treasury from Acre to Jerusalem varied from one horseman to the next. The largest bonus paid to a horseman was twenty-five *qirsh*. The same bonus was paid to the horseman called the "horseman of the treasury" who transported orders between Acre and Jerusalem. In general, the bonus for the horsemen who accompanied the treasury from Ramla was ten *qirsh*, while the hire of the transport was six *qirsh*. The amount of bonuses that the horsemen as a whole received was around 2,000 *qirsh*, or about 35 percent of the total amount of bonuses.

k. *Messengers*

Around 600 *qirsh* was paid to messengers. The wage of a messenger to Hebron or Ramla was five *qirsh*. The reasons for travel to Hebron included requests for paint, glass or sand, while a messenger was sent once to request mats from Ramla. A messenger sent with reports to the *wali* of Gaza was recorded twice; he was paid ten *qirsh*. The wage of a messenger to Jaffa was seven *qirsh*, raised later to 7.5 *qirsh*. One such journey was to request general supplies and to send purchase requests and documents via Jaffa to Süleyman Paşa. Another time a messenger was sent to Jaffa to deliver the news of the death of Muhammad Jawish (Muhammad Ağa was the *jawish* appointed by Sülayman Paşa, the *wali* of Sidon and Tripoli. He was responsible for a group of horsemen who transported the treasury from Acre to Jerusalem. He was appointed with a salary of five qirsh a day or 150 qirsh a month; *Sijill al-mahkama al-shar'iyya* 301: 45), on 18 Rabi' I 1233 (26 January 1818) to be sent on to Acre. He returned to Jerusalem on 22 Rabi' I (29 January), so the trip from Jerusalem to Jaffa and back took three days for a wage of eight *qirsh*, a rate of less than three *qirsh* per day. A messenger who went to Acre was paid eighteen *qirsh* when he arrived. Sometimes the trip was direct to Acre, most likely the land route; there were six such trips.

l. *Bonuses*

Bonuses were paid to many people in the project and took many forms, but were not related to the monthly or daily salaries of the recipients. The smallest bonus was one *qirsh*, while the largest bonus was 500 *qirsh* paid to Muhammad Ağa Jawish, with an authorization from Süleyman Paşa. The total amount of bonuses was around 5,500 *qirsh*. Some people received bonuses due to their connections to those in charge or their work or social position. A bonus of five *qirsh* was paid to the *jawish* of the *mutasallim* of Jerusalem for unspecified services, while a bonus of 19.5 *qirsh* was paid to al-Sayyid Husayn Jarrad, the follower of *janab* Muhammad Ağa, the *mutasallim* of Gaza. The dervish Husayn received 6.5 *qirsh*. A bonus of 6.5 *qirsh* was paid to a person named Husayn al-Tahhan for training the draught animals in the mills, while a bonus of five *qirsh* was paid to a person (*tuflaji*) who travelled to the countryside to look for lime. An amount of 4.5 *qirsh* was paid to a North African worker who fell from the scaffold. Antwan al-Talhami was paid ten *qirsh*, seemingly to compensate for him also having fallen from the scaffold of the Masjid al-Aqsa; the project also celebrated on the day of his recovery, when sheep were butchered at a cost of twelve *qirsh*. Another sheep worth 8.5 *qirsh* was butchered for ʿIsa on the day that he fell from the scaffold.

Many bonuses were paid to the craftsmen, marking when the various stages of the project were completed. For example, a bonus of fifty *qirsh* was paid to three Christian craftsmen after the end of the spreading of the *tiwan* (roofs) with sheets of lead on 6 Muharram 1233 (16 November 1817). When the scaffolding of the dome was dismantled on 22 Rabiʿ I 1233 (30 January 1818), bonuses of 250 *qirsh* were paid; ten *qirsh* to each of the ten carpenters, fifty *qirsh* to the *qalfa* Bughuz and fifty *qirsh* apiece to Ibrahim Ağa and Muhammad Ağa, the painters. Abu ʿIsa al-Talhami was paid 32.5 *qirsh* for dismantling the scaffolding on 23 Rabiʿ I 1233 (31 January 1818). High bonuses were paid when the interior work in the Masjid al-Aqsa was completed around the middle of Jumada I 1233 (23 March 1818), some by order of Süleyman Paşa and some from the head of the project: 300 to the architect Salih Effendi, 200 *qirsh* to the two inscribers Birqadar and his associate, and 150 *qirsh* to the *siwaji* Hamid Usta and his associate. The inscribers and the *siwaji* were given a bonus of 200 *qirsh*, but they refused it because it was too little. Likewise, fifty *qirsh* was paid to the Turkish inscribers and the same amount to the Turkish *siwaji*s on 13 Jumada I 1233 (21 March 1818). At the beginning of Dhu al-Hijja 1233 (2 October 1818) a bonus of 43.5 *qirsh* was paid to the builders, signaling the end of the work in the interior of the Masjid al-Aqsa.

Supplies Brought via Jaffa

The material that was sent via Jaffa, whether by sea or by land, arrived paid for by the sender, while the project paid the cost of transportation to Jerusalem, which totaled around 8,600 *qirsh*. One example was the glazed tiles carried in not more than ten chests. *Shuqaf* (sherds) of lead and occasionally *qitaʿ* (pieces) of lead were sent from Acre, and *Islambuli* wood of different sizes was shipped more than once. Among other materials shipped via Jaffa were cotton, lapis lazuli, taps (*sawabir*), paints, asphalt, tar, piercing tools (*makhariq*), rope, felt, verdigris and white lead. The shipments also contained numerous kinds of building materials such as iron, pavers, marble and lead. The largest quantity that was transported at one time via Jaffa was on 13 Dhu al-Hijja 1232 (24 October 1817), when a caravan of eighty-two camels was used. Shipments from Ramla were limited to teeth of oak wood for the mill wheels in addition to the oak wood recorded once, sent by the order of ʿUthman Ağa, the *mutasallim* of Ramla.

Meals

The project provided meals for the local laborers, craftsmen, and others at a cost of around 7,500 *qirsh*. Most of the entries were for the midday meal. The amount spent for food at the beginning was low, but it reached its highest level when 270 *qirsh* was paid for bread from the end of Safar to the beginning of Rabiʿ I 1233 (December 1817). We notice an increase in the consumption of coffee then as well. In lieu of meals, daily food allowaces were paid to some craftsmen who were responsible for their own food, such as the four workers on the glazed tiles, each of whom was given a *qirsh* a day for a total of around 6,000 *qirsh*. It seems that those payments were by their choice, since some other craftsmen ate the meals that the project provided. The total cost of food was more than 13,500 *qirsh*. If we add the cost of coffee, then the total comes up to 16,000 *qirsh*, i.e. more than four percent of the project budget. If we add an estimate for the four lost pages then the percentage rises to around five percent of the total budget.

Coffee

Coffee was provided at project expense. An employee prepared the coffee, while between six to ten servants, depending on the number of workers,

helped him to clean the coffee pots and cups and serve the coffee. Coffee was purchased weekly, listed seventy-one times, the amount depending on the number of workers. The largest quantity purchased came seven months after the work started, when forty-six *oqah*s were purchased for 50.5 *qirsh*, indicating that two kilograms of coffee were consumed every work day. The cost of the coffee for the entire period was around 2,000 *qirsh*, with an additional estimate of 300 *qirsh* in the four lost pages.

Transport Animals

The project had fifteen camels, brought from the *mutasarrif* of Gaza, and thirty-five pack animals, probably provided by one of the *mutasallim*s, while additional animals were hired from the locals when needed. The animals and especially the donkeys were used to bring in materials and take away refuse; mostly there was one servant for every two animals. 5,500 *qirsh* were paid for removal of leftover building materials from the Haram, which began four months after the project was underway. The wages of the porters and the donkey drivers who came from Acre were specified by an order of Süleyman Paşa at a *qirsh* per day for a porter, while the wage of each worker with donkeys was half a *qirsh*. There were five porters from Acre, who received 544 *qirsh* for the period of their work, which means that others, perhaps locals, continued in their place.

The Project in Hebron

Groups of masters and craftsmen went to investigate the Haram of Ibrahim in Hebron for the first time, on 15 Rajab 1233 (21 May 1818). At the beginning of Safar 1234 (30 November 1818), painters went to Hebron, while builders and their craftsmen followed on 17 Rabiʿ I 1234 (14 January 1819). Most of those who worked on the Haram of Ibrahim were Christians, among them Jirjis Yanaki, the Armenian Istafan, the *muʿallim* ʿIsa Flayfil and Jirjis al-Talhami, while the Christians from Bethlehem undertook the transportation of supplies. The water channel in the city was renovated by the Qanawati family from Bethlehem. Most of the material like glass, linen, paint brushes, wax and nails was purchased locally. The cost of the renovation, including materials, hire of transport and wages for the workers and craftsmen and their food allowance was around 20,000 *qirsh*. Muhammad Effendi worked as a supervisor of the Hebron project for the daily wage of five *qirsh*.

Various Other Renovations

Some renovations took place in the Maqam al-Nabi Da'ud in Jerusalem, restricted to plastering and whitewashing the walls of the shrine with plaster and linen, while the window glass was also replaced. That work ended on 18 Shawwal 1233 (21 August 1818). The *mathara* (place of ablution and public lavatory) along the west side of the Haram was also improved, seemingly by cleaning the *mathara* of filth and transporting the waste outside the Haram. The villagers who did the work received 208 *qirsh*. One of the *sabil*s (public fountains) on the Haram, most likely the Sabil Bab al-Maghariba, was also repaired. The stones of the dome and the building were replaced. The work on the *sabil* dome ended with the payment of a bonus of 26.5 *qirsh* to the builders on 11 Shawwal 1233 (14 August 1818).

The roof was replaced in the Mahkama. The wood for the scaffolding was transported on twenty-three camels and seventeen pack animals. The pottery *qawadis* (vessels of various sizes) for the vaults and stones from the village of ʿAnata were purchased for 351 *qirsh*. In addition, improvements were carried out in the area of the vaults connecting Bab al-Silsilah and the Mahkama. The Maqam of Sayyidna Musa near Jericho was inspected by the *mufti* of Jerusalem, *qalfawat* and masters, but it seems that they realized that the shrine did not need renovation, and so no renovations were carried out there.

Summary of Expenses

The expenses of the project are recorded in what follows. The amounts are rounded to the nearest hundred *qirsh*.

Wages of the Craftsmen

Chief Architect	5,500
Manager	700
Manager of the inscribers	600
Manager of the carpenters	600
Juqandar (manager)	1,000
Carpenters	10,000
Tile makers	11,000
Glass maker	1,300
Painters	1,200

Inscription carvers	4,000
Plasterers	4,100
Marble cutters	7,700
Lead workers	6,200
Total	53,900

Miscellaneous Expenses

Manda	114,000
Bonuses	3,500
Horsemen	2,000
Messengers	600
Food	7,500
Coffee	2,000
Kharjara	6,000
Total	135,600

Materials

Qusurmil	2,000
Plaster	13,700
Linen	2,100
Stones and marble	10,000
Pavers	5,500
Copper	1,200
Nails	400
Iron	300
Gold	1,200
Charcoal	4,400
Wood	7,500
Glass	4,500
Various	16,000
Delivery from Jaffa	8,600
Approximate total	77,400

The total amount listed above is about 266,900 *qirsh*. If we add 80,000 *qirsh* as an estimate for the amount in the missing four pages and 20,000 *qirsh* for the expenses for the project in Hebron, the total expenses reached 366,900 *qirsh*, which comes out about 7,000 *qirsh* less than the total amount of 374,433 *qirsh* that was recorded as having been spent.

Conclusion

The total expenditures of 374,433 *qirsh* cover all of the wages and costs of the materials purchased locally and transportation costs, among other things. If we add the cost of the material that came at the expense of the sender, the amount would perhaps double. Large amounts of lead were used, the weight of which was around 130,000 *oqah*, while many kinds of wood were cut and transported from Lebanon and delivered to Jerusalem, but it is difficult to determine the price of an *oqah* of lead and its shipping costs, or the cost of cutting each tree and transporting it to the port of Beirut and from there by sea to Jaffa or Acre and to Jerusalem by land. The documents recorded entries for project expenses from the beginning of the actual work on the project, but preparations went on for several months before the work started.

Wages accounted for more than half of the total. The craftsmen received salaries equaling 14.43 percent of the total project expenses. If we add the entries under the heading of the *manda*, which included wages for workmen and expenses, totaling 36.36 percent, and add a quarter of the amount for the four lost pages totaling 5.34 percent, then wages rose to around 56 percent of the total expenses. That percentage is so high because the entries did not include the cost of the supplies brought from Jaffa, or the cost of soil and sand of local origin; the cost of purchased materials was 20.72 percent of the total expenses.

Many of the professionals had sons as assistants. For example, a father as *usta*, and two of his sons and his daughter's husband as craftsmen, worked on the glazed tiles. Nothing in the documents indicates the role that the guilds in the city played in the renovations whether in selecting or supplying craftsmen or workers to the project. Many of the professionals who participated in the project were Christians. There was no problem for them to enter and work in those Muslim holy places. That indicates that people in general were more tolerant and accepting of each other than in our own time.

OTTOMAN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING DURING NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF EGYPT AND PALESTINE

Dror Ze'evi

Napoleon's invasion has been discussed at great length by historians dependant largely on French and English memoirs, reports, and archival documents. The small number of studies focusing on the local and Ottoman perspectives is based to a great extent on Egyptian chronicles, and mainly on the famous history written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti. In his treatise *Mazhar al-taqdis bi-zawal dawlat al-Faransis*, and in his monumental history *'Aja'ib al-athar fi-l-tarajim wa'l-akhbar*, al-Jabarti produced a long and detailed account of the French invasion, which, for obvious reasons, concentrates on their occupation of Alexandria and Cairo and on their subsequent actions inside Egypt.[1]

One of the earliest and, to-date, the most comprehensive studies of Palestine on the eve of the invasion is Amnon Cohen's *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century*, derived mostly from local and Ottoman sources. Very few of the other studies that deal with Napoleon's failed invasion of Palestine and with the debacle in Acre against Ahmad Jazzar (Cezzar) Pasha and Admiral Sidney Smith are based on Ottoman archival documents. Only recently has a trickle of such studies started to emerge, examining the Empire's confrontation with Napoleon.[2]

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[1] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, *'Aja'ib al-athar fi-l-tarajim wa'l-akhbar* (Bulaq, 1297 AH [1879/80]). Also idem, *azhar al-taqdis bi-zawal dawlat al-Faransis*, ed. 'Abd al-Rahim Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rahim (Cairo: Matba'at Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1998). A partial list of modern research based on these sources includes: Shmuel Moreh, ed. and trans., *Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of the First Seven Months of the French Occupation of Egypt, Muharram-Rajab 1213/15 June-December 1798, Tarikh muddat al-Faransis bi-Misr* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975); Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2008); Irene Bierman, ed. *Napoleon in Egypt* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2003). Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns of Government and Administration* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1973) remains the most important study of Palestine just before the French invasion. The invasion is studied in even more detail in Amnon Cohen's M.A. thesis, "Jezzar Ahmed Pasha," submitted to the Hebrew University in 1965.

[2] Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century*. For new studies on the Empire and Napoleon see Kahraman Şakul, "An Ottoman Global Moment" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2012); Fatih Yeşil, "Üçüncü Selim'in Dönemi" (Ph.D. diss., Marmara University, 2008).

By a serendipitous coincidence, during work on another topic in Sofia's Cyril and Methodius National Library, I came across a small cache of Ottoman documents pertaining to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, especially to his army's incursion into Palestine.[3] Written for the most part by local Arabs of various social groups and professions, these documents are in many cases thinly veiled intelligence reports sent to Ottoman governors. The writing style and type of paper differ from one letter to the next. While some of these documents are composed in highly ornate literary Arabic, others are almost entirely colloquial or written in an awkward attempt to imitate classical style. Here is a section from one such typical letter:[4]

> *u'rifukum [inna] min qibal al-Faransis alladhi sakinin fi qal'at al-Salihi hasil lana minhum ta'b wa-karb 'azim wa-lam radin bi-dhalika ila min shan al-nas al-'awajiz alladhi lam lahum barir siwa 'alayhi wa-min shan harimna wa-min shan a'talna wa. . . . qadr allah 'alayna wa-'ala kamil qa'im Misr. . . .* (spelling mistakes in the original)
>
> I would inform you that from the French living in the Salihi castle we had much trouble and strife from them and we are not accepting that but for the sake of the old people who have no other choice but that and for the sake of our women and those who are incapacitated (could also be translated as 'families') and . . . we ask God's destiny for us and for the whole Egyptian nation.

It seems that in some cases the documents were too difficult for the Ottoman authorities to read and they had to be copied into more comprehensible Arabic, and in some cases translated into Ottoman Turkish.[5]

Covering the entire period of the invasion, the letters focus on events in Egypt and the Sinai, and on the advance of the French forces into Palestine. One letter, an assessment of the situation written by Jazzar Pasha himself, seems to be based on many of these other letters. My intention

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[3] In 1931 Bulgaria purchased a trainload of old scrap paper intended for industrial use from Turkey. On the way to the pulp mills officials found out that they were all Ottoman archival documents. Some 500,000 of these documents are now stored in the National Library, pertaining to all parts of the Ottoman Empire. See Stoyanka Kenderova, "Ottoman Period Arabic Language Archives on Bilad ash-Sham in the Bulgarian National Library," *Chronos* 11 (2005: 209–224; idem, *Inventory of the Documents in Arabic Language kept in the Oriental Department of the Cyril and Methodius National Library in Sofia, XIII–XX c.* (Sofia: National Library, 1984). I am very grateful to Prof. Kenderova for supplying me with these documents. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Prof. Rossitsa Gradeva and to Prof. Svetlana Ivanova for assisting me with the (mostly Bulgarian) indexes and complex filing system.

[4] Bulgarian National Library in Sofia (hereafter BNLS) OAK 125, 37, p. 4.

[5] For copying see BNLS F. 276 Ar. a.u. 28—letter sent by Bedouin shaykhs; F. 279 Ar. a.u. 29. For translated (and probably summarized letters), see OAK 1, 15a–15d.

in this article is to study, through a close examination of this batch of letters, the Ottoman intelligence gathering operation in the initial phases of this collision.

Pre-19th Century Ottoman Intelligence

There is an inherent problem with studies of intelligence in pre-modern societies. The nature of intelligence gathering operations requires a high degree of secrecy and a very low profile. It may be assumed, therefore, that the documents expose only a tiny sample of the intelligence networks that were deployed by the Ottomans, and reveal but a minor fraction of the information gathered. But even the little that is exposed here hints at an elaborate and developed system.

Reports from Venice and other European capitals indicate that the use of spies was common, and that suspicions of infiltration by Ottoman spies disguised as Christian locals into sensitive areas were rife.[6] In an article on Ottoman strategy in the context of Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, Gabor Agoston claims that the Ottomans had at least four information-gathering systems: central intelligence in Istanbul; information gathering by local Ottoman authorities along the Empire's borders; intelligence provided by client and vassal states; and espionage by Ottoman spies and saboteurs in foreign countries.[7] In the late 16th century, much of this information gathering in European countries was based on vast spy networks deployed by Don Joseph Nassi of the Mendes family, whose intelligence was both precise and timely. This network informed the sultan of the great arsenal fire in Venice in 1569, leading to the occupation of Cyprus. In another case, in 1588, Don Alvaro Mendes, alias Solomon Abenaes (Ibn Ya'ish), a resident of Istanbul whose brother-in-law was Queen Elizabeth's physician, informed the sultan of the great naval victory over the Spanish

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[6] Palmira Brummett, "Foreign Policy, Naval Strategy, and the Defence of the Ottoman Empire in the Early Sixteenth Century," *The International History Review* 11.4 (1989), 618; John E. Woods, "Turco-Iranica I: An Ottoman Intelligence Report on Late Fifteenth/Ninth Century Iranian Foreign Relations," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 38.1 (1979): 1–9; Gabor Agoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy," in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76.

[7] Agoston, "Information, Ideology and Limits," 81–2. It is not clear from his discussion whether the central intelligence organization in Istanbul had independent sources of information, or whether it was mainly concerned with the evaluation and assessment of the intelligence gathered by the other three systems.

Armada long before the news was conveyed by England's ambassador to the Porte. Other spy networks were operated by provincial and district governors in the periphery. On the Western fronts some of these spies lived inside the Habsburg capital, Vienna, and sent information to their handlers on a regular basis.[8]

In a recent article Fatih Yeşil claims that after the accession of Selim III to the throne in 1789, the process of intelligence gathering was reevaluated. It was clear by that time that the Ottomans were no match for European armies and that the danger could no longer be overlooked. One of the first to offer remedies was Ratib Efendi, the ambassador to Vienna, who wrote a long memorandum to the sultan about Austrian intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques, including interception of messengers in order to read their communiqués stealthily, and the use of dispatches in cipher.[9]

Ratib Efendi stressed the role of ambassadors as political spies. In order to demonstrate his own usefulness as an official spy he assembled a group of over one hundred experts, including engineers and draftsmen, to study, assess and report on military and strategic developments. It also appears that Ratib Efendi used the services of local supporters, including the famous author Muradgea d'Ohsson and the Jewish Ottoman merchant, Isaac Camondo, whose family had been exiled to Trieste several years previously as punishment for colluding with a rebellion against the government. Camondo perceived Ratib's appointment as an opportunity to get back into the government's good graces and offered his services and contacts all over Europe.[10]

Ratib Efendi's memorandum must have speeded up the reorganization of intelligence gathering, and the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions in Paris and London during that period was first and foremost an attempt to improve the quality of information. Yeşil concludes:

> The importance of intelligence was soon to be demonstrated in 1798 when on the 1st of July Napoleon landed in Egypt. Esseyid Ali Efendi had noted that a fleet was being assembled at Toulon but allowed himself to be assured by Talleyrand that this fleet was not to be used to endanger Ottoman interests.

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[8] Ibid., 87–88.

[9] Fatih Yeşil, "The Transformation of the Ottoman Diplomatic Mind: The Emergence of the Licensed Spy." (unpublished article) My thanks to Prof. Virginia Aksan for suggesting this fascinating article.

[10] Ibid. Camondo's plan seems to have succeeded. In 1802 he was given permission to open a bank in Galata.

> When news of the French invasion arrived in Istanbul before [Ottoman ambassador to France] Esseyid Ali Efendi's report that the French had no ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean the sultan himself wrote in the margin of the Ottoman ambassador's report "he must be an ass!" The Sultan had learnt the lesson that Ratib Efendi was giving to the Porte: the importance of diplomatic intelligence can never be overestimated.[11]

From these sources an image emerges of intelligence gathering services, which, though directed from above, were based to a large extent on local initiatives. While the impetus and perhaps the request for specific information arrived from the capital, the actual handling of sources seems to have been decentralized. In this respect, as in many others, the Ottoman Empire could be viewed as a level political playing field for pashas who tried to outdo each other in their attempts to curry the sultan's favor. Intelligence gathering was precious hard currency in this game. The more one knew about a situation abroad, in the provinces, or even in the capital itself, the more likely one was to impress the sultan with a shrewd analysis of the options. By obtaining up-to-date information one could outmaneuver enemies and rivals in the pasha network, and be better prepared for possible eventualities.

We may therefore assume that quite a few Ottoman dignitaries in the provinces, such as Ahmad Jazzar Pasha in Acre or his counterparts in Aleppo, Sofia or Damascus, as well as those high-ranking officials in the center who viewed themselves as potential governors or military chiefs of staff (*seraskers*), invested serious efforts in gathering information through their contacts in the region.

Another trait typical of Ottoman intelligence gathering is the blurred boundary between professional and personal ties. This, of course, is typical of many human professional interactions. Intelligence gathering relationships between, say, a spy and his handler could easily develop into a personal friendship that might compromise the entire operation. But on the other hand, such relationships might serve as an excellent cover for communication between people who, under any other circumstances, would be suspect. This too, as we shall see, is illustrated by our sources. In some of them the author sends his regards to named family members of the addressee. This could be sincere, but could also be a ploy to make the letter seem less incriminating if captured by the enemy. We may assume

[11] Ibid., p. 15.

that such paragraphs could indicate at one and the same time existing personal ties and good tradecraft.

Communications and Delivery Systems

Our letters are written in plain language rather than cipher, use visible ink, and contain information of military or strategic value. Hence their contents would be almost impossible to explain away if captured or sold to enemy forces. In order to minimize the risks of such an eventuality the writers of the letters often used trusted messengers and go-betweens, known to both parties to the correspondence. Some of the letters described below mention the messenger entrusted with the letter, others contain a note of concern at the fact that promised letters did not arrive, or fear that the messenger has turned back without delivering them. These letters indicate that the use of special envoys, letter carriers and messengers was part and parcel of the intelligence operation. The messengers were apparently required to deliver the letter only to the intended recipient, and if direct contact was impossible, to return them to the sender. In one case the author mentions a rapid camel rider (*hajjan*) arriving in Gaza from al-'Arish with a message delivered orally, informing the authorities that a six thousand-strong Ottoman force headed by Selim Bey Miralay had arrived in al-'Arish and that other forces would follow. Since later on the same page the author says "these were the contents of the letter," we may assume that the method was a document learned by rote and then delivered without incriminating proof.

In yet another case, the writer requests that two envoys be sent with copies of the letter at the same time: "It is better to send two experienced people, one from al-Salihi and one from al-Qasasi," probably in order to make sure that even if one messenger is intercepted, the directions arrive safely.[12]

Network Structure

A basic one agent—one messenger structure may have been the most common but some of the networks were more complex. In one case the author complains that the intended messenger did not arrive: "We were

[12] BNLS, OAK 125, 37, 4.

informed by Mustafa Matar that you have sent us a letter with Muhammad al-Shami, but the latter has finished his business in Jaffa and returned to your side without delivering the letter. We would also like to inform you that our man Mustafa Matar [probably the bearer of this letter] has by now reached you, and we request that Your Excellency take good care of him." It appears that communication has faltered and the agent in the field decided to send another messenger from among his trusted household members to his case officer.[13]

The same network, it appears, included other spies as well. At the end of the letter the writer mentions an agent sent into the combat zone: "As for ʿAbdallah Efendi, since he went to Egypt we have no news of him. We have received some letters on his behalf and we have sent them to him." It appears that the network included a local hub (the writer of the letter), several agents operating under cover in the field (those who supplied the information about enemy movements mentioned in the letter, as well as the agent who failed to make contact) and the messengers. It also seems that the French expeditionary force was aware of the danger of such communications and in several cases managed to capture the messengers and the letters they carried.[14]

Staff Officers, Handlers and Operators

Networks may have been operated by professional intelligence personnel or by veteran military officers connected to the local governors. In some instances the letters mention this connection. One letter reminds the receiver: "You should definitely go see the pasha and get us a promise of security to calm our worries" (*wa-la budd min dukhulikum ʿind al-basha wa-taqtaʿu lana aman yaqwi qulubana*)."[15]

A letter addressed to dignitaries in Jerusalem mentions a missive that arrived recently with information from Egypt. The letter goes on to say that a certain ʿAbd al-Rahman had inserted the received missive into another envelope and sent it on to "our honorable efendi, *wali al-naʿm* [Jazzar Pasha]" and continues to say that "on the same date a petition

[13] BNLS, F. 276 Ar. 7, 1.
[14] BNLS, F. 283 Ar. 14, 2.
[15] BNLS, OAK 125, 37, 4.

about the issue, addressed to Jazzar Pasha, had arrived from al-'Arish and was sent directly to him."[16]

Al-Jazzar's personal interest in the information his agents gathered in Egypt may be perceived in his own letter to the sultan, written in stylized Ottoman, in which he analyzes the situation after the taking of Alexandria and Cairo, describes the steps he had already taken to halt the French expeditionary forces, and suggests a series of measures that the Sultan should put in motion immediately in order to confront the enemy. This extraordinary letter, which shows al-Jazzar to be an analyst and strategist of high caliber, sets down, almost verbatim, the information sent to him by his agents in Egypt and the Sinai, before offering his recommendations.[17]

In other communications it is more difficult to decide whether the addressee is indeed part of the intelligence gathering apparatus or simply an acquaintance approached by the writer. One of the letters, sent by notables in Jerusalem, is clearly addressed to an unnamed vizier, and in others the language of address makes it clear that a senior Ottoman official is the end recipient of the document.[18]

Psychological Warfare

Some of the letters sent from Palestine to the Sublime Porte contain indications of psychological warfare, probably instigated by Ottoman agents provocateurs. Thus, a dispatch sent by a group of very prominent Bedouin shaykhs mentions a letter allegedly sent by Napoleon to his "public" (*jumhur*). His real intention, it appears from the cited letter, is to kill all the inhabitants of Egypt, to steal their properties and to take their children prisoner; and, the Bedouin dignitaries conclude, it would be impossible to do such things to the inhabitants of Egypt and Acre without uprooting all of the Muslims. This was his real intention upon arrival in Egypt, the dispatch goes on to say, but since his troops were not up to the task he tried for a while to win over people's hearts with his smooth talk. Yet this is still Napoleon's main objective and after taking Acre he will attempt to sow dissension among the Muslims in order to turn them against each other. Once this is achieved, he will single out the other groups in the area, including the Bedouin. His more distant goals are to occupy Mecca

[16] BNLS, F. 283 Ar, 14, 1.
[17] BNLS, OAK, 6, 11.
[18] BNLS, F. 283 Ar. 14, 2; F. 276 Ar. 29, 1.

and the Hejaz, to slaughter their inhabitants and enslave their children and womenfolk.[19] It is difficult to tell at this stage whether an actual letter was produced, or whether the rumors were circulated orally. These countermeasures initiated by the Ottomans are perhaps also an indication that they considered Napoleon's "sweet talk" and his measures to set up advisory bodies a serious threat.

Conclusion

Research on the series of documents presented here is still at an initial stage but it is clear from their content that the letters could shed new light on the French incursion into Palestine, and especially on the ensuing reactions among the local population. Some of the letters, notably those written by al-Jazzar, are crucial to our understanding of Ottoman strategy in this case, and to our still too scanty knowledge of the man himself.

In this article I have tried to examine one narrow aspect of this vast issue, namely the Ottoman information-gathering mechanism as depicted by the documents. As mentioned above, the low profile of intelligence operations and their clandestine nature makes it difficult to offer a clear, sharp, depiction of such mechanisms, but we may say with some certainty that the Ottomans must have had agents in place long before the invasion. These agents, whether formally employed or simply volunteering information, went into action immediately after the landing in Alexandria, and their first missives were sent close to the taking of Cairo.

While some networks were simple and consisted of an agent, a messenger and a handler, others were more complex, making use of several agents, local hubs, envoys and messengers, as well as several levels of handlers and operations officers at the other end. It is not clear at this stage whether such elaborate networks were considered professional tradecraft or occurred as "natural" growth of smaller networks over time, as more and more people were exposed to the espionage secret and recruited. The letters do not provide us with clear information about principles of compartmentalization or limits to the size of networks.

[19] BNLS, F. 276 Ar. 28.

Judging by addresses and names of recipients in the letters, Ottoman information gathering was indeed decentralized. Agents sent their reports to different addresses, some to military officers in the adjacent districts of Gaza and Jerusalem, some to the major provincial capitals, including the mighty al-Jazzar in Acre. A small number were sent directly to the Imperial center. On the one hand, maintaining such a decentralized system may have enabled the authorities in Istanbul to apply a system of cross-checks and to assess information provided by one grandee against that proffered by another. On the other hand, it must have caused difficulties in planning and made the gathering of information less efficient.

Intelligence gathering during the invasion could be assessed as a partial success. The Ottomans managed to acquire valuable information about their rivals' moves and deployment from their agents on the ground, and this information may have assisted them in defending the Empire against the French threat. Yet, at the same time Sultan Selim III must have realized the limits of this decentralized system. In the wake of the invasion, during the rule of his nephew Mahmud II, a new centralized intelligence agency would be created.

A NOTE ON ʿAZIZ (ASIS) DOMET: A PRO-ZIONIST ARAB WRITER

Jacob M. Landau

ʿAziz Domet, who used to spell his name Asis Domet, was one of those rare *literati* who wrote favorably about the Zionist enterprise, differing in this from almost all Arab writers in Palestine during the late Ottoman period and between the two world wars. Many years ago I researched his life and activities; but in a lengthy essay I published,[1] I did not discuss Domet's pro-Zionist writings. I shall attempt to do this here, after a brief summary of his life.

Domet was born to a Protestant Arab family in Cairo on 25 June 1890, but spent most of his life in Jerusalem and Haifa, with lengthy visits to Munich, Berlin, Vienna and Budapest (and shorter ones to Syria, Iraq and Egypt). His father was employed as a *dragoman* by German settlers in East Africa, which is how he acquired a basic knowledge of German, improved at the German school in Haifa and at the Syrian Orphans' School in Jerusalem, and later in Europe (where he studied at the University of Berlin in 1920 and wrote articles for German newspapers).[2] His works are written mostly in German. Exceptions are the drama *Akhir bani Umayya*, translated from his German *Der Letzte Omajade* by his brother, Amin Dablan;[3] and several newspaper articles in Hebrew (to be noted below). His plays, too, were usually performed in German. Domet died in Berlin on 27 July 1943. Throughout his life, he maintained that he was trying to build two cultural bridges—between Arabs and Germans, as well as between Arabs and Jews. It is the latter which concerns us here, with an emphasis on Domet's attitude towards the Zionist enterprise.

Domet's relations with Zionism emerge in his unhesitatingly close connection with several prominent Zionist leaders in Palestine and abroad, such as Leib Yafé (1876–1948), Brigadier Frederick Kisch (1888–1943),

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[1] Jacob M. Landau, "'Aziz Domet, d'origine araba, poeta, scrittore di romanze e opere drammatiche di soggetto orientale in lingua tedesca (1890–1943)," *Oriente Moderno* 35 (1955): 277–289. Since then, to my knowledge only one scholarly paper about his life has been published: Gerhard Höpp, "Ein Komma zwischen den Kulturen: Der Dichter Asis Domet," *Das Jüdische Echo Europäisches Forum für Kultur und Politik* 48 (1999): 156–160.

[2] Höpp, "Ein Komma," 156–157.

[3] Cairo: n.p., 1933.

Avigdor Hame'iri (1890–1970) and Israel Zangwill (1864–1926), who liked him personally and appreciated both his literary talent and his sympathy for Judaism.

Domet produced no fewer than thirty volumes of poetry, novels and plays,[4] most of them in mimeographed form. This was then quite usual in the domain of drama, when playwrights were mostly interested in having their plays staged (only sometimes later published in book form). However, having most of his works reproduced in mimeograph may indicate either that Domet did not reach great popularity or that he was inexperienced in matters of publication.

Domet's sympathy for the Jews is evident in several of his plays and some essays, but his support of Jews in Palestine and of Zionism is particularly striking in three works—two plays and a novel, all of them written during the 1920s. The fact that later he more or less ceased to express his pro-Zionist sentiments may denote a certain disappointment with the response to his earlier works; and also, perhaps, his apprehension of the violent increase in anti-Zionist feelings among Palestine's Arab population during the 1930s (although he was not a politicized writer but rather an author of historical fiction).

Yossef Trumpeldor. Drama in drei Akten (xi, 55 pp.) was written in 1922 and mimeographed in 1924. In eloquent prose it describes Trumpeldor's last day. Characteristically, it starts with an imagined cordial relationship between Jews and Arabs, despite the efforts of "the foreign officer" (probably the British administration in Palestine) to stir up conflict between them. In the play, the young Arab sheikh ʿAbd al-Ra'uf was and remained a cordial friend of the Jews, despite Arab incitement and despite his unrequited love for Debora, a young Jewess from the locality of Tel-Hai, in Galilee, where much of the action takes place. The cordial comradeship among the Jewish settlers of Tel-Hai, imbued with the wish to rebuild their country, characterizes the first act. The second takes place in a nearby kibbutz, Kefar-Gilʿadi, and emphasizes the personal and national problems typical of the life of a kibbutz at that time. A party is being prepared for the engagement of Trumpeldor to his sweetheart, Shulamit, when shots are heard from the direction of Tel-Hai, Trumpeldor and his friends hurry there to defend the place. The third act describes in some detail the fighting with the "gypsies" (Domet seems to have deliberately avoided men-

[4] List in Landau, "ʿAziz Domet," 288–289.

tioning the Arabs). ʿAbd al-Raʾuf comes to help Trumpeldor, but both are killed (thus Domet presents a Jewish-Arab friendship until death).

The play, first performed in Jerusalem on 3 January 1923 and later in Krakow and Warsaw, was prefaced by Israel Zangwill, who maintained that Domet had undoubtedly felt the Semitic element in his blood, an element which had prompted him to call for a defense of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine—thus exhibiting Arab generosity. Zangwill expresses hope that the play would be translated into Hebrew and performed in Jerusalem. Indeed, the play was favorably reviewed in the Jewish press both in Palestine and abroad.[5]

Die Feuersäule. Roman aus der heutigen Palästina (The Pillars of Fire: A Novel of Contemporary Palestine) (2 vols.: vol. I—iii, 145 pp.; vol. II—pp. 146–296) was written in 1923. While *Yossef Trumpeldor* obtained some public acclaim through being performed, the novel did not and remained in typewritten form. The title is taken, of course, from the Bible. The novel is dedicated to Chaim Weizmann (1874–1952), then President of the World Zionist Organization, whom Domet highly respected.

In his introduction to the novel, Domet asserts that all of it was drawn from the real situation in Palestine, but that, in addition, he intended to highlight God's guidance of His people. The novel begins with an account of the immigration of a Jewish group to Palestine. On the ship, Dr. Raghib, a Christian Arab, expresses his amity to the Jews—a parallel to ʿAbd al-Raʾuf in *Yossef Trumpeldor*. Raghib, too, is in love with a Jewess, Abigail. At a homecoming party for Raghib, at his mother's house, there is a lively discussion between those who claim that the Jews have come to Palestine to drive away the Arabs and those who praise the superior qualities of the Jews. However, Raghib fails to persuade the members of the local Muslim-Christian Association about the advisability of liking and befriending the Jews. The members of this association criticize Raghib for having published an article siding with the Jewish return to Palestine. Later, on his way to Tel Aviv, Raghib admires Jewish success in cultivating the land. Then, in a Tel Aviv hospital, he lectures everyone on his theory that the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel are in reality the Christian Arabs—and perhaps also the Muslim Arabs of Palestine. Later, Raghib marries Abigail, but is stabbed to death by a Bedouin. However, he is content that his life and work have not been in vain.

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[5] For example, by S.G., in *The Palestine Weekly* 4 (12 January 1923), 27; and Rudolf Seiden, in *Der Jude* (Berlin), 8 (April 1924), 244–246.

This rather naive novel is written to serve a humanitarian purpose—Jewish-Arab understanding. Certain autobiographical elements are evident: Raghib is a Protestant Arab who informs us that he studied dramatic art in Budapest with Oscar Beregi, the well-known expert on drama. His return to his parental home in Haifa, at the beginning of the novel, reminds one of Domet's return to Haifa in 1921. Raghib's library includes works on Zionism and Judaism which, most likely, formed part of Domet's own library. Raghib's sympathy for the Jews and Zionism are again characteristic of Domet. His strong impressions of Tel-Aviv are reminiscent of Domet's own excitement, expressed in an essay, "The Dream of Tel Aviv."[6] Further, Raghib's comments about the Ten Lost Tribes are those of Domet in another essay (both published in Hebrew).[7]

Der Annayaschleier (The Veil of *ʿAnaya*) (typewritten i, 61 pp.; mimeographed ii, 47 pp.) is a play produced in Berlin in 1929 and probably written shortly before that. It differs from the two other works outlined above in that it deals with Zionism only towards the end. Most of the text focuses on customs and beliefs in eastern Algeria. The *ʿanaya*[8] symbolizes the protection of the person who presents it by the recipient. The plot is as follows. Nasima is in love with Fahd, a man of Jewish origins, but has handed her veil to Radwan, her brother-in-law, who considers this act as an *ʿanaya*. Fahd kills Radwan in a duel, but cannot marry Nasima, as Radwan's blood separates them. Fahd convinces the members of the tribe that his act was a vendetta, so that they forgive him and even wish to choose him as their leader. Fahd, however, refuses and prefers to immigrate to Palestine, which he desires to rebuild together with other Jews.

This ending, found in the typewritten version, was dropped by Domet in the final, mimeographed version, perhaps due to fear of the riots which started in Palestine in 1929. The change reduces the final effect of the play—but shows the problems of an Arab author writing on Palestine and Zionism. At all events, the play was performed in Berlin in 1929.[9]

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[6] "Der Traum von Tel-Aviv" (The Dream of Tel-Aviv), *Wiener Morgenzeitung*, 14 (May 1922): 2–3.

[7] "Die Zehnstämme Frage" (The Question of the Ten Tribes). A copy is available in the Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem), A 13/21/ file 19.

[8] More properly *ʿinaya*.

[9] For the performance of the play see B.E.W. in *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (16 December 1929); *B.Z. am Mittag* of the same date; and H.N. in the Egyptian weekly *al-Balagh al-Usbuʿi* (22 January 1930), 29.

The Habimah Theater in Tel Aviv considered performing it but gave up the idea on the advice of Chaim Arlosoroff and Moshe Sharett.[10]

In conclusion, one may note that very probably both ʿAbd al-Raʾuf in *Yossef Trumpeldor*, and Raghib in *Die Feuersäule*, although the former is a village sheikh and the latter a European-educated young man, represent Domet's own sympathy for Zionism. That they are both assassinated at the end of the respective works may well be a sign that Domet was afraid that his own life might end in the same way—hence the change at the end of *Der Annayaschleier*. It is rather difficult to estimate the influence of Domet's works, but it is likely that they reached some German-reading Arabs in Palestine and abroad—whose number was not altogether negligible. Domet travelled to Berlin in 1939 and spent his last years there. His employment by the Nazi German Foreign Office and the state radio as a translator during the war years attests not merely to economic necessity but possibly to his despairing of Jewish-Arab rapprochement in Palestine.

[10] *Yediʿot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), Sabbath Supplement of 29 July 1955, 4.

PART TWO

OTTOMAN EGYPT AND THE FERTILE CRESCENT

UN TERRITOIRE « BIEN GARDÉ » DU SULTAN ? LES OTTOMANS DANS LEUR *VILÂYET* DE BASRA, 1565-1568[1]

Nicolas Vatin

Désireux de dédier à Amnon Cohen une étude se rapprochant un peu de ses centres d'intérêt, et cherchant un sujet qui fût un peu plus « arabe » que ceux que j'ai traités jusqu'ici, je suis tombé dans l'excès inverse, faisant par dessus Jérusalem un saut qui m'amena, de la frontière hongroise où Soliman mourait à Szigetvár en 1566, jusqu'à Basra, à l'autre bout de son empire.

En effet Ferîdûn Bey, dans son *Nüzhetü-l-esrâri-l-ahbâr der sefer-i Sigetvâr*, chronique dont le manuscrit fut achevé le 13 *receb* 976 / 1er janvier 1569 à Çorlu[2], évoque soudainement la nomination d'un nouveau *beylerbey* à Basra peu après la mort de Soliman :

> Huit jours après la mort de feu le *pâdişâh* jouissant du pardon divin, un courrier arriva avec une lettre venant de Dervîş 'Alî Beg, qui gouvernait le *sancaḳ* de Zekiyye, dans le *vilâyet* de Basra. [Ce courrier] donnait les informations et nouvelles suivantes : "On informe que le 17 *şevvâl* de l'an 973 / 7 mai 1566 le *beglerbeg* de Basra Ferrûh Paşa a quitté ce monde transitoire

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[1] Tous mes remerciements vont à Gilles Veinstein, qui m'a fait l'amitié de relire cet article et m'a généreusement communiqué plusieurs documents du manuscrit Koğuşlar 888 du musée de Topkapı sur lesquels il avait autrefois travaillé, auquel il sera renvoyé ci dessous par la référence K 888. J'ai également utilisé les *Mühimme defterleri* conservés aux archives du Başbakanlık à Istanbul, portant les cotes MD III, MD V, MD VI, MD VII et MD XII (MD III : *3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 2 vol., Ankara, 1993 ; MD V : *5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 2 vol., Ankara, 1994 ; MD VI : *6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 3 vol., Ankara, 1995 ; MD VII : *7 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 6 vol., Ankara, 1997-1999 ; MD XII : *12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, 3 vol., Ankara, 1996).

[2] Chronique inédite à l'époque de la rédaction de cette étude, à laquelle je renverrai ci-dessous par la référence Ferîdûn. La première partie, consacrée à la campagne de Szigetvár et à l'arrivée sur le trône de Selîm II, a été publié et traduite en français par mes soins à partir du ms H 1339 de la bibliothèque du palais de Topkapı (cf. F.E. Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu*, tome I, Istanbul, 1961, p. 227 sq.) : Nicolas Vatin, *Ferîdûn Bey. Les plaisants secrets de la campagne de Szigetvar. Édition, traduction et commentaire des folios 1 à 147 du* Nüzhetü-l-esrâr-il-ahbâr der sefer-i Sigetvâr (*ms. H 1339 de la Bibliothèque du Musée de Topkapı Sarayı*, Vienne-Munster: LIT Verlag, 2010). Plus récemment est parue une transcription de l'ensemble du manuscrit, accompagnée d'un fac-similé. Les transcriptions qui suivent sont celles que j'avais faites à partir du manuscrit. Le présent article n'a donc pas pu tenir compte du travail de H.A. Aslantürk et G. Börekçi éds, *Nüzhet-i esrârü'l ahyâr der ahbâr-ı sefer-i Sigetvar*, H.A. Arslantürk et G. Börekçi éds (Istanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi, 2012).

pour l'éternel au-delà et que par un accord unanime de l'ensemble des émirs de Basra on a confié au susdit [Dervîş ʿAlî Beg] la garde de Basra. Le personnage de mauvaise réputation nommé Muḥammed ʿOs̱mân, qui avait envahi le *vilâyet* de Basra et assiégé Basra pendant neuf mois du temps de l'ancien *vâlî* Meḥmed Paşa[3], a pénétré à nouveau dans le *vilâyet* et est venu dans des intentions séditieuses. Un raid de cavalerie ayant été lancé contre lui avec les soldats portant le signe de la victoire qui se trouvaient là, il a été battu près du fort nommé Ġavrına et quelques têtes ont été coupées : [bref], par l'assistance et la grâce de Dieu et des miracles de Son Excellence refuge de la Loi, ainsi que par l'influence du *pâdişâh* refuge du monde, cet intrigant a été mis en déroute. Après quoi, il s'est à nouveau uni à la tribu des Beni ʿUlîyân, a fait un nouvel assaut contre le *vilâyet* et le pays pour profiter de la vacance entre deux *vâlî* et a de nouveau été défait. Bref, lors des attaques lancées contre la région à plus d'une reprise par les tribus "arabes" qui pensaient que c'était une occasion à saisir, grâce aux efforts et au zèle de Dervîş ʿAlî Beg qui remplissait le service de garder [le *vilâyet*], un certain nombre ont été sabrés, d'autres ont été pris vivants et exécutés avec toutes sortes de traitements infamants, et en se montrant si terrible, le susdit [Dervîş ʿAlî] a inspiré tant de frayeur et de crainte aux ennemis de la religion et de l'État que si désormais [le sultan] fait la grâce et la faveur de nommer *vâlî* de ce *vilâyet* un de ses *ḳul* si efficace aux affaires, si vaillant et si brave, ces pays seront parfaitement tranquilles et on y obtiendra certainement abondance de trésors et de biens et accroissement du territoire et des productions." En conséquence de ces informations et nouvelles, parmi les postes importants et les grades élevés, c'est l'*eyâlet* de Basra qui en raison des circonstances fut le premier l'objet d'une note destinée au susdit Dervîş ʿAlî Beg, qui fut envoyée pour être posée sur la tombe lumineuse de Son Excellence le défunt *pâdişâh* de haut renom jouissant du pardon divin. Après avoir demandé la faveur et l'assistance divines pour la prospérité du nouveau *pâdişâh* et fortuné *şehînşâh*[4], le brevet de félicité concernant l'*eyâlet* en question qui avait été émis sous le signe de haut renom de l'ancien *pâdişâh* plongé dans la miséricorde divine fut envoyé au nom du susdit et susmentionné ʿAlî Paşa ; on s'occupa à la hâte des questions concernant ses hommes et l'on renvoya [les réponses] par courrier[5]

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[3] Güzelce Meḥmed Paşa, nommé à Basra en 972 / 1564-65, remplacé comme on verra par Ferrûẖ Paşa dans l'été 1565. Cf. Meḥmed S̱üreyyà, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, (rééd. Istanbul, Türkiye Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996) p. 1052.

[4] Selîm II.

[5] Ferîdûn, 89v°-91 r° : *merḥûm pâdişâh-ı maġfiret-penâh vefâtından ṣoñra sekizinci gün Baṣra vilâyetinde Zekiyye sancaġına mutaṣarrıf olan Dervîş ʿAlî Begden mektûb ile ulaḳ gelüb sene ṭoḳuz yüz yetmiş üç ṣevvâlinüñ on yedinci güni Baṣra begler begisi olan Ferruẖ Paşa bu fenâ dünyâdan dâr-ı ʿuḳbâya intiḳâl édüb cemîʿ ümerâ-ı Baṣra ittifâḳı-ile muḥâfaża-ı Baṣra içün mumà-ileyhi taʿyîn eyledüklerin ʿarż édüb ve Baṣra vilâyetine müstevlî olub vâlî-i sâbıḳ Meḥmed Paşa zamânında ṭoḳuz ây Baṣra'ı muḥâṣara éden Meḥmed ʿOs̱mân nâm ṣaḳîü-ş-şân gérü vilâyete girüb fesâd etmek ḳaṣdı-ile gelüb ḥâżır olan ʿasâkir-i nuṣret-şiʿâr ile üzerine ilġâr olınub Ġavrina nâm ḳalʿe ḳurbında baṣılub bir niçe baş kesilüb be-ʿavni ʿinâyet ilâhî*

Dans un premier temps, ce sont des considérations sans rapport direct avec Basra qui viennent à l'esprit du lecteur de ce curieux passage. On est frappé par la délivrance d'un *berât* émis au nom du souverain défunt pour faire croire qu'il vit toujours, sans valeur juridique donc, et pourtant sanctifié par la proximité de la tombe du Sultan. On y voit l'habileté de Ferîdûn qui montre son héros – le grand vizir Ṣoḳollu Meḥmed Paşa – capable de gérer l'ensemble de l'Empire, se préoccupant de sa frontière la plus méridionale alors qu'il est en campagne sur sa frontière septentrionale. Enfin comment ne pas faire un parallèle entre Dervîş ʻAlî, laissé par la mort du pacha seul devant l'ennemi avec quelques compagnons, et Ṣoḳollu Meḥmed Paşa lui-même assurant avec l'aide de quelques fidèles un impossible intérim entre un sultan défunt et un sultan non encore intronisé ?

Mais on est bientôt saisi du désir de mieux comprendre quelle était la situation de Dervîş ʻAlî à Basra, grâce à l'abondante documentation des *Mühimme defterleri* V, VI, VII et XII publiés par les archives du *Başbakanlık* à Istanbul. J'avais achevé le dépouillement de ces registres et commencé à mettre ma contribution en forme quand je découvris qu'un travail fondé sur cette même documentation d'archives avait récemment été publié par Abdürrahman Sağırlı[6]. Il m'a cependant semblé, après réflexion, que je pouvais apporter quelques compléments à l'article d'A. Sağırlı, mais également considérer les événements d'un autre point de vue que lui[7].

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ve muʻcizât-ı ḥażret-i şerîʻat-penâhî ve be-himmeti pâdişâh-ı ʻâlem-penâh müfsid-i mezbûr münhezim olduḳdan ṣoñra yine Ben-ʻAliyân ḳabîlesi-ile birikib vâlî aralıġı-dur déyü tekrâr vilâyet ve memlekete hücûm édüb yine inhizâm müyesser olub muḥaṣṣal bir niçe defʻa fırṣatdur déyü ḳabâ'il-i ʻarab ol ḥavâlîye hücûm étdüklerinde muḥâfaża ḫidmetinde olan Dervîş ʻAlî Begüñ iḳdâm ve ihtimâmı-ile bir niçesi kesilüb ve bir niçesi diri dutılub envâʻ-ı ḫaḳâret-le siyâset olınub mumà-ileyhüñ iżhâr étdügi mahâbet aʻdâ-yı dîn ve devlete bir mertebe ḫavf ve ḫaşiyyet vérdi ki min baʻd bu vilâyetüñ eyâleti bu maḳûle müdebbir ve şecîʻ ve cerî ḳullarına ṣadaḳa ve iḥsân buyurılsa bu diyâr tamâm emn ü emân üzre olub tevfîr-i ḫazîne ve mâl ve tevsîʻ-i memleket ve iʻmâl müyesser olmaḳ muḳarrer-dür déyü iş'âr ve iḫbâr eyledükleri ecilden iptidâ manâsıb-ı mühimmeden ve merâtib-i külliyyeden münâsebet-i mezbûre iḳtiżâsınca vilâyet-i Baṣra eyâleti mezbûr ve meşhûr olan mumà-ileyh Dervîş ʻAlî Bege teẕkere olınub merḥûm pâdişâh-î ʻâlî-şân-ı raḥmet-mekân ḥażretlerinüñ merḳad-ı nûr-raḫşânları üzerine ḳomaḳ içün gönderildi baʻde-l-istiḫâre ve-l-istimdâd be-yümni pâdişâh-ı cedîd ve şehinşâh-ı saʻîd eyâlet-i mezbûreye müteʻallıḳ pâdişâh-ı ʻaṭîḳ-ı maġfiret-ġarîḳüñ ʻunvân-ı ʻâlî-şânları-ile menşûr-ı saʻâdet-meşhûr müşârün-ileyh ʻAlî Paşanuñ nâmına yazılub ʻalè-l-fevr âdamlarınuñ her meşâliḥi görilüb ulaġı-ile ʻavdet étdürilüb ve vilâyet-i ʻIrâḳ Cezâ'ire ve Laḥsâya fetḥnâmeler yazılub mezbûr ulaġ-la irsâl olındı.

[6] Abdürrahman Sağırlı, « Cezâyır-ı Irâk-ı arab veya Şattu'l-arab'ın fethi », *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi* 41 (2005), p. 43-93. Je remercie Güneş Işıksel de m'avoir communiqué cet article qui m'avait échappé.

[7] L'information d'A. Sağırlı, très complète, vise surtout à appuyer une étude de la campagne militaire de Basra, de son organisation et de ses aléas : cf. Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 47.

Je me bornerai donc à résumer les événements dont mon prédécesseur a donné un récit très détaillé, quitte à ajouter quelques informations et à citer tel ou tel passage particulièrement intéressant, avant de m'interroger, dans un second temps, sur ce que représentait le *vilâyet* de Basra pour les Ottomans au moment où Selîm II succédait à Soliman en guerre avec les Habsbourg.

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Pour les gouverneurs de Basra annexée à l'Empire ottoman depuis décembre 1546, la vie était loin d'être facile[8]. Outre les Portugais d'Ormuz et les Séfévides d'Iran voisins, ils devaient compter avec un ennemi intérieur : les tribus arabes, particulièrement celles de la zone appelée par les documents ottomans *Cezâ'ir* (« les îles »). Il ne s'agit pas de la région connue sous le nom de Djezireh située entre Tigre et Euphrate en amont de Baghdad, mais des territoires marécageux délimités par le confluent des deux fleuves[9]. Les cheikhs de ces tribus, qu'on avait déjà vus assiéger Basra pour exiger un tribut des prédécesseurs des Ottomans[10], ne se sentaient guère enclins à accepter la souveraineté de ceux-ci et les révoltes furent nombreuses[11].

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[8] Sur les premiers temps de la présence ottomane à Basra, cf. Yusuf Hallaçoğlu, « Basra, Osmanlı dönemi », *Diyânet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 5 (1992), p. 112-114 ; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Viviane Rahmé et Salam Hamza, « Notes et documents sur le ralliement de la principauté de Basra à l'Empire ottoman », *Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu* VI (1996), p. 85-95 ; Cengiz Orhonlu, « Un rapport sur l'expédition de Bahreyn en 1559 », *Anatolia Moderna-Yeni Anadolu* VI (1996), p. 97-110 ; Salih Özbaran, « XVI yüzyılda Basra Körfezi sahillerinde Osmanlılar. Basra beylerbeyliğinin kuruluşu », *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi* 25 (1971), p. 51-78.

[9] Cf. Cengiz Orhonlu et Turgut Işıksal, « Osmanlı devrinde nehir nakliyatı hakkında araştırmaları. Dicle ve Fırat nehirlerinde nakliyat », *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi* XIII/17-18 (1962-1963), p. 77-103 (p. 96-97) ; Salih Özbaran, « A review of Portuguese and Turkish Sources », in idem, *The Ottoman Response to European Expansion. Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands During the Sixteenth Century* (Istanbul: Isis, 1994), p. 15-24 (p. 18). On notera du reste que la carte des frères Ottens, qui doit dater de 1737 ou un peu avant, donne précisément à cette zone le nom de *Gezira* : cf. B.J. Slot, *Les origines du Koweit* (Leyde: Brill, 1991), p. 48-53. Il paraît donc nécessaire de lever l'ambiguité de la formulation d'A. Sağırlı qui pourrait donner à penser que le Chatt el-arab fait partie des *Cezâ'ir*.

[10] Ainsi en 1529 : cf. Salih Özbaran, « The Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, 1534-1581 », in idem, *The Ottoman Response*, op. cit., p. 119-157 (p. 123-124).

[11] Sur les tribus arabes d'Irak, cf. Pierre-Jean Luizard, *La formation de l'Irak contemporain* (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1991), p. 62-79 ; pour une description du mode de vie, encore archaïque, des habitants des marais des *Cezâ'ir* dans les années 1950, cf. Wilfred Thesiger, *Les Arabes des marais* (Paris: Plon, 1983).

C'est à ces milieux qu'appartenaient les Beni ʻUlîyân évoqués dans la lettre reçue par le grand vizir : ce clan puissant avait pour base Madina, sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate à une vingtaine de kilomètres en amont du confluent de Qurna[12]. Un peu avant la conquête ottomane de Basra en 1545, Mîr ʻAlî bin ʻUlîyân demandait de l'aide aux Portugais d'Ormuz contre les Ottomans[13] ; en 1549, il coupait les routes, puis se soumettait après avoir subi une répression militaire[14] ; au printemps 1552, le *beylerbey* de Baghdad, renforcé de troupes du Karaman et du Diyarbekir et d'un détachement de janissaires, menait à bien le siège de Madina et, félicité, recevait l'ordre de nettoyer les Cezâ'ir, de leur donner une organisation provinciale et de se saisir de Beni ʻUlîyân[15] ; pourtant, l'année suivante le *beylerbey* de Basra devait à nouveau marcher contre celui-ci et détruisait ses bateaux[16]. On voit que, quinze ans après, les Beni ʻUlîyân étaient toujours aussi remuants.

Il ne m'a pas été possible de déterminer quel lien ils avaient avec Muḥammad ʻOs̲mân, mais celui-ci, à l'évidence un chef de tribu arabe, apparaît à plusieurs reprises dans la documentation d'archives. Son attaque contre Basra du temps du *beylerbey* Güzelce Meḥmed Paşa – entre août 1564 (au plus tôt) et août 1565[17] – est confirmée par une lettre du Chah qui, protestant de sa bonne volonté à l'égard des Ottomans, affirmait que « c'était le malfaisant Ḥasan Ġanemî qui était à l'origine des mouvements maudits du brigand Ḳara ʻOs̲mân qui avait marché sur Basra »[18]. Assiégea-t-il réellement la ville neuf mois durant ? On sait en tout cas que le *beylerbey* de Basra (Meḥmed, donc), assiégé, demanda des renforts à

[12] Cf. S. Özbaran, « XVI yüzyılda Basra Körfezi », *art. cit.*, p. 53. Cette localité, indiquée sur les cartes anciennes, apparaît toujours sur les cartes actuelles de l'Irak.

[13] Cf. S. Özbaran, « XVI yüzyılda Basra Körfezi », *art. cit.*, p. 64 ; « A review of Portuguese and Turkish Sources », *art. cit.*, p. 18.

[14] Cf. S. Özbaran, « XVI yüzyılda Basra Körfezi », *art. cit.*, p. 64.

[15] Le siège de Madina est évoqué d'un mot dans un ordre expédié le 28 avril 1552 au *beylerbey* de Roumélie (K 888, nº 836, 190 vº : *ve vilâyet-i cezâ'irde muḥâṣara olan ḳal'enüñ feṭḥi ḫuṣûṣı ve ʻUlyân oġlı aḥvâlin bildirmiş-sin maʻlûm oldı*). La place dut tomber en avril, puisque c'est des alentours du 29 mai que date vraisemblablement l'ordre répondant au *beylerbey* de Baghdad qui avait fait savoir qu'il s'était emparé de Madina et fait connaître « les grands efforts qu'il avait déployés pour extirper et mettre à terre l'ennemi » (*âʻdanuñ ḳalʻ ü ḳamʻı ḥaḳḳında vüfûr-ı ihtimâmı*) : il en était félicité et recevait des ordres sur la suite des opérations (K 888, nº 1032, 240 rº-vº).

[16] Cf. S. Özbaran, « XVI yüzyılda Basra Körfezi », *art. cit.*, p. 64-65.

[17] Güzelce Meḥmed Paşa fut nommé *beylerbey* de Basra en 972 d'après Meḥmed S̲üreyyâ, op. cit., IV, p. 1052. On sait que Ferrûḫ Paşa, *beylerbey* de Lahsa, fut nommé à Basra par un ordre enregistré le 29 juillet 1565 (MD V-23).

[18] MD V-1377, enregistré le 5 avril 1566.

son collègue de Baghdad au printemps 1565[19]. L'affaire était importante, car le *sancakbey* de Zekiyye[20] faisait savoir que Madina, Rahmaniyye et Fethiyye[21] étaient également assiégées[22]. Pour répondre à la situation, une série de firmans expédiés le 24 mai ordonnait, outre les troupes déjà fournies par Baghdad, l'envoi de renforts par les *beylerbey* de Şehrizor et de Diyarbekir, que leur collègue de Baghdad dépêcherait sur le front dès leur arrivée à Baghdad (décisions confirmées par de nouveaux firmans expédiés les 12 et 30 juin)[23]. En fait, les Arabes furent repoussés avant l'arrivée des renforts, sans doute dans le courant du mois de juillet[24]. Les ordres étaient donc de démobiliser, tout en restant sur ses gardes[25].

Ce n'était que partie remise. Le sultan était informé, dès le mois d'août 1565, que du matériel stratégique (métaux, chevaux, vivres) quittait illégalement le territoire ottoman pour les Cezâ'ir et autres pays extérieurs (*Cezâ'ir ve ġayrî ḫâricî vilâyet*) et ordonnait au *beylerbey* de Basra de l'empêcher[26]. Mais il lui fallait encore protester le 2 décembre contre des livraisons aux Beni 'Ulîyân de vivres, armes et produits nécessaires au calfatage (question importante pour les opérations dans cette zone faite d'un

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[19] MD VI-1176, expédié le 24 mai 1565.

[20] Siège de *sancak* du *vilâyet* de Basra, qu'Özbaran (« XVI yüzyılda Basra Körfezi », art. cit.), situe par inadvertance sur l'Euphrate dans le texte de son article (p. 55), mais sur la rive droite du Tigre un peu en amont de Qurna dans sa carte (*id.*, p. 78). C'est bien ce que montrent la très belle *Vera delineatio civitatis Bassorae* de 1680, BNF, Cartes et plans, Ge DD 2987 (nº 7) et la carte de d'Anville de 1779, BNF, Cartes et plans, Ge D 10831A, (cf. reproduction de celle de 1755 in Slot, op. cit., p. 65 et ibid. p. 50 le Sakie de la carte des frères Ottens). On en trouve confirmation dans le document MD VI-857, expédié le 13 mars 1565, qui indique que Zekiyye est proche de Nehr[ev]ân (sur la rive gauche : cf. les mêmes cartes et le nº 41 de la *delineatio*). Sur la soumission de la place aux Ottomans à la fin de 1544 ou au tout début de 1545, cf. 94 vº du document E 12321 des archives du Palais de Topkapı (ordre nº 213, p. 172-173 de l'édition de Sahillioğlu (Halil), *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H. 951-952 Tarihli ve E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, Istanbul, IRCICA, 2001).

[21] Fethiyye se trouve sur la rive gauche de l'Euphrate entre Qurna et Madîna (nº 9 de la *Delineatio* et cartes citées ci-dessus). En revanche je n'ai pas pu situer Rahmaniyye.

[22] Informations également fournies par le *beylerbey* de Baghdad in MD VI-1176.

[23] MD VI-1176, 1177, 1178, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323. Le *beylerbey* de Şehrizor devait participer en personne à l'expédition, de même qu'Ebû Rîş, seigneur arabe de 'Ane.

[24] Le sultan fait état de l'information dans une lettre expédiée le 16 août (MD V-122.) On sait (MD V-123) que le *beylerbey* de Şehrizor avait reçu le 3 *muharrem* / 31 juillet 1565 le *çavuş* lui portant l'ordre de partir (sans doute MD VI-1322 expédié le 30 juin). Il ne lui fallait sans doute pas beaucoup de temps pour gagner Baghdad.

[25] MD V-118, 122, 153, 213.

[26] MD V-67, expédié le 12 août.

dense réseau de bras des fleuves)[27] et réitérer le 21 janvier 1566[28] et le 5 avril l'ordre de faire respecter la loi à Ferrûh Paşa, le nouveau *beylerbey*, qui lui assurait que ces pratiques datant de ses prédecesseurs n'avaient plus lieu et que les frontières étaient bien gardées[29].

Il n'est donc pas étonnant qu'on se soit décidé, à la Porte, à mettre un terme à une situation inacceptable. Le Sultan le fit savoir au *beylerbey* de Basra par un firman vraisemblablement expédié le 24 septembre 1565[30] : « J'ai l'auguste intention d'extirper et éradiquer de ce pays – si Dieu qu'Il soit exalté le veut – les effets des nuisances des Arabes malfaisants qui attaquent Basra et l'on a commencé tous les préparatifs d'une campagne[31]. » Il demandait donc un rapport sur les moyens nécessaires. L'essentiel de ce rapport a été conservé dans un ordre expédié le 14 octobre 1565 au *beylerbey* de Baghdad İskender Paşa :

> Il n'y a pas dans les Cezâ'ir d'ennemi plus puissant du *vilâyet* que la tribu des Mu'awiya[32]. Sans leur appui, l'ennemi ne peut absolument pas faire subir de dommages à Basra. Quant à ceux qui sont soumis, ils ne sont d'aucune utilité : ils se révolteront à la première occasion. Donc si on ne prend pas des dispositions à l'égard [de la tribu Mu'awiya], il est extrêmement difficile de contrôler ce *vilâyet*. Quant aux mesures à prendre, [les voici] : le *vilâyet* des Cezâ'ir est fait de trois cents bras de fleuve ; tous les forts et les villages baignent dans l'eau. En sorte qu'il n'est pas possible de s'emparer [du pays] par le combat. Si au printemps [1566] on envoie 500 bateaux de Birecik et 200 de Baghdad avec des canons et des combattants, ainsi que 2 000 janissaires et 5 000 cavaliers venant du Seuil sublime et 10 000 archers kurdes, le *beylerbey* de Baghdad venu avec les bateaux construira un fort au lieu dit Ṣadr-ı dâr (qui est au confluent de l'Euphrate[33]) et y laissera 200 cavaliers et 200

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[27] MD V-597 (ordre au *beylerbey* de Baghdad avec copie à celui de Basra). Des ordres similaires leur étaient envoyés, à la même date, concernant l'exportation de matériel stratégique en Iran (MD V-598).

[28] MD V-831.

[29] MD V-1361.

[30] MD V-119. Le document porte la mention *yazıldı*, mais pas de date d'expédition. On peut cependant supposer qu'il fut expédié en même temps que le précédent, lequel est destiné au *beylerbey* de Baghdad et concerne la menace arabe sur Basra.

[31] *Ḥâliyyen Baṣra üzerine hücûm éden A'rab-ı bed-fi'âlüñ vuḳû'ından âṣârları ol diyârdan bi-'ınâyeti-lláh te'âlà ref' ve def' olmaġa niyyet-i hümâyûnum olub küllî sefer tedârükine mübâşeret édüb*.

[32] Cette tribu est citée pour sa production de figues dans le règlement de Basra publié par Robert Mantran, « Règlements fiscaux ottomans de la province de Bassora (2e moitié du XVIe siècle », *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient* X (1967), p. 224-277 (p. 237, 262).

[33] Selon ce plan, le *beylerbey* de Baghdad doit descendre le Tigre avec sa flotte. Le confluent avec l'Euphrate est donc à Qurna. Ṣadr-ı dâr, que je n'ai pas pu localiser plus précisément, doit se trouver dans cette zone.

> archers et arquebusiers ; et des soldats venus de Baghdad, d'autres hommes et des soldats de Basra construiront un fort sur la rive nommée *Şatt-ı ṭavîl*[34] : quand l'ennemi sera empêché de sortir par les deux côtés, il se repliera sur le *vilâyet* des Cezâ'ir. Ils pratiquent l'agriculture en élevant des digues sur les canaux : si les soldats en question détruisent ces digues, ils seront submergés par l'eau, seront bien forcés de remettre leurs fils en otages et on récoltera entièrement leur [dîme] d'un cinquième. Ainsi le Trésor [de Basra] sera suffisant pour Basra[35], mais en outre on pense qu'il sera possible d'envoyer une contribution [à la Porte][36].

Ferrûḫ Paşa suggérait une stratégie dictée par sa connaissance de terrain de la situation politique et géographique. La guerre qu'il proposait de faire était différente de celles que l'armée ottomane avait l'habitude de mener. Il s'agissait de retourner contre l'adversaire les avantages dont il avait profité jusqu'alors : puisqu'on ne pouvait pas aller le chercher pour le battre en bataille rangée, on allait au contraire l'empêcher de sortir. Cette tactique était-elle aussi neuve qu'il y paraît ? Elle rappelle les propositions qu'un prédécesseur de Ferrûḫ à Basra faisait déjà treize ans auparavant, au début de 1552. On en trouve le résumé dans un firman expédié le 15 février 1552 au *beylerbey* de Baghdad : il avait fait savoir à la Porte « que l'on pouvait sortir du pays des Cezâ'ir par trois issues, deux vers la terre ferme et une vers les marais ; qu'il ne convenait pas d'attaquer avec des troupes d'un seul côté : dès qu'on entrerait d'un côté, l'ennemi sortirait de

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[34] Non localisé.

[35] Le *vilâyet* de Basra était *sâlyâneli* : cf. Salik Özbaran, « Note on the *sâlyâne* system in the Ottoman Empire as organised in Arabia in the sixteenth century », in idem, *The Ottoman Response*, op. cit., p. 33-38.

[36] MD V-353. Ce document, glosé en turc par A. Sağırlı (*art. cit.*, p. 53-54), est connu. Il m'a cependant paru, en raison de son importance, qu'il méritait d'être traduit et reproduit sous sa forme ottomane : *Muḳaddemâ Baṣra beglerbegisi mektûb gönderüb vilâyet-i mezbûrenüñ Cezâ'irde Mu'aviyye ṭâ'ifesinden ḳâvî düşmanı olmayub anlaruñ mu'âveneti olmayıcaḳ aṣlâ düşman ẕarar érişdürmek muḥall olub ve iṭâ'at eyleyenlerüñ aṣlâ fâ'idesi olmayub fırṣat bulduḳlarında 'ışyân étmeleri muḳarrer olub şöyle ki meẕkûrlara tedârük görülmez ise vilâyet-i mezbûrenüñ ẕabṭı 'asîr olub tedârüki daḫi vilâyet-i Cezâ'ir üç yüz şaṭṭ olub cümle ḳılâ' ve ḳurrâ ṣu içinde olmaġın ceng-le alınub ẕabṭ olınmaḳ mümkin olmayub evvel bahârda Birecikden beş yüz ve Baġdâddan iki yüz pâre gemiler ṭoplar ve cenkcileri ile ve dergâh-ı mu'allâm yeñiçerilerinden iki biñ yeñiçeri ve beş biñ atlu ve on biñ kemândâr-ı Kürd irsâl olınur ise Birecikden gelen gemiler-le Baġdâd beglerbegisi eyle Fıra ṣuyı birikdügi yer ki Ṣadr-ı dâr démek-le ma'rûf-dur anda bir ḳal'e binâ édüb iki yüz atlu ve dört yüz kemândâr ve tüfenkendâz vaẕ' édüb ve Baġdâddan gelen leşker ile ve baẕ'-ı 'asker ile ve baẕ'-ı Baṣra 'askeri daḫi Şaṭṭ-ı Ṭavîl nâm şaṭṭuñ üzerinde bir ḳal'e binâ édüb iki cânibden düşman ṭaṣra çıḳmaġa ḳâdir olmaduḳlarında şaṭṭ alub vilâyet-i Cezâ'ire ḥavâle olub ḫandaḳları bend étmek-le zirâ'at éderler ẕikr olınan 'asâkir bendelerin bozub ṣuya ġarḳ étmek-le ẕarûrî oğlanların rehn vérüb ḳânûn üzre ḫumsları alınacaḳ küllî ḥâṣıl olub Baṣra ve Cezâ'ire ḫazîne vefâ étdüginden ġayrî ḫazîne daḫi gönderilmek fehm olınur déyü bildürdi.*

l'autre ; qu'il suggérait donc qu'on lui affectât les troupes venues du Karaman et de Diyarbekir en sorte qu'elles fussent disposées de deux côtés contre l'ennemi ainsi empêché de fuir ; que c'était ainsi qu'il convenait de procéder »[37]. Ferrûḫ Paşa avait-il conscience de reprendre les conclusions de son prédécesseur ? Il est bien possible que le rapport de celui-ci ait été depuis longtemps oublié en 1565, mais il devait bien se trouver sur place des hommes se souvenant des opérations de 1552. Du reste, peut-être ces considérations étaient-elles de simple bon sens pour des officiers compétents connaissant le terrain ? Quoi qu'il en soit, les propositions de Ferrûḫ allaient bien au delà, me semble-t-il, des projets de 1552. Le *beylerbey* d'alors envisageait en effet une campagne rapide : à l'en croire, la conquête des Cezâ'ir était l'affaire d'un mois[38], avec des effectifs certes renforcés par les contingents du Karaman et du Diyarbekir, mais sans commune mesure avec ceux demandés par Ferrrûḫ[39]. De fait, la Porte semble en 1552 avoir cru qu'après la prise de Madina, base des Benî 'Ulîyân, la soumission de ceux-ci et de l'ensemble de la zone était pratiquement acquise. En témoignent les ordres envoyés au *beylerbey* de Baghdad au lendemain de la conquête de la place : « Montre toutes sortes de beaux efforts pour réformer les Cezâ'ir et fais au mieux pour mettre la main sur le malfaisant nommé 'Ulîyân oġlı[40]. » Le résultat ne semblait pas faire de doute, puisque le sultan se préoccupait surtout de l'organisation de sa nouvelle conquête : combien fallait-il prévoir de *sancak* ? Y avait-il lieu de créer un nouveau *beylerbeylik* ?[41] En fait, on l'a dit, l'ennemi ne fut pas saisi en 1552,

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[37] *Cezâ'ir memleketinüñ üç yerden gürîzgâhı olub iki cânibi ḳuruya ve bir cânibi şaṭṭadur mücerred bir ṭarafdan 'asker ile varılmaḳ olmaz bir ṭarafdan çıḳub gider aña binâ'en Ḳaramandan ve Diyârbekirden gelen 'asker kendünüñ üzerine 'arż édüb â'dânuñ iki ṭarafdan üzerine ḳoyulub ḳaṭ'â ḳaçmaġa mecâlleri olmaya bu vech-le olması münâsib-dür déyü bildürmiş* (K 888, nº 247, 62 rº-vº). L'ordre était donc donné au *beylerbey* de Baghdad d'agir pour le mieux après s'être concerté avec son collègue de Basra, auquel un ordre dans le même sens était envoyé à la même date (K 888, nº 246, 62 rº).

[38] *Cezâ'ir feṯḥi ḫuṣûṣı inşâ-lláh bir âyda olur* (K 888, nº 246, 62 rº).

[39] À dire vrai, on n'a pratiquement pas de chiffres, sinon la mention de 300 janissaires envoyés de Damas (*Şâmdan irsâl olınan üç yüz nefer yeñiçeri* : K 888, nº 246, 62 rº), quand on a vu qu'en 1565, Ferrûḫ en demandait 2 000 venant d'Istanbul.

[40] *Cezâ'irüñ ışlâḥı ḫuṣûṣında envâ'-ı mesâ'î-i cemîlüñ żuhûra getürüb 'Ulyân oġlı déyen müfsidi ele getürmege sa'y eyleyesin* (K 888, nº 1032, 240 rº-vº).

[41] « En dehors de ceux-ci [deux *sancak* nommés dans le rapport du *beylerbey* de Baghdad], tu n'indiques pas, en donnant des noms, si d'autres lieux pourraient constituer des *sancak* et combien ils seraient. Et au cas où ce serait un *beylerbeylik*, où conviendrait-il que le *beylerbey* ait son siège ? Le revenu suffira-t-il à payer le *beylerbey*, les *sancakbey* et les hommes ? De combien est-il ? Combien faut-il de *bey* ? Indique-le par écrit de façon détaillée et fais un rapport sur chaque *sancak* en indiquant son nom » (*bunlardan ġayrî daḫi anda sancaġa müteḥammil yer var mı-dur ḳaç sancaġa müteḥammil-dür isimleri-ile*

et les Cezâ'ir demeurèrent hors du contrôle ottoman. Or c'est précisément l'impossibilité technique de contrôler les marais – soulignée dans les premiers mots de son rapport – qui dictait la conduite suggérée par Ferrûḫ en 1565. Il était vain de s'enfoncer dans les marais à la poursuite d'un ennemi insaisissable ; il n'était donc plus question d'une tactique visant à éliminer rapidement un adversaire empêché de fuir, mais d'une stratégie de blocus et de guerre totale. Puisqu'il paraissait impossible de l'emporter durablement par la guerre ou d'amadouer les chefs de tribu par la politique classique de l'*istimâlet* – en effet la tribu dominante était définitivement hostile et les autres n'étaient pas sûres –, on allait les empêcher de survivre dans leurs îles en détruisant l'agriculture dont le produit les nourrissait et leur fournissait des produits d'exportation[42].

La solution du blocus a tenté plus d'un stratège. Son inconvénient est son coût : Ferrûḫ Paşa ne demandait pas moins de 700 bateaux[43] et 17 000 hommes venant s'ajouter aux troupes des *vilâyet* de Baghdad et Basra. Bien que dubitative devant ces exigences[44], la Porte semblait prête à faire des efforts, puisque, dans ce même firman du 14 octobre 1565 au *beylerbey* de Baghdad, elle signalait avoir déjà ordonné la construction à Birecik de 400 bateaux destinés à Basra, précisant – avec son sens aigu de l'arithmétique – que cela ferait 200 bâtiments de transports de vivres et 150 de transports de troupes. Le 21 janvier, des mesures furent prises pour envoyer de Baghdad, Diyarbekir et Alep des prisonniers destinés à être mis à la rame sur les *ḳadırġa* nécessaires à la défense de la ville ; le *beylerbey* de Şehrizor devait envoyer des janissaires ainsi (avec son collègue de Diyarbekir) que du matériel nécessaire à la fonte de canons ; on envoyait enfin à Basra 500 fusils et du plomb[45].

Ces préparatifs étaient justifiés : la Porte fut bientôt informée que « les Arabes malfaisants qui s'étaient auparavant rendus coupables de

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yazub bildirmemişsin beylerbeylik olduġı taḳdîrce beylerbegisi ne maḥallde oṭurmaḳ münâsib-dür maḥṣûlı beglerbege ve sancaḳ beglerine ve neferâ[t] mevâcibine vefâ éder mi nîcedür ḳaç beg lâzım-dur tafṣîli ile yazub her sancaġı ismi ile 'arż eyleyesin : K 888, n° 1032, 240 r°-v°).

[42] On sait qu'ils vendaient sur le marché de Basra leurs produits (notamment des dattes, des agrumes, des nattes) et y achetaient des tissus : cf. Mantran, *art. cit.*, p. 231/258, 237/262.

[43] Le chiffre paraît assez conséquent, même s'il est vrai que ces embarcations destinées à la navigation fluviale n'étaient pas grandes, pouvant transporter deux tonnes de marchandises et 8 à 10 passagers (il y avait aussi des radeaux reposant sur des outres gonflées appelés *kelek*) : cf. Orhonlu et Işıksal, *art. cit.*, p. 85-87.

[44] Cf. *infra*.

[45] MD V-825, 826, 827,828, 830, 831, 832.

mouvements maudits avaient à nouveau l'intention d'attaquer le *vilâyet* de Basra pour y commettre des dégats et de se livrer à des actes séditieux et mauvais[46] ». Des ordres du 9 et du 18 février organisaient en conséquence l'envoi à Basra, via Baghdad, de renforts fournis par les *beylerbey* des *vilâyet* de Baghdad, Şehrizor, Diyarbekir et divers beys kurdes[47], tandis que le *beylerbey* d'Alep devait procurer blé et orge aux troupes[48]. Les *Mühimme defterleri* ne renseignent pas sur ce qui se passa sur le terrain, mais l'allusion à des Arabes qui s'en étaient pris auparavant à Basra semble renvoyer aux actes de Ḳara Muḥammad ʿOs̲mân en 1565 : on a donc de bonnes raisons de prendre à la lettre le résumé par Feridûn du message parvenu à Szigetvár : Muḥammad ʿOs̲mân fit une nouvelle incursion au début du printemps 1566, qui fut rapidement repoussée par un raid de cavalerie, sans qu'il fût nécessaire de faire appel aux renforts disponibles.

On s'en tenait en tout cas, du côté ottoman, à une attitude défensive. En effet les mesures détaillées dans les firmans envoyés le 18 février 1566 étaient accompagnées d'une nouvelle qui dut décevoir Ferrûh̲ Paşa : le sultan renonçait à la campagne de répression des tribus arabes des Cezâ'ir. Il en informait en ces termes le *beylerbey* de Baghdad : « On a l'intention – si Dieu le Très-glorieux le veut – de mener au printemps une campagne victorieuse contre les vils mécréants et il a été décidé que je procéderai moi-même à un auguste déplacement. Comme on a renoncé à l'envoi de soldats de mon seuil de félicité et de Damas, et comme on part en campagne avec félicité et prospérité, il a paru préférable de repousser cette année l'affaire en question[49]. »

En fait, la décision de faire la campagne de Szigetvár – dont il est question ici – avait été prise plusieurs mois auparavant, puisque les premiers ordres l'attestant sont enregistrés sous la date du 13 novembre 1565[50].

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[46] MD V-929, expédié le 6 février 1566 : *Bundan aḳdem Aʿrâb-ı bed-fiʿâlüñ ḥareket-i bî-bereketi olub vilâyet-i Baṣraya ẓarar ḳaṣdına hücûm édüb gérü fitne ve fesâd ḳaṣdında olduḳları istimâʿ olındı.*

[47] MD V-920, 930, 931, 933, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027.

[48] MD V-1028.

[49] MD V-1024 : *İmdi inşâ-Alláh el-aʿazz evvel bahârda küffâr-ı ḫâksâr ṭaraflarına sefer-i ẓafer-âyîne niyyet olınub ʿazîmet-i hümâyûnum muḳarrer ḳılınmış-dur südde-i saʿâdetümden ve Şâmdan ʿasker gönderilmek müsedded olmaduġından saʿâdet ve iḳbâl ile sefere müteveccih olınmagın bu sene ol ḫuṣûṣ teʾḫîr olınmaḳ evlà görilüb*. Le firman destiné au *beylerbey* de Basra ne jugeait pas nécessaire d'entrer dans tant de détails ; on se bornait à lui écrire : *ammâ saʿâdet ve iḳbâl ile evvel bahârda küffâr-ı ḫâksâr ṭaraflarına sefer-i hümâyûnum muḳarrer olmagın* (MD V-1027).

[50] MD V-491, 493, 494, 496.

Or ce n'est qu'au milieu de février 1566, semble-t-il, qu'on renonça à la Porte à ce qui aurait été un second front : la campagne de répression contre les tribus des Cezâ'ir. On peut donc supposer qu'on caressa un temps l'idée de mener les deux expéditions en même temps. Certes cela signifiait que la pacification de l'arrière pays de Basra ne paraissait plus prioritaire, mais aussi qu'on n'en sous-estimait pas l'importance et la difficulté : il paraît clair, à la lecture de l'ordre au *beylerbey* de Baghdad, que c'est l'impossibilité désormais d'envoyer des soldats d'Istanbul qui rendait illusoire une opération punitive efficace. Les arguments de Ferrûẖ Paşa avaient donc été entendus, mais c'était une victoire à la Pyrrhus, puisque, de ce fait, il était décidé de ne rien faire.

Sur ces entrefaites Ferrûẖ Paşa mourut le 7 mai 1566, laissant le *vilâyet* de Basra sans gouverneur. À en croire la missive arrivée à Szigetvár peu après le décès de Soliman, Ḳara Muḥammad 'Oṣmân et les Benî 'Ulîyân virent dans cette vacance l'occasion de repasser à l'attaque. C'est très vraisemblable, à en juger par les ordres expédiés le 21 juin en réponse à un rapport par lequel le *beylerbey* de Baghdad, İskender Paşa, « faisait savoir que les Arabes malfaisants s'en prenaient à Basra et l'attaquaient et que les troupes avaient besoin de vivres »[51]. La Porte décidait donc d'appliquer les plans prévus : le *beylerbey* de Diyarbekir et les beys kurdes devaient envoyer les effectifs qui avaient été prévus et celui de Şehrizor répondre à l'appel de celui de Baghdad. Le *beylerbey* d'Alep de son côté enverrait des vivres (de même que celui de Diyarbekir) et 50 000 pièces d'or à son collègue de Baghdad[52].

Les lacunes de la documentation ne permettent pas de connaître la suite des opérations. On constate en tout cas que le *beylerbey* de Baghdad jouait un rôle central et que, si celui de Şehrizor était apparemment chargé des opérations sur le terrain, c'est Baghdad qui centralisait et répartissait l'information et, probablement, prenait les décisions stratégiques. Il n'y avait plus de *beylerbey* à Basra, mais son remplaçant intérimaire Dervîş 'Alî, bey de Zekiyye, fit apparemment des merveilles, ou du moins s'en prévalut efficacement, puisque la première nomination qui suivit le décès de Soliman le Magnifique (dans la nuit du 5 au 6 juillet) fut sa promotion au *beylerbeylik* de Basra.

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[51] Md V-1964 : *Baṣraya A'râb-ı bad-fi'âlüñ te'addî ve tecâvüzin ve 'askere ẕahîre lâzım idügin bildürüb*. À en juger par le firman envoyé au *beylerbey* de Diyarbekir (MD V-1965), « les bandits malfaisants encerclaient les alentours de Basra » (*A'râb-ı bed-fi'âl Baṣra eṭrâfın iḥâṭa édüb*).

[52] MD V-1964, 1965, 1966, 1967.

Cette nomination ne pouvait évidemment pas suffire à pacifier le sud de l'Irak. On sait qu'à l'automne 1567 le *beylerbey* de Baghdad était commandant en chef[53] d'une campagne dans le *vilâyet* de Basra à nouveau menacé par les Benî 'Ulîyân[54], avec sous ses ordres le *bey* de 'Ane Ebû Rîş, les troupes de Diyarbekir et Şehrizor et des beys kurdes, et bien sûr celles de Basra[55]. Tous furent félicités par des firmans envoyés le 24 janvier 1568[56] pour leur bonne conduite dans cette campagne qui s'achevait par un succès : le *beylerbey* de Basra – notre Dervîş 'Alî désormais – pouvait annoncer fièrement que Basra et Lahsa étaient maintenant paisibles et sûres et que Muḥammad 'Osmân respectait l'accord[57]. De cette campagne de 1567, nous possédons trois récits. Le premier est un rapport rédigé à l'issue de la campagne par le *beylerbey* de Baghdad İskender Paşa ; le second est une courte synthèse due à Gelibolulu Muṣṭafà 'Âlî, qui dans son *Künhü-l-aḫbâr* consacre quelques lignes à ce qu'il présente comme la première « conquête du règne de Selîm II »[58].

Enfin A. Sağırlı s'est fondé sur un passage inséré dans certains manuscrits de la chronique de Meḥmed bin Meḥmed d'Andrinople (mort vers 1640)[59], *Nuhbetü-t-tevârîḫ ve-l-aḫbâr*, qui semble être consacré, plutôt qu'à la campagne de 1567 en général, aux faits et gestes de Canpulad Bey, emir de Kilis et A'zaz, nommé commandant de la flotte envoyée depuis Birecik pour l'occasion[60]. Or la chronique de Ferîdûn – rédigée, rappelons-le, quelques mois seulement après les événements – s'achève, aux folios 277 v° et suivants, par un chapitre sur ces événements principalement consacré, à partir du folio 280 r°, à la campagne de Canpulad. A. Sağırlı résumant le texte de Meḥmed bin Meḥmed, il ne m'a pas été possible de faire une

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[53] *Ol bâbda ser-'asker ta'yîn olınan Baġdâd beglerbegisi İskender* (MD VII-302, expédié le 1er octobre 1567).

[54] Un firman expédié le 12 octobre 1567 nous apprend que ceux-ci avaient sans succès demandé l'aide des autorités séfévides (MD VII-321).

[55] MD VII 203 (expédié le 14 septembre), 292, 302 (expédié le 1er octobre), 322 (expédié le 12 octobre).

[56] MD VII-742.

[57] *Baṣra ve Laḥsânuñ emn ü emân üzre olub ve Muḥammad 'Osmân daḫi 'ah[d]ında ṣabıt-ḳadem idügin bildürmişsin* (MD VII-742).

[58] *Gelibolulu Mustafà 'Âlî ve* Künhü'l-ahbâr'*ında II. Selim, III. Murat ve III. Mehmet Devirleri*, Faris Çerçi éd., (Kayseri, Erciyes Üniversitesi yayınları, 2000), p. 5-6.

[59] Cf. A. Sağırlı, « Mehmed b. Mehmed Edirnevî », *Diyânet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 28 (2003), p. 495.

[60] La version imprimée propose (Meḥmed bin Meḥmed, *Nuhbetü-t-tevârîḫ ve-l-aḫbâr*, Istanbul, 1276 / 1860, p. 108) un récit de « la campagne contre Benî 'Ulîyân » qui paraît issu de celui de Gelibolulu 'Alî, ce qui est également le cas du récit de Peçevî, *Ta'rîḫ*, Istanbul, 1283 / 1866 (rééd. Istanbul Enderun, 1980), I, p. 467.

comparaison systématique avec la version de Ferîdûn. On constate des différences : quelques phrases citées ne semblent pas être identiques chez les deux auteurs ; Ferîdûn fournit des dates qui tiennent compte du jour de la semaine alors que Meḥmed date parfois par décade[61] ; de même, quand Ferîdûn parle des 46 bateaux de Mîr Sultân ben ʿUlîyân, Meḥmed arrondit le chiffre à 50[62]. Mais ces variantes pèsent peu devant le parallélisme frappant entre les deux récits : les mêmes étapes sont indiquées dans le même ordre, avec les mêmes détails sur l'abondance des arbres fruitiers, les puantes sources de bitume de Hît[63], la même notation qu'on a dû attendre deux mois à al-Hilla que le climat des Cezâ'ir devienne supportable[64]. Ce sont les mêmes opérations, les mêmes événements qui sont décrits, dans le même ordre, jusqu'au départ de la flotte de Canpolad. Bien plus, il s'agit dans les deux cas du même *Ġazavâtnâme* à la gloire de Cânpolad, toujours le premier à se battre et la principale cause des succès des armées impériales. Bien peu de place est laissé aux autres officiers. Il est donc hautement probable que la version de Meḥmed bin Meḥmed procède de celle de Ferîdûn, ou d'une source commune[65].

Il est sûr en tout cas que le texte de Ferîdûn, contemporain des événements particulièrement bien informé, est une source de valeur. C'est donc lui que je résumerai en quelques mots après avoir cité ceux de Gelibolulu ʿÂlî et d'İskender Paşa, moins dans le but d'étudier les opérations elles-mêmes – A. Sağırlı le fait dans son article – que de fournir l'original de ces documents.

Voici donc la synthèse de Gelibolulu Muṣṭafà ʿÂlî :

> C'est la révolte de ʿUlîyân oġlı, dans les environs de Basra. Il résidait dans l'île de . . .[66] et faisait partie des puissants chefs arabes. Or ne supportant plus les perceptions extraordinaires (*tekâlif-i şaḳḳa*) des *beylerbey* de la région, il s'était révolté à l'époque de l'auguste montée sur le trône [de Selîm II, juillet 1566] : il avait rassemblé un certain nombre d'Arabes malveillants qui galopent dans le désert et querelleurs et commença à se livrer dans la région à la

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[61] Mais – en dehors d'une inadvertance de transcription par A. Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 71 – la chronologie est bien la même.

[62] Ferîdûn, 294 v° ; Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 74.

[63] Ferîdûn, 283 v° ; Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 70. Cf. Thesiger, op. cit., p. 138-139 : « J'ai appris le même jour que le coaltar venait de Hit sur l'Euphrate, non loin de Bagdad. Je connaissais l'endroit. J'avais vu les petites mares d'où le bitume en fusion jaillissait en bouillonnant. »

[64] Ferîdun, 285 r° ; Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 70.

[65] Je n'ai pas trouvé dans le catalogue des archives du palais de Topkapı de renvoi à un pareil document.

[66] *Mezbûr cezîre (?) sâkin* : F. Çerçi (p. 5, n. 5) précise en note que dans les quatre manuscrits qu'il a consultés, il y a un blanc après le mot *cezîre*.

> sédition et aux méfaits. Un rapport ayant été fait, le *beylerbey* de Baghdad – le Tcherkesse İskender Paşa dont on a raconté plus haut les combats dans la région d'Erzurum avec le fils de Şâh Tahmasb Şâh İsmâ'îl Mirzâ – fut chargé comme commandant en chef (*serdâr*) de mettre un terme à la sédition. Il avait été choisi parce qu'il était un homme de décision, compétent et expérimenté. On désigna encore les *beylerbey* de Basra et de Şehrizor et des émirs kurdes connus et renommés pour leur bravoure et leur courage, puis on envoya en outre du Seuil de félicité 2 000 janissaires[67] avec des artilleurs et des gens du train d'artillerie. À la suite de combats répétés et d'engagements avec les Arabes de mauvais renom, la plupart des villages et des *naḥiyye* furent pillés et dévastés et l'on se décida à incendier et détruire les bourgades (*ḳaṣaba*) qui étaient ses principales résidences. À la fin de l'année [9]75[68], ordre fut donné aux soldats musulmans de regagner leurs postes sains et saufs et avec leurs butins.

Le rapport d'İskender Paşa sur la « campagne de 'Ulîyân oġlı » est plus détaillé sur les choix tactiques[69] :

> Par la grâce de Dieu (qu'Il soit exalté) on a pris à l'ennemi ses gabions, ses forts et de nombreux hommes. Le *beylerbey* de Şehrizor étant passé sur l'autre rive, les Arabes sont venus de nuit et il y a eu une grande bataille des deux côtés[70]. Les boulets ont pénétré la masse de l'ennemi et leur ont tué 170 hommes et 40 cheikhs. Mis en déroute par cette frappe, ils ont fui. Il est un lieu très fameux nommé Remle[71]. Les experts ayant dit que la conquête et le contrôle des Cezâ'ir pouvaient être obtenus si on contrôlait ce détroit en construisant des forts des deux côtés, j'ai aussitôt déployé mes efforts en construisant d'un côté une forteresse fortifiée et bien tenue par les soldats, tandis que j'en faisais construire une autre sur l'autre rive par le *beylerbey* de Şehrizor (que ses faveurs se perpétuent). Ces mesures ont amené la plupart des cheikhs à choisir de venir [au devant de moi]. Il est même venu des *müftî* d''Ulîyân oğlı et de ceux d'entre eux qui ont des connaissances des lettres par lesquelles ils affichaient leur totale soumission et obédience et demandaient la paix en affirmant qu'ils n'étaient nullement en rébellion. Enfin les Arabes ont fui en amont de Remle, abandonnant le tiers des Cezâ'ir[72].

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[67] Cette mention est particulièrement intéressante dans la mesure où elle reprend les demandes formulées par Ferrûḫ Paşa en 1565. On peut supposer que ce n'est pas un hasard. Au demeurant, les chiffres, il est vrai peut-être incomplets, qu'a trouvés A. Sağırlı dans sa documentation, sont nettement inférieurs : cf. Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 68, n. 109.

[68] 8 juillet 1567-25 juin 1568.

[69] Rapport résumé dans le firman que lui envoie le Sultan le 24 janvier 1568 (MD VII-743).

[70] Il faut sans doute comprendre que les Arabes sont venus par voie d'eau et se sont trouvés entre deux feux, les Ottomans occupant les deux rives du cours d'eau.

[71] Thesiger parle (op. cit., p. 97-99) d'une localité du nom de Ramla, située « près » de (mais non sur) la rive gauche de l'Euphrate.

[72] *Be-'inâyeti-lláh te'âlà a'dânuñ meterîsleri ve ḳal'eleri ve ḫaylî âdemleri alınub ve Şehrizôl beglerbegisi öte yaḳaya geçürilüb géce ile 'arab gelüb öteden ve berüden küllî muḥârebe olub*

Ferîdûn quant à lui nous apprend que le grand-vizir appuie personnellement la campagne[73] et qu'il suit les conseils des experts : la cavalerie marchera le long de l'Euphrate tandis que l'infanterie descendra par bateau. Canpulad Bey part donc de Birecik à la tête de la flotte le 11 juillet 1567, et d'étape en étape arrive à al-Hilla au début d'août[74]. Après avoir attendu que le climat devienne plus supportable, la flotte repart le 18 octobre, bientôt rejointe par Sînâv, chef de la tribu des Mu'awiya venu faire acte d'allégeance et participer à la campagne[75]. L'arrivée de la flotte à Ṣadr-ı dar impressionne les Arabes qui fuient[76]. Canpulad continue sur Zernuk[77], où il retrouve İskender Paşa le 10 novembre 1567 et dix jours plus tard la flotte de Baghdad venue par le Tigre[78]. Deux forts sont construits sur les deux rives à Ṣadr-ı dar[79], deux autres à Zernuk[80]. Le 20 novembre a lieu un véritable combat sur une autre île des Cezâ'ir, Ṣadrü-l-baḥrân, dont la description rappelle nettement le combat décrit par İskender Paşa[81]. On entreprend la construction de deux forts malgré les incessantes attaques des Arabes. Pour y mettre un terme, on commence à couper leurs arbres, ce qui est les ruiner : ils tentent de s'y opposer par les armes, mais une pluie diluvienne met un terme aux combats. Les forts étant achevés, le chef des Benî 'Ulîyân demande la paix par des ambassadeurs (reçus avec honneur), ce qui lui est accordé moyennant le versement d'un tribut de 15 000 pièces d'or et la remise d'otages gardés à Basra, qui seront remplacés tous les ans à l'occasion du versement du tribut[82]. « C'est ainsi, conclut Ferîdûn, que le pays des Cezâ'ir a été conquis et annexé aux autres

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a'dânuñ âlâyına ṭop girüb yüz yetmiş âdemlerin ve kırḳ nefer miḳdârı şeyẖlerin helâk édüb ol ẕarbdan ṣınub firâr étdüklerin ve Remle nâm maḥall ĝâyet nâmdâr yer olub ehl-i vuḳûf olanlar cezâ'irüñ feṯḥ ü ẕabṭı ṣuyuñ iki cânibinde ḳal'eler bünyâd olınub bu boġaz ẕabṭ olınmaġıile olur dédüklerinde hem-ân iḳdâm olınub berü cânibde 'asker ile maẕbûṭ ve mustaḥkem bir ḳal'e ve öte cânibde şehrizôl beglerbegi dâme iḳbâluhuya bir ḳal'e bünyâd étdürilüb bu sebeb ile cezâ'irüñ ekṣer yerleri şeyẖleri gelmege yüz ṭutub ḥattà 'ulyân oġlınuñ nefîmeri (müftüleri ?) ve içlerinde 'ilimleri olan (? çâryek ?) mektûbları gelüb küllî iṭâ'at ve inḳiyâd üzre olub 'ışyânumuz yoḳ-dur déyü ṣulḥ ricâ étdüklerin ve Remleden yuḳaru 'arab firâr édüb ẖâlî ḳalan yer cezâ'irüñ ṣülûṣi miḳdârı olduġın i'lâm édüb.

[73] *Çûn ki düstûr-ı a'ẓam ḥaẓretleri bu umûrı vech-i meṣfûr üzre ḳayurub tamâm eyledi* (279 v°).

[74] Ferîdûn 280 r°-284 v°.

[75] Ferîdûn, 289 r°.

[76] Ferîdûn 289 v°-290 r°.

[77] Non identifié.

[78] Ferîdûn, 291 v°.

[79] Non identifié.

[80] Ferîdûn, 291 v°, 292 r°.

[81] Ferîdûn 292 r°-v°.

[82] Ferîdûn, 292 v°-294 v°.

territoires ottomans[83]. » De fait, la suite des déplacements de la flotte de Canpolad s'apparente à une marche triomphale, mais voilà que la tribu du *Nehr-i ṭavîl*, en face de Rahmaniyye, « qui précédemment, quand les Arabes avaient marché sur Basra et en avaient fait le siège, avait été la première (séduite par le malfaisant Muḥammad ʻOs̲mân) à commettre tous les méfaits et scélératesses possibles quand les irréguliers du peuple des Cezâ'ir avaient marché sur Basra[84] », persiste, sous la conduite de Faṣl bin Ebî-l-Leys, à refuser de se soumettre. L'armée impériale marche donc contre eux, les encercle, les contraint à abandonner leurs gabions et les combat ; bien entendu, c'est Canpulad qui, le premier, plante son drapeau sur les gabions ennemis[85]. Défaits après cinq jours de combat, les rebelles s'enfuient. « La troupe les poursuivit et les janissaires les rejoignirent alors qu'ils partaient en faisant fuir leurs femmes et enfants sur des barques et des radeaux, tirèrent dessus au fusil et beaucoup de femmes, d'enfants et d'Arabes se noyèrent ; beaucoup étant contraints d'abandonner leurs biens et vivres, les soldats de l'islam pillèrent leurs affaires et marchandises et mirent le feu à leurs rizières et aux… de leurs dattiers et les brûlèrent ; leurs forts furent incendiés et le feu fut mis aussi à leurs villages et hameaux[86]. » Après cette victoire finale et la construction d'un dernier fort au confluent de trois rivières, la flotte de Canpulad repart le 29 février 1568[87].

Comme on le voit, ces trois sources, loin de se contredire, se complètent. Surtout, elles permettent de constater que la campagne de 1567 fut bel et bien une application du plan proposé deux ans auparavant par Ferrûh̲, plan qui se révéla efficace, au moins à court terme. On notera également une phrase d'İskender qui rappelle l'attention prêtée par les officiers ottomans, dans cette zone difficile qu'ils connaissaient mal, à l'avis des

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[83] *Vilâyet-i cezâ'ir bu ṭarîḳ-le feṯḥ olub sâ'ir memâlik-i pâdişâhîye münẓamm oldı* (Ferîdûn, 294 v°).

[84] *Muḳaddemâ Baṣra üzerine ʻarab yürüyüb muh̲âṣara olunduḳda Muḥammad ʻOs̲mân nâm müfsid iġvâsı ile z̲ikr olan nehr-i ṭavîl ʻarabı mübâşereti-ile cezâ'ir h̲alḳınuñ levendâtı Baṣra üzerine varub küllî fesâdlar ve şenâʻatlar eylemiş imişler* (Ferîdûn, 295 v°). Lieux non identifiés.

[85] *Her ṭarafdan üzerlerine nâzıl olub ve meterisleri bıraḳdurılub muḥkem cenk ve ḥarba mü'eddâ olunduḳda cümleden evvel ḳapûdân-ı müşârün-ileyh ḥaẓretlerinüñ bayraġı meterislerine dikilüb…* (Ferîdûn, 296 r°).

[86] *Ve ʻasker h̲alḳı ardına düşüb ehl ve ʻiyâlleri zevraḳ ve kelken ile ḳaçurub giderler iken yeñiçeri ṭâ'ifesi yetişüb tüfenge ṭutub h̲aylî ʻavret ve oġlan ve aʻrab ṣuya ġarḳ olub ve niçelerinüñ da h̲i mâl ve rızḳları bıraḳdurılub esbâb ü cinsin ʻasâkir-i islâm yaġmalayub ve pirinç ve h̲urmâ ḳavsûrelerine âteş vérüb iḥrâḳ eyleyüb ve ḳalʻeleri yaḳdurılub ve köy ve kendlerine da h̲i âteş vérilüb…* (Ferîdûn, 296 v°).

[87] Ferîdûn, 297 v°.

experts. En revanche, force est de constater que, dans l'incapacité de placer sur une carte la plupart des lieux nommés par nos sources, nous ne retirons de celles-ci qu'une vision un peu floue des opérations.

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Dans le récit qui précède, les événements – déjà bien décrits par l'exposé d'Abdürrahman Sağırlı auquel je n'ai apporté que quelques compléments – sont comme il est naturel présentés du point de vue à court terme du pouvoir central : nous apprenons comment la Porte s'est efforcée de résoudre avec plus ou moins de succès, en tenant compte des difficultés locales, un problème local. Mais la documentation dont nous disposons permet aussi d'envisager la question de Basra et son *vilâyet* d'un autre point de vue, de se demander ce que cette province représentait pour les Ottomans et quelle était la situation des représentants de la Porte sur place.

Il me semble qu'il faut d'abord insister sur le climat, particulièrement pesant, qui (selon un rapport du *beylerbey* de Basra) rendait impossible de conserver des grains en magasins plus de trois mois, ce qui amenait la Porte, par un ordre expédié le 27 avril 1568, à ordonner d'entreposer de préférence des produits qui se conserveraient mieux, comme le riz ou les dattes[88]. Si l'on se souvient que Basra fut à plusieurs reprises assiégée et ne dut apparemment son salut qu'à la qualité de son système de défense, on admettra qu'il pouvait y avoir là un motif d'angoisse pour le *beylerbey*. De façon plus générale, d'ailleurs, les militaires ottomans devaient se plier à un terrain et un climat qui n'étaient pas les leurs. C'est ainsi que nous avons vu la flotte de Canpulad, arrivée à al-Hilla dans la première quinzaine d'août 1567, y « demeurer plus de deux mois, attendant que le climat des Cezâ'ir se tempère[89] », avant de partir en campagne le 18 octobre[90]. On notera également l'ordre expédié le 21 janvier 1566 au *beylerbey* de Şehrizor, sur la demande de son collègue de Basra, d'envoyer à ce dernier des janissaires dans la mesure où « les environs de Basra ne conviennent pas à la guerre de cavalerie[91] ». Il est frappant de constater que les autorités de la capitale ne se bornèrent pas à demander l'avis des

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[88] MD VII-1312. Cf. de même MD VII-2287, expédié le 22 octobre, où il est précidé que, conservé un certain temps, le grain se gâte (*bir miḳdâr müddet ḥıfẓ olınursa çürüyüb żâyiʿ olub*). A. Sağırlı (*art. cit.*, p. 91) tout comme C. Orhonlu et T. Işıksal ont déjà cité ces mêmes documents.

[89] *Cezâ'irüñ daḫi havâsı iʿtidâl üzre olıncaya degin donanma-ı hümâyûn ʿaskeri ile iki âydan ziyâde Ḥillede iḳâmet eyleyüb* (Ferîdûn, 285 r°).

[90] Ferîdûn, 298 v°.

[91] *Başranuñ eṭrâfı atlu ceng édecek yer olmayub* (MD V-827).

officiers se trouvant sur le terrain, mais surent en tenir compte : on a vu combien les opérations de 1567-1568 avaient été préparées et menées en conformité avec le plan suggéré à l'automne 1565 par le *beylerbey* de Basra Ferrûh Paşa.

La géographie et le climat auraient sans doute été supportables s'il n'y avait eu aussi les hommes. Parmi les difficultés propres à la région, A. Sağırlı signale notamment[92] le risque toujours présent d'une entente entre l'ennemi de l'intérieur (les tribus arabes des Cezâ'ir) et ceux de l'extérieur : les Séfévides d'Iran et les Portugais d'Ormuz. En fait, s'il est vrai que le *beylerbey* de Baghdad se faisait au printemps l'écho d'un bruit selon lequel les Arabes s'étaient entendus avec les *Frenk*, autrement dit les Portugais[93], cette information n'est confirmée par aucune autre information. De façon générale, les relations étaient dans l'ensemble satisfaisantes avec l'Iran séfévide depuis la paix d'Amasya de 1555, les deux souverains s'efforçant de contenir leurs officiers respectifs aux frontières et d'éviter les *casus belli*[94]. De même, les rapports avec les Portugais furent plutôt bons entre 1559 et 1573[95]. Tel n'était pas le cas bien entendu avec les tribus arabes des Cezâ'ir. La première et principale conséquence de cette situation était que les communications n'étaient pas assurées en toute sécurité. C'est là un point que mes prédécesseurs ont également souligné : les transports par voie fluviale couraient le risque d'être attaqués par les Arabes[96]. Une flotte militaire même n'était pas à l'abri, puisqu'on a vu le *beylerbey* de Baghdad envoyer en novembre 1567 un détachement de quelques milliers d'hommes au devant de Canpulad, « craignant, comme cet endroit [la zone de Ṣadr-ı dar] était dangereux et étroit, que les Arabes ne fissent subir des

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92 Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 90.

93 MD VI-1269, expédié le 12 juin 1565.

94 Cf. Bekir Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyâsî Münâsebetler. I 1578-1590* (Istanbul, İstanbul Fethi Cemiyeti, 1962), p. 11, qui cite notamment les documents MD V-1377, VI-424, 1122, Zeyl III 190-191, 193. On peut y ajouter MD V-1385 ou V-1247, expédié le 18 mars 1566, où il est rappelé à une série de *beylerbey* proches de la frontières : « Prenez garde à ce qu'il ne se fasse rien de notre part qui soit contraire à l'amitié avec Son Excellence le Chah (…) Vous ne laisserez personne de chez nous s'en prendre à leurs *re'âyâ* et ne perdrez pas une minute pour préserver et conserver la voie du pacte et de la paix. » De même que MD V-1385, VII-321 (expédié le 12 octobre 1567) montre comment de son côté le Chah tenait à afficher le soin qu'il prenait à ne pas appuyer les éléments rebelles au pouvoir ottoman.

95 Cf. Özbaran, « XVI yüzyılda Basra körfezi », *art. cit.*, p. 62.

96 Cf. cet ordre à Mîr Ḥüseyn, bey de Bâyât, qui a fait savoir « que le lieu dit Qurnah, sur la route de Basra, est un endroit dangereux et risqué, où les gens de passage passent avec beaucoup de difficulté ». Sur la sécurité des transports fluviaux, cf. Orhonlu et Işıksal, *art. cit.*, p. 88, 97.

dommages à la flotte qui arrivait[97] ». Des ordres impériaux rappelaient du reste à l'occasion au *beylerbey* de Baghdad qu'une de ses tâches était de s'assurer que les transports à destination de Basra arrivent à bon port[98]. Le manque de matières premières à Basra, que souligne à juste titre A. Sağırlı[99], constituait un handicap auquel pouvait aisément remédier la possibilité de faire parvenir renforts et matériel par l'Euphrate depuis Bilecik. Le Danube jouait ce rôle à la frontière hongroise. Mais s'il était certes nécessaire d'assurer une police fluviale sur le Danube, la situation était à l'évidence beaucoup plus grave en Irak : à tout moment Basra pouvait être coupée de Baghdad et du reste de l'Empire, ce qu'écrit tout uniment Ferîdûn juste avant le passage cité ci dessus : « Nul ne pouvait traverser Ṣadr-ı dar en provenance des territoires ottomans[100]. » Autrement dit, la continuité territoriale de l'Empire ottoman n'existait pas dans la zone.

À dire vrai, le bas Irak n'était pas la seule province ottomane aux prises avec de remuantes tribus arabes : on peut rappeler celles de la basse vallée du Nil ou les Bédouins qui s'attaquaient aux caravanes de pèlerins se rendant à La Mecque[101]. Mais les conditions climatiques et l'éloignement rendaient le contrôle des tribus des Cezâ'ir particulièrement délicat. Ferrûḫ Paşa, on s'en souvient, ne se faisait guère d'illusions sur la possibilité de neutraliser leurs chefs par la classique politique de la conciliation (*istimâlet*). Elle n'était pas totalement impossible, puisque ces mêmes Mu'awiya, qu'il présentait comme les plus puissants de la région et qu'il fallait contrôler si on voulait tenir celle-ci, agirent en fidèles vassaux à l'automne 1567 : « L'Arabe nommé Cheikh Sinav, de la tribu des Mu'awiya, qui s'était précédemment soumis et jouit d'un timar, vint à la rencontre de la flotte impériale quand on arriva chez lui dans le lieu dit 'Arce[102], eut l'honneur de baiser la main sacrée de Son Excellence le susdit *ḳapûdân*, fut gratifié d'une robe d'honneur et, accompagnant la flotte impériale, fit la campagne des Cezâ'ir[103]. » Mais force est de constater que la soumission

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[97] *Her vech-le maḥall-i tehlike ve cây-ı ẓayyıḳ olduġından A'râb gelen donanmaya ẓarar étmek tevehümminden* (Feridûn 291 r°).

[98] Cf. MD V-696 (enregistré le 24 décembre 1565).

[99] Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 90.

[100] *Żikr olan Ṣadr-ı dar ortasından dûr-ı 'Oṣmândan kimesne geçemeyüb* (Ferîdûn, 291 r°).

[101] Suraiya Faroqhi, « Robbery on the Hajj Road and Political Allegiance in the Ottoman Empire (1560-1680) », in eadem, *Coping with the State. Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire. 1550-1720* (Istanbul: Isis, 1995), p. 179-196.

[102] S'agit-il de la localité d'*Argieh* placée sur la rive droite de l'Euphrate par D'Anville ?

[103] *Mu'aviyye 'arâbî ḳabîlesinden Şeyḫ Sinâv nâm 'arab ki sâbıḳâ muṭî' olub timara mutaṣarrıf-dur mekânı olan 'Arce nâm mevżi'e gelindükde donanma-ı hümâyûna istiḳbâle*

de ce cheikh n'avait pas suffi à calmer les autres chefs tribaux. On a vu que les Benî 'Ulyân ne cessèrent d'alterner gestes d'apaisement et d'hostilité. Enfin une tribu vaincue se dispersait – le mot *perâkende* revient sans cesse sous le calame de Feridûn –, voire « disparaissait sans laisser de trace » comme Faṣl bin Ebi-l-Leys[104]. Mais on savait qu'elle pouvait réapparaître à tout moment. Moins que ces faits eux-mêmes, bien connus, ce qu'il importe de souligner est la conscience qu'en avaient les autorités ottomanes, qui semblent avoir eu du mal à communiquer avec des populations à leurs yeux versatiles et imprévisibles et, pour tout dire, à peine civilisées. La description qu'en donne Ferîdûn est de ce point de vue significative :

> Leur population rapporte que l'ensemble des Cezâ'ir est constitué de 360 cours d'eau. Chacun a d'abord peuplé une île avec son clan et ses clients et s'est approprié personnellement le revenu des palmiers dattiers qui s'y trouvaient et des rizières qu'ils y cultivaient, et ils n'ont pas estimé qu'il était préférable de verser de dîme et de produit à quiconque. Ils ne se montrent pas d'attachement et d'amitié réciproque et entrent en hostilité et conflit les uns avec les autres pour des broutilles. Ils complotent les uns contre les autres à la première occasion et personne n'a les moyens de leur imposer le talion quand ils se tuent. Benî 'Ulîyân tient lieu d'une sorte de grand chef parmi eux. Ceux qui sont en conflit et hostilité mutuelle vont le voir et il rétablit la paix entre eux avec une odorante *fâtiḥa*. [Puis] ils repartent après lui avoir donné un peu de dattes ou de riz[105].

Comment traiter sérieusement avec des gens qui ne connaissent qu'une vague organisation tribale et ignorent les bienfaits civilisateurs de l'impôt ? Ce dernier trait fait presque d'eux des mécréants. D'ailleurs Ferîdûn préfère écrire avec un *t* non emphatique, comme pour éviter toute confusion avec un musulman, le nom de Mîr Sultân, frère du chef des Benî 'Ulîyân.

Plus généralement, comment se fier aux Arabes indigènes, même sédentarisés ? Il est remarquable que la Porte éprouve en 1565 le besoin de préciser à Ferrûḫ Paşa, *beylerbey* de Lahsa, qu'elle le promeut à Basra en

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gelüb müşârün-ileyh ḳapûdân ḥaẕretlerinüñ taḳbîl-i yed-i şerîfleri-ile mü'ezzez olub ḫil'ât ile ri'âyet eyledîler ve donanma-ı hümâyûn-la bile gelüb Cezâ'ir seferin seferlemiş-dür.

[104] *Mezbûr Faṣl ḳaçub nâ-bedîd olub eṣeri ẓâhur olmadı* (Ferîdûn, 296 v°).

[105] *Cümle Cezâ'ir üç yüz altmış nehir-dür déyü ḫalḳı rivâyet eyledi herkes zamân-ı evvelde ḳavm ve tevâbi'i ile bir cezîre'i ma'mûr édüb ve içinde olan eşcâr-ı ḫurmânuñ ve zirâ'at eyledükleri çeltük maḥṣûlin mâlikâne ẓabṭ édüb kimesneye 'öşr ve maḥṣûl vérmek evlà gelmiş degül-dür ve bir birine iḫlâṣ ve maḥabbet üzre olmayub cüz'î nesne içün bir birine 'adâvet ve ḫuṣûmet édüb fırṣat bulduḳda bir birine ḳaṣd édüb ve bir birin ḳatl eyledükde kimesne ḳıṣâṣ eylemege ḳâdir degül-dür 'Ulyân oğlı bunlaruñ içinde hem-ân bir ulu şeyḫleri maḳûlesinden olub bir biri ile ḫuṣûmet ve 'adavvet üzre olanlar varub fâtiḥa-ı fâ'iḥe birle ıṣlâḥ-ı mâ-beyn eyleyüb mezbûra pirinçden ve ḫurmâdan ba'ẓ-ı nesne vérüb gidermiş* (Ferîdûn, 290 v°-291 r°).

récompense de ses bons services et notamment « en raison des relations cordiales qu'il entretenait avec la population de ce *vilâyet* [de Lahsa][106] ». Mécontentes de leur sort, les populations pouvaient en effet émigrer[107], risque économique auquel les autorités ottomanes étaient sensibles sur tout le territoire de l'Empire, mais aussi, ici, risque politique et militaire, comme le rappelait le *beylerbey* de Basra à propos des crimes de Ca'fer, *bey* de Zernük. Les plaintes s'étaient multipliées à son égard : cet encombrant personnage avait éliminé illégalement des « Arabes » ; il avait emprisonné un cheikh et abusé de sa femme comme des enfants déposés par d'autres en otage, extorqué aux *re'âyâ* des amendes illégales ; deux cents familles (*ḫâne*) avaient fui dans les *Cezâ'ir* : « S'il n'est pas éliminé – concluait le *beylerbey* – les *ḳul* s'enfuiront et les *re'âyâ* de leur côté s'entendront de nouveau avec le peuple des Cezâ'ir et nous perdrons les forts[108]. »

La fidélité des officiers eux-mêmes (dont l'origine ne nous est pas toujours connue) était loin d'être certaine : İbrâhim, *ḳul aġası* de Rahmâniyye, avait fui à Baghdad lors du siège de Basra dans l'été 1565, pour revenir benoîtement reprendre son poste après la bataille[109]. Du moins ce déserteur n'avait-il pas trahi. Mais que dire de Sinân, agha des *'azab* de Basra qui, ayant été démis vers la fin de 1565, avait poussé la garnison à attaquer le divan et à battre le cadi[110] ?

On comprend dans ces conditions que la Porte rappelle à maintes reprises que les officiers et hommes de garnison doivent être recrutés avec discernement. Ainsi l'ordre était envoyé le 21 janvier 1566 au *beylerbey* de Baghdad d'envoyer à Basra de jeunes braves (*yiğit*[111]) *rûm* – autrement dit turcs d'Anatolie – ou à défaut kurdes, mais ni « arabes », ni « tat »[112],

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[106] *Ol vilâyetüñ ehâlîsi ile ḥüsn-i zendegânî üzre olduġı ecilden* (MD V-23, enregistré le 29 juillet 1565).

[107] Cf. MD V-66 (expédié le 12 août 1565), VII-375 (expédié le 13 décembre 1567).

[108] *Eger ref' olmaz ise ḳul tâ'ifesi firâr édüb ve re'âyâ daḫi cezâ'ir ḫalḳı-ile gérü müteffiḳ olub ḳal'eler elden gider* (MD VII-1386, expédié le 9 mai 1568).

[109] MD V-113 (expédié le 22 août 1565) et V-951 (enregistré le 9 février 1566).

[110] MD V-824 (expédié le 21 janvier 1566). John Mandaville, « The Ottoman province of al-Hasa in the sixteenth century », *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 90 (1970), p. 480-513, signale aussi (p. 499-500) des collusions entre officiers et rebelles dans le Lahsa.

[111] Pour une discussion sur les réalités recouvertes par ce terme, cf. Pál Fodor, « Making a living on the frontiers : Volunteers in the sixteenth century Ottoman army », in idem, *In Quest of the Golden Apple. Imperial Ideology, Politics and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul, Isis, 2000), p. 275-304.

[112] Dans le contexte, l'épithète désigne sans doute des Iraniens, mais le mot *tat* a des applications si diverses qu'il est difficile d'être affirmatif. Cf. C. E. Bosworth, « Tât », in *Encyclopédie de l'Islam* 2e éd. X (2002), p. 395-396.

ni autres[113]. Mêmes recommandations au *beylerbey* de Basra le 5 avril, avec une précision supplémentaire concernant l'absentéisme : « Ne donne pas de poste (*gedik*) aux locaux, aux Arabes[114] et aux Iraniens ; ne verse pas de solde aux *ḳul* et hommes de garnison (*ḳal'e mustaḥfiẓı*) qui ne sont pas à leur poste : fais attention à ne pas dilapider le trésor[115]. » Comme de juste, ces consignes doivent être rappelées par la suite[116] …

Ces exigences manquaient apparemment de réalisme. Rappelé à l'ordre, le beylerbey de Basra protestait de sa bonne foi :

> On ne donne pas de *gedik* à des locaux, des gens qui ne seraient pas à leur place (*nâ-maḥall*) ou des "Arabes". Mais quand des *gedik* d'*'azab* ou de *mustaḥfiż* sont vacants et doivent être attribués, on ne trouve pas de *yiğit rûm*, kurdes ou turcs et ceux qu'on trouve n'acceptent pas parce que [ces postes sont rétribués] à 6 aspres [seulement]. On attribue donc ces *gedik* à des Iraniens qui ont fait la preuve de leurs qualités de service à de nombreuses reprises. Si l'on n'y était pas contraint il ne serait pas question de le faire. Enfin on ne donne pas de position à des *ḳul* ou *mustaḥfiż* dépendant de Basra qui ne seraient pas à leur poste[117].

Le sultan n'ignorait pas la situation ; il savait même qu'il y avait un trafic de postes, comme le prouve le début de sa réponse au *beylerbey* : « Il y a des individus qui, ayant reçu de mon seuil sublime un ordre leur attribuant un *gedik* là-bas les font vendre ensuite à des individus dont ce n'est pas la place, Arabes ou autres[118]. » Pourtant sa conclusion est toujours la même : « Tu ne donneras pas de *gedik* à des locaux ou des indigènes qui se présenteraient avec de tels ordres, mais leur reprendras ces ordres des mains et proposeras leurs *gedik* à des Rûm aptes et méritants[119]. »

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[113] MD V-833, évoqué par A. Sağırlı, *art. cit.*, p. 71 et 90 : *Rûm yigitlerinden yararlarından yazub rûmlardan kifâyet yetmeyen yarar kürd yigitlerden yazub defter édüb (…) ammâ 'arabdan ve tâtdan ve sâ'irden yazmayub rûm yigitlerinden kifâyet etmeyen kürdden yazıla.*

[114] Appartenant aux tribus par opposition aux paysans locaux, *yerlü*.

[115] *Ve yerlüye ve 'arab ve 'acem ṭâ'ifesine gedük ve ḳul ṭâ'ifesinüñ ve ḳılâ' mustaḥfiżlarınuñ mevcûd olmıyan neferlerine 'ulûfe vérmeyüb ḫazîne'i îrâḳ ve itlâfdan iḥtiyâṭ üzre olasın* (MD V-1361).

[116] MD V-1541, VII-1308, VII-1512.

[117] *Ve yerlüye ve nâ-maḥallî ve 'arab ṭâ'ifesine daḫi gedük vérilmeyüb ammâ ba'ż-ı 'azabistân ve mustaḥfiżlaruñ gedükleri düşdükde vérilecek rûm ve kürd ve türk yigitleri bulınmayub bulınanları daḫi altışar akçe olmaġ-la ḳabûl étmeyüb def'ât-la yoldaşlukları żâhur olmış 'acem ṭâ'ifesine ve yerlüye vérilür żarûret olmayıcaḳ vérilmek iḥtimâli yoḳ-dur ve Baṣraya tâbi' ḳul ṭâ'ifesinüñ ve mustaḥfiżlaruñ mevcûd olmıyanlardan bir ferde vérilmeyüb* (MD V-1361).

[118] *Ve südde-i sa'âdetümden ba'ż-ı kimesneler anda gedük içün ḥükm alub ṣoñra 'arabdan ve ġayrîden nâ-maḥaller elinde bey' étdürilmiş* (MD V-1361).

[119] *Anuñ gibi ḥükm ile varan yerlü ve 'arab ṭâ'ifesine gedük vérmeyüb ḥükümlerin ellerinden alub gedügi rûmlar ṭâ'ifesine yarar mustaḥḥaḳ olanlara tavsiyye eyleyüb* (MD V-1361).

Bref, devant les difficultés locales, le pouvoir central se borne à répondre, dans la meilleure tradition militaire : « Je ne veux pas le savoir. » On peut imaginer l'impuissante colère dont fut saisi le malheureux gouverneur de Basra quand il reçut cette réponse. Il devait lui paraître évident que, dans la lointaine capitale, le gouvernement sous-estimait largement ses difficultés. De fait, si l'expérience de 1567 prouva que les demandes du *beylerbey* de Basra Ferrûh Paşa deux ans auparavant correspondaient bel et bien aux besoins, le sultan ne s'en était pas moins montré bien dubitatif, demandant, par un ordre expédié le 21 janvier 1566, un second rapport au *beylerbey* de Baghdad :

> Il a demandé beaucoup de matériel et d'hommes. Comment est-il possible de se procurer tant de matériel et d'hommes ? J'ordonne que quand mon ordre sacré sera arrivé et que tu auras pris connaissance du contenu de la lettre du susdit [le *beylerbey* de Basra Ferrûh] tu fasses connaître ton point de vue sur la question : en va-t-il comme le dit le rapport du susdit ? Est-ce indispensable, ou bien d'autres mesures sont-elles possibles ? Et quand il faudrait juger nécessaire ce que dit son rapport, où prendre tous ces hommes ? Quel est le mieux ?

Le sultan attendait donc une seconde expertise, mais il avait déjà son idée sur la question : « On a le sentiment que les hommes et le matériel qu'il demande dépassent les besoins »[120]. Et voilà que pour finir, le sultan décidait à la dernière minute d'abandonner le projet de campagne, au motif qu'il partait en guerre en Hongrie, à l'autre extrémité de l'Empire[121].

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[120] *Ḥâliyyen Baṣra beglerbegisi Ferrûḥ dâme iḳbâluhu mektûb gönderüb emr-i şerîfüm üzre a'dânuñ ḥaḳḳından gelinmek tedârüki ne vech-le olmasın ehl-i vuḳûfdan su'âl édüb 'arż eylemegin mektûbuñ ṣûreti 'ayn ile saña irsâl olındı ḫaylî yaraḳ ve âdem ṭaleb étmişdür bu miḳdâr yaraḳ ve âdem ne vech-le mümkün-dür buyurdum ki ḥükm-i şerîfüm vuṣûl bulduḳda mektûbınuñ mefhûmı ma'lûm olduḳda senüñ daḫi bu bâbda fikr ve firâsetüñ ve re'y ü tedbîrüñ ne vech-ile-dür müşârün-ileyhüñ 'arżı idügi gibi mi-dür gerek-dür yoḫsa ġayrî tedârük mümkin mi-dür 'arż olınduġı üzre lâzım olduḳda ol miḳdâr 'asker ne yerden tedârük olınur münâsib olan ne-dür* (…) *ammâ ol 'asker ve yaraḳ ki müşârün-ileyh ṭaleb éder ḳadr-ı ḥâcetden ziyâde fehm olınur* (MD V-829, expédié le 21 janvier 1566).

[121] Un bon exemple de la difficulté à communiquer est fourni par un ordre envoyé le 26 octobre 1564 au *beylerbey* de Basra (MD VI-276). Il avait informé que des Arabes étant venus brigander sur le Chatt el-arab, il avait fallu construire un nouveau fort en y affectant des hommes d'autres forts : Sakâltutan, en ruine, et Taşköprü, sur la rivière de Zekiyye ; et qu'il faudrait y affecter la moitié des 200 *gedik* supprimés à Basra. Le sultan donnait son accord, mais ne pouvait s'empêcher de remarquer que les prédécesseurs du *beylerbey* en poste avaient présenté ces autres forts comme nécessaires : il fallait prendre garde à ce que leur ruine ou disparition n'entraînât pas d'attaque (*ammâ ref' olmasın 'arż étdügüñ ḳal'eleri senden evvel olan beglerbegiler ḥıfẓ ü ḥirâset-i memleket ve ẓabṭ u ṣiyânet-i ra'iyyet içün gereklü ḳal'eler-dür déyü binâ ve iḥyâ étmişler idi ol bâbda tamâm üyzre başîret ü tedârük üzre olasın ol ḳal'eler ḫarâb ḳalmaġ-la içine düşmen gelüb ṣuġınub veyâ ref'*

Pour les officiers en fonction à Basra, qui craignaient à tout moment un nouveau siège, il devait être clair que leur province, pourtant toujours menacée, n'était pas prioritaire pour le sultan. On peut supposer qu'ils se sentaient abandonnés et laissés à eux-mêmes. Faut-il s'étonner qu'on ait eu, apparemment, du mal à attirer en Irak des volontaires turcs d'Anatolie[122] qui, dans un climat sans doute pénible pour eux et pour une solde misérable, n'avaient que des coups à gagner dans le *vilâyet* de Basra ? La question se posait aussi pour les officiers supérieurs. Quand Ferrûḫ Paşa, alors *beylerbey* de Lahsa, fut nommé à Basra, il reçut l'ordre de regagner aussitôt son nouveau poste en désignant parmi les *ḳul* sous ses ordres un lieutenant qui le remplacerait en attendant son successeur[123]. Ce firman, qui ne porte pas de marque d'expédition dans le registre mais fut mis par écrit, pourrait avoir été enregistré le 29 juillet 1565. Pourtant six mois plus tard le successeur n'était toujours pas arrivé. Meḥmed Paşa, qui avait été désigné, avait fait valoir que sa santé ne lui permettait pas d'aller à Basra. Un firman expédié le 18 février 1566 en prenait acte et le nommait *sancakbeg* de Jérusalem, afin de lui permettre de « rétablir un peu sa santé » avec un revenu de 400 000 aspres[124]. À sa place, on désignait le bey de Hama, ʿAlî, avec un *ḫâss* de 800 000 aspres[125]. Meḥmed préférait donc renoncer à

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olmaġ-la memleket ü vilâyete ẓarâr ü ẓiyân olmaḳdan ḥaẕer édüb memleket ü reʿâyâya enfaʿ olan ile ʿâmil olasın). Deux logiques s'opposaient là et l'on peut comprendre l'une et l'autre. Le pouvoir central, qui ne connaissait pas les lieux, était sans doute perplexe à l'idée de ces forts sans cesse détruits et reconstruits, nécessaires la veille et inutiles le lendemain. Sur place, on était probablement plus sensible à une situation toujours mouvante, et ces forts après tout n'étaient sans doute que d'assez légers fortins bâtis de terre et de bois de palmier, à en croire la description de Ferîdûn (291 v°) : *ve ḳal'eleri daḫi bi-l-külliyye balçıḳ kesekinden ve ḫurma aġacından vâḳıʿ olub*.

[122] Le « registre de rémunération » (*mevâcib defteri*) de 962 /1555-56 étudié par Salih Özbaran donne apparemment une image fort différente, puisqu'on y recense, tant à Basra qu'à Rahmaniyye ou Fethiyye, de nombreux *mustaḥfiẓ* ou des *göñüllü* venant d'Anatolie et même de Roumélie : Bosnie, Albanie, Grèce, Bulgarie … cf. S. Özbaran, *Yemen'den Basra'ya Sınırdaki Osmanlı* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), p. 220-221, 242-243, 247. La situation avait-elle changé en dix ans ? S. Özbaran ne fournissant que quelques exemples, il est difficile de se faire une idée de l'importance relative des indigènes et des « volontaires » venus de l'ensemble de l'Empire en 1555-56. Quant à la situation en 1565, on ne voit pas pourquoi les autorités auraient inventé une pénurie inexistante.

[123] *Ḥükm-i hümâyûnum varub vuṣûl bulduḳda teʾḫîr eylemeyüb* (…) *begler ḳullarumdan ẓabṭ ve ṣiyânet-i vilâyete ḳâdir bir yarar beg beglerbegi érişince ḳâʾim-maḳâm taʿyîn édüb* (MD V-23).

[124] MD V-997. Mandaville fait donc erreur en plaçant (*art. cit.*, p. 513) Meḥmed dans sa liste des *beylerbey* de Lahsa.

[125] MD V-996. Document ne portant pas de date d'expédition, mais portant la mention *yazıldı* et situé juste au dessus du précédent sur la page du registre. On peut donc admettre qu'ils sont contemporains. Un ordre expédié le 17 février au *beylerbey* de Basra concerne l'installation de ʿAlî à Lahsa (MD V-1011).

une promotion et acceptait une rémunération deux fois inférieure à celle qu'il aurait reçue à Basra. « Faute de *beylerbey*, écrivait le sultan à Ferrûḫ Paşa, le *vilâyet* est dépourvu de tout[126]. » Pourtant les officiers locaux avaient été laissés à eux-mêmes plus d'un semestre. Encore Ferrûḫ avait-il désigné un commandant intérimaire. Mais on a vu que quand ce même Ferrûḫ mourut soudainement le 7 mai 1566, les *sancakbeg* du *vilâyet* de Basra durent s'arranger entre eux. À les en croire, ils avaient unanimement choisi pour chef le meilleur d'entre eux, Dervîş ʿAlî, bey de Zekiyye. On veut bien le croire. Mais dans d'autres circonstances de graves tensions pouvaient apparaître, au détriment de la sûreté du pays. De plus, les officiers de Basra prirent l'initiative de demander au sultan d'officialiser la situation en nommant Dervîş ʿAlî au poste de *beylerbey*. On peut y voir le sentiment qu'il leur fallait, plutôt qu'un pacha plus ou moins compétent parachuté d'Istanbul, un homme ayant l'expérience du pays, fût-il dépourvu des titres nécessaires. De fait, Dervîş ʿAlî n'aurait jamais dû devenir pacha, à en croire du moins Gelibolulu Muṣṭafà ʿÂlî qui lui consacre la notice suivante dans son *Künhü-l-aḫbâr* :

> Il y a encore [Dervîş] ʿAlî Paşa : alors qu'il était un irrégulier (*levend*) issu du peuple (*ʿavâm*), il acquit une réputation au service de certains émirs. Par la suite, en se fondant sur le soutien de Muḥammed Paşa le *şehîd*, il parvint au rang émiral. Enfin, par d'importantes contributions et la corruption, il devint *vâlî* de Lahsa et de Basra et même de Baghdad, porte du califat, où il mourut[127].

Cette notice venimeuse, qui fut reprise par Peçevî et Meḥmed Süreyyâ[128], n'est probablement pas entièrement véridique. Dervîş ʿAlî, en tout cas, ne fut sans doute pas en poste à Lahsa[129]. Appartenait-il à la clientèle[130] de Ṣoḳollu Meḥmed Paşa ? Le texte de Ferîdûn cité plus haut ne le laisse pas entendre et l'on peut en douter, car Selânikî, qui appartenait aussi à

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[126] *Beglerbegi olmamaḳ ile ḫâlî-dür*. Il fallait donc lui envoyer tout ce dont il avait besoin (*mühimmât ve meṣâliḥi ne ise*) : MD V-1011.

[127] *Bir daḫi (Dervîş) ʿAlî Paşa-dur ki ʿavâmdan bir levend iken baʿż-ı ümerâya ḫidmet-le şöhre-bend oldı baʿdehu Muḥammed Paşa-yı şehîd istinâdı-ile emâret pâyesine vuṣûl buldı bi-l-âḫire vergüsi ziyâde naḳd-ı irtişâsı âmâde olmaġ-la Laḥsâ ve Baṣraya ḥattà ki dârü-l-ḫilâfet-i Baġdâda (vâlî) olub anda vefât eyledi* (Gelibolulu Mustafà ʿÂlî, *Künhü-l-aḫbâr*, op. cit. II, p. 101).

[128] Cf. Peçevî op. cit., I, p. 445-446 ; Meḥmed Süreyyâ, op. cit., II, p. 410.

[129] Cette information vraisemblablement erronée pourrait être due à une confusion avec ʿAlî, promu du *sancak* de Hama au *beylerbeylik* de Lahsa pour succéder à Ferrûḫ Paşa, dont il a été question plus haut. On sait que Dervîş ʿAlî était *sancakbey* de Zekiyye avant d'être promu à Basra.

[130] ʿÂlî utilise le mot *istinâd*, Peçevî *intisâb*.

l'entourage du grand vizir mais n'en était pas aussi proche que Ferîdûn, ne connaissait apparemment pas le personnage, qu'il confond dans son récit avec Ferrûh Paşa[131]. En revanche, il est probable que la hargne de 'Âlî vient précisément des origines « populaires » de Dervîş 'Alî, passé au tour extérieur en raison des circonstances, mais peut-être aussi – même s'il est imprudent de généraliser à partir de quelques exemples – en raison d'une certaine difficulté à trouver des candidats pour cette province lointaine[132].

* * *

Au total, quelle image garde-t-on du *vilâyet* de Basra en 1565-1567 ?

C'est un *beylerbeylik* aux frontières de l'Empire, bien sûr. On est d'ailleurs tenté d'esquisser une comparaison avec la Hongrie ottomane, où se multiplièrent vers le même moment les *sancak* puis, quelques décennies plus tard, des *beylerbeylik* parfois transitoires. Géza Dávid, qui a étudié ce phénomène, émet l'hypothèse que ce mouvement s'explique sans doute par le désir d'assurer une meilleure efficacité du commandement militaire et une meilleure discipline. Il remarque aussi qu'en fait, le *beylerbeylik* de Bude demeure hiérarchiquement dominant[133]. Il en va un peu de même en Irak, où l'on voit par exemple Lahsa détaché de Basra au milieu des années 1550[134], mais où à l'évidence le *beylerbey* de Baghdad est le véritable maître : c'est lui qui centralise l'information, organise les déplacements de troupes et les opérations.

Mais la comparaison s'arrête là. Les provinces hongroises sont une priorité pour la Porte, qui contrôle à peu près la population et dispose d'un personnel de qualité, souvent originaire de régions voisines. En 1565, elle

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131 Cf. Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî*, M. İpşirli éd., (Istanbul, İstanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1989), p. 36 : « Un *ulaḳ* vint apporter la nouvelle que le *beylerbey* du *vilâyet* de Basra, Dervîş 'Alî Paşa, était décédé lui aussi. Il fut nécessaire de tenir un divan pour procéder à ces hautes nominations. »

132 La liste des nominations dans le *vilâyet* de Basra en 1572 publiée par Salih Özbaran (*The Ottoman Response*, op. cit., p. 154-156) montre beaucoup de mouvements internes, et notamment plus d'un cas où deux officiers font un échange de *sancak*, sans qu'on puisse déterminer lequel reçoit de ce fait une promotion. Il serait néanmoins erroné de considérer comme exceptionnel, à cette époque, le poids du recrutement d'officiers en poste dans une province et la connaissant de ce fait assez bien, notamment dans les régions frontalières de l'Empire : cf. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants. The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 63 sqq.

133 Géza Dávid, « Ottoman administrative strategies in Western Hungary », in C. Heywood et C. Imber éds, *Studies in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage* (Istanbul, Isis, 1994), p. 31-43.

134 Cf. Orhonlu, *art. cit.*, p. 99-100.

n'a aucun mal à trouver de bons candidats aux postes qui se présentent[135]. La situation est bien différente dans le bas Irak, dont l'*Hinterland*, territoire conquis et non pas vassal, ne mérite pourtant guère l'épithète « bien gardé ». Du point de vue ottoman, il est occupé par des populations à peine civilisées, qu'on ne peut espérer contrôler que par de ponctuelles concentrations de force, des prises d'otages, voire la terreur : on a vu les janissaires, en février 1568, incendier rizières, palmeraies, forts et villages, et même noyer des femmes et des enfants. En dehors de ces moments de brutale répression, l'ordre ottoman est assuré par des officiers turcs laissés à eux-même avec des subordonnés peu sûrs, cherchant à trouver tant que bien que mal un compromis entre les exigences irréalistes de la capitale et la réalité locale : bref une situation coloniale plus qu'impériale[136].

Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas très surprenant que Basra n'ait pas pu jouer le rôle de marche frontière et de base pour une expansion dans le golfe Persique[137] : pour contrôler la mer, il eût fallu aux Ottomans contrôler la terre et disposer avec l'Euphrate d'une voie de communication sûre avec le centre de l'Empire : tel n'était pas toujours le cas dans la seconde moitié du XVI^e^ siècle.

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[135] Cf. Pál Fodor, « Who should obtain the castle of Pankotya (1565) ? Interest groups and the self-assertion of interests in the mid-sixteenth-century Ottoman political establishment », *Turcica* XXXI (1999), p. 67-86.

[136] Dans son article « Portugais et Ottomans au XVI^e^ siècle », paru dans son recueil *Autoportrait du sultan en conquérant*, Istanbul, Isis, 2010, p. 225-236, G. Veinstein insiste sur le caractère secondaire pour la Porte de ces provinces lointaines, aux garnisons « bricolées ». « En un mot, écrit-il, ces provinces resteront toujours, vues d'Istanbul, très périphériques et même, en un sens, coloniales. » Sur la difficile position des gouverneurs ottomans de Basra et Lahsa, cf. Hala Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf, 1745-1900* (Albany, SUNY, 1997), p. 92 sqq. À en juger par le tableau de la situation au début du XX^e^ siècle tel que le présente P.-J. Luizard (op. cit., p. 19), les choses n'avaient guère changé : « Les Turcs considéraient leurs provinces mésopotamiennes comme un lieu particulièrement peu attractif : une population non turque et de surcroît dans sa majorité non sunnite, un sous développement que la politique de Midhat Pasha, gouverneur de Baghdad de 1869 à 1872, avait tenté d'atténuer, une position excentrique par rapport à la capitale de l'Empire, aggravée par la difficulté des communications, un climat peu clément aux étés torrides, autant d'éléments qui contribuaient à décourager nombre de fonctionnaires turcs appointés par Istanbul (…) D'une façon générale, et à plus forte raison pour tous les émirs et les tribus des confins, le sultan était un suzerain plutôt qu'un souverain. La perception du tribut dû à la Porte, qui faisait l'objet de négociations perpétuelles, interrompues par des révoltes, suivies de campagnes inefficaces de l'armée ottomane et d'alliances temporaires, symbolise pendant longtemps la principale manifestation du pouvoir ottoman. »

[137] Cf. Svat Soucek, « The Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf », in D. Couto et E. M. Loureiro éds, *Revisiting Hormuz. Portuguese Interactions in the Persian Gulf Region in the Early Modern* Period (Wiesbaden, Fondation Gulbenkian-Harrassowitz, 2008), p. 29-56. S. Soucek souligne notamment l'impossibilité de contrôler le golfe Persique sans faire de Basra une importante base navale.

Le port de Basra donne certes l'impression d'un marché international prospère, où se croisaient négociants et marchandises, à commencer du reste par celles des Arabes des Cezâ'ir qui y écoulaient leurs dattes, leurs agrumes ou leurs nattes de roseaux[138]. Mais autant – sinon plus – qu'une capitale de province, Basra semble avoir été une sorte de comptoir colonial ottoman[139].

[138] Cf. Mantran, *art. cit.*

[139] Cf. cette conclusion de Fattah, op. cit., p. 96 : « More an interplay between local and imperial interests than a straightforward colonization on the French Algerian model ».

EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN SUFIS VIEWING OTTOMAN TURKISH SUFISM: SIMILARITIES, DIFFERENCES, AND INTERACTIONS

Michael Winter

In August 1516 the Ottoman Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluks on the plain of Marj Dabiq, near Aleppo, and quickly conquered Syria. In January of the next year, the Ottomans conquered Egypt, thus completing the destruction of the Mamluk Sultanate, and annexed Egypt and Syria as provinces. Both empires were Sunni, and were ruled by Turkish-speaking sultans, who commanded mostly Turkish-speaking troops. Despite these and other similarities, there were fundamental differences between the two empires. This paper focuses on the religious aspects, Sufism in particular.

Both the Mamluks and the Ottomans were committed to live by the *Shari'a*, and developed systems of religious colleges, *madrasa*s, aimed primarily at training ulema. Egypt and Syria had the oldest and most prestigious institutes of higher learning, principally in Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo. The Ottoman system was more centralized and hierarchical than anything known in Islam until then, and was geared for preparing students to serve as *madrasa* professors, judges, and jurisconsults. Despite the differences between the Mamluks and the Ottomans in the religious structure, such as the monopoly of the Hanafi *madhhab* in the Ottoman judicial system, as compared to the coexistence of the four Sunni legal schools under the Mamluks, educational methods and approaches were similar. The religious subjects taught in *madrasa*s in both empires were similar.

Ahmad b. Mustafa, known as Taşköprüzade (d. 968/1561) wrote a pioneering biographical dictionary of Ottoman ulema and Sufis in grammatically correct Arabic. From his autobiography that concludes his book, one learns about his Muslim education and career as a scholar.[1] Although the Ottoman core provinces were Turkish speaking, the linguistic requirement of an Ottoman *'alim* was the knowledge of Arabic in order to be able to read the religious and legal sources.

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[1] 'Isam al-Din Abu al-Khayr Ahmed Effendi Taşköprüzade, *al-Shaqa'iq al-nu'maniyya fi 'ulama' al-dawla al-'Uthmaniyya*, ed. Ahmed Subhi Furat, with additions from Mecdi's Turkish translation (Istanbul: Kulliyat a-Adab, Markaz al-Dirasat al-Sharqiyya, 1985), 552–60.

Mamluk versus Ottoman Sufism

In both empires, ulema and rulers usually regarded Sufism as legitimate, and even as a complement to Muslim scholarly knowledge (*ʿilm*) and experience. In its struggle for legitimacy, the movement had gone a long way. In spite of lingering opposition, Sufism can be seen as a success story. Many ulema were tolerant towards Sufis, if they abided by the *Shariʿa* law, and their doctrines were not too far from the theological mainstream. Moreover, many ulema were themselves initiated into orthodox Sufi orders. Yet, while there was general understanding about what was acceptable to the *Shariʿa*, there were disagreements about aspects of mysticism, because it had never been defined as clearly as the law, and was open to many debates and interpretations. The level of tolerance for mystical ideas varied among the ulema and the Sufis themselves, and also between Arab and Turkish Islam.

Generally, in the period under discussion (from the 10th/16th through the 12th/18th centuries), the separation between ulema and Sufis was sharper among the Ottomans than it was in the Arab lands. This is evident even from the way the biographical dictionaries are organized in both cultures. In Taşköprüzade's *Shaqa'iq* and its *zeyller*, the Turkish supplements that continue it into the next centuries, the biographies are organized under the sultans' reigns, first listing the high-ranking ulema (*molla*s), and, in the next section, the Sufi shaykhs.[2] In the biographical dictionaries written in the Arab provinces, however, during the Ottoman period, no such separation was used; ulema and Sufis are arranged alphabetically and chronologically. Since there are no special sections for Sufis, and almost every *ʿalim* had Sufi affiliations, it is often hard to tell whether the person is a Sufi or an *ʿalim*. One has to look at his career rather than at Sufi links.

There were cases of Ottoman ulema who were employed as qadis, *madrasa* professors, or administrators at a religious institution; at some point they decided to forsake their careers to join the Sufis, sometimes

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[2] See especially the great centennial collections of Damascus and others in Aleppo and Cairo. Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi (d. 1061/1651) for the 10th/16th and the first third of the 11th/17th century, Muhammad al-Amin al-Muhibbi (d. 1111/1699) for the 11th/17th century, and Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi (d. 1206/1791 or 1792) for the 12th/18th century. For bibliographic information, see Michael Winter, "Historiography in Arabic during the Ottoman period", in *Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period*, ed. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 171–90.

even the unruly dervish groups. This happened also in the Arab lands, but to a lesser degree. It was common for an Arab *ʿalim* to carry on his scholarly or judicial career, and simultaneously to be engaged in Sufi activities.

The attitudes of Arabic-speaking ulema and Sufis towards Turkish Sufism were broadly influenced by two main factors: a. The Arabic-speaking population was under the domination of mostly Turkish-speaking people. Without making proto-nationalist insinuations, the ethnic difference was natural and important. The Arab historians call the Turks *Arwam* or *Rumi*s, and see them as outsiders; b. Examples showing that Turks were inclined to Sufism of a certain kind that the Arab people disliked abound in the Arabic sources. The religious culture and concepts of Islam were different on the two sides. The Muslim Turks (and Persians) were more attracted to mystical and even monistic notions than the Arabs. As always, a warning against generalizations is warranted.

Dervish Groups

In Anatolia (and also in India and Iran), there was another kind of mysticism beside the Sufi orders. It was represented by many dervish groups, who in their appearance, behavior, and beliefs were doing everything to contravene the *Shariʿa* and the accepted social norms. Their beliefs were based on renunciation of this world for the sake of a higher truth. The dervish groups were called Qalandars, Haydaris, Abdals of Rum, Jamis, Shams-i Tabrizis, and Bektashis. In their costumes, hairstyle, earrings, dances, music, begging for alms, they tried to express fantastic, cosmic notions. Sometimes their views were so removed from normative Islam that that only the cult of the house of ʿAli and the veneration of several sacred tombs of old Turkish heroes in Anatolia remained their link with Islam.

As Ahmet T. Karamustafa explains in his study of the dervish groups, this motley, vulgar dervishism was a protest movement against the regular Sufi orders, which accommodated themselves to the religious establishment, and enjoyed the rulers' favors no less than the ulema did.

Karamustafa notes that—

> In spite of similarities on the surface, the popular Arab Sufi movements of the Rifāʿiyah, the Badawiyah, and, in the Maghrib, the ʿIsāwiyyah, did not uphold the basic principles of deviant renunciation. These appear, rather, to have been regular *tarīqa*s that did not practice asceticism on a permanent

basis and were not radical protest movements directed against Islamic society at large.[3]

The Bektashi Order

Karamustafa explains that the Bektashi order at the beginning was not different from the other dervish groups, but by the end of the 16th century was transformed into a full-fledged Sufi order. This happened because during the 10th/16th century, the Ottoman state, for various reasons, exerted pressure upon socially deviant dervish groups.[4] As a result, the abovementioned dervish groups ceased to exist as independent social collectives. The Bektashi order of the later Ottoman periods absorbed many of the beliefs and practices of dervish groups that had ceased to exist. The reason for the success of the Bektashis was their connection with the elite Janissary corps that paid allegiance to Hajji Bektash (d. ca. 738/1337), the patron saint of the Bektashis, although he himself had not started a dervish order, and did not have *murid*s (disciples, aspirants in a Sufi path).[5]

In spite of the safe status of the Bektashis within the Ottoman state through their connection with the Janissaries, the tolerance by the Ottoman state of their heterodox beliefs and practices, a blend of Shi'i, Christian and popular Turkish elements, leaves room for astonishment. This paradox demonstrates once again the Ottomans' tolerance and pragmatism for the sake of *raison d'état*.

Ibn 'Arabi

One cannot exaggerate the importance of the doctrines of Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi, the famous and controversial Anadalusian mystic (born in

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[3] Ahmet T. Karamustafa, *God's Unruly Friends; Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200–1550* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1994), 99–100. About Egypt specifically, see Michael Winter, *Society and Religion in Early Ottoman Egypt; Studies in the Writings of 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha'rani* (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction, 1982; repr., 2007), 21–22.

[4] Karamustafa, 83–84. The explanation of this development must be the growing religiosity of the Ottoman state during that century. This occurred as a result of the Ottomans' wars against the Safavid Shi'i heretics in the east and the Catholic Hapsburgs in the west. The conquest of the Arab lands, with their long tradition of Islamic learning and *Shari'a* rule, contributed much to this process.

[5] *'Aşıqpaşazadeh Ta'rikhı*, ed. 'Ali Bey (Istanbul: n.p., 1332/1914; repr. Farnbourough, UK: Gregg International Publishers, 1970), 205.

Murcia in 560/1165, died in Damascus 638/1240), as an indicator of the kind of Sufism that was admired or rejected. His admirers studied and propagated his books, particularly *al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya* (The Meccan Revelations), and *Fusus al-hikam* (The Bezels of Wisdom), while opponents banned them, or at least warned that they should not be made accessible to the uninitiated, who might be led astray by reading them and turn into infidels. *Wahdat al-wujud* (the Unity of Being), the monistic theory that is associated with Ibn ʿArabi (whether or not he coined this term himself), was regarded as incompatible with the Muslim theological notion of God's transcendental nature, and the strict separation between the Creator and the created world. Generally, Ibn ʿArabi's doctrines appealed to the Turkish and Persian Sufis, and were considered unacceptable by the majority of the Arab Sufis, let alone by Arab ulema who were not Sufis. The reason for the opposing attitudes in this matter lies in culture and religious mentality, that are not hard to discern, but almost impossible to explain scientifically.[6]

The following anecdote illustrates the point. Arab sources of the Mamluk period report that in 822/1419, *Mollâ* Fenârî, the first Müfti of the Ottoman Empire, visited Cairo on his way to the hajj. The chronicler Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani (d. 852/1449) writes that he was widely known for his erudition, and that he was both pious and abundant in culture and merit except that he was censured for [espousing] the sect of Ibn ʿArabi and for the fact that he taught the *Fusus* and affirmed it. He goes on to say that *Mollâ* Fenârî, on the advice of friends, abjured mention of the subject in Egypt.[7]

During the Mamluk period, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), the brilliant Damascene Hanbali "fundamentalist" and polemicist, viciously attacked Ibn ʿArabi's theories. Later, debates were held about the beliefs of Ibn ʿArabi, often also about ʿUmar Ibn al-Farid (d. 632/1235), the greatest Arabic mystical poet. One such confrontation was conducted in the presence of the Mamluk Sultan Qaytbay. Among those who were invited was Zakariyya al-Ansari, the most respected scholar of his time (d. 926/1520 at the age of 101). He was a chief qadi and a Shafiʿi jurist, and had taught several generations of students. In addition, he was a Sufi and was initiated

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[6] On Ibn ʿArabi, see Éric Geoffroy, *Le Soufisme en Égypte et en Syrie sous les derniers Mamelouks et les premiers Ottomans; orientations spirituelles et enjeux culturels* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1995), *passim*, with many bibliographic references.

[7] R.C. Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul: A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), 86–87.

into several Sufi orders. He supported the Sufi side, exonerating Ibn ʿArabi and Ibn al-Farid of suspicions of disbelief. His argument, in short, was that unless one is knowledgeable about the terminology of the Sufis, one is not allowed to pass judgment on their sayings and to accuse them of infidelity.[8]

The Turks were attracted to the mysticism of Ibn ʿArabi, and his writings gained wide popularity. He stayed a short time in Qonya where he was welcomed by the Seljuk sultan. His disciple, Sadr al-Din Qonavi, propagated his doctrines in Anatolia. Ibn ʿArabi became tremendously influential in Ottoman society. Among mystical writers, he was matched only by Jalal al-Din al-Rumi, the great Persian mystical poet (d. 672/1273). Later, many viewed him as a patron saint of the Ottoman dynasty and attributed to him a treatise in which he had allegedly predicted the rise of the Ottomans and their conquest of the Arab lands.[9]

One of the first symbolic acts that Selim I performed, after defeating the Mamluk Sultanate and conquering Syria and Egypt, was restoring Ibn ʿArabi's tomb in Damascus on his way back to Istanbul. He ordered the building of a cupola on the tomb, a mosque, and a *tekke* (monastery or hospice for Sufis), endowed by a *waqf*. It is noteworthy that the people of Damascus, an orthodox and conservative town, did not like the project, and as Muhammad Shams al-Din ibn Tulun, the chronicler and an eyewitness to the events, tells, the works had to be done under the cover of night.

After Selim's death a short time later, Janbirdi al-Ghazzali, a high-ranking emir who betrayed his Mamluk sultan on the battlefield, and was appointed the first Ottoman governor of the province of Damascus, rebelled against the Ottomans. During his short-lived rule, he closed down Ibn ʿArabi's tomb complex in order to win popularity.[10]

Under Sultan Süleyman *Kanuni* (the Law-Giver), the Magnificent (reigned 1520–1566), the doctrine of Ibn ʿArabi became the official state policy. The *Şeyhülislâm* Ibn Kemâl Pasha, the Mufti of Istanbul (d. 940/1534), issued a fatwa declaring the Shaykh "a great *ʿarif* (gnostic), who had many disciples whom the ulema approve. He wrote many works,

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[8] See Winter, *Society and Religion*, 125–126.

[9] Dina Le Gall, *The Culture of Sufism; Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World, 1450–1700* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 123–24, and 217, note 74.

[10] Muhammad Shams al-Din ibn Tulun, *Mufakahat al-khullan fi hawadith al-zaman*, ed. Muhammad Mustafa (Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿAmma lil-Ta'lif wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Ṭibaʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1962–64), 2: 68, 79, 80, 124.

including *al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya* and *Fusus al-Hikam*. Anyone who does not understand must be silent. Those who deny this will be reprimanded by the sultan."[11]

Indeed, Ottoman officeholders who opposed Ibn ʿArabi's views could lose their posts. The most famous case is the dismissal of Çivizâde, the Mufti of Istanbul (d. 954/1547), for attacking the mystic against the attitude of most Turks (*Arwam*, a term the Arabic sources used those days for Turks).[12] Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi, the biographer and historian of Damascus, reports that in 942/1535, Muhammad al-Faluji, a popular preacher and expert in Qur'an readings, was sentenced to death by the qadi of Aleppo for accusing Ibn ʿArabi and those who believe in him of infidelity, "while the majority of the ruling elite believe in him." This expression is repeated many times by al-Ghazzi and other Arab writers of the period. He managed to flee to Damascus, and explained his case to the authorities there, and was pardoned.[13]

Several well-known Arab Sufis were partisans of Ibn ʿArabi, arguing that his writings did not contain anything that contravened the *Shariʿa*. Three names of the Ottoman period stand out: the Egyptian ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Shaʿrani (d. 973/1565), the Moroccan ʿAli b. Maymun al-Fasi (d. 917/1511) and the Syrian ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1144/1731). These three were the greatest Sufi shaykhs of their times. Al-Shaʿrani's orthodoxy was impeccable, yet he wrote apologetic works interpreting and defending the ideas of *al-Shaykh al-Akbar*, the "Greatest Master," as the Anadalusian mystic was called by his admirers. ʿAli b. Maymun, who was active in Syria as a guide and revivalist of Sufism, learned to admire Ibn ʿArabi's ideas under the influence of ʿAbd al-Qadir Ibn Habib, a humble teacher from Safad. Al-Nabulusi wrote a treatise entitled *Kitab al-qawl al-sadid fi jawaz khulf al-waʿid wa-l-radd ʿala al-Rumi al-jahil al-ʿanid*, "the right talk about the possibility of changing the punishment of the sinners in hell-fire, against the ignorant and stubborn Turk." This is an interesting theological treatise against an unnamed Turkish critic of Ibn ʿArabi. Al-Nabulusi says that the Turk has written against the good qualities of the Arabs, and that he hates all of them, not just Ibn ʿArabi.[14] Interestingly, here an Arab Sufi and *ʿalim*

[11] Éric Geoffroy, *Le Soufisme en Égypte et en Syrie*, 133–34, 511.

[12] He declared guilty of unbelief certain great Sufi shaykhs like Ibn ʿArabi and Jalal al-Din al-Rumi and others. Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, 250.

[13] Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi, *al-Kawakib al-saʾira bi-aʿyan al-miʾa al-ʿashira*, ed. Gibraʾil Jabbur (Beirut: Dar al-afaq al-jadida, 1945, repr. 1979), 2: 48–49.

[14] M. Winter, "A polemical treatise by ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi against a Turkish scholar on the religious status of the *dhimmis*," *Arabica* 35 (1988): 92–103.

defends Ibn ʿArabi against a Turk who opposed him. This was a rare, but not an isolated case. It has to be emphasized in this connection that al-Nabulusi was also a renowned Hanafi jurist, who maintained close and comfortable relations with the religious establishment of the empire.[15]

The Naqshbandiyya

In her study of the movement in the Ottoman world from 1450 until 1700, Dina Le Gall discusses the possible reasons for the fact that the Naqshbandiyya order that spread in Kurdistan, India, the Ottoman capital and other Turkish parts of the empire, was not successful in establishing a permanent presence in the Arab lands. The main points of her analysis can be summarized as follows: Although the Naqshbandis emphasized their loyalty to the *Shariʿa*, they did not think that it contradicted several of their modes and techniques, which some regarded as dangerous and unorthodox. One of them was the *rabita*, a spiritual technique of fixing the picture of the shaykh in the imagination as a vehicle for the flow of divine energy. Another was their insistence on the silent (*khafi*) *dhikr*, shunning singing, music and bodily movement. Most important perhaps was their adherence to mystical speculation of the Ibn ʿArabi school. In addition, the Naqshbandiyya, with some exceptions (mainly Kurdistan), was mostly a Hanafi movement; the Shafiʿi school, that was the leading *madhhab* in Egypt and Syria, insisted on the vocal (*jahri*) *dhikr*. The *tariqa* was an intellectual order that cherished the Persian language and literature that were much in demand among educated people in Istanbul and other Ottoman towns.[16]

These qualities appealed to ulema who were attracted to Sufism. The Naqshbandiyya was identified with the Ottoman state, although the most powerful and influential order in the capital was the Khalwatiyya. As Le Gall points out, all these religious and cultural elements are precisely the reasons why ulema and Sufis in the Arab lands were unwilling to accept this Sufi package. What was considered orthodox Sufism among educated Turkish people was not necessarily seen as such by Arabs. The Shafiʿi preference for the vocal *dhikr* was crucial. Although *madhhab* and *tariqa* affili-

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[15] ʿAbd al-Ghani b. Ismaʿil al-Nabulusi, *al-Haqiqa wal-majaz fi a l-rihla ila bilad al-Sham wa-Misr wa-l-Hijaz*, ed. Ahmad ʿAbd al-Majid Haridi (Cairo: al-Hayʿa al-Misriyya al-ʿamma lil-kitab, 1986), 407, 408, 464.

[16] Le Gall, *The Culture of Sufism*, 90–94.

ations belong to different religious spheres, it has been recognized that socially they are not as separate as one might expect. Usually, even educated Arabs, proud as they were of their own language and culture, were not interested in Persian language and literature. As has been mentioned already, they were wary of Ibn ʿArabi's ideas.

It should be added, however, that the above-mentioned observations apply more to Egypt than to Syria, where Naqshbandi activity definitely existed. ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, arguably the greatest Sufi shaykh in Ottoman Syria, who was an adherent of that *tariqa*, is the best known example, but there are many others.

The Muradis of Damascus were a family of Hanafi ulema and Naqshbandi Sufis, who for several generations made extraordinary careers in Istanbul and Damascus, moving easily between the two cities, being at home in both cultures and societies. Ottoman sultans granted them honorary titles, appointments as Hanafi muftis of Damascus, and gave them generous gifts of money and lands. The first member of the Muradi family to rise to prominence was Murad al-Muradi (d. 1132/1720), the great-grandfather of the historian al-Muradi. He was born in Bukhara and traveled to India, where he became a Naqshbandi. He went on the hajj, and remained in Mecca as a pious resident (*mujawir*) for thirty years. After further traveling, he came to Damascus, then to Istanbul. There he won the favor of the highest authorities. He propagated the *tariqa* with great success. The sultan gave him villages in the Damascus area as *malikane* (state lands held in fief by a private owner). In Damascus, he built a Naqshbandi center and a mosque. He died in Istanbul in 1132/1720.[17] His son, Muhammad al-Muradi, was born in Istanbul, and went there frequently, but his real home was in Damascus, where he died in 1169/1755. He was proficient in Arabic, Turkish and Persian. The historian Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi writes that his grandfather underwent a spiritual transformation, and gave all his many landed properties to his relatives. For more than forty years he wore coarse clothes and was a full-time Sufi, spreading the Naqshbandi *tariqa*. He became famous in the Turkish and Syrian regions. Sultan Mahmud I invited him to Istanbul and asked him to perform the hajj for him.[18]

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[17] Ibid., 154.

[18] Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 131.

It is obvious, then, that the Ottomanization of the Muradis—together with their Arab ethnicity and culture—made them natural carriers of the Naqshbandiyya in Syria.

Ibn Abi l-Surur al-Bakri al-Siddiqi on Ottoman Sufism

Muhammad ibn Abi l-Surur al-Bakri al-Siddiqi (d. after 1071/1661) was the most important Egyptian chronicler of the 11th/17th century. He was a member of an old family of distinguished ulema and Sufis who were active in Egypt's religious and public life from the 15th until the mid-20th century. In Ottoman Egypt, the family was rich and privileged and maintained good relations with the political and scholarly elite, hence Ibn Abi l-Surur al-Bakri's enthusiastic support of the Ottoman state and dynasty. He wrote important chronicles, but his longest published work, *al-Minah al-Rahmaniyya fi al-Dawla al-ʿUthmaniyya*, in spite of its historical value, is laden with panegyrics. As expected, interesting information about the Bakri Sufi family-order is provided. The author's reports about Ottoman Sufism are very meager, however, probably due to the author's limited knowledge, and also because of his reluctance to write critically. His short passage about Hajji Bektash consists of the following words:

> The shaykh and gnostic (*al-ʿarif billah*), shaykh of the Janissary group (*taʾifa*), was a saintly man who performed miracles. His noble tomb is in the land of the Turcoman. It has a cupola and a *zawiya* (a small Sufi center) that is a site of pilgrimage, and it grants the devotees' wishes, and brings blessing. In our days, some infidels have falsely associated themselves to him. Yet he is surely innocent of their claims. God bless his soul, and bring light to his tomb.[19]

It is remarkable that the writer avoids mentioning the Bektashi order, which he alludes to in the passage. The technique of praising a long-deceased saint, while dissociating him from his unworthy followers, is an old one, and was used also in Egyptian Sufism.[20] Moreover, the passage follows the reference to Hajji Bektash in Taşköprüzade's *Shaqaʾiq*, who wrote it this way for the same reasons, almost word for word.[21]

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[19] Muhammad ibn Abi l-Surur al-Bakri al-Siddiqi, *al-Minah al-Rahmaniyya fi al-Dawla al-ʿUthmaniyya*, ed. Layla al-Sabbagh (Damascus: Dar al-Basha'ir, 1415/1999), 23–24.

[20] Winter, *Society and Religion*, 76–80.

[21] Taşköprüzade, *Shaqaʾiq*, p. 20.

Al-Bakri al-Siddiqi praises Mehmed I for allowing the public execution by burning of the head of the heretical Hurufiyya order that disseminated the ideas of *hulul* (indwelling, infusion of the divine essence in a creature) and *ittihad* (the identification of the divine and human natures), that were attributed to Ibn al-Farid and Ibn ʿArabi. He points out that Beyazid II spent 40 days in a secluded cell, like a [Khalwati] Sufi. He highly lauds Selim for renovating Ibn ʿArabi's tomb.[22]

Al-Nabulusi and al-Azhar defending Sufism in Egypt against Turks

Al-Nabulusi wrote several travelogues that describe the social and religious conditions in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The longest and the most important one describes his long journey from his native Damascus through Palestine and Egypt to perform the hajj. The journey started in early Muharram 1105 (early September 1693) and ended in early Safar 1106 (late September 1694). Al-Nabulusi made a long stop in Egypt to visit holy tombs and to meet members of the local religious elite. His report shows scenes from Sufi customs and beliefs and the attitude of the al-Azhar ulema toward them.[23]

Al-Nabulusi recounts that he saw shaykhs of the Burhaniyya, Ahmadiyya, Mutawiʿa and the Saʿdiyya *tariqa*s performing the *dhikr* outside Bab al-Futuh in Cairo, each according to its particular ritual. All these orders were Arab and definitely non-orthodox. Yet al-Nabulusi attended some of their *dhikr* sessions. Al-Nabulusi adds, praising three Turkish orders, all of them also non-orthodox: "We saw in Egypt members of the Khalwati and Demirdashi *tariqa*s, and the offshoots of Sayyidi Karim al-Din al-Khalwati's way. They are perfect in pronouncing the Supreme Name. Whoever attributes infidelity to them is an infidel himself. The rulers ought to protect the Sufis from him."

A certain Turkish Sufi shaykh asked the Azhari ulema about a *dhikr* that seemed to him too ecstatic. Al-Nabulusi cites the long fatwas of the ulema of the four *madhhab*s regarding these Sufi rituals and beliefs. All of them expressed unequivocal support for the Sufis.[24] It is remarkable that a *tariqa* that was regarded as antinomian even by the meek and

[22] Al-Bakri al-Siddiqi, *al-Minah al-Rahmaniyya*, 33–34, 59, 83–84.
[23] ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, *Al-Haqiqa wal-majaz* 55–64.
[24] Ibid., 59–60, 63–64.

tolerant al-Shaʿrani seemed 150 years later wholly acceptable not only to al-Nabulusi, but even to the ulema of al-Azhar.

In Ramadan 1123 [October 1711] an anti-Sufi *fitna*, or violent conflict, erupted in Cairo between Turks, who were incited by a fundamentalist preacher, and Egyptian Sufis. This strife is reported in contemporary Arabic and Turkish chronicles, and has been studied by several modern historians. The incident is of special interest, since it reveals ethnic tensions between Turkish residents of Cairo and Arabic-speaking people of the city, caused by opposing attitudes towards Sufism.

The clash was started by an unnamed preacher, called a *softa* (a student of religion) in the Turkish chronicle, and *al-waʿiz al-Rumi* (the Turkish preacher) in the Arabic sources. During the month of Ramadan, the preacher incited his all-Turkish congregation at the Mu'ayyadi mosque against the Sufis. He made a list of seven *bidaʿ*, blameworthy innovations, all of them related to Sufism, and called upon his listeners to remove them. It is important to note that that he was not referring only to Egyptian Sufi practices, but also to similar customs that were popular among his Turkish audience. He specifically criticized the Gülsheni (founded by Ibrahim Gülsheni, a Khalwati shaykh in the early sixteenth century) and the Mevlevi *tekke*s, two exclusively Turkish centers. The crowd attacked the Sufis who were holding their *dhikr* at the Zuwayla Gate with swords and cudgels. (It was believed that the gate was the seat of the hidden *Qutb*, or axis, the master of the saints.) The Sufis went to obtain fatwas from the Azhari ulema about their customs. Again, as al-Nabulusi had witnessed seventeen years earlier, the chief ulema sided with the Sufis. The Turkish preacher dismissed the fatwas that were issued "by your Arab shaykhs" (*awlad al-ʿArab*). The Egyptian observers expressed their distaste for the "rough and ignorant Turks." Since the conflict was disturbing the public peace, the Mamluks expelled the preacher and punished the rioters. The incident also shows to what degree the Sufis permeated the ulema and enjoyed the sympathy of the ulema establishment.[25]

The 1711 *fitna* in Cairo serves as a warning against stereotypes and ethnic generalizations. Although the preacher who initiated the 1711 incident remains anonymous, it is clear that the riot must be considered as an aftershock of the by-then extinguished violent movement of the

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[25] On the 1711 *fitna*, see Barbara Flemming, "Die vorwahhabische Fitna in osmanischen Kairo, 1711," in *İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı'ya Armağan* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1976), 55–65; Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule, 1517–1798* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 156–60.

Kadizadelis that raged in the Ottoman capital and in several other Ottoman cities for much of the 11th/17th century, and was finally repressed in the 1680s. This fundamentalist movement attacked with its rhetoric and violent actions, under the old Islamic maxim of "commanding right and forbidding wrong," customs and beliefs considered to be blameworthy innovations, most of them associated with the Sufis. The movement's ideology was based on the ideas of Birgili (or Birgevi) Mehmed (d. 981/1573) and his follower Kadizade.[26]

Al-Nabulusi totally defended Sufism with all its variation, all *tariqa*s—orthodox and unorthodox alike, visitation of saints' tombs for intercession and blessing, Sufi dances and religious music, and both the silent (*khafi*) and the vocal (*jahri* or *jali*) *dhikr*, disregarding the long-standing debates about the merits and faults of each kind. The only targets of al-Nabulusi's criticism are, not surprisingly, Ibn Taymiyya, the brilliant Hanbali polemicist zealot, who viciously attacked Ibn ʿArabi's mystical ideas, and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350). Ibn Taymiyya's ideas are similar to those of the Kadizadelis. Yet, while he was isolated, and was even considered as an unbalanced troublemaker, the Kadizadelis were a powerful movement, which counted among its adherents several highly placed members of the Ottoman ruling class, particularly during the reign of Murad IV (1623–1640).[27]

Al-Jabarti against Turkish Sufism

ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, the great historian of Egypt during the late 18th and early 19th century, was puritanical and very orthodox. He admired the Khalwatiyya order, which during the 12th/18th century had undergone a reform toward strict orthodoxy, and whose membership in the 18th century included Azhari shaykhs, including all the *shuyukh al-Azhar*. He was repelled by what he regarded as the antinomian Egyptian Sufi orders with their unrefined and uneducated followers of the lower classes.

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[26] On the Kadizadelis, see Le Gall, *The Culture of Sufism*, pp. 58–59, 150–56.

[27] Ibid., p. 155, citing Barbara Rosenow von Schlegell, *Sufism in the Arab World: Shaykh ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1143/1731)* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977). On al-Nabulusi's defense of the Sufis against their attackers and his humanism generally, see the recent study of Samuela Pagani, "Défendre le soufisme par des temps difficiles, ʿAbd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi, polémiste anti-puritain", in *Le soufisme à l'époque ottomane, XVI^e–XVIII^e siècle, Sufism in the Ottoman era, 16th–18th century*, ed. Rachida Chih and Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 2010), 309–335.

He directed uncompromising criticism at Turkish Sufism as he saw it in Egypt, as both wrong and foreign. He often writes: "The Turks incline to this kind [of unruly dervishism]." Speaking of a certain Sufi, Jabarti says: "He was inclined to believe in *hulul* (infusion of God, the divine essence, in a creature) and *ittihad* (identification of the divine and human natures, the doctrines attributed to Ibn al-Farid and Ibn ʿArabi, respectively). Our masters, the Maghribis, do not approve of these things, since they adhere to the literal meaning of the *Shariʿa*. Yet the Turks (*ahl al-Rum*) believe in these Sufi ideas."[28]

Al-Jabarti recounts the misdeeds of two Turkish swindlers who tried to gain an appointment and get funds to renovate the Bektashi *tekke* in Cairo, taking advantage of the Ottomans' proclivity for Sufism. More negative descriptions of Turkish Sufis by this chronicler could be provided.[29]

Damascene Historians on Contemporary Sufism

Al-Ghazzi, al-Muhibbi and al-Muradi, the three authors of the centennial biographical dictionaries of the notables (*aʿyan*) of Damascus, were members of respected orthodox Sunni families of ulema, who were also part-time Sufis. All three regarded the Ottoman state positively, and judged its representatives whom they met in Damascus, or during their own visits to Istanbul, on their merits, assessing the governors, qadis, ulema and Sufis who passed through the city or who made Damascus their home. The majority of them are described by the biographers as good men, learned in religion, pious, some with good knowledge of Arabic. Many Ottoman qadis showed respect for local qadis and ulema.[30] Al-Ghazzi shows keen interest in Sufism, which was an integral part of his family's religious life for generations. He records biographies of Sufis, those from his native Damascus in particular, but also those who lived in Aleppo, Cairo, and the Turkish parts of the Empire, whose biographies he gleans from collections written by historians of these towns. He gets almost all his information about Ottoman Turkish Sufism from Taşköprüzade's *Shaqa'iq*, which is in Arabic. Even so, the number of Turkish Sufis described in al-Ghazzi's

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[28] ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, *ʿAja'ib al-athar fi al-tarajim wa'l-akhbar* (Cairo: Bulaq, 1297/1880), 2: 144, 210, 238.

[29] Ibid., 2: 144.

[30] See examples in Michael Winter, "Ottoman qadis in Damascus during the 16th–18th centuries", in *Law, Custom, and Statute in the Muslim World; Studies in Honor of Professor Aharon Layish*, ed. Ron Shacham (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 87–109.

books is small. Several Turkish Sufis, and also some Persian ones, moved to live in Damascus. Al-Ghazzi mentions their fascination with Ibn ʿArabi, his writings, and his sepulcher. He emphasizes the fact that the Ottoman notables (who were not Sufis themselves) who lived in Damascus were also the most enthusiastic admirers of the Sufi shaykhs of the local orders of Damascus, and went to them for blessing. Sufi shaykhs succeeded sometimes in pleading with the Ottoman authorities to reduce taxes imposed on the people.

The two main Damascene Sufi orders, the Samadiyya and the Saʿdiyya (known also as Jibawiyya), began their activity in that town in the early 16th century. The Samadiyya *tariqa* grew out of the Qadiriyya, generally regarded as orthodox. The members used drums (*tubul*) during their *dhikr* sessions, which gave rise to criticism. Yet respected religious authorities in the town reassured the critics that it was permissible, since the sounds resembled the drums that accompany the hajj caravan or the troops during a holy war. Shaykh Muhammad b. Khalil (d. 948/1541), the head of the order, had the reputation of a saintly man whose *dhikr* was respectable and awe- inspiring. The biographer writes that "people believed in him, particularly the Turkish notables." The shaykh traveled to the Ottoman capital, and was welcomed by Sultan Selim and after him by Süleyman, who donated to the order the revenues and the yield of Kanakir, a village in the province of Damascus. Their *zawiya* in the Shaghur quarter was well provided for, and the shaykh invited the local notables, as well as students of religion and saintly people, to their annual *mawlid* (a Sufi event, to commemorate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, or of a Sufi saint), entertaining the guests lavishly. The proclivity of Ottoman sultans, from Osman Ghazi on, for Sufism was well known, and Sufis came from near and far to take advantage of it.

The Saʿdiyya-Jibawiyya order originated from the Rifaʿiyya, which like the Qadiriyya, was one of the first Sufi orders in Islam. Both *tariqa*s originated in Iraq in the 6th/12th century. Contrary to the Qadiriyya, it was notoriously heterodox, given to fire-resistant and snake-charming exercises to signify the victory of the spirit over the flesh. The Saʿdi Sufi order was known to perform the *dawsa* (trampling) ceremony, in which the shaykh rode on horseback over the prostrate forms of his dervishes. In Damascus, the stronghold of the Saʿdiyya order was the Qubaybat quarter, whereas the Samadiyya were concentrated in the Shaghur neighborhood. Once, the two orders almost came to blows over the issue of drums in a procession. The Saʿdi Sufis were beating the drums during their procession, and the Saʿdiyya people insisted that this instrument was their

symbol, and must not be usurped.[31] It is noteworthy that Ahmad al-Budayri al-Hallaq ("the Barber"), an important chronicler of Damascus in the second half of the 12th/18th century, was not an *ʿalim*, but a barber, as his sobriquet indicates, and was a member of the Saʿdiyya order.[32]

Al-Muradi writes an interesting biographical notice about Ibrahim ʿAbd al-Baqi, known as Abu l-Wafa', a descendent of Saʿd al-Din, the founder of the Saʿdiyya. He had many admirers, disciples and deputies in Istanbul from the sultan and the elite down to the common people. He had two *zawiya*s in Damascus, and one in the Ottoman capital. The *tariqa* spread among Arabs and Turks.[33]

Ibrahim ʿAbd al-Baqi, like other descendants of Saʿd al-Din, was a virtuous man (*salih*), but unpractical, even enraptured or possessed (*majdhub*). Nevertheless, he was appointed as the trustee (*nazir*) of the *awqaf* of the Umayyad mosque. The clerks took advantage of his negligence, and controlled the mosque's administration to their benefit.[34]

The Khalwatiyya

The Khalwatiyya was established in the Ottoman capital later than the other major Sufi orders, but by the early 16th century it became the sultan's favorite and enjoyed considerable political influence. It imposed on the dervishes a strict novitiate, that included *khalwa* (seclusion in a cell), the learning of the "Divine Names", and the mystic doctrines of Ibn ʿArabi. The first adherents of the order in Egypt were Turkish-speaking disciples of ʿUmar Rusheni (d. 892/1487). One of them, Ibrahim Gülsheni (d. 940/1534) escaped to Egypt from Tabriz after the Safavid occupation. He was welcomed by Qansawh al-Ghawri, the last effective Mamluk sultan. The order became established in Egypt in earnest only after the Ottoman occupation.

Gülsheni was revered by the soldiers of the Ottoman garrison of Cairo; they even quarreled for the water with which he washed his hands. He was

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[31] Najm al-Din al-Ghazzi, *Lutf al-samar wa-qatf al-thamar min tarajim aʿyan al-tabaqa al-ula min al-qarn al-hadi ʿashar*, ed. Mahmud al-Shaykh (Damascus: Wizarat al-thaqafa wa-l-irshad al-qawmi, 1981), 2: 656–69.

[32] His chronicle is *Hawadith Dimashq al-yawmiyya, 1154–1175/1741–1762*, ed. Ahmad ʿIzʿat ʿAbd al-Karim (Damascus: Lajnat al-Bayan al-ʿArabi, 1959).

[33] Muhammad Khalil al-Muradi, *Silk al-durar fi aʿyan al-qarn al-thani ʿashar* (Cairo: Bulaq, 1874–83), 1: 41–42.

[34] van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures*, 137.

summoned to Istanbul for fear that his popularity might cause disorders. Upon his return, he had to retreat into complete seclusion. Two other Khalwatis, also former disciples of Rusheni, were Muhammad Demirdash al-Muhammadi (d. 929/1522 or 1523) and Shahin al-Charkasi, a former officer in the Mamluk army, who became a hermit and lived in the Muqattam Mountain, east of Cairo.[35]

Al-Shaʿrani, a genuine representative of orthodox middle-road Sufism, regarded the Khalwatis as lacking in Islamic beliefs and practices. He denounced the ways of the "men of the *khalwa*" for their laxity in fulfilling the religious ordinances and manipulating the "Divine Names" for material gain. He perceived the psychological dangers inherent in confining the Sufi to a solitary cell for an extended period, as long as forty days. Al-Shaʿrani confronted Karim al-Din Muhammad al-Khalwati (d. 985/1578), a disciple of Demirdash, who accused al-Shaʿrani of trying to turn him into a *faqih* (jurisconsult), while he was a Sufi. Karim al-Din outlived al-Shaʿrani and became the leading Sufi of Cairo.[36]

According the biographies of Sufis written by ʿAbd al-Raʾuf al-Munawi (d. 1031/1621), al-Shaʿrani's follower and successor as a historian of Egyptian Sufism, there were Turkish Sufi shaykhs in Cairo after Shaʿrani's death.[37] Later sources show that the Khalwatiyya continued its existence in Egypt during the 11th/17th century, but it was probably confined to Cairo's Turkish community.[38] During the 12th/18th century, the Khalwatiyya underwent a thorough transformation toward strict orthodoxy through the missionary activity of Mustafa b. Kamal al-Din al-Bakri, a Damascene Sufi shaykh (d. 1162/1749), who traveled to Egypt and propagated the Khalwatiyya of the line of his Turkish shaykh ʿAli Efendi Karabash. Under several Egyptian deputies, the *tariqa* became the dominant order of the Azhari elite. All those who held the position of *Shaykh al-Azhar* in the 12th/18th century were members of the Khalwatiyya. The historian al-Jabarti, whose rigid orthodoxy and contempt for the "irregular" and vulgar orders are beyond doubt, joined the *tariqa*.[39]

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[35] J. Spencer Trimingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam* (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 74–76.

[36] See Winter, *Society and Religion*, 83–88 on al-Shaʿrani against the Khalwati shaykh and the order's mystical techniques.

[37] Ibid., 87–88.

[38] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname* (Istanbul: n.p., 1938), 10: 219, 228, 229, 255, 429.

[39] Al-Jabarti, *ʿAjaʾib al-athar*, 1: 294–95.

Conclusion

Because of geographical conditions and cultural and linguistic differences, the Arabs' view of Ottoman Turkish Sufism was somewhat limited. The excellent Arabic chronicles and biographical dictionaries written in Egypt and Syria provide only a few biographies of Turkish Sufi shaykhs, almost invariably taken from Taşköprüzade's *Shaqa'iq*. The reverse is also true: in the *zeyller* (supplements), the biographical collections that continue the *Shaqa'iq*, all of which are in Turkish, one can find lives of several Sufi shaykhs from Syria and Egypt. All of them are Turkish translations of notices in the works of the Arab biographers.

Conversely, high-ranking Ottoman officials who resided in Arab cities sought the company, hospitality and the blessing of the local, Arabic-speaking Sufi shaykhs, if these were respectable and prosperous, such as the shaykhs of Samadiyya, the al-Ghazzi family in Damascus, and the al-Bakri family-order in Cairo. One should weigh the differences between Egypt and Syria. Geographic proximity played a part. Many ulema and Sufis from Syria—many more than from Egypt—traveled to Istanbul, some staying for extended periods, thereby observing and experiencing the religious and cultural milieu of the capital. Ottoman officeholders who served in the great Syrian cities or became residents were involved in social and cultural life there, including local Sufism.

On the other hand, Ottoman officials or Turks without an appointment who moved permanently to Cairo did not mix as well with the indigenous population. As chroniclers and travelers show, in Ottoman Cairo there were Turkish enclaves. Evliyâ Çelebi lists mosques and Sufi *tekke*s with exclusively Turkish congregations and *tariqa* adherents.[40] The Arabic and Turkish descriptions of the 1711 *fitna* leave no doubt about the existence in Cairo of exclusively Turkish religious institutions.

Finally, when assessing the degree of interaction between Arab and Turkish Sufism, cultural and ethnic differences and varying religious tastes must be considered. In Cairo and in several towns in Syria, there were a few Turkish *zawiyas* and *tekke*s. All of their adherents were non-Arabs, mostly Turks. The Bektashiyya was Turkish, and was considered a heretical sect by the Ottoman ulema. It was tolerated by the state only owing to its strong ties with the Janissaries. The Khalwatiyya mystical tradition and its eremitical devotional regimen, as well as the centrality of Ibn 'Arabi's

[40] Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*, 10: 195, 216, 218, 235, 239, 467.

monism in its curriculum, did not fare better among the Egyptians, until the order was totally reformed toward orthodoxy in the 18th century. The Mevleviyya was regarded as *Shariʿa*-leaning in the Ottoman Turkish provinces, but not among the Arabs. Their membership was Turkish; its basic Sufi text was the eponym's famous *Mesnevi* (*Mathnawi*), the poet's mystical thought expressed through a Persian poem of parables. The music and the ritual dancing of the "Whirling Dervishes," as they were known in the West, symbolizing the universal movement of the spheres, could never have attracted Arabs. Besides, its organization was centralist and did not spread beyond Anatolia and the Ottoman parts of Europe.

The Naqshbandiyya order, which of the other above-mentioned orders was the closest to Sunni orthodoxy, did not appeal to Arabic-speakers either, because of the centrality of Ibn ʿArabi's mysticism and Persian culture, and some of its Sufi preferences and experiences. Even the immense prestige of al-Nabulusi, the most famous Arab Naqshbandi of the period, did not make the *tariqa* popular among the Arabs, since he became famous as a teacher and defender of Sufism of any kind, but not a as a guide of Sufi aspirants.

GROWING CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE CHILD IN OTTOMAN SYRIA IN THE 19TH CENTURY: MODES OF PARENTING AND EDUCATION IN THE MIDDLE CLASS

Fruma Zachs

> A physician in antiquity was asked how to educate children. He replied that this should begin twenty years before they are born. People asked him how this was possible, and he answered, by educating their mothers from a young age.[1]

Introduction

In recent decades, the history of childhood has become a separate discipline, and more than a branch of family history, in Western culture. However, the modern history of children in the Middle East has yet to be written. Interest in children's education and the acknowledgement of the uniqueness of childhood—or what Philippe Ariès calls the growing awareness of the specific nature of children and moral solicitude[2]—was not a novelty in 19th-century Arab society. Islamic law and the *Hadith*, for example, refer to the need to instill children with self-respect.[3] During the medieval Islamic period several treatises were written on methods of childrearing, and there are indications that Muslim religious men and scholars were interested in children's education. In this pre-modern period, the prime texts were translations of Greek writings dealing exclusively or in part with children from ethical, pedagogical and pediatric points of view. Some of these translations were Islamized by Muslim writers and philosophers.[4]

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[1] "*Tahdhib al-Awlad*," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1376 (21 January 1891), 3.

[2] See for more details, Philippe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood*, trans. Robert Baldick, (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); Adrian Wilson, "The Infancy of the History of Childhood: An Appraisal of Philippe Ariès," *History and Theory* 19/2 (1980): 132–53.

[3] See for example, J. Mark Halstead, "An Islamic Concept of Education," *Comparative Education* 40/4 (2004): 517–29.

[4] See for more details Avner Giladi, "Concepts of Childhood and Attitudes towards Children in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Study with Special Reference to Reaction to Infant and Child Morality," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 32/2 (1989): 121–52; on the issue of poetry written on children in the medieval period see

Unlike in Europe, modern research on children in Arab provinces during the early modern period of the 18th and 19th centuries is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, there has been an upsurge in research drawing on *shari'a* court records of family life, especially on the condition of women, but also children. Some studies have shown that the Muslim jurists and courts of the period exhibited a certain flexibility in their approach and showed a willingness to temper many of the strictly delineated gender roles to the needs of the child.[5]

The present article is not a comparative study. It examines one facet of children's history, namely parental education and childrearing among the Arab middle class. It deals with the public discourse on children and the ideas surrounding childhood as manifested in the Arabic-language press, especially in the region of Greater Syria at the turn of the 19th century, and does not attempt to deal with actual conditions, evidence of which may be found in annals of Islamic law such as the *fatawa* collections and the *shari'a* court records (e.g. the *sijill*). It thus constitutes an initial foray into the field of children's history in the 19th century (the *nahda*-Enlightenment period) and suggests preliminary findings. It should be emphasized that the Arab middle class in Greater Syria was mainly Christian but evolved within a Muslim majority. On matters of culture it was the Christian Arabs who had the dominant voice in local newspapers, yet the ideas found in the press are an amalgam of both Christian and Muslim Arab thought.

This research also provides a glimpse into public opinion, including that of women, and thus reflects a different perspective on approaches to

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Thomas Bauer, "Communication and Emotion: The Case of Ibn Nubatah's *Kindertotenlieder*," *Mamluk Studies Review* 7 (2003): 49–96.

[5] See for examples on the issue of children in Ottoman Syria, Margaret L. Meriwether, "The Rights of Children and Responsibilities of Women: Women as Wasis in Ottoman Aleppo, 1770–1840," in *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History*, ed. Amira El Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse and New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 219–35; Amira El Azhary Sonbol, "Adults and Minors in Ottoman Shari'a Courts and Modern Law," in ibid., 236–56; Judith E. Tucker, "The Fullness of Affection: Mothering in the Islamic Law of Ottoman Syria and Palestine," in *Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era*, ed. Madeline C. Zilfi (Leiden, New-York, Köln: Brill, 1997), 232–52. On gender and family issues see for example, Beshara Doumani, "Adjudicating Family: The Islamic Court and Disputes between Kin in Greater Syria in Beshara Doumani, ed. *Family History in the Middle East* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 173–200; Iris Agmon, "Text, Court, and Family in Late Nineteenth Century Palestine," in ibid., 201–28; Eyal Ginio, "Childhood, Mental Capacity and Conversion to Islam in the Ottoman State," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 25 (2001): 90–119. See also, Hugh Cunningham, "Review Essay: Histories of Childhood," *American Historical Review* 103/4 (1988): 1195.

children in a rapidly modernizing Arab society in the 19th century. However, this child-centered attitude was not the outcome of new insights into child psychology or their rights but rather was a by-product of the reconstruction of the modern Arab family (one of the *nahda*'s core projects), which centered on marriage and marital relationships.

New Forms of Motherhood and Fatherhood

In Arab societies the child has often been seen as a crucial generational link in the family unit and the key to its continuation; the living person that binds the present to the past and the future.[6] Nonetheless, during the 19th century, as the notion of patriotism grew among the Arab middle class as a result of the encounter with Western culture, and with it the need to create a modern society, the place of women and hence children was redefined, in the sense that now children were considered to determine not only their families' future but also that of society. Intellectuals of that time tended to see the family, and not the individual, as the basic sociopolitical unit and hence viewed marriage, the marital relationship and children's education as the vital building blocks of modern civilized society.

This family-centered attitude, in particular as concerns the place of women and children in society, was partly influenced by the discourse on domesticity taking place at that time in Europe and America, regions to which the local Syrian/Lebanese bourgeoisie was attuned, due to the growing export and import commerce between the region and the West. As Fleischmann notes, this development "should be situated within a broader, global historical context in which domesticity was integral to the globalized project of modernity that accentuated nation building."[7] It was also the result of the influence of missionary education in the schools (both for boys and for girls) established throughout the region. However, I view this emerging domestic discourse in the pages of the journals and newspapers as a hybrid, complex, processual, and dynamic cultural creation in which power relations were negotiated and re-inscribed, and which drew upon multiple sources (both Arab and Euro-American) to

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[6] See for more details, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea (ed.), *Children in the Muslim Middle East* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).

[7] Ellen L. Fleischmann, "Lost in Translation: Home Economics and the Sidon Girls' School of Lebanon, 1924–1932," *Social Sciences and Missions* 23 (2010): 60.

constitute a unique discourse, albeit one which bore an outward resemblance to similar discourses emerging worldwide.

The socioeconomic changes that took place in the region of Greater Syria encouraged a family-centered outlook. As the Arab Muslim and Christian bourgeoisie came into power in this period through its encounter with the Western economy, its socio-economic interests reinforced the importance of the family and marriage. In Damascus at the end of the 19th century, Hudson points out that the boom economy and connections with Europe led to the rise of an intermediate commercial stratum and a dramatic increase in liquid and commercial assets. This change was also reflected in a decline of the traditional economy. Hudson's analysis of the *shari'a* court records shows that while extra-familial economic ties were solidified by loans and inheritance, the case of Damascus shows that the intermediate commercial stratum preferred to invest in the family, especially in this period of upheaval. This resulted in a situation in which patrimony was less emphasized than matrimony and gave greater weight to the family and the woman.[8]

Before long, a lively and public dialogue on childrearing and concepts of childhood, such as the place of the child in society, his education and parents' obligations to their children, was kindled in the Ottoman Empire in general and in the Syrian-Lebanese middle class/bourgeoisie in particular, and local newspapers devoted extensive coverage to the significance of the nuclear family and domesticity.[9]

Writers of the *nahda* believed that men's duties lay in the realm of the *kharij* (outside the house) while women's obligations were in the *dakhil* (inside the house).[10] Intellectuals stressed the importance of women's roles in the home and argued that women should be educated to fulfill what they considered to be their most important mission: raising their children, the future generation of society.[11] The press particularly (but

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[8] Leila Hudson, "Investing by Women or Investing in Women? Merchandise, Money and Marriage and the Formation of a Pre-national Bourgeoisie in Damascus," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 26/1 (2006): 105–20.

[9] It is important to understand this discourse as part of the growing debate on similar issues under the Hamidian regime toward the end of the 19th century. In fact, with the promulgation of the Education Regulation (*Maarif Nizamnamesi*) of 1869, there was a gradual implementation of new pedagogic methods in Ottoman schools and Ottoman public education was developed. See for more details Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 99–117.

[10] Yusuf Asbar Sab', "al-Mar'a," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1610 (7 April 1894), 4.

[11] See for example, Salim al-Bustani, "al-Zawaj wa-al-Zawja," *al-Jinan* 6 (1877), 382–4.

not exclusively) was an especially eager promoter of training women in *tadbir al-manzil* (home management). Magazines and journals in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria all published articles calling for female education in home economics and emphasized the prestige of motherhood.[12] Housewifery was redefined as the art of household management and the local standing of the family was frequently depicted as dependent on the social skills of the wife/mother. Women were often described as the *hakimat al-bayt* (ruler of the house), *ruh al-bayt* (soul of the house) or *qiwam al-hay'a al-ijtima'iyya* (the foundation of society).[13]

The division of labor within the family and the larger societal project was also re-debated. Wives and mothers were called upon not to stop at learning about domesticity and modern notions of household management. They were also encouraged to become active agents in influencing their husband's and their children's behavior. Mothers were groomed to play an important role in adopting modern concepts of discipline, and to some extent to reproduce a culturally specific definition of femininity and masculinity.[14]

This perception changed the more traditional role of the mother. In the classic Arab view, mothering was a temporary activity performed for the good of the child, but also for the benefit of the patrilineal family. In the past, in Arab society, mothering was mainly defined as maternal warmth and careful attention to the welfare of the child.[15] The mother was the child's nurturer, protector and something of an instructor, mostly from her own experience, since women were more often than not uneducated. Women, for example, taught their daughters sewing and cooking,

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[12] Lisa Pollard, *Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Mona Russell, *Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863–1922* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Crafting an Educated Housewife in Iran," in *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 91–125; Beth Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and Press* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 158–60; Omina Shakry, "Schooled Mothers and Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt," in *Remaking Women*, 126–70.

[13] Fathallah Jawish, "al-Mar'a fi al-Hay'a al-Ijtima'iyya," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1601 (4 April 1894), 4.

[14] See for example on this issue the writing of 'A'isha Taymur. Mervat F. Hatem, "The Nineteenth Century Discursive Roots of Continuing Debate on the Social-Sexual Contract in Today's Egypt," *Hawwa* 2/1 (2004): 72–4; *Al-Fatat* 1/1 (November 1892), 16.

[15] See for more details, Tucker, "The Fullness of Affection."

told stories, and sang nursery rhymes, but dealt less with their education or, for that matter, with their sons' education.[16]

However, the *nahda* not only emphasized women's/mothers' educational role, but expected women to become educators and role models for both girls and boys so as to integrate them into society. The intellectual Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (1804–1887), the editor and publisher of the newspaper *al-Jawa'ib*, wrote one of the most interesting articles on this subject, entitled "The difference between East and West."[17] Shidyaq was familiar with Western culture. He was a man of the world who spent much of his life in Lebanon, Egypt, Malta, Istanbul, and Tunis, and lived in France and England for more than 15 years. Although Shidyaq criticized Western society, he was fascinated by its attitude toward children. He believed that the main differences between East and West could be found in education, family life, and commerce. He argued that the difference between the roles of European and Arab women was that European women educate and teach their children before they start school, whereas Eastern women fill their children's heads with tales and superstitions. Hence, Eastern children are weak and cowardly compared to European children who are proud, active, full of initiative, and contribute to society. Obviously, Shidyaq was calling upon his readers to treat their children with more respect and in ways that would shape them into the adults of tomorrow. Shidyaq also believed that the condition of Arab society was the fault of men who kept women in a state of subjection, thereby damaging their children and by extension—the nation.[18] Despite their main focus on women, intellectuals such as Shidyaq called on men to maintain their prime role as provider to the family, to demonstrate more involvement in the family and to become more responsible for their wives and children's education.

This new perspective on parenthood, and especially the mother, nevertheless preserved the general attitude of the Islamic/religious and Arab

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[16] In his chapter on children, the American missionary Henry Harris Jessup claims that there are no less than a hundred and twenty nursery rhymes, songs for weddings, wails, and funeral dirges, etc. Henry Harris Jessup, *The Women of the Arabs* (New York: Dodd and Mead Publishers, 1873), 95–107; idem, *Syrian Home-Life*, compiled by Isaac Riley (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company Publishers, 1874), 41–3.

[17] Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, "Fi al-Farq ma bayna al-Sharq wa-al-Gharb," in *Kanz al-Ragha'ib fi Muntakhabat al-Jawa'ib*, ed. Salim al-Shidyaq (Istanbul: Matba'at al-Jawa'ib, 1288/1871), 1: 87–101.

[18] Ibid. See also Fawaz Tarabulsi (Tarabolsi) and 'Aziz al-'Azmeh (eds.), *Silsila al-A'mal al-Majhula, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq* (London, Beirut, Cyprus: Riad el-Rayyes Books Ltd, 1995), 150–4, 250–1.

definition of the marriage contract, which was to maintain harmony. In the Muslim/Arab definition, the marital relationship was complementary and not one of equality.[19] In fact, mothering and fathering were constructed along clearly gendered lines defining the mother as the nurturer best equipped to tend babies and young children, and the father as the provider best suited to support his children and protect the older ones. In the *nahda*, harmony was not defined by the fact that each was cognizant of his/her role and obligations, but by the fact that husband and wife helped each other to fulfill those roles and obligations. Men and not only women were expected to be more responsible and involved in their children's education and the leadership position enjoyed by men in the family was not absolute, but gradually became conditional on their fulfillment of their marital duties.[20] Whereas in the past fathers were mainly in charge of discipline and education within the household, they also had a close relationship with their sons' educators and instructors (for example in the *kuttab*), who were regarded as an essential part of the educational process.[21] In the *nahda*, both parents shared in the education of their children (both boys and girls), mainly at home and not only in school,[22] and created what Bouhdiba described as a "unitary vision of the interpersonal."[23] Nevertheless patriarchy was still preserved and thus authority, guidance and discipline continued to be viewed as central to the father's role.

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[19] Judith Tucker, *In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998). See also Hanan Kholoussy, *For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis that Made Egypt* (California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 99–122.

[20] See for example Hanna [Kasbani] Kurani, "Inhad al-Ghira al-Wataniyya li-Tarqiyat al-Bada'i' al-Sharqiyya" (part one), *al-Fatat* 1/5, (April 1891), 224.

[21] See for example on medieval education, Avner Giladi, "Individualism and Conformity in Medieval Islamic Educational Thought: Some Notes with Special Reference to Elementary Education," *Al-Qantara* 26/1 (2005): 99–121.

[22] Many writers saw the school as another important tool in educating the child, but felt that schools were not doing enough to educate children. See for example, "al-Madaris wa-al-Ta'lim-Kayfa wa-Mata Tuhayyi'i Waladaki li-al-Madrasa—Nasa'ih Mukhtabir Mufida," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1628 (28 July 1894), 3.

[23] See for more details A. Bouhdiba, "The Child and Mother in Arab Muslim Society," in *Psychological Dimensions of Near Eastern Studies*, eds. L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1977), 138 and 126–41; see also Amin Kna'an Talhuq, "Al-Rajul wa-al-Mar'a," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1358, (19 November 1891), 2.

Concepts of Children's Education: Theory and Practice

Now that education had become so important for both parents, the main issues revolved around the meaning of education and how to educate children. The local press primarily argued that children needed to undergo a process of education that would transform them into better individuals with proper virtues and morality; in other words, education would make them exemplary citizens who could contribute to and promote modern society. Writers envisioned children's education as a vehicle for preserving, extending and transmitting the community's or society's cultural heritage and traditional values, but also as a tool for social change and innovation in modern society. They believed that a good child is one who is polite and disciplined and conforms to the values of the group.

The shaping of children's character was an important part of the new discourse on the family in the 19th century.[24] The goal of childrearing was to instill and develop children's ability to reason, which was seen as a prime factor for successful adult life in society.[25] The authors made it clear that such a process required effort, patience and perseverance, provided by a protected and prolonged period of nurture. This perception was based on the belief that the child naturally has bad inclinations and the parents' goal was to guide the child back to virtuousness.[26] Hence, the purpose of education (*tarbiyya* and *taʿlim*) was "to suppress their desires and to cause them to loath their own inclinations."[27] Education needed to eliminate "... that which is coarse (*fazaza*) and barbaric (*khushuna*) within them and to filter out their bad behavior so that good behavior (*al-khisal al-karima*) may appear, with which they will be able to do well."[28]

The authors felt that the goal of a good education was to lift the "veil of ignorance" and to protect the child's mind. They called on their readers to "prevent the mind from falling into slackness (*khumul*) and out of focus (*kumun*) in order to obtain that which is visible and active." They clarified that the goal was not "refining the visible (*zahir*) and neglecting the inner side of the child (*batin*)" but was a lengthy process whose main influence

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[24] The same process can be found in British Bengal. See for more details Pradip Kumar Bose, "Sons of the Nation: Child Rearing," in *Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal*, ed. Partha Chatterjee (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 118–45.

[25] See also Hanna [Kasbani] Kurani, "Inhad al-Ghira al-Wataniyya li-Tarqiyya al-Badaʾiʿ al-Sharqiyya" (part two), *al-Fatat* 1/6 (May 1893), 275–81.

[26] "Akhlaq al-Sighar," *al-Muqtataf* 21/1 (1897), 60.

[27] "Shadhrat fi-al-Tarbiyya wa-al-Taʿlim," *al-Muqtataf* 7/7 (1883), 425.

[28] Ibid.

was on the child's inner being[29] and whose success lay in its administration at an early age (*tufula*).

This attitude was based on the assumption that at an early age, which the writers defined as infancy until the age of ten, the child is inclined to misbehave, to lie and to act egotistically. The parents' role was to give the children a regimen of love, affection, discipline and punishment, to help them distinguish between good and evil and to prevent them from making poor choices. In other words, the parents are guides. The authors made it clear that not every woman is capable of accomplishing this goal. The educator needs to possess the same good qualities; she herself needs to be properly educated.[30] Mothers must stop telling fairy tales and concentrate their teaching on principles of culture (*al-mabadiʿ al-adabiyya*).[31]

Articles that appeared, for example, in the newspaper *al-Muqtataf* under the heading of "home management" (*tadbir al-manzil*) were directed at a female audience and explained that a child does not like to study or be educated because these actions restrict his or her own desires, but a good parent plans for the future and should thus carry out these principles.[32] Authors distinguished between *taʿlim* and *tarbiyya*, i.e., between transfer of knowledge or providing information and the state of becoming refined, disciplined, and cultured. Authors stressed that *taʿlim* has to do with the inculcation of knowledge, but this process is only completed by *tarbiyya*, in which the child applies this knowledge, often through repetition, until he or she is transformed into a civilized and educated person.[33] For this reason, education needs to start at an early age and requires inculcation.

Al-Muqtataf published several debates on this topic that dealt mainly with the child's first ten years. Notably, education at home was seen as more crucial than education at school. It was argued that "[t]he child's first school is that of his father and the model imprinted in his mind is that of his mother . . . that which the child learns from his mother in a year cannot be learned in years at school."[34]

Thus, socialization was considered to take place primarily within the home and parents were seen as more crucial than teachers. While the

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[29] Ibid.

[30] "Akhlaq al-Sighar," *al-Muqtataf*, 60–1.

[31] "Shadhrat fi al-Tarbiyya wa-al-Taʿlim," *al-Muqtataf*, 426.

[32] Ibid., 425.

[33] "Laysa al-Taʿlim Huwa al-Tarbiyya," *al-Muqtataf* 7/3 (1882), 173–4.

[34] "Shadhrat fi-al-Tarbiyya wa-al-Taʿlim," *al-Muqtataf*, 425; see also Wadiʿ al-Khuri, "Huquq al-Marʾa," *al-Muqtataf* 7 (1882), 20.

debate concerning childrearing and children's education in Arab society was by this time centuries old, new educational theories incorporating both the work of Enlightenment thinkers and nineteenth-century physicians was added into the mix. For example, some of the above ideas seem to echo Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) writings and attitude toward children's education. Rousseau's philosophy of education, for example his novel *Emile*,[35] was not concerned with particular techniques of imparting information and concepts, but rather with developing the child's character and moral sense, so that children could acquire self-mastery and remain virtuous.[36]

Rousseau believed that the child is a savage who requires taming and instruction. He felt that both parents should teach the child to reason. He believed that the foundations of success in adult life were anchored in the self-discipline and morality acquired in childhood.[37] The writers of the *nahda* were apparently influenced by this European discourse, not only because they were attuned to French culture, but primarily because the principle of *equality in difference*[38] was preserved and these ideas emphasized the importance of the family—a key concern in Arab society.

Newspapers featured articles calling for tolerance toward children, and ways to make children happy, healthy and obedient. Thus, alongside interest in child's education there was a growing awareness of the place of children in society and their needs, which went hand with hand with the new

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[35] *Emile* gives an account of how Rousseau would educate an imaginary student from infancy to adulthood. This novel was considered among European intellectuals and educators of that time a seminal treatise on the education of the whole person for citizenship. See Mary P. Nichols, "Rousseau's Novel Education in the Emile," *Political Theory* 13/4 (1985): 535–58; Scott Walter, "The 'Flawed Parent': A Reconsideration of Rousseau's Emile and its Significance for Radical Education in the United States," *British Journal of Educational Studies* 44 (1996): 260–74.

[36] It is difficult to prove that they actually read his work but they were in fact exposed to several French books on the topic of education, books which were influenced by Rousseau.

[37] John Tosh, *A Man's Place: Masculinity and the Middle Class Home in Victorian England* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 91; Lynda Lange (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 1–23.

[38] The principle of *equality in difference* can be found in the writings of Ernest Wilfred Legouvé (1807–1903), a highly influential writer on the question of women in the 19th century who appealed to many Arab thinkers and readers of the *nahda*. Legouvé insisted that males and females were sexually different but complementary. He insisted on the necessity for separate but equal or parallel sexual spheres for women and men, united in the institution of monogamous marriage. For more details see Karen Offen, "Ernest Legouvé and the Doctrine of 'Equality in Difference' for Women: A Case Study of Male Feminism in Nineteenth-Century French Thought," *Journal of Modern History* 58 (1985): 452–84.

project of Arab middle class domesticity. Given that the home was now the center of family life, writers advised women on interior design and debated its construction and functions. They suggested that the educated and distinguished bourgeois woman should have a three-room house with a bedroom, guest room and kitchen, and that in the guest room there should be "a table piled with books."[39] Children's comfort was a prime concern and a growing number of the *tadbir al-manzil* columns, as well as later articles, were devoted to child education. Writers stressed that there should be a room (*bayt*) for a small child and a room for an older one. Detailed instructions were provided on the nursery—it must be large and well-ventilated, and allow occasional sun to enter. These descriptions went hand in hand with a growing awareness of children's hygiene.[40] Articles on infant welfare written by well-known European physicians of the time were also published in local newspapers. Writers also explained how to wean infants, what kind of food women should avoid giving their children[41] and when a baby should rest and sleep.[42] The importance of celebrating children's birthdays (*'id al-awlad*),[43] which was becoming increasingly popular in Europe at the time, also began to be discussed in Arab newspapers. The authors devoted considerable attention both to the mother and to the values she should instil in her children. Her role as a filterer of correct information and behavioural norms was stressed; her role was not merely to instil knowledge but to inculcate a moral code of behaviour. While the mother was expected to select appropriate clothing for her children, feed them healthy food, and care for them when sick, her most important function was to serve as a moral exemplar in whose footsteps her children could follow.[44]

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[39] Jirjis Himam, "Ikhtiyar al-Manzil," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1277 (25 January 1891), 3.

[40] Dr. Richard Ward Richardson, "Kayfa Nurabbi al-Atfal—Ghurfa al-Manama," *al-Muqtataf* 22/6 (1898), 529.

[41] Dr. Sinklar (Sinclair) Huldan (Holden), "Tadbir al-Amrad al-Mu'diya—al-At'ima al-Fasida," *al-Muqtataf* 22/6 (1898), 531–2.

[42] Dr. Richard Ward Richardson, "Kayfa Nurabbi al-Atfal—Fitam al-Awlad," *al-Muqtataf* 22/6 (1898), 528; idem, "Kayfa Nurabbi al-Atfal—al-Nawm wa-al-Raha," ibid., 529; idem, "Kayfa Nurabbi al-Atfal—al-Riyada al-Yawmiyya," ibid., 529–30.

[43] Celebrating a child's birthday was a novel event, which was entrusted primarily to the organizational skills of the mother. The anonymous author of a short 1894 article favoured such parties, as they instil a sense of importance in the child; however, the author cautioned against overspending and overindulging the young children with sweets. See Anonymous, " 'Id al-Awlad," *al-Muqtataf* 18/8 (1894), 558.

[44] These issues concerning the child also preoccupied late Ottoman textbooks. See Avner Wishnitzer, "Teaching Time: Schools, Schedules, and the Ottoman Pursuit of Progress," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 43 (2010): 19–29.

Women Write on Education and Punishment

The image of an active woman who takes charge of her children's education soon became actual fact and women writers strongly supported this cause. A good example is Istir Wakid from Antakya (Antioch), whom the Beiruti newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* referred to as an *adiba* (educated woman). Little is known about her. In 1891 she wrote a series of articles entitled "The Mother at Home" (*al-Umm fi-al-Bayt*), in which she advised women how to raise their children, especially girls between the ages of 8–10. Her writing can be described as a philosophy of child rearing. She explained that her main interest was to describe the difficulties that women face and that she chose to write her articles in the newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* since it had a large female audience. She criticizes local newspapers for failing to devote enough space to the issue of children's education and blames the school system for not doing enough to teach girls how to educate their children.[45] Wakid's articles concentrate on the proper way to educate children at a young age to be obedient and disciplined, which shows that she had absorbed the prevailing discourse on children and to some extent accepted some of its principles.

She also elaborates on the correct way to punish children.[46] She advises women to punish their children only after gently explaining why in a rational and didactic way.[47] Wakid felt that children learn right and wrong by realizing the ramifications of their acts rather than through physical punishment. Other writers also criticized methods of discipline in the schools, arguing that this kind of attitude infringed on children's free will. They claimed that severity makes the child more vulnerable and unruly. Writers called on teachers to focus on their role as educators and mentors and to educate children toward self-sufficiency.[48]

Corporal punishment was usually the custom in Arab society. Fathers perceived punishment as part of their patriarchal role. Traditionally, the head of the household or the teacher in the *kuttab* had the right to beat his pupils. Inflicting punishment was an unequivocal demonstration that ulti-

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45 Qalam Istir Wakid, "al-Umm fi al-Bayt," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1377 (25 January 1891), 4.

46 Istir Wakid, "al-Umm fi al-Bayt," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1328 (28 April 1891), 3; issue 1326 (16 April 1891), 3; idem, "Sultat al-Umm," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1329 (27 April 1891), 3.

47 Istir Wakid, "al-Umm fi al-Bayt," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1375 (18 January 1891), 2–3; issue 1376 (21 January 1891), 1. This attitude was already debated in medieval times by Ibn Khaldun, who argued that teachers must not to be too severe toward their pupils, nor a father toward his son.

48 Anonymous, "al-Walad fi al-Madrasa," *al-Mabahith* 15 (15 July 1909), 691.

mate power resided in the father or teacher.[49] However, in Wakid's writing, punishment was a well-thought-out progression based on understanding and the principles of childcare, and not an unplanned, unstructured emotional and spontaneous process (traits which also describe an uneducated woman). As with other ideas of the *nahda*, education and punishment become more rationalized and hence more cultural and modern.

As was true of liberal educators in Europe at that time, there was a gradual but marked shift away from beating as a routine punishment. Most texts assumed that the purpose of parental discipline was to shape, rather than to crush, the child. The desired outcome was not a broken spirit, but a capacity for self-government, and this called for different methods. The mother was thought best able to administer appropriate punishment.[50] In this way, childcare and in many cases punishment were left to the educated woman who was considered to have the moral ability and the sensitivity to raise a child.[51] This transition in the concept of punishment was reflected in a revealing change in vocabulary. There was less talk of authority and much greater emphasis on influence. Because the child's individuality was gradually recognized, children's upbringing had to be carefully adapted to each child's particular temperament, something that required observation and flexibility from day to day.[52]

Readings on Girls' Education

In 1891 the newspaper *Lisan al-Hal* published an article entitled *Tahdhib al-Awlad* (Children's Education) that contained the following anecdote: "A physician in antiquity was asked how to educate children. He replied that this should begin twenty years before they are born. People asked him how this was possible, and he answered, by educating their mothers from a young age."[53]

What was conspicuous in the 19th century was the growing importance of girls' education from a young age, which was considered no less important than boys' education. Girls' education was vital, not only in

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[49] Giladi, "Concepts of Childhood," 125–6.

[50] Tosh, *A Man's Place*, 92.

[51] Michelle Perrot and Georges Duby (eds.), *A History of Private Life: From Fires of Revolution to the Great War* (Cambridge, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), 208–11.

[52] Tosh, *A Man's Place*, 91.

[53] "*Tahdhib al-Awlad*," *Lisan al-Hal*, issue 1376 (21 January 1891), 3.

order to shape an educated woman who would take care of her husband and children, but also for the construction of her femininity starting in childhood.

In 1894, Hind Nawfal (1860–1920), the founder of the first women's newspaper in Cairo, *al-Fatat*, published an article which presented a list of almost thirty mainly French books that Arab women should read to educate themselves and their daughters.[54] The list was directed towards local wives, mothers and young daughters to educate them morally and modestly and to teach them how to behave and how to raise their children.[55] Most of the authors were women from the distinguished French and English elite of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries who had made contributions to society. Most of them are identified as the wives of important male figures and not by their own names. Some were feminists who wrote novels dealing with the issue of women in the nation. Others concentrated on domesticity. For example, Harriet Martineau (1802–1876), an English writer and philosopher, was renowned in her day as a controversial journalist, political economist, abolitionist and life-long feminist, who wrote on the economy, education and the household.

The list also included pedagogical literature for children. Some of these books, with a moral bent, were intended to educate local mothers and daughters how to behave with modesty and how to curb their inappropriate behavior. For example, the newspaper recommends Sophie Rostopchine, the Comtesse de Ségur (1799–1874), who was a French writer of Russian birth. She is best-known for her educational books for children such as *Les Malheurs de Sophie* (Sophie's Misfortunes), which was published in 1859 and dealt with girls' education. In her character Sophie, the Comtesse de Ségur depicts the process of girls' socialization in an amusing fashion. Sophie is an upper-class four-year-old who lives with her parents in a château and her main playmate is her slightly older cousin Paul. Sophie has a string of little adventures that always end in tears.[56]

Another recommended book was that of Elisabeth Charlotte Pauline de Meulan, Madame Guizot (1773–1827), which deals with pupils and home education. She was the wife of the statesman François Guizot (1787–1874),

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[54] It seems that this list was reprinted from the Beiruti newspaper *Lisan al-Hal*. I could identify only some of the books listed since it was hard to re-construct their titles, which are written in French but with Arabic letters, especially since full details, titles and the authors' names were not always specified.

[55] *"Fa'ida Adabiyya,"* *al-Fatat* 1/10 (15 February 1894), 446–8.

[56] Alison Finch, *Women's Writing in Nineteenth-Century France* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 111–2.

a historian and French Prime Minister. Madame Guizot wrote a series of moral, educational and political treatises. She emerged as one of the most prominent moral and educational theorists in France and she won a prize for moral theory from the Académie Française in 1827 and 1828 for her treatises on education. Her writing had a major impact on the educational thought of her day.[57]

These books were not chosen at random. All dealt with messages that the Arab middle class wanted to encourage, especially about women's domesticity and girls' femininity. For example, the main message of the Comtesse de Ségur's book, which would dominate local Arab writing as well, was that "femininity" is not innate. Little girls do not know by instinct how to make themselves physically attractive or how to behave according to social norms. This attitude was also highly emphasized in Arabic novels written during the *nahda*. Like Rousseau, local intellectuals of the *nahda* believed that women should be re-educated, re-shaped and re-adjusted and they should be taught to curb their (spontaneous) negative character traits from a young age.[58]

Conclusion

Childhood is not an unchanging, natural phenomenon but a social and cultural construct. In the writing of the Arab middle class in Greater Syria at the turn of the 19th century, children began to capture a larger place in the adult imagination, yet children themselves were often brought up in an inflexible domestic regime. As the Arab middle class in the region increasingly focused on patriotism, domestic life also became more important

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[57] "Madame Guizot," *The New York Times* (13 February 1898); Eva Martin Sartori (ed.), *The Feminist Encyclopedia of French Literature* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1999), 247.

[58] Local Muslim religious and educators also began to write books on children's education in which they discussed girls' education. One example is Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801–1873). In 1872 he wrote a book entitled *al-Murshid al-Amin lil-Banat wa-al-Banin—A Guide for Girls and Boys*. It was written as a textbook for boys and girls in the newly established schools of Egypt, in response to a 1837 request from the Ministry of Schools (*Diwan al-Madaris*) in which al-Tahtawi was a central figure. Al-Tahtawi devoted a chapter of the book to the thesis that it is preferable not to discriminate between teaching boys and girls. He argued that girls' education has an enormous impact on happiness in married life and education, and that good manners on the mother's part determine how children are raised. See Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi, *Tahrir al-Mar'a al-Muslima: Kitab al-Murshid al-Amin fi Tarbiyat al-Banat wa-al-Banin*, ed. Yahya al-Shaykh (Beirut: Dar al-Buraq, 2000).

as the foundation of the future society. In this framework a new, more extensive role was increasingly assigned to women within the patriarchal framework: one of educational authority. At the same time, public debate in the local press increasingly dealt with issues related to children. Thus, everything pertaining to children and family life gradually became worthy of attention. Children were now seen as the future components of society and the homeland and as such, to be invested in and nurtured. This child-centered attitude was not the result of new insights into children's psychology or rights, but rather was a by-product of the reconstruction of the modern Arab family (one of the *nahda*'s core projects), which was mainly focused on marriage and marital relationships and not on women's (or for that matter, children's) self-fulfillment and rights. However, what is important is that this approach gradually changed the collective image of the child, which slowly began to be perceived, not as an entity in the making, but as a reality in itself, deserving of interest and consideration.[59]

By discussing children's education in the press, this topic, which previously had mostly been the fief of men of religion, ethicists and philosophers, became a central issue in the public sphere among the local bourgeoisie. Not only men but also women put forward their opinions and interpretations, and attempted to re-adjust them to modern times.

In this way, the 19th century was the time when childhood was seen as important not in itself, but for the ways in which it would produce the adults of tomorrow, meaning, the members of the nation. In this regard the *nahda* was a period of transition, one in which adult lives were increasingly defined as shaped by childhood experiences. This transformation helped to set the tone for the modern approach to Arab children's education and rights.

[59] See for more details Bouhdiba, "The Child and Mother in Arab Muslim Society," 126–41.

PART THREE

OTTOMAN JEWS AND THE SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES

RETOUR SUR LES PRIVILÈGES DES ALAMANOĞLU: UNE LIGNÉE JUIVE OTTOMANE À TRAVERS LES SIÈCLES

Gilles Veinstein*

Des édits d'exemption du XIX^e siècle

La famille juive ottomane des Alamanoğlu (pl. Alamanoğulları) ou Ashkenazi a retenu l'attention des historiens depuis la fin du XIX^e siècle. La raison en est la découverte dans les archives de plusieurs actes d'exemptions fiscales, concernant la famille en général ou telle de ses diverses branches disséminées à travers l'Empire en particulier. Tous les documents connus jusqu'ici n'étaient pas antérieurs au XIX^e siècle. Le plus ancien ne remontait pas au delà de 1839[1]. Les autres dataient respectivement de 1851[2], 1863[3], 1864-1865[4]. Plus récemment des documents de 1859-1860 ont été mis au

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* We deeply regret the death of Professor Gilles Veinstein of EHESS and Collège de France while we were in the process of producing this volume. He was among the foremost Ottomanists of his generation, leaving an enormous scholarly legacy. His collegial manner and verve will be missed by all of us.

[1] J.H. Mordtmann, « Adalék Buda 1526-iki elfoglalásához », *A Konstantinápolyi Magyar Tudományos Intézet Közleményei* 3 (1918), p. 4-15. Je remercie vivement mon collègue et ami Pál Fodor de m'avoir aidé à consulter cette étude en hongrois. La version allemande de la même étude ne m'a pas été accessible : « Zur Kapitulation von Buda im Jahr 1526 », *Mitteilungen des ungarischen wissenschaftlichen Instituts in Konstantinopel* 3 (1918). Une copie de ce même renouvellement de 1839 est signalée dans les archives d'État de Roumanie à Bucarest et sert de base à l'article de Marie-Mathilde Alexandrescu-Dersca, « Un privilège accordé par Suleyman 1^er après l'occupation de Bude (1526) », *Revue des Etudes sud-est européennes* IV/3-4 (1966), p. 377-391. Description et références du document, p. 381, n. 30.

[2] Ce document concerne un Alamanoğlu de Chio, Sakızlu Avram David. Il a été publié par Avram Galante, *Documents officiels turcs concernant les Juifs de Turquie*, VII (Istanbul : Çituri Biraderler, 1938 ; reprint Isis), p. 13-15. Il porte la date du 12 *safer* que Galante transcrit de façon erronée par 1853 (*recte* : 7 décembre 1851).

[3] Une confirmation de 1280 [1863] a été publiée par Avram Danon dans la revue *Yosef Da'ath*, à Edirne, en 1888 (ne nous a pas été accessible). Un résumé de cette publication figure dans Moïse Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'Empire ottoman, depuis les origines à nos jours* (Paris, 1897 ; reprint du Centre d'études Don Isaac Abravanel, 1980), p. 49-51.

[4] Ce renouvellement concerne 65 familles de descendants réparties entre Hasköy, Istanbul, Üsküdar et Galata ; il a été publié à plusieurs reprises par Avram Galante, notamment dans *Documents officiels turcs concernant les Juifs de Turquie*, V (Istanbul : Haim, Rozio et Co, 1935 ; reprint Isis), p. 133-135.

jour dans le fonds ottoman du département oriental de la Bibliothèque nationale St. Cyrille et Méthode de Sofia[5]. Il n'est pas exclu que d'autres, encore inédits, subsistent ici ou là.

La version de 1693

Il est vrai que ces actes se référaient toujours à des actes bien antérieurs, mais la connaissance de ces derniers se réduisait à ces témoignages ultérieurs. C'est ce qui fait l'intérêt d'une version sensiblement antérieure de ces actes d'exemption, qui n'avait pas été prise en compte jusqu'ici[6]. Elle figure dans le volume n° 104 des *Mühimme defteri* et date de la deuxième décade de *şevval* 1104 (15-24 juin 1693). Elle fut donc émise par le sultan Ahmed II. Cette nouvelle pièce à porter au dossier fournit un chaînon qui manquait pour retracer le contenu des franchises accordées par les sultans et leur évolution, mais aussi pour répondre à la question de la cause de ces exemptions, c'est-à-dire de l'origine du statut privilégié durablement reconnu par les sultans à cette lignée juive.

Nous donnons ci-dessous un essai de traduction française de ce *hüküm* des *mühimme*, ainsi que le fac-similé :

> Ordre au *kadi* et au *kaimmakam* d'Istanbul :
> Le juif nommé Yasef (Joseph) a soumis une supplique à mon Seuil sublime pour dire que son grand-père (*dede*), Israil fils de Yasef, connu sous le nom d'Alaman, avait, lors de la conquête de Buda, remis les clefs de la forteresse. Lorsqu'il les a livrées, le défunt et pardonné, Sultan Süleyman Han – que la terre de sa tombe lui soit légère ! – a accordé au susdit et à ses descendants, garçons et filles, de génération en génération, la franchise et l'exemption [de tout ce qui est dû] au titre des *avarız-i divaniyye* et des *tekalif-i örfiyye.* Afin d'éviter d'être opprimé et molesté, il a sollicité mon ordre sacré

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[5] Evgeni Radushev, « The First Ottoman Conquest of Buda in 1526 and the History of a Jewish Family » dans Eugenia Kermeli et Oktay Özel (éds), *The Ottoman Empire. Myths, Realities and 'Black Holes'. Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber* (Istanbul : The Isis Press, 2006), pp. 111-128. L'auteur indique (p. 114, n. 4) que ces documents ont été découverts par Mme Svetlana Ivanova et qu'il les a traduits à l'intention du Dr. Zvi Keren de l'université de Tel-Aviv. J'ignore quel parti ce dernier en a tiré. J'ai consulté à mon tour ma collègue et amie Mme Ivanova sur ces mêmes documents et je la remercie vivement des précisions qu'elle a bien voulu m'apporter.

[6] À vrai dire, ce *hüküm* n'est pas entièrement inconnu. Il a été publié en translittération par Ahmed Refik dans son *On ikinci asr-i hicrîde İstanbul Hayatı, 1689-1785* (Istanbul : reprint 1988), p. 13, n° 22 ; mais, pour des raisons que je ne m'explique pas, l'éditeur ne donne que les cinq premières lignes de ce document qui en compte 19 et indique en note qu'il n'y a pas de suite.

pour que soit interdit et empêché qu'on ne vienne le léser en lui réclamant l'*avarız* et la contribution en argent correspondant au service des rameurs (*kürekçi akçesi tekalifi*), en contravention avec l'auguste *berat* qu'il détient. En conséquence, il a déclaré que lorsque mon ancêtre avait conquis la forteresse de Budun, son grand-père, le Juif susnommé, avait apporté et remis les clefs de la forteresse en question, et comme il avait rendu ainsi service (*hizmetde bulunduğu olmağın*), à l'époque du défunt et pardonné le sultan Mehmed Han (Mehmed III) – que sa tombe lui soit légère ! – il a été [à son tour] reconnu par un acte d'exemption auguste (*muafname-i hümayun*), lui-même ainsi que tous ses descendants masculins et féminins, libre et exempt de toutes les *avarız-i divaniyye* et *tekalif-i örfiyye*.

Cet acte d'exemption a été confirmé (*mukarrer tutup*) par le défunt et pardonné sultan [...][7] Han – que sa tombe lui soit légère ! – et un acte d'exemption auguste (*muafname-i hümayun*) a été remis[8] dans la première décade de *cemaziyel'ahır* de l'année 1024 [28 juin-16 juillet 1615], avec les dispositions suivantes :

ses enfants, de génération en génération et de progéniture en progéniture, seront libres et exempts du service de poste (*ulak*), des corvées (*suhre*)[9], de l'obligation de loger chez eux des ambassadeurs (*elçi*)[10], des *acemioğlan*[11] et d'autres ; des déportations (*sürgün*) ; de la redevance pour le service de *celeb* (*celeb akçesi*)[12] ; de l'équivalent monétaire de la surveillance (?*bedel-i murakaba*), de l'entretien des agents officiels en tournée (*salgun*) ; du service de rameur (*kürekçi*) ; de la garde du palais et du quartier (*saray ve mahalle beklemek*) ; des corvées de grands travaux et de l'équivalent monétaire de ces corvées (*cerahor ve cerahor akçesi*) ; de la contribution pour l'envoi d'hommes de métier à l'armée (?*ordu akçesi*) ; des travaux de construction de forteresses (*hisar yapması*) ; des corvées (*kulluk*) auprès des *subaşı* et des *naib* ; de la contribution pour l'approvisionnement en viande (*kassabiyye*)[13] ; pour l'entretien du *kaza* (?*kaza akçesi*) ; de la contribution des auxiliaires (?*yamak akçesi*) ; de la fauche des prairies (*çayır biçmek*) ; de la compensation

[7] Le nom est laissé en blanc, mais la date précisée plus bas indique qu'il s'agit d'Ahmed 1er.

[8] Le texte, par sa construction, laisse penser que c'est au même Yasef que l'acte confirmatif a été remis.

[9] Traduction par « occupation forcée de leurs foyers » chez Dersca-Bulgaru, « Un privilège », p. 382.

[10] Comme la version de 1839, celle de 1693 porte bien « *elçi* » et non « *yeniçeri* », comme certaines versions ultérieures ont cru devoir le corriger ; ibid., p. 382, n. 39.

[11] Les membres du corps des aspirants janissaires.

[12] Les *celeb* étaient chargés d'assurer l'approvisionnement en viande d'Istanbul et de l'armée. Il s'agit vraisemblablement ici d'un équivalent monétaire de ce service.

[13] Le produit de cette taxe, levée à partir du début du XVIIe siècle, aidait à financer la fourniture en viande d'Istanbul ; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia. Trade, crafts and food production in an urban setting, 1520-1650* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 233. Galante traduit par « impôt de boucherie ».

financière aux réquisitions de grains (*bedel-i iştirâ*) ; du drainage des prairies (*çayır hendekleri*).

Ils échapperont également aux [interdits] sur le port des habits de soie et des culottes de type *çakşır*, ainsi qu'à l'obligation de monter des mulets[14] ; bref à toutes les *avarız-i divaniyye* et *tekalif-i örfiyye* – exemptions qui se transmettront de fils en fils et de filles en filles.

[En outre], personne ne pourra les empêcher d'acquérir [jusqu'à] dix servantes et cinq esclaves rameurs (*forsa esirleri*). Si quelqu'un leur intente un procès, il ne devra être instruit nulle part ailleurs que devant l'auguste divan.

[Enfin], si l'un d'entre eux vient à décéder, on ne réclamera pas, en violation de la loi, la taxe sur les héritages (*resm-i kısmet*).

L'acte d'exemption ci-dessus ayant été accordé, il a été confirmé par la suite par le défunt et pardonné sultan Osman Han (Osman II) – que sa tombe lui soit légère ! Ensuite, un acte d'exemption auguste a été accordé dans la première décade de *cemaziyelevvel* [13-22 mai 1649], du temps du défunt et pardonné, le précédent *Hüdavendigâr* (Mehmed IV) – que sa terre lui soit légère ! Après quoi, le défunt et pardonné, mon frère sultan Süleyman Han (Süleyman II) – que sa terre lui soit légère ! l'a renouvelé et, conformément à l'acte d'exemption auguste (précédent), un [nouvel] acte d'exemption a été accordé dans la dernière décade de *safer* 1099 [7 décembre 1687 – 4 janvier 1688].

Comme le renouvellement [du précédent acte] a été [de nouveau] sollicité, un ordre sacré a été délivré par le département des finances (*maliye*), stipulant que, une fois la *cizye* acquittée, aucune des *tekalif-i şakka* ne devait être réclamée. Il a été écrit qu'on devait en agir ainsi.

Deuxième décade de *şevval* [1]104 [15-24 juin 1693].

L'enseignement des sources

Un des intérêts de cette version plus ancienne est de nous aider à y voir plus clair sur l'historicité de l'événement à l'origine des immunités de cette famille. Comme les versions du XIX^e^ siècle, il explique le statut privilégié de la lignée par le service insigne rendu par un ancêtre à Soliman le Magnifique : il lui aurait remis les clefs de Buda (Budun ou Budin en turc ottoman) et aurait donc joué un rôle majeur dans la reddition de la capitale hongroise. Seul varie le nom de cet ancêtre : ici Israil (Israel) fils de Yasef ; dans les versions du XIX^e^ siècle, Yasef fils de Salomon – une différence qui n'est peut-être pas due à une erreur purement fortuite du scribe, comme nous le verrons plus loin. Quoiqu'il en soit du nom de cet ancêtre,

[14] Et non des chevaux.

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l'affirmation contenue dans les privilèges accordés à ses descendants a été prise pour argent comptant et intégrée au récit de la conquête de Buda par la plupart des historiens qui ont traité de la question[15] et, de même,

[15] Franco, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites*, p. 49 ; Avram Galante, *Türkler ve Yahudiler* (Istanbul, 1947), p. 6 ; İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* II (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), p. 326 et n. 3 ; Alexandrescu-Dersca, « Un privilège », p. 379 ; M.A. Epstein, *The Ottoman Jewish Communities and their Role in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Fribourg : Klaus Schwarz, 1980), p. 42 : « The two best known instances of Jewish support for the campaigning Ottomans are the frequently cited instances of the Jewish contributions to the conquest of Buda [...] and of Rhodes » ; Gyula Káldy-Nagy, « Contribution to the history of the Jews of Buda in 1526 : Banishment or resettlement ? » dans *Occident and Orient. A tribute in the memory of A. Scheiber* (Leyde : Brill, 1988), p. 257 : « It is a matter of common knowledge that Jozef ben Schelomo, leader of the Jewish that took the keys of the city of Buda [...] in order to surrender them to Sultan Süleyman ... »

encore récemment, par E. Radushev[16]. En d'autres termes tous ont intégré cette affirmation figurant dans des documents officiels certes, mais postérieurs de plusieurs siècles aux événements et, comme nous allons le voir, ne figurant que là, à ce qu'ils considèrent comme la réalité historique de la conquête de Buda par Soliman le Magnifique en 1526.

Cependant la question se pose de savoir dans quelle mesure cette version des faits est corroborée par les sources anciennes, plus proches de l'événement, dont nous disposons[17]. Parmi les chroniqueurs ottomans, Kemalpaşazade et Peçevi sont, tout étant relatif, les plus explicites sur le sujet et leurs récits sont d'ailleurs divergents. Selon le premier, les clefs de Budun n'auraient pas été remises à Soliman en personne mais à son grand vizir İbrahim pacha, arrivé en avant-garde aux abords de la ville, le sultan étant encore à l'arrière avec le reste de son armée. En outre, ces clefs auraient été remises par les basses classes de la population urbaine, le reste ayant fui. Il n'est pas fait mention particulièrement des Juifs[18]. Solakzade suivra cette même version[19]. Selon İbrahim Peçevi, lequel prétend avoir traduit les « histoires hongroises » (*Macar tarihler*), avant même que le siège ait été mis devant Buda, Soliman, qui est encore à l'étape de Földvár (Duna Földvár) reçoit l'ambassade d'un ou deux hommes de confiance parmi les mécréants (*kefereden bir iki mu'temedleri*). Ils lui remettent les clefs de Buda et de Pest et demandent l'*aman*. Le sultan la leur accorde[20]. C'est sur la version de Peçevi que J. de Hammer-Purgstall fondera son récit des événements[21]. Evliya Çelebi, quant à lui (qui prétend avoir recueilli des informations sur la prise de Budun auprès de son père), fait une sorte de synthèse entre les versions de Kemalpaşazade et de Peçevi : İbrahim pacha met le siège devant Bude. Ceux qui se trouvent à l'intérieur de la citadelle (*derun-i kal'edekiler*) se rendent au grand vizir. Ce dernier les

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16 « Returning to one of the main characters in the events of 1526, Solomon, Yasef's son, the Head of the Jewish community in Buda, who went to the Ottoman camp in deference to the conqueror and to obtain compassion towards his fellow-townspeople [...] the historical authenticity of Solomon has been proved by several documents found in the Ottoman archives of Sofia », Radushev, « The history of a Jewish family », p. 118.

17 Le journal de la campagne de 1526 est muet sur les conditions de la reddition de Buda.

18 Kemalpaşazade, *Mohaçname*, Pavet de Courteille (éd. et trad.), (Paris, 1859), p. 108.

19 *Solak-zade Tarihi* (Istanbul : Mahmud Bey matbaası, 1297), p. 458.

20 *Budin ve Peşte miftahları ile kefereden bir iki mu'temedleri gelüp istiman etdiler...*, F.Ç. Derin et V. Çabuk (éds), *Tarih-i Peçevi* (Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1990), p. 108-117.

21 « Le 10 septembre 1526 (3 *zi'l-hicce*), Souleiman arriva devant Ofen ; une députation de cette capitale de la Hongrie était venue à sa rencontre jusqu'à Foeldvar pour lui en apporter les clefs... », J. de Hammer, *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman*, J.J. Hellert (trad.), V (Paris, 1836), p. 87.

envoie, accompagnés de « ceux qui en apportaient les clefs » (*miftahları getirenlerle*) à Süleyman, qui stationnait sous la forteresse de Földvár. Süleyman se rend alors à Buda où il accorde l'*aman* à la ville[22].

Aucune de ces versions – on l'aura remarqué – ne met en avant, ni le rôle des Juifs en général, ni celui d'un Juif en particulier qui aurait tenu une place prépondérante, à plus forte raison exclusive, dans cette affaire.

La déportation des Juifs de Buda

Il est cependant vrai qu'elles ne les excluent pas non plus et que nous disposons d'autres indices sur la présence des Juifs à Buda et sur leur rôle possible. Plusieurs de ceux qui ont traité le sujet avant nous n'ont pas manqué de le rappeler. Il est clair qu'il y avait des Juifs à Buda au moment de la conquête et qu'une part au moins d'entre eux suivirent les armées de Soliman, quand celles-ci quittèrent la capitale hongroise. Ils furent ensuite établis comme déportés (*sürgün*) dans plusieurs villes de l'Empire ottoman. Peçevi mentionne ainsi Salonique et d'autres lieux[23].

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[22] *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi* VI, Bibliothèque du musée du Palais de Topkapı, Revan Köşkü, Ms.1457, f. 74r ; Seyit Ali Kahraman et Yücel Dağlı (éds), *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi* (Istanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 2002), p. 128. Il existe cependant un autre passage où Evliya, dans le même t. VI de ses voyages, fait état de l'attitude des Juifs de Buda. Nous ne sommes plus dans la campagne de 1526, mais dans un autre siège de Buda – le troisième, dit l'auteur – où ce sont, cette fois, les Habsbourg qui sont les assiégeants (il existe quatre sièges dans ce cas, en 1527, 1530, 1540 et 1541). Les Juifs de la citadelle avaient chacun un morceau d'arsenic en main et la question était de savoir si, à l'entrée des assaillants de la forteresse, ils le lécheraient ou chercheraient à sauver leur vie. Or, il restait dans la citadelle, « du temps des mécréants » (donc avant les conquêtes ottomanes successives) un canon de la taille d'un homme. Un Juif le mit à feu et, aux dires des mécréants eux-mêmes, il réussit à étendre au sol des milliers de soldats de valeur parmi les assiégeants. Pour cette raison, les Juifs de Buda sont, depuis lors, exemptés de tous les *tekalif-i emîriyye* (*sic*). Mais en raison de ce qui s'est passé, si les Hongrois, Autrichiens ou Tchèques ont un Juif entre les mains, ils en ont font du *kebab* bien rissolant . . . (Ibid., f. 80e, p. 139). Même s'il s'agit d'un autre événement et que les modalités de l'action des Juifs sont différentes, le schéma reste le même que dans l'épisode de 1526 : collusion entre Juifs et Ottomans ; ressentiment des chrétiens.

[23] *Yahudi ta'ifesin kimi Selanike ve kimi sa'ir memleketlere gönderdiler*, Peçevi, p. 98. Il est à noter que, d'après un décret émis par la reine Marie, veuve du roi Louis II, après le retrait de Soliman, tous les Juifs de Buda n'avaient pas eu la même attitude, tant avant l'entrée des Turcs à Buda qu'après, mais l'événement devait être néanmoins l'occasion de les écarter tous : ceux qui, après la bataille de Mohács avaient fui la ville avec leurs possessions, par peur des Turcs, ne devaient pas être autorisés à y rentrer et leurs maisons devenaient propriété de l'État ; ceux qui étaient au contraire restés après le départ des Turcs devaient être exilés, mais ils pouvaient néanmoins disposer de leurs maisons. Cette dernière disposition semble bien indiquer que tous n'avaient pas suivi le sultan dans son

Le recensement de Budun, de 1546, publié par Gy. Káldy-Nágy fait bien état d'un quartier juif à l'intérieur de la citadelle de Buda (*mahalle-i yahudiyan der dahil-i kal'e-i Budun*). En même temps, ce nom n'est plus qu'une survivance en 1546 puisque, à cette date, aucun Juif n'est recensé dans le quartier en question. En revanche, le même recensement fait bien apparaître une population juive se montant à 50 foyers, dans un autre quartier : le « quartier des Tziganes à proximité du Danube » (*mahalle-i kıbtıyan der nezd-i Tuna*). Au surplus les *lakab* de certains des recensés, qui sont les noms d'un certain nombre de villes de l'Empire (Istanbul, Belgrade, Filibe, Kavalla, Semendire, Selanik, Vidin et Edirne) indiquent que ces Juifs sont originaires des villes en question[24] : on peut voir en eux (interprétation vraisemblable mais non certaine) des déportés de 1526 qui seraient retournés à Buda, à la suite de l'annexion de la ville par Soliman en 1541, insatisfaits de leur établissement précédent ou/et attirés par les nouvelles possibilités économiques de la Budun ottomane, les autorités locales intervenant en outre, le cas échéant, dans ce sens.

Deux documents de 1545, à notre connaissance non remarqués jusqu'ici, nous permettent d'ailleurs d'illustrer ce phénomène à travers le cas du port égéen de Kavalla, une des destinations des *sürgün* de Buda. Un premier *hüküm*[25] adressé par le sultan à un certain Mehmed bey, chargé de la défense de Kavalla, lui demande comme une chose de la plus haute importance (*ehemm-i mühimmatdan*) quel avait été auparavant le nombre de *sürgün* juifs déportés de Budun à Kavalla et combien il s'en trouvait actuellement et, d'autre part, quels étaient leurs moyens de subsistance[26] : une question fondée sur la conscience qu'avait la Porte de l'instabilité des installations faites à Kavalla.

Dans le *hüküm* suivant du même manuscrit[27], le sultan fait part au *beylerbey* de Budun de la requête que trois femmes juives dont les noms sont donnés, faisant partie des déportés de Buda établis à Kavalla, sont venues présenter à sa Porte de Félicité. Elles ont déclaré que leurs époux

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retrait. Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A social and religious history of the Jews*, XVIII (New York : Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 52 (avec bibliographie, pp. 463-464).

[24] Gy. Káldy-Nágy, *Kanunî devri Budin Tahrir Defteri* (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1971).

[25] Archives du musée du palais de Topkapı, E. 12321, f. 75v, n° 165 ; publié dans Halil Sahillioğlu, *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H.951-952 Tarihli ve E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* (Istanbul : IRCICA, 2002), p. 136, n° 172.

[26] *Zikr olunan sürgün Yahudi ta'ifesi mukaddemen ne mikdar idi ve haliyen mevcud ne mikdar Yahudi vardır ve kar ve kisbeleri nedendir . . .*

[27] Archives du musée du palais de Topkapı, E. 12321, f. 75v ; Sahillioğlu, *E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri*, p. 136, n° 173.

respectifs s'étaient rendus pour des raisons de commerce dans la province de Budun (*ticaretle Budun vilayetine gelüb*). Après leur séjour là-bas ils n'ont pas reçu du *beylerbey* l'autorisation de rentrer à Kavalla. Ainsi retenus, ils se sont établis de nouveau à Buda. Viennent ensuite dans le texte du document des précisions sur les enfants respectifs des trois femmes. La première a trois filles de 16, 12 et six ans. La deuxième a deux filles de dix et six ans. La troisième a une fille de 13 ans et une de 15 ans, ainsi qu'un fils de 20 ans, lequel est marié à une femme dont le nom est également noté.

Ces précisions sont suivies des instructions données au *beylerbey* de Budun : il devra convoquer les maris présents à Buda et les interroger sur le descriptif (*hilye*) et sur les caractéristiques (*evsaf*) de leurs femmes et de leurs filles[28]. Il les confrontera aux renseignements que lui fournit le présent ordre. Il indiquera à la Porte s'ils correspondent ou non. Il s'agit pour la Porte de vérifier les affirmations contenues dans la supplique et probablement, dans le cas où il est confirmé que leurs maris se sont bien rétablis à Buda, selon la volonté expresse du *beylerbey*, de les autoriser à quitter définitivement Kavalla pour les rejoindre.

Pour revenir au départ des Juifs de Buda en 1526, à la suite de l'armée de Soliman, il a été interprété comme une décision volontaire des intéressés (quoi qu'il en soit advenu par la suite), motivée par la crainte de représailles de la part des Hongrois, une fois ces derniers retournés dans leur ville[29]. S'il en fut bien ainsi, la déportation des Juifs viendrait en confirmation de leur rôle décisif dans la reddition de Buda. Cependant, sur ce point encore, les sources plus anciennes ne confirment que partiellement cette vision des choses. Certes – et c'est un point d'importance – , le journal de la campagne de 1526 mentionne bien, à la date correspondant au 22 septembre, une opération de déportation dans laquelle seuls les Juifs sont cités[30].

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[28] On constate que les critères retenus portent sur le nombre et l'âge des filles, à l'exclusion de toute caractérisation physique (comme cela aurait vraisemblablement été le cas pour des garçons) : question de pudeur, peut-on supposer.

[29] « À son départ, Soliman fit mettre le feu aux villes de Bude et de Peste, emmenant à sa suite les membres de la communauté israélite qui n'osaient rester sur place, de peur d'être accusés de trahison par les Hongrois », Alexandrescu-Dersca, « Un privilège », p. 380 ; Radushev, « The history of a Jewish family », pp. 117-118.

[30] « *Die in Budin wohnhaften Juden wurden ausgesiedelt und auf Schiffe verladen* », Anton Schaendlinger, *Die Feldzugstagebücher des ersten und zweiten ungarischen Feldzugs Suleyman I* (Vienne: Verlag der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs, 1978), p. 89.

En revanche, Peçevi en fait une autre présentation : « Parmi ceux qui avaient obtenu l'*aman*, tant *re'aya* chrétiens que juifs, plusieurs milliers de chefs de famille, accompagnés de leurs familles, qui en avaient fait la demande (*talib olanlardan* . . .), furent placés dans des bateaux et emmenés en *sürgün* dans le *dar al-islam*. . . . »[31]

À l'en croire, la déportation, de la même manière que la reddition, n'aurait pas été spécifiquement l'affaire des Juifs, mais aurait touché également et au même titre des habitants chrétiens de la ville. C'est également la version d'Evliya Çelebi : « pas moins de trois mille hommes pris parmi les chrétiens, les Juifs et autres éléments instruits et productifs furent envoyés à Istanbul. On leur attribua des habitations à Galata, Yedikule et Hasköy où on les fit s'installer »[32]. Non seulement la déportation n'est nullement réservée aux Juifs, mais elle semble plus procéder ici d'une décision du Sultan de faire bénéficier sa capitale de nouvelles compétences et talents, dans la bonne tradition du *sürgün* tel que, par exemple, Mehmed II l'avait pratiqué à Istanbul, que de protéger des « collaborateurs » des représailles de ceux qu'ils avaient trahis.

De cet examen de sources extérieures et antérieures aux actes d'exemption des Alamanoğulları, il résulte que l'ancêtre de ces derniers a fort bien pu être l'un des Juifs de Buda déportés dans l'Empire ottoman à la suite de la conquête de Soliman, que même il a pu être l'un des membres de la délégation venue offrir la reddition au Conquérant (à Buda même ou à Földvár) – délégation dont il n'est nullement sûr qu'elle fut purement juive. En revanche, rien ne permet d'affirmer qu'il joua dans cette capitulation un rôle exclusif ou même prépondérant : les affirmations qu'on peut trouver en ce sens chez les historiens modernes sont dépourvues de fondement historique précis. Elles ne sont que des extrapolations gratuites de l'allégation contenue dans les édits d'exemption[33].

Salomon fils de Joseph ou Israil fils de Joseph ?

La version de 1693 de ces édits, que nous avons citée en commençant, permet d'aller plus loin dans la mesure où elle nous autorise à mettre

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[31] Peçevi, p. 98.

[32] *Hırıstiyanlardan, Yahudiden ve sa'ir erbâb-i ma'arif ve re'ayadan üçbin kadar ademi İstanbul'a gönderüp, Galata, Yedi Kule ve Hasköy'de meskenler verüp oturtdu* . . . (Revan Köşkü, Ms. 1457, f. 74v), Kahraman et Dağlı (éds), *Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnamesi* VI, p. 129.

[33] Comme d'affirmer, par exemple, que Salomon fils de Joseph était le chef de la communauté juive de Buda ; cf. *supra* note 29.

en doute l'existence même d'un *berat* accordé par Soliman le Magnifique à Israil fils de Yasef, en remerciement du service prétendument rendu. Il existe en effet une contradiction dans la construction de ce firman. Il débute comme il est courant par la mention de la démarche accomplie par un particulier auprès de la Porte (du « Seuil ») du sultan, qui est à l'origine de la délivrance de l'ordre. Mais en l'occurrence, le sultan dont il s'agit n'est pas le sultan régnant, auteur du firman (Ahmed II), mais un de ses lointains prédécesseurs, Mehmed III. De même, le particulier dont il s'agit, auteur de la requête initiale, n'est pas un contemporain d'Ahmed II, mais un contemporain de Mehmed III, petit-fils du sujet de Soliman le Magnifique qui aurait joué un rôle dans la prise de Buda. Cette incohérence inhérente au texte est à l'origine de plusieurs ambiguïtés. Lorsque, quelques lignes après le début, Süleyman est désigné comme « mon ancêtre susnommé » (*ceddim münşarünileyh*), on ne sait plus qui parle : Mehmed III ou Ahmed II, les deux pouvant au demeurant tenir ce propos, bien qu'à une bien grande distance dans le cas du second ? De même, lorsque, dans la suite du texte, les renouvellements successifs de l'exemption sont évoqués, on a l'impression, en l'absence de tout nouveau sujet dans la construction grammaticale, que c'est le même Yasef, auteur de la demande adressée à Mehmed III, qui aurait sollicité tous les renouvellements ultérieurs et en aurait été le bénéficiaire ; ce qui serait encore tout à fait possible pour le renouvellement demandé à Ahmed 1er, mais ne le serait évidemment plus pour les sultans postérieurs et, notamment, pour le dernier renouvellement cité, celui de Süleyman II, frère et prédécesseur du sultan régnant[34].

Ces incohérences de construction sont dues au fait que le firman comporte des parties d'époques différentes qu'on a simplement juxtaposées sans chercher à unifier le tout de façon cohérente. Or la partie la plus ancienne a trait à la démarche du petit-fils d'Israil auprès du sultan Mehmed III. Il est certes question d'une première exemption accordée par Soliman à Israil et ses descendants, mais la mention reste vague et ne fait pas état d'un document précis. L'initiative de Soliman le Magnifique est bien à l'arrière-plan mais le commencement concret de toute l'affaire se situe sous Mehmed III (1595-1603). Le premier *muafname* dont il est fait expressément état est celui de Mehmed III accordé au petit-fils Yasef. Le

[34] Dans la traduction, nous avons suppléé à cette absence d'un sujet différent pour les verbes *bildirüp* et *rica etmeğin* à la ligne 18 du document, en utilisant le passif (a été sollicité).

flou et le doute qu'il autorise sur la réalité d'un *muafname* émis par Soliman, sont renforcés par l'absence de toute allusion aux renouvellements par Selim II et Murad III qui auraient dû normalement intervenir, de même qu'interviendront plus tard les renouvellements d'Osman II, Mehmed IV et Suleyman II[35], au contraire soigneusement rappelés. Le cœur du document est constitué par le contenu détaillé, apparemment intégral, des exemptions accordées par Ahmed 1er renouvelant le *muafname* de son père Mehmed III : la date en est donnée (1ère décade de *cemaziyel'ahır* 1024 [28 juin-16 juillet 1615]) mais le nom du sultan est laissé en blanc. Comme nous l'avons déjà relevé, la rédaction de notre texte laisse penser que Yasef fut le bénéficiaire à la fois de l'acte de Mehmed III et du renouvellement par Ahmed 1er. Ce n'est pourtant pas ce que déclarera la version de 1864-65, éditée par Galante, laquelle, à son tour, n'est pas exempte de confusion. L'acte de 1615 y est présenté comme datant de Mehmed III[36] et, d'autre part, comme ayant été accordé à deux frères, Rafi Salto fils de Joseph et Israil fils de Joseph, tous deux petit-fils de celui qui remit les clefs de Buda. Quant à ce dernier, il n'est plus nommé Israil fils de Joseph, comme dans la version de 1693 mais Joseph fils de Salomon.

Ces données diverses mettent en évidence l'importance dans le processus d'exemption des Alamanoğlu, d'une période, celle de Mehmed III et Ahmed 1er, et également d'un personnage, Israil fils de Joseph, dont la version de 1864-1865 précise non seulement qu'il était le petit-fils de Joseph fils de Salomon, mais aussi qu'il était connu sous le nom d'Alamanoğlu. Il apparaît comme le premier membre de la lignée à recevoir cette dénomination. Faute d'en savoir sur ce personnage autant qu'il le faudrait, nous disposons cependant de quelques lueurs sur son importance au sein de la communauté juive stambouliote, au début du XVIIe siècle, et sur son influence politique. Il aurait été un protégé du *kapudan pacha* Halil pacha. À ce titre, il aurait informé Cornelius Haga du mémorandum adressé à Ahmed 1er, par l'intermédiaire du chef des eunuques noirs, par les adversaires de la reconnaissance comme ambassadeur de cet envoyé des Provinces-Unies à Istanbul[37]. De son côté, l'ambassadeur de France à Constantinople, Harlay de Sancy, à la tête des adversaires du projet

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35 Dans un document de 1860, il est question d'un renouvellement par le sultan İbrahim qui n'était pas cité en 1693 ; Radushev, « History of a Jewish Family », p. 121. En revanche, aucune version ne fera état d'un renouvellement par Selim II et Murad III.

36 Ce que corrige Galante.

37 Alexander De Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic. A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations 1610-1630* (Leyde-Istanbul : Nederlands Historisch-Archeologisch Instituut, 1978), p. 300, n. 16. Israel çelebi est également cité comme ayant participé à

hollandais, confirmait la place tenue dès le départ par le notable juif dans ce projet. Le 10 mars 1602, il écrivait de Pera au Sr. de Villeroy :

> Un juif nommé Israel Cheliby qui est le premier de tous les juifs de cette ville ha mandé il y a un an [. . .][38] pour solliciter qu'ils *envoyent ici un ambassadeur*[39] et qu'il se promet de le faire *recepvoir*. Je n'ai sceu ceci que depuis deux jours. Et bien que la vanité de cette Porte soit grande, et qu'ils désirent la gloire de voir *ici plusieurs ambassadeurs de grands Roys*. Si espère-je de rompre cette pratique et commenceray incontinent à travailler[40].

Même si l'époque des « grands juifs de cour » ottomans est désormais passée, elle reste encore proche et n'est apparemment pas totalement révolue. Dès lors, il n'est pas à exclure que cet « Israil çelebi connu sous le nom d'Alamanoğlu » ait, dans des circonstances particulières qui nous échappent, mis à profit sa position et son influence pour obtenir un certain nombre de privilèges fiscaux du sultan. Dans cette hypothèse, il aurait été à l'origine d'un premier acte sous Mehmed III et du renouvellement de ce dernier, éventuellement dans une forme amplifiée, sous le sultan suivant, Ahmed 1er. Dès lors, quel aurait été le rôle véritable de son ancêtre (son grand-père ?) dans cette exemption ? Il aurait servi, rétrospectivement, à lui conférer la plus incontestable des justifications. Le principe d'exemptions fiscales plus ou moins poussées en échange de services (*hizmet*) rendus au sultan est au fondement même du fonctionnement de l'État et de la société ottomans. En l'occurrence, il ne s'agissait pas d'un service actuellement rendu, mais d'un service rendu, une fois pour toutes, dans le passé. Il n'en reste pas moins légitimant dans la mesure où ce service a été rendu au plus illustre des sultans et qu'en outre ce dernier aura été aidé dans sa tâche la plus sacrée : l'extension de l'empire de l'Islam[41]. Cette fiction légitimatrice était d'autant plus adéquate qu'elle pouvait s'appuyer sur une certaine vraisemblance historique ou, en d'autres termes, qu'elle n'était pas totalement une fiction : l'ancêtre avait peut-être fait effectivement partie de la mission de reddition (même si, dans cette hypothèse, il

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des négociations entre les Ottomans, l'Autriche et la Toscane ; Baron, *A social and religious history*, XVIII, p. 145.

38 Ici trois mots en chiffre non déchiffrés.

39 Les mots donnés en italiques sont en chiffre dans l'original.

40 Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms. Fr. 16145, f. 100r°-v°.

41 On notera que dans un document de 1859, la remise des clefs de Buda n'est pas le seul service rendu à Soliman par l'ancêtre de la famille et la seule justification des exemptions : « the same person also did some favors », Radushev, «History of a Jewish family », p. 126 : peut-être une façon de dire que l'origine des privilèges de la famille ne se limitait pas à la remise des clefs ; que l'affaire était plus complexe.

est improbable qu'il y ait joué le rôle primordial et même exclusif qu'on prétendra). À tout le moins, cet ancêtre avait fait très probablement partie des *sürgün* juifs de Buda, ce qui rendait toute l'histoire plausible. Entièrement fictive, en revanche, selon notre hypothèse, serait l'obtention par la famille d'un *muafname* dès l'époque de Soliman. Dans cette hypothèse encore, la différence de noms entre les versions trouverait une explication : l'auteur de la version de 1693 aurait simplement interverti le premier demandeur d'un édit d'exemption (et donc l'initiateur effectif de la tradition), Israel fils de Joseph, et son initiateur théorique, Joseph fils de Salomon.

Le cas des Alamanoğlu, tel que nous l'interprétons, n'aurait rien d'unique en son genre : Evliya Çelebi mentionne ainsi le cas de 10 pêcheurs grecs du Bosphore, exempts de dîme sur la pêche et d'une série d'autres taxes parce que leurs ancêtres auraient ouvert la porte de Petri aux armées de Mehmed II, lors du siège de Constantinople[42]. J.H. Mordtmann dans son étude sur la légende de la capitulation de Constantinople rapporte plusieurs témoignages sur des pêcheurs du Bosphore expliquant (et justifiant) de la même façon les privilèges ou les exemptions fiscales dont ils disposaient, par une action de leurs ancêtres, favorable aux Turcs, durant le siège de Constantinople[43].

À la la suite de Mordtmann, j'ai montré à mon tour que la légende de la capitulation totale ou partielle de Constantinople en 1453 ou encore, celle d'une neutralité des Juifs pendant le siège de Constantinople, étaient des fictions historiques, acceptées par tous, musulmans et non-musulmans, comme un fondement indispensable au statut de *zimmi* reconnu aux juifs et chrétiens de la capitale et plus largement de l'Empire[44]. Toute interprétation trop littérale ou trop positiviste de documents de ce genre oublie cette tendance humaine (et pas seulement ottomane !) : refaire l'histoire ou, du moins, lui donner un coup de pouce, quand des impératifs pratiques ou juridiques le requièrent.

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[42] *Evliya Celebi Seyahatnamesi*, Bibliothèque du musée du palais de Topkapı, Bagdad Köşkü, Ms. 304, f. 174v ; Orhan Saik Gökyay (éd.), *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi* I (Istanbul : Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 1995), p. 254.

[43] J.H. Mordtmann, « Die Kapitulation von Konstantinopel im Jahre 1453 », *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 21 (1912), p. 140. Voir, par ex., Bertrand Bareilles, *Les Turcs et leur empire* (Paris, 1917), p. 33.

[44] Gilles Veinstein, « Les conditions de la prise de Constantinople en 1453 : un sujet d'intérêt commun pour le patriarche et le grand mufti » dans *Le patriarcat œcuménique de Constantinople aux XIVe–XVIe siècles : rupture et continuité* (Paris : centre d'études byzantines, néo-helléniques et sud-est européennes, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2007), pp. 275-287.

Un statut hybride

Un autre intérêt de la version de 1693 est évidemment de fournir une attestation sûre d'un état nettement plus ancien des exemptions que ce dont on disposait jusqu'ici : l'état en 1693, et même, bien en deçà, celui de 1615, puisque le renouvellement d'Ahmed II ne fait pour l'essentiel que reprendre les dispositions d'Ahmed 1er, reproduites dans le détail. Il nous semble qu'une interprétation correcte de documents de ce genre doit prendre en compte ce qu'on peut désigner comme le principe de précaution. Il implique de prévoir, pour parer à tout prélèvement abusif, non seulement ce qui est ordinairement exigé, mais ce qui pourrait éventuellement l'être, de manière plus exceptionnelle. Ainsi s'explique que figurent dans l'édit d'exemption, à côté des obligations habituelles, d'autres plus difficiles à identifier dans la mesure où elles sont rarement attestées et, notamment, sont absentes des *kanunname*. Le même principe de précaution qui implique de tout imaginer, incite aussi à tout conserver. On est en effet frappé du conservatisme de ces actes qui reprennent au XIXe siècle des dispositions du XVIIe, correspondant parfois à des institutions tombées en désuétude entre-temps ; mais pourquoi renoncer à un privilège que l'on a une fois acquis et dont on ignore s'il ne pourrait pas resservir un jour[45] ? Ces remarques sont faites pour souligner combien il serait imprudent de considérer n'importe quelle version du *muafname* comme la photographie des obligations fiscales de ceux qui, à un moment donné, ne bénéficieraient pas d'un tel acte.

Néanmoins ce conservatisme n'est pas total et il y a bien des différences entre les versions des XVIIe et XIXe siècles. Disparaissent ainsi entretemps l'exemption du *sürgün* ; celle des interdits portant sur les habits de soie et les pantalons de type *çakşır* ; de même que l'obligation de monter des mulets. En revanche le droit de posséder jusqu'à dix esclaves femmes et cinq esclaves hommes sera maintenu. Mais par ailleurs, les versions successives s'adaptent sur certains points aux évolutions terminologiques et institutionnelles : déjà, au sein même du texte de 1693, on pouvait

[45] La même logique est, le cas échéant, à l'œuvre dans les renouvellements des capitulations des différents pays : même devenus obsolètes entre temps, des privilèges anciennement obtenus y sont rappelés : les capitulations anglaises de 1675 comprendront ainsi un long développement sur le conflit franco-anglais à propos du droit de protection des marchands hollandais et rappelleront que ce droit appartient aux ambassadeurs et consuls d'Angleterre, alors que le droit en question avait été rendu caduque par l'octroi de capitulations spécifiques aux Hollandais dès 1612 ; Gabriel Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, I, *1300-1789* (Paris : librairie F. Pichon, 1897), pp. 154-155.

constater le passage, entre le début et la fin du document, de la notion de *tekalif-i örfiyye* et *avarız-i divaniyye* à celle de *tekalif-i şakka* – formule plus récente et d'un spectre encore bien plus large[46]. D'autres modifications tiennent non plus à une simple transposition mais à une extension réelle des exemptions. Hautement symbolique à cet égard est le cas de la *cizye.* Il est encore spécifié en 1693 que les Alamanoğulları, quelle que soit l'étendue de leurs exemptions, restent néanmoins soumis à la *cizye*[47]. Cela ne serait plus vrai au XIX[e] siècle. De même, l'un des principaux motifs ayant suscité les documents de 1859-1860 traduits par Radushev tient à l'instauration d'un nouvel impôt de la période des Tanzimat sous le nom d'*iane-i askeriye*. Il s'agit pour les Alamanoğlu de l'époque de faire bien établir qu'il fait partie de leurs exemptions. Quand il est ainsi question non plus seulement de reproduire des privilèges anciens, mais d'en acquérir de nouveaux, soit au niveau global de la famille, soit pour telle de ses branches dans son implantation locale, il aura fallu qu'elle dispose de représentants influents (comme l'avait été *mutatis mutandi* Israil çelebi en son temps)[48].

Au total, les exemptions acquises confèrent à la lignée des Alamanoğulları un statut étrangement hybride : ils sont juifs et le demeurent, mais en même temps, ils se mettent à part des autres Juifs, l'identité lignagère l'emportant sur l'identité communautaire. Sans devenir musulmans, ils ne sont plus entièrement des *zimmi* puisqu'ils échappent à plusieurs restrictions liées à ce statut : ils peuvent s'habiller comme des musulmans et partager sur plusieurs points les privilèges de la communauté dominante. Au surplus, du fait de l'impôt par répartition, les avantages dont ils disposent chargent d'autant leurs voisins et leurs coreligionnaires. Non seulement ils se détachent de leur communauté, mais ils s'opposent ainsi à

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[46] Sur la prolifération de ces taxes sous les prétextes les plus variés aux XVII[e] et XVIII[e] siècles, voir Halil İnalcik, « Adâletnameler », *Türk Tarih Belgeler Dergisi* II /3-4 (1967), pp. 49-145 ; Avdo Sućeska, « Die Entwicklung der Besteuerung durch die 'Avârız-i divâniye und die Tekâlif-i 'örfiye im osmanischen Reich während des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts », *Südostforschungen* XXVII (1968), pp. 89-130 ; id., « Promjene u sistemu izvanrednog oporezivanja u Turskoj u XVII vijeku i pojava nameta tekâlif-i şakka », *Prilozi za orientalnu filologiju* X-XI (1961), pp. 103-109 ; Yücel Özkaya, « XVIIIinci yüzyılda çıkarılan adaletnâmelere göre Türkiye'nin iç durumu », *Belleten* XXXVIII/151 (1974), pp. 445-491.

[47] « Après avoir acquitté sa *cizye*, on ne devrait pas lui réclamer les *tekalif-i şakka* . . . »

[48] Mme Alexandrescu-Dersca mettait ainsi le renouvellement de 1864-65 en rapport avec l'influence de Yakir Gueron, un Alaman, *kaymakam* de la communauté juive d'Istanbul de 1863 à 1872 et jouant un rôle important dans l'élaboration du statut organique (*nizamname*) de la communauté, qu'approuvera le sultan Abdülaziz le 5 mai 1865 ; Alexandrescu-Dersca, « Un privilège », p. 381-382.

elle en s'appuyant sur l'État ottoman. Ils jouent l'État contre les solidarités communautaires ou locales. Ils échappent en outre aux autorités locales en préservant leurs héritages de l'intervention de ces dernières et en obtenant la délocalisation de leurs procès. Par ces derniers traits, leur situation rappelle celle des résidents étrangers (*mustamin*) et marchands et interprètes (barataires) protégés par les capitulations. Toutefois, pour ce qui concerne ces Juifs privilégiés, il n'y a pas de tierce partie – les ambassades et les consulats étrangers – entre le sultan et eux. Un passé, largement mythique, mais ineffaçable et régulièrement ravivé, leur fait un rempart indestructible.

OF ORPHANS, MARRIAGE, AND MONEY: MATING PATTERNS OF ISTANBUL'S JEWS IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Minna Rozen

The findings presented below offer a glimpse into the world of the Jewish family in Istanbul in the first half of the 19th century. This brief glance is part of a larger work in progress on the history of the Jews of Istanbul in the Ottoman era (1453–1923). Of course, family life is only one aspect among many of this history; yet the wealth of sources at my disposal makes it an especially fruitful and fascinating area of study.

In the first part of the above mentioned work,[1] concerning the history of the Jewish community from the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople to the death of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1453–1566), I present a tapestry of Jewish family life in Istanbul, a community made up of interwoven strands of local Greek-speaking Jews and emigrants from Italy, the Iberian peninsula, and to a lesser degree, the lands of Ashkenaz. Notwithstanding the diversity of Jewish society in the capital, the nature of the Jewish family there was very clear-cut: a patriarchal, Mediterranean family whose primary raison d'être was perpetuating the family name (and bloodline).[2] Since it was the male heirs who bore this name, a further defining characteristic was the desire to keep the family's assets in their hands; accordingly, the ancient Jewish laws of inheritance were maintained, giving precedence to male heirs over female ones and to the heirs of the male over those of the female.[3]

An additional feature of the Istanbuli Jewish family of this era is the perception of the woman as a means of strengthening the family lineage.

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[1] The first volume of this opus has already appeared: Minna Rozen, *A History of The Jewish Community in Istanbul: The Formative Years (1453–1566)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002, 2010); see in particular 99–196.

[2] Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 99–111; idem, "The Social Role of Book Printing among Istanbul Jews in the Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries," in idem, *A Journey Through Civilizations*.

[3] L. Bornstein-Makovetsky, "The Istanbul Regulations of Inheritance and Their Expression in the Social Life in the Ottoman Period," in A. Haim (ed.), *Society and Community: Proceedings of the Second International Congress for Research of the Sephardi and Oriental Jewish Heritage, 1984* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Misgav Yerushalayim, 1991), 3–24; R. Lamdan, *A Separate People: Jewish Women in Palestine, Syria and Egypt in the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 232–250; Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 123–126.

She was the chattel of her father, and later, her husband; but either way, she was the repository of the family's honor.[4] In the event of a divorce, contemporary rabbinic rulings generally favored the interests of the husband.[5] If the woman was a widow, the interests of the late husband's heirs took priority. Under such circumstances, her male offspring could be taken from her by the husband's family after reaching two years of age, and in any event, from the age of six.[6] Her daughters remained with her, since in any case they did not perpetuate the line; often, the mother was forced to sign an undertaking that if she remarried, her daughters from her first marriage would go with her and would not remain under the aegis of their late father's family. Under this pattern, the choice of a marriage partner was governed almost entirely by business considerations, and the spouse, for the first marriage at least, was selected by the parents. The final decision of course rested with the father, but the women of the family exercised great informal influence on the choice of a wife for a family member, in particular if she was not from the extended family itself. In a family from the middle class or higher, that is, one that owned property that would pass upon marriage from one family to the other, love was utterly irrelevant.[7] Another outcome of this situation was the high incidence of marriage within the family, in particular to a male from the male line, such as: an uncle from the father's side, a male cousin from the brother's side, a second cousin from the paternal grandfather's side. Such marriages allowed a wealthy father who wanted a comfortable life for his daughter also after her marriage to provide her with a generous dowry without fear that her premature death would cause the assets to pass to a different line, as would have been the case according to *halakha* (Jewish religious law).[8]

Monetary and property concerns dictated that a young child orphaned of his father would be raised by his father's family from approximately age six at the latest, and would generally also marry a woman from within that family. This ran counter to *halakha*, which stipulated that an orphan should not be entrusted to those who were likely to inherit him, since in the case of an orphan who had inherited abundant assets, there was liable

[4] Lamdan, *Separate People*, 2–3, 13–23, 28; Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 111–125, 187.
[5] Lamdan, *Separate People*, 171–195; Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 162–179.
[6] Lamdan, *Separate People*, 88–95; Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 179–185.
[7] Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 120–129.
[8] Ibid., 124–127.

to be a temptation not to care for him properly. The reality of orphans being raised by the father's family (his immediate heirs), which contradicted the *halakha*, indicates how firmly entrenched patrilineage was in this society.[9] If the orphan was raised by his mother's family, on the other hand, he was subject to extreme pressure to marry a woman from that family, especially if he stood to inherit substantial assets.[10]

In all societies, orphans, in particular daughters without a father, were low in status, both physically and legally.[11] To address this disadvantage, Jewish communities everywhere decided that the *beit din* (Jewish religious court) would serve as the "father" of orphans.[12] As a rule, fathers left wills that named a guardian for their children in the event of their death. But if such a guardian was not determined by the father during his lifetime, the religious courts saw that one was appointed. In any case, the *beit din* took it upon itself to oversee the guardian, whether appointed by the father or by the court.[13] The manner in which the *beit din* of Istanbul served as

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[9] Ibid., 183–184.

[10] On these points in general, see Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 99–196.

[11] On this subject in the Jewish communities of the Middle East during the sixteenth century, see: Lamdan, *Separate People*, 51–57.

[12] BT Gittin 37a.

[13] R. Ya'aqov ben Asher, *Tur Hoshen Mishpat*, Hilkhot Apotropsut (The Laws Concerning Guardianship), sec. 290: "If one dies and leaves behind heirs who are minors or a pregnant wife or he leaves behind [a number of heirs, including] minors and those who have attained majority, he must appoint a guardian who will look after the minors' affairs until they attain majority; if he did not appoint him (a guardian), the court must appoint a guardian, as the court is considered responsible for the welfare of orphans (literally, 'the father of orphans'): if the bequeather ordered that the minor's portion be given to him, so that he may do with it as he likes, he may do so: the court may not appoint as guardians women or slaves or minors or unlearned people (*'amei ha-aretz*), who are presumed to transgress, nor [may it appoint] a relative, who is fit to inherit with the minor, even if he is merely related on his mother's side, if any argument can be made for his right to retain possession of the inheritance, as I have explained regarding the captive who has been taken, in Section 285; however, if the father appointed them, he may do so. And the Rambam (R. Moses ben Maimon) wrote, 'they should seek out a trustworthy and capable individual who knows how to turn things to the orphans' advantage and make their claims for them, one who is skilled in worldly matters, so that he can preserve their assets and make a profit for them. Such a person is appointed a guardian over the minors whether or not he is related to them; however, if he is a relative, he should not take control of the landed property.' And when the court appoints him, it must make an accounting with him and write down a tally of the movable and landed property and the debts and everything that is being transferred into his keeping, for he must take an oath if the heirs [later] make a positive, though unsupported, claim (*ta'anat bari*) against him; therefore, they must know what he is going to receive and what he must return; And the Raabad (R. Abraham ben David) wrote that two identical deeds—to the very letter—are written, one for the guardian and one for the relatives, and the guardian may wear handsome clothes purchased with the orphans' assets when this is to their benefit, as his words will

guardian of orphans in the 15th and 16th centuries has already been presented in my study of this period;[14] but its function in this regard from the 17th through the 19th centuries has been accorded only scant attention to date.[15] The cases that I have selected deal exclusively with the betrothal of orphans, all but one of them female.

For every couple, marriage is a fateful moment affecting the course of their lives—all the more so for a woman in the pre-modern world whose options were so narrow, let alone a female orphan, and especially, a daughter orphaned of her father, so that the person who was ostensibly her greatest advocate and defender, with the legal power to put this protection into practice, was no longer alive.

In writing this article, I examined two registries of the rabbinic court of Istanbul for the period from 1833 to 1847 to see the changes that occurred in the Jewish family during the 250 years from the death of Süleyman the Magnificent (1566) to the early decades of the nineteenth century. The first record book includes deliberations that took place between 1833 and 1841. In the second book, covering the years 1841–1847, several earlier deliberations were entered, some of them even predating those of the first book. This was because these were theoretical discussions that were intended to serve as a model for future generations.

The Jewish marriage ritual is actually made up of two ceremonies that were combined into one over the years. The first was the *qidushin* or *erusin*, wherein the groom would give his bride or her representative a ring or any object of a certain value and recite the formula: "Behold, you are consecrated unto me according to the laws of Moses and Israel." Acceptance of the object, and the recitation of the formula in the presence

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be granted a fairer hearing because the clothes [he is wearing] look better. And even if he eats and drinks beyond his means, we do not suspect him, saying that he is eating and drinking the orphans' assets, unless witnesses testify that he is despoiling their assets. Then they remove him [from his post] and make him take an oath that he did not cause an even greater loss, and not only is this obviously the case when the loss was incurred through his negligence but even when, though he was not negligent, the precautions he took were not really adequate (*shemirah pehutah*); however, if the loss was incurred due to forces beyond his control (*oness*), he is not removed from his post. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote that when the orphans' father appointed him guardian, he is not to be removed [from his post] for merely falling under suspicion—without the testimony of witnesses, but if he was court-appointed, the court removes him even if he merely falls under suspicion."

[14] Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 122–124, 180–181.

[15] With the exception of Leah Bornstein-Makovetsky, "The Jewish Family in 18th through 19th Century Istanbul as an Economic Unit," in I. Bartal and V. Gafni (eds.), *Sexuality and the Family in History* [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1998), 330–331.

of two adult male witnesses, created the legal bond between the two. But for the legal process to be complete, the *nisu'in* had to take place, that is, the couple were required to stand beneath the wedding canopy before a quorum of ten male adults (some of whom had to be relatives of the bride, according to local community practice); the marriage blessings had to be recited; and the *ketubah*, or marriage contract, read aloud and handed to the bride. Among the Sephardic community and the few Ashkenazim living in Istanbul, both ceremonies were held together under the *huppah* (canopy), as they are conducted today. But among the Romaniots (Greek-speaking Jews) in Istanbul and other parts of the Ottoman Empire, several months and even years would sometimes elapse between the *qidushin* and *nisu'in*. During the period between the two rituals, the bride was prohibited to her groom and to all others. A betrothed woman who wished to extricate herself from this commitment required a *get* (bill of divorcement) with all that that implied. The separation between *qidushin* and *nisu'in* in the Romaniot community continued throughout the period from the mid-16th century to the mid-19th century, and apparently had a considerable impact on the fate of young girls orphaned of their fathers.[16] Several of the deliberations in the 1833–1847 records dealt with the rejection by minor female orphans of *qidushin* agreements that were accepted by others on their behalf. According to Jewish law, a father could not accept *qidushin* in the name of his son, but he could do so on behalf of his minor daughter if she was not yet twelve years plus one day of age.[17] When she reached the age of twelve years and six months, she achieved majority status and her consent was required for *qidushin*. Between the age of twelve years and twelve years plus six months, she was considered a *na'arah*, or young girl. Within this six-month "window," the marriage could be consummated if women who were competent to do so testified to the presence of two pubic hairs.[18] A minor female or young girl whose father had accepted *qidushin* on her behalf could refuse it, but she required a bill of divorce and only her father could accept this *get* for her—a fact that greatly restricted her (already negligible) ability to reject the arrangement.

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[16] On the procedure as practiced in the 16th century, see Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 111–112. Regarding its continuation into the 19th century, see for example, *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 42, sec. 3. The deliberation took place on 19 August 1843 (23 Elul 5603), long after the *qidushin*; the *nisu'in* was set for 1 December 1843 (25 Kislev 5604). See further below, pp. 169–170.

[17] M Qidushin 3:8.

[18] BT Qidushin 64a; Ketubot 22a; Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, Hilkhot Ishut 2:2–3; *Shulhan 'Arukh*, Even ha-'Ezer, Hilkhot Me'n 155:12.

Nonetheless, if a girl's father accepted *qidushin* on her behalf when she was a minor and he died before she reached the age of six, or her family member or guardian accepted *qidushin* in her name after she was orphaned but before she turned six, the *qidushin* was considered null and void and she was free to marry anyone else without a bill of divorcement from the man to whom she had been betrothed. Between the ages of six and ten, if she wished to reject a prospective groom, she was obligated to explicitly refuse the *qidushin* entered into in her name, but did not yet require a *get*. From the age of ten and above, she required a bill of divorcement under such circumstances, but could receive it directly even if she was not yet twelve years and six months of age.[19] Cases of *qidushin* accepted by fathers or guardians on behalf of minor females were very common during the formative period of Jewish society in Istanbul, that is, until roughly the mid-16th century, since fathers considered themselves free to betroth their underage daughters without their consent, both for financial/business reasons and because they wished to safeguard their daughters' future in the event that they themselves died before seeing them wed.[20] This last reason indicates that the notion of refusal on the part of the daughter in the event that her father died before she reached maturity did not carry any real weight with the father. A father who betrothed his minor daughter did not consider the possibility that she might refuse to marry the groom he had chosen for her.[21]

In the two registries that we examined, which cover a period of fourteen years during which Western ideas were already beginning to make themselves felt on the streets of Istanbul, we found among the rabbinic court's deliberations seventeen cases dealing with disputes at the stage of *qidushin* but prior to *nisu'in*; some were aimed at bridging differences of opinion, while others focused on determining the legal status of the parties to the agreement, that is, whether the woman required a bill of divorcement before she could marry someone else, and whether the man was free to marry another. Virtually all of them related to minor-age brides.

Some of the discussions, however, took place slightly before the period covered by the registries, and were brought as representative cases to show later generations of religious court judges how to handle similar situations. Thus, four of the seventeen deliberations belong in this category,

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[19] BT Gittin 64b; Yevamot 107a, b; Maimonides, Hilkhot Gerushin, 11: 1–4.

[20] Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 120–124.

[21] On this matter in Christianity and Islam from a multicultural perspective, see ibid., 113–120.

in addition to several standard formulas relating to annulment of marriages. Of these four cases, one was from late 1816, another from 1827, and the two remaining ones are undated, although it is possible to establish a time frame for them: One of the undated cases concerns the refusal of marriage by Dona bat Avraham, who was betrothed as a minor to a man who went bankrupt.[22] The ruling is signed by Avraham Gabbai,[23] Hayyim ʿAnavi, and Yehuda Benvenisti, as the judges responsible for matters of *issur ve-heter* (Jewish ritual law) in Istanbul. This particular panel of judges is also referred to in a court case from the summer of 1824.[24] Hence we can safely state that the discussion in our possession took place between 1808 and 1824, or slightly later. This time frame is further substantiated by a reference to the person who was supposed to carry the ruling with him to Edirne, where the prospective groom resided. This individual, whose name was Turunca, had business dealings with an unnamed *şafcı* (holder of the sultan's monopoly in the trading of *şaf*, or alum, in the city of Edirne). At the same time, the head lessee (*şafcı başı*) of this monopoly for the Empire as a whole was an extremely powerful man and a leader of the Istanbul Jewish community by the name of Çelebi Bekhor Carmona, who was executed by Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) on 11 July 1826. The alum monopoly was removed that year from Jewish control, so that the earliest plausible date for this ruling is 1808, Gabbai's first year as a judge, and the latest date is the summer of 1826.[25]

The second undated ruling deals with a young Istanbuli girl who was betrothed to a boy from Bursa. A rumor was spread that she had actually accepted *qidushin* earlier from a different young man from the

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[22] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 56, sec. 1 (The approximate date can be inferred from the last dated entry on the same register, no. 2. p. 54, sec. 1, issued in Tammuz 5584[July 1824]).

[23] He was responsible for matters of *issur ve-heter* in Heshvan 5569 (October 1808) and Shevat 5580 (February 1820). In Tevet 5569 (January 1809), and in 5598 (1838) and 5602 (1842), he served as head of Istanbul Rabbinical Court (Leah Bornstein-Makovetsky, *The Istanbul Court Record in Matters of Ritual and Ethics, 1710–1903* [in Hebrew] [Lod: Orot Yahadut Hamagreb, 1999], 69, 163, 178, 229). In the list of Istanbul rabbis in the city's Rabbinical Court Records of 15 Av 5651 (19 August 1891), it is noted that he was the head of Istanbul's *kollel* from 1840 to 1841 and died in 1841 (5601) (*Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, No. 4 [5651–5652 (1871–1894)], 187). He is listed as a judge on the High Rabbinical Court of Istanbul in 1827 (R. Eliʿezer de Toledo, *Mishnat R. Eliʿezer*, pt. 2, Hoshen Mishpat [Izmir, 5625 (1865)]), pp. 73–74; R. Yosef Alfandari, *Responsa Porat Yosef* [Izmir, 5628 (1868)], Hoshen Mishpat, section 30).

[24] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 54 (Tammuz 5584).

[25] Minna Rozen, *The Last Ottoman Century and Beyond: The Jews in Turkey and the Balkans, 1808–1945* (Tel Aviv: Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Institute, Tel Aviv University, 2005), 1: 56–57.

cities of the Morea (Peloponnese).[26] The ruling was signed by the *dayyanim* (religious court judges) Yosef David Kamhi, Yosef Hakohen, and Nissim Yerushalmi sitting as a court for matters of *issur ve-heter*, and confirmed by R. Eliyah 'Anav, Ha-Rav Ha-Kollel[27] of the city at the time. The ruling as written appears also in the records of Balat, from where it was apparently copied.[28] Nissim Shemaryah Yerushalmi appears as a *dayyan* in 1818, and as the judge in charge of *issur ve-heter* in 1823–4, in addition to which he is listed as a member of the same panel of judges as in the ruling before us (along with Rafael Yosef HaKohen and Yosef David Kamhi) in a ruling of the court of *issur ve-heter* from that year.[29] R. Eliyah 'Anav was appointed Rav Ha-Kollel in 1825, and died in 1831.[30] The ruling was therefore issued at some point between 1825 and 1831.

Thus these four rulings expand the time frame of the deliberations to the period between 1817 and 1847—thirty years in which Western ideas were sweeping Istanbul's homes and palaces. Of the seventeen cases dealing with annulment of betrothals during these thirty years, five involved orphans, and four of these were due to a change of heart on the part of the orphans. Four of the five dealt with nullifying the *qidushin* of young female orphans. It should be noted that not all *qidushin* of minor females in general, and not all those of young female orphans, culminated in a dispute of some sort, and there were certainly many betrothals of this type that never reached the rabbinical courts. Seventeen deliberations over the course of thirty years means two such cases each year that ended up before the *beit din*.

a. *Rivqah Does Not Want Her Cousin*

The first case was that of Rivqah, daughter of the late Menahem Zalman aka Mercado. During his lifetime, he had apparently accepted *qidushin* on her behalf from the son of his brother. The prospective groom, Matatyah Zalman, went by the name Bekhor ben David. On 25 December 1816

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[26] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 56, sec. 2.

[27] Head of the central *beit midrash* (house of study) of the Istanbul community, and second to the Chief Rabbi.

[28] Bornstein-Makovetsky, *Istanbul Court Records*, p. 52, n. 246; idem, "Remnants of the Balat Court Register—Istanbul 1839," *Sefunot*, New Series, 4 (19) (1989), 96, document. No. 8 [in Hebrew].

[29] Ibid., 77, 231.

[30] Chronological listing of Istanbul rabbis as presented in the *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 4 (5631–5654 [1871–1894]), p. 187.

(6 Tevet 5577), she came before the religious court and publicly declared in the language of Judeo-Spanish: "*Yo, non lo quiero por novio lo ditto Bekhor, non lo quiero, non lo quiero!*" [I do not want him as a groom, this Bekhor, I do not want him, I do not want him!]. Two witnesses testified that Rivqah was still a minor, that is, she was less than twelve years of age. The court therefore decided that her *qidushin* was not valid and she was permitted to marry anyone her heart desired.[31] But Rivqah's case calls for closer scrutiny, beyond the simple facts of the story. We do not know precisely how old this orphan was, although we do know that she was a minor aged less than twelve. Her concerned father, foreseeing what might happen, wished to safeguard her future by marrying her to her cousin, so that if her parents died before their time, she would grow up in the home of her aunt/mother-in-law and not in the home of a stranger who might not be favorably disposed toward her. But Rivqah, young as she was, did not want this security, and we do not know why. Since her erstwhile groom was her cousin, she certainly knew him; his good and bad traits alike would not be foreign to her, and may have been at the heart of her refusal. The young girl's rejection of the *qidushin* that her late father had accepted in her name, along with the financial security that might have gone along with it, are not the whole story. For her refusal to be valid, she was required to appear before the religious court with two admissible witnesses who could testify that she was still a minor. In other words, she could not execute this refusal without the help of adults, both male and female. There are two possibilities in this case: one, that some adult in the family decided that this marriage was not good for her—either because of the character of the prospective husband or because he or she had a better match in hand—and this person persuaded her of such and arranged her appeal to the court. Although this is the more logical possibility, we must not reject outright the second alternative, namely, that little Rivqah did not love her cousin; stated plainly, she simply did not want him. So she turned to one of the older women in her family—certainly not her aunt (the mother of the intended groom) but perhaps her mother or her grandmother—and recounted her distress, and they produced witnesses who could corroborate the girl's claim that she was still a minor.

[31] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 54.

b. *The Minor Orphan Miriam is Faced with an Underage Brother-in-law*

The mother of the orphaned Miriam persuaded her to marry a certain boy. In the description of the case, it was stated that Miriam "was married," i.e., that both *qidushin* and *nisu'in* had taken place, although it was not recorded whether the marriage had been consummated. Very soon after the marriage, the groom died suddenly, before producing any offspring, and the young bride was faced with the obligation of waiting until her husband's minor-age brother grew up and either entered into levirate marriage with her (*yibbum*) or freed her of this obligation through the ritual of *halitsah*, as mandated by Jewish law.[32] On 20 May 1835 (21 Iyyar 5595), Miriam came to the religious court with expert witnesses who testified that she was a minor, and she herself informed the court, just as Rivqah had before her, that she did not want the young brother-in-law as her groom, and that her mother had misled her by marrying her off before she had reached majority. The court accepted her arguments and freed her to marry whomever she chose.[33]

This case has several puzzling aspects. One is the fact that it was the mother who arranged the marriage, and not a male family member—a grandfather, brother, uncle or guardian. This leads us to conclude that such a man was not to be found, and that the two were too poor for anyone to take an interest. Moreover, as opposed to a father, a mother could not accept *qidushin* on behalf of her minor daughter; it therefore follows that what took place was a *qidushin* for all intents and purposes, that is, a groom gave the minor Miriam a ring or other object by which he betrothed her, and she accepted the object. For this to be the case, she had to have been a twelve year old with two visible pubic hairs or have reached the age of twelve years and six months. But can it be that a mother does not know the age of her own daughter? Thus, either the mother gave a false age for her daughter and pretended that she was of

[32] If a woman's late husband left no viable offspring, but had a brother, Jewish law called for levirate marriage (from the Latin *levir*, husband's brother); the widow and her brother-in-law were obligated to marry (in Hebrew, *yibbum*) so that she could bear a male child to carry on the name of the deceased—unless the widow could persuade the brother to annul his obligation to marry her (*halitsah*). The Hebrew root H.L.TS., meaning "to remove a shoe," gave the act of *halitsah* its name (as part of the ritual, the widow removes the levir's sandal and casts it to the ground). On the procedure of *halitsah*, with comments referring to Istanbul practice compiled by Rabbi Shemu'el Yafeh Ashkenazi at the end of the 16th century, see *Tiqqun Sofrim* (Izmir, 1673), 14a–15a. On the obligation of *yibum*, and its execution in the 16th century, see Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 155–162.

[33] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 55.

marriageable age, or, following the death of the groom, when it became clear to the mother and daughter that the latter would have to wait many years until her brother-in-law fulfilled his obligation of levirate marriage or released her from said obligation via the *halitsah* ritual, they both deceived the court—the daughter, by stating that her mother had misled her, and the mother, by feigning confusion. The court, for its part, did not want an *'agunah* (a "chained" woman, who was not free to marry another man) in its precincts, a situation guaranteed to undermine the social and moral order; hence it accepted the web of falsehoods. The entire affair raises serious questions: If Miriam was a defenseless minor orphan, where were the guardians appointed by the rabbinic court? In the 16th, 17th, and even 18th centuries, it is hard to imagine a male or female orphan, rich or poor, without a guardian. The fiction accepted by the court is also curious: On the one hand, it indicates a healthy dose of common sense, in that it is better to free the young bride from the ties that bind her to the minor brother-in-law than to create a situation of a young lower-class girl, unable to marry, who will be easy prey for men. But if we compare this attitude with the stringent practices of the 16th-century rabbis, the difference is highly conspicuous.[34]

c. *A Match between a Young Man and the Daughter of His Father's Widow from Her First Marriage*

In this case, a dispute arose following the death of a man by the name of Yisrael Gabbai, who had married twice. He left two adult sons from his youthful marriage, one of them named Yitshaq, as well as a minor son by the name of Mosheh. After the death of his first wife, Yisrael married a widow who had a daughter named Luna from her previous marriage. By the time of his death, his second wife had given birth to another daughter

[34] In *Responsa of R. Eliyahu ibn Hayyim* (Venice, 1657), section 26, the same question was discussed on 12 July 1577; however in that case, the groom was alive and well. The bride claimed, exactly like our Miriam, that her mother had misled her. The rabbinical court did not release her from her betrothal. In *Responsa Maharit* [R. Yosef Mitrani] (Lvov, 1861), pt. 1, sec. 51 (end of 16th century), a case was deliberated in Safed involving "the *qidushin* of a minor female orphan [who rejected a betrothal], in which R. [Mosheh] Galante ruled that she should be freed [from her obligation] and the Maharit wrote that she was obligated. And all the scholars of the city agreed with his opinion that she was obligated, with the exception of R. Mosheh Castelatz, and R. Shem-Tov Atias z"l even recanted his opinion and signed that she should be obligated."

and was pregnant with a third child.[35] The widow had no intention of continuing to live with the adult sons of her deceased husband, and she produced her *ketubah* (marriage contract) in the amount of 7,102 *kuruş* and demanded that this sum be paid to her. The amount of money cited in this *ketubah* was very high. At the time, the cost of renting a flat in the Hasköy district ranged between 13.5 *kuruş* a month for a small flat on a middle floor in Kalaycı Bahçe,[36] to 37.5 *kuruş* a month for a flat with glass windows on the top floor in the Piri Paşa neighborhood,[37] to forty-four *kuruş* a month for a house in the Ma'alem neighborhood.[38] This suit was likely not welcomed by the guardians of the orphans, since executing it entailed selling off substantial assets of the deceased that could have provided a livelihood for them; but they did not have much choice, and they were compelled to come to some sort of agreement with her. In the midst of the negotiations, it emerged that while her second husband was still alive, she had betrothed Luna, the daughter from her first marriage, to Yitshaq, the adult son of her second husband from his first marriage, and had even paid the prospective groom a considerable amount of money as a *mohar* (bride-price). The classification of the money as a *mohar* is somewhat confusing, since the bride-price was generally the sum that the groom paid to the family of the bride for exclusive rights to her as his wife. The significance of its definition as a *mohar* in this case is that it was his future mother-in-law who had given him the money, which, according to custom, he was then expected to bring into the marriage. In any event, the intended groom claimed that she still owed him 700 *kuruş* on account, and that this should be deducted from the sum of the *ketubah*. Later in the negotiations, the first-born son waived the amount that his stepmother still owed him, and she, for her part, waived the bulk of the *ketubah* money that was due her. She agreed to accept only 1,000 *kuruş* in

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[35] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 1 (1833–1841), p. 12, section 10–11, last third of Kislev 5595 (between 22 December 1834 and 1 January 1835). It should be noted that in these sections of the Rabbinical Court Records, which discussed the appointment of guardians for the minor orphans, and representatives for the widow in her claim, it is stated that Yisrael Gabbai had two adult sons and a minor son from his first marriage, whereas in the discussion of the widow's claim, which took place several months earlier (see note 41), it was noted that the deceased had only one adult son and one minor son. It is possible that there was a scribal error in one of the sections, or that one of the adult sons of Yisrael Gabbai died between the appointment of the guardians and the discussion of the widow's claim.

[36] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 1,3, section 4, from 8 Heshvan 5594 (21 October 1833).

[37] Ibid., p. 5, section 6, from 12 Kislev 5594 (24 November 1833).

[38] Ibid., p. 2, section 2, from 4 Av 5594 (9 August 1834).

cash and a full wardrobe, the cost of which was estimated at 300 *kuruş*. In exchange for her relinquishing the remainder of the *ketubah*, the heirs of her late husband and the guardians of the orphans waived her obligation to take a "widow's oath," which she would normally have been obliged to swear if she wished to collect the sum of her *ketubah*. The "widow's oath" was required of every widow who demanded her *ketubah* money in place of the right to live off her late husband's estate; in it, the widow pledged that she had not taken any of her late husband's assets and had not concealed any object or money of his.[39]

In addition to forgoing the sum in the *ketubah*, the widow in question undertook to provide for her daughter Luna, the intended bride of the son of her first husband, until she was old enough to marry. Sums for her support were enumerated in the agreement for a considerable period: three years with precise amounts of money, and unspecified sums of money for an indefinite number of years, with the time and amount to be determined by the court. The prospective bride was apparently nine years of age at the time, for the assumption was that within three years she would be of marriageable age. In addition, the widow Sarah undertook to nurse the baby about to be born to her, a commitment that she was not obligated to assume under Jewish law, since, with the death of her husband, all his rights to his wife's body were terminated; if his heirs wished to have her nurse his son or daughter, they were expected to pay her as if she were a wet nurse from outside the family, and even then, only if she consented to such an arrangement.[40] In any event, the woman committed to nursing the infant for a period of two years. In practical terms, this meant that she could not remarry for two years following the birth. Moreover, she pledged that if she were to marry a third time, her daughter from the second marriage, that is the stepsister of her husband's son, would be raised by her in her new home.[41]

Like the previous cases, this saga contains a wealth of information about the Istanbuli Jewish family of the early 19th century. The most interesting insight is that the widowhood of a young woman was considered undesirable for society. The woman in this case was a widow when she married Yisrael Gabbai, and after his death it was likely that she would marry a

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[39] Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah*, Hilkhot Ishut, 17:15, and chap. 18; *Shulhan ʿArukh*, Even ha-ʿEzer, Hilkhot Ketubot, section 96, subsections a–b.

[40] See on this matter, Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 181–183; Lamdan, *Separate People*, 87–88.

[41] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 1 (1833–1841), p. 15, section 6 (3 Adar 5595 [9 March 1835]).

third time. The logic in such circumstances is threefold: (a) a young widow of child-bearing age undermines the social order, and the situation invites sexual relations outside of wedlock; (b) if the widow leaves the marriage with a comfortable financial arrangement, she immediately becomes a desirable match, thereby increasing the pressure on her to remarry; (c) if the widow leaves the marriage penniless, her own interests will push her to seek a new marriage. The sums of money invested by the mother in arranging the marriage of her daughter Luna, and likewise, the sum of her own *ketubah*, suggest eminent social and economic standing.

In the case before us, the widow needed to resolve a number of problematic issues. The first was one that she brought with her into the marriage, her first-born daughter Luna from her first marriage. To ensure her future, she hastened to match her with the first-born son of her second husband, and even invested a considerable sum of money in arranging that marriage. Her calculations were quite simple: in the event of her death, this daughter would have a home and family to look out for her. At the same time, it is obvious from the details of her own *ketubah* agreement following the death of her second husband that the aforementioned Luna was only a young girl at the time of her stepfather's death. The agreement included amounts of money that were to change from year to year, which her mother undertook to set aside for her livelihood until she reached marriageable age, twelve years at the earliest. The arrangement implies that Luna would live during this period in the home of her future husband; otherwise, there is no reason to enumerate the sums that her mother undertook to pay for her support. However, the minor child born to the widow from her second husband would go with the mother wherever she went, and she pledged that if she remarried it would be on condition that her third husband agree to have this daughter live with them.

The fate of these two daughters is worthy of consideration. Upon the death of her father, a minor daughter became an unwanted burden, and her future was assured only if she could be betrothed into a family that was likely to look out for her, or alternatively, if the new husband of her mother would allow her to be raised in his home. Obviously, her wishes—or objections—with regard to a future marriage were not considered by any of the parties involved.

A further aspect of this case is the widow's set of concerns. Widowed a second time, with two daughters and a baby about to be born, she preferred to come to an agreement that would allow her to stand on her own two feet and not remain in the same house where she had been living—and where her eldest daughter would one day be the lady of the house.

So anxious was she to avoid remaining in this house that she agreed to waive the bulk of her *ketubah*, to nurse the baby about to be born without compensation, to remain unmarried for at least two years, and to make her third marriage contingent on the second daughter's living with her and her new husband. It is interesting that, apart from the subject of nursing, there is no discussion in the *ketubah* arrangement of the sex of the unborn child, his/her future, or who would raise him or her. If the baby would be a boy, we can assume that the husband's family would allow the woman to raise him until he reached the "age of education," six years at the most, and then they would claim him as an heir of Yisrael Gabbai, just like his two stepbrothers from the first wife of the deceased. And if it would be a girl, there is reason to believe that, as with the first-born daughter of Yisrael Gabbai, his heirs would be happy to leave her in her mother's care. In any event, the arrangement indicates that the widow felt it would be better for her to relinquish most of her *ketubah* money and go her own way, with all that that implies in terms of the care of two small children.

Did the factors that she considered stem from the situation in which she found herself? Her relationship with her prospective son-in-law? Or the belief that she could marry a third time? We can only speculate, not having been there; but it is possible to construct various scenarios, all of which are plausible. One might have expected that a widow would be happy to remain in the same home where her first-born daughter resided, but this was not the case. Instead, she abandons her for reasons unknown, whether to serve her own interests or those of her younger children. Her own interest is in having a possible third marriage, and the best interests of her children from her second marriage are to distance them from an older stepbrother who will be none too happy to share with them the inheritance of their common father, and may even conspire against them. Perhaps the reasoning behind her decision is that a nine-year-old girl can survive without her, but the young babies in her care cannot, and it would be better for them to be far from the family of her late husband.

d. *The Tale of an Orphaned Minor, Her Grandmother, and Her Uncles*[42]

Orphanhood is also the central theme of our next case of arranged marriage. This particular tale involved an orphaned girl of minor age, that is, less than twelve years old, whose mother died in Istanbul and whose

[42] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), pp. 18–20, sec. 27.

father, Avraham Ha-Kohen, and her maternal grandmother, a woman by the name of Khursi, took her with them and settled in the Land of Israel. But luck was not with the young orphan, and shortly after their arrival in Jerusalem her father died as well, leaving her dependent on her grandmother. The latter, who was concerned about the child's fate if she too were to die, returned with the girl to Istanbul and moved into the home of her son-in-law, ʿEzra Motola (hereafter referred to as ʿEzra the elder), who was married to her second daughter. Appointed as guardians of the girl were Yisrael Motola and Avraham Motola, respectively the brother and son of ʿEzra the elder. At the time of the rabbinic court deliberations, ʿEzra the elder was no longer alive. The fact that he had been married to the daughter of Khursi, and that his son was already of an age that the court considered fitting to serve as a guardian, could indicate that this Khursi, mother-in-law of the late ʿEzra and grandmother of the guardian Avraham, was already quite advanced in years, which explains her fears concerning her granddaughter's future. In any event, when she arrived in Istanbul, "the aforementioned grandmother and all her relatives concluded an agreement" to match the minor orphaned girl with the son of one of her guardians (Avraham Motola); the son bore the name of his grandfather, ʿEzra Motola (and will hence be referred to as ʿEzra the younger). The reason for their decision was that they believed such an arrangement would be highly advantageous on several counts: first, the groom and all his relatives were family members of the girl; second, the groom in question was very well-to-do; and lastly, the match would ensure that the orphan would find refuge there and not be forced to wander hither and yon. Thus, everyone approved of the match.

But the matter did not end there. The second guardian, Yisrael Motola, who was the brother of ʿEzra the elder and great-uncle of the prospective groom, disagreed with the match and wanted the girl to be betrothed to his (unnamed) grandson, the son of his own son, Hayyim Motola. His demand turned the entire family against him, as they sided with the grandmother Khursi. The Istanbul rabbinical court, which deliberated the issue in the first third of the month of Tevet in the year 5602 (between 14 and 24 December 1841), ruled that, although the grandson of the second guardian was also a fitting match, they preferred the first arrangement. The esteemed rabbis Raphael ʿAli, Hayyim ibn Yaqar, and Yehoshuʿa Misha'el Bitran did not give the reasons for their decision.

The matter of the orphaned minor, daughter of Avraham Ha-Kohen, raises several questions, some of them similar to those we have already encountered and some of them new. Here, as in the previous case, the intended bride is "absent" from the proceedings: she has no name, no

preference; no one considers the possibility of waiting until she grows up and says "this is the man of my choosing." The grandmother Khursi needed to ensure her granddaughter's future, and it seemed obvious to all involved that to simply raise her in the bosom of the Motola family until she matured and married was not a possibility worth considering. The status of her aunt, wife of ʿEzra Motola the elder, was not enough to protect her; safeguarding her future depended on a marriage within the family. The question that arises is what impelled the two branches of the family to fight over her welfare. After all, she was merely a young girl who was not yet ready for marriage. The answer can be found between the lines. It is not stated explicitly, but there is no other explanation that is feasible. Her father, Avraham Ha-Kohen, had apparently been a wealthy man, and this was the reason for the quarrel over her fate. Perhaps the grandmother Khursi also possessed assets that she wished to bestow on her granddaughter. The grandmother, who feared leaving her wealthy granddaughter prey to guardians from outside the family, sought a solution in the form of marriage within the family of her second daughter, who were also affluent—a fact that perhaps lessened the temptation to exploit the young girl's riches.

A few words on the grandmother's wishes would not be out of place: Why did she prefer the grandson of her son-in-law ʿEzra Motola the elder over the grandson of his brother? In the end, isn't it all the same family? Well, not exactly. The grandson, ʿEzra Motola the younger, was a blood relative. And further, just as the boy was the grandson of ʿEzra Motola the elder, he was also her great-grandson by her second daughter, meaning that he was the first cousin once removed of her granddaughter, the prospective bride. Thus she was joining two of her grandchildren in marriage. By contrast, the great-grandson, son of Hayyim ben Yisrael Motola, did not share any blood ties with her. He was a member of the Motola family, and her lineage had no connection with his. The young girl's marriage to her cousin meant that her aunt, the sister of her mother—and not some unknown woman—would raise the tender bride. Moreover, upon her death, the grandmother Khursi would leave her assets to her two flesh-and-blood grandchildren and not to someone from the Motola line, in which case if her granddaughter died without offspring, the descendants of another woman would enjoy this inheritance.[43]

[43] See on this point, Bornstein-Makovetsky, "Istanbul Regulations of Inheritance," 3–24; Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 124–127.

While it is difficult to follow the fortunes of the Ha-Kohen family because the name is so common, the Motola family has left us several traces of its status and affluence. In the rabbinical court records, Yisrael Motola, the brother of the bride's uncle, is referred to by the Turkish honorific *çelebi* (meaning "distinguished gentleman"). This title attests to high social and financial standing as well as connections with the ruling powers.

An additional piece of information about the family emerges from the rabbinic court deliberations on an entirely different matter, involving the heirs of Yisrael Danon, a resident of Ortaköy. Several properties in that village were enumerated at the hearing, among them "the Motola houses," located in an area of large, well-appointed homes. In other words, we are speaking not of one home but of a group of houses belonging to the same family, in an area associated with the affluent and distinguished residents of the village.[44]



Table 1. Family Ties of Grandmother Khursi

[44] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 4 (1871–1894), pp. 18–75, sec. 7, from 27 Shevat 5638 (31 January 1878).



Table 2. The Motola Family

e. *An Orphan, His Mother, and His Uncle*

The final case involves, unlike the above, a male orphan by the name of Mordekhai ben Mikhael Matias, and his mother Clara, a widow. A dispute erupted between them and the boy's uncle, Mosheh Matias (his mother's brother), over the dissolution of a match between Mordekhai and his cousin, "the bride Sarah, may she be blessed among women."[45] This is their story: Following the death of his father, the boy lived in the home of his uncle, his mother's brother. The reason for this will soon be clear. In any event, when he grew up, he began to work in his uncle's business, but not before his uncle had matched him with his daughter. From the correspondence between the age at the match and the age when he began working, and also from the involvement of the groom's mother in the match, there is reason to assume that this took place not long after the boy had reached the age of *mitzvot* (that is, thirteen). To secure the

[45] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 41, sec. 1, first third of Sivan 5609 (between 19 and 29 May 1844).

match, it was agreed that any party that violated the betrothal agreement would pay the other side 10,000 *kuruş*—an almost unimaginable sum in the eyes of ordinary folk.

It was customary that at the time of the match, monetary matters between the two families were formally arranged. The father of the bride would state the size of the dowry that she would receive, to which he added a sum of money in cash, known as *medodim*, that would generally be given to the groom for business purposes. Under normal circumstances, the young couple would continue to live in the home of the groom's father and be supported by him for several years. In cases where the bride was the only daughter of a wealthy man, her father would grant the couple (with the agreement of the groom's family) the right to *mesa franca* ("free table," in Judeo-Spanish), meaning he would support them for a certain period following their marriage, generally three years, during which time they would live in his home.

In the case before us, the groom had already been living for several years in the home of his uncle and future father-in-law. When they were about to formalize the financial arrangements, the "deal" fell apart. It transpired that the young groom had assets that he had inherited from his father from which the uncle had borrowed 300 *kuruş*. The groom and his mother tried to get back this loan money as part of the financial agreement arranged in connection with the match. The uncle claimed that he had supported the young man for several years and hence was not obliged to return the loan, while the groom argued that the uncle had provided for him out of love, and moreover, he had worked for the uncle for several months without pay. Either way, the "flames of discord were fanned" between the parties, to the point where the marriage was called off. In the compromise agreement between them, the groom waived the debt of 300 *kuruş*, the uncle renounced his claim to a sizeable penalty from the groom, and each of the parties went on his way.

This episode is fraught with implications. The fact that the widow shared the same family name as her brother, with whom she had the dispute, shows that her late husband, Mikhael Matias, had been her cousin on her father's side. In other words, the entire tale unfolded within the male line of the family, and the intended marriage within the family was not the first of its kind, meaning that the custom of endogamy was still widely practiced even in the mid-19th century. Moreover, just as in the 16th century, the widow was not seen as capable of raising her son alone. To do so, she required male patronage, and when such was not found in the home of her late husband, her brother became the guardian.

The fact that the orphan had grown up in the home of his uncle is not unrelated to the matter of the money that the widow and her son had loaned him. In fact, he had made use of a portion of the estate of his brother-in-law for his own dealings, as fitting compensation for having raised his son. If he had succeeded in marrying off his nephew to his daughter, the uncle would have killed several proverbial birds with one stone: To his way of thinking, his debt would have been covered, since the money that he would have invested in the marriage of his daughter would have at least partially offset this debt. Likewise, all monies expended on the marriage would have remained on the "right" side of the family even if the girl had died without leaving any progeny. And last but not least, the fact that he had raised the boy in his home, and the latter had begun to work in his business without pay, only increased the value of the match, for in this way the uncle did away with the need to pay any wages to his future son-in-law. The high penalty imposed for breaking the marriage agreement is also significant: At least one of the parties was very interested in preventing the dissolution of this match, and it is not hard to guess which one.

It should be understood that this was not a case of exploiting a helpless orphan. It was a very common marriage arrangement in several respects: the financial considerations, the fact that the prospective groom had worked for his future father-in-law without pay, and the use of the orphan's money by the uncle/father-in-law. The only thing that was not customary in this case was the refusal of the uncle to acknowledge his debt to the widow and her son.

The bride does not make any appearance in this discussion, either physically or in terms of her wishes. Her father manages all dealings with the groom and his mother, despite the fact that they doubtless know each other well, having lived in the same house for a number of years. This may suggest that she was less than twelve years and one day of age, and thus her father could accept *qidushin* on her behalf as he saw fit. One further detail is missing from the story: the betrothal of a young Jewish girl from Istanbul carried much greater legal significance than that of a Jewish maiden elsewhere in the Diaspora. This is because in Istanbul the betrothal gifts, known as *sivlonot*, were considered legally binding on the young woman in the same manner as the actual *qidushin*.

From ancient times, it was customary in Istanbul, as in other Jewish communities, that when families concluded the financial arrangements of a marriage, the groom bestowed various gifts on his bride-to-be, and he received gifts from her family. In the Ottoman Empire at the time, typical

gifts included a hand-crafted belt, made of plaited gold threads or a combination of gold and silver strands woven together, or perhaps a band of silver inlaid with precious or semi-precious stones—depending on the wealth of the groom. The groom generally received from the bride's family a *kalemdar*, or as Sephardic Jews called it, an *escrivania*. This writing case, holding a quill and ink, was fashioned from copper, silver or gold (according to the wealth of the bride's family), with an artistic inscription, and in special cases, was even inlaid with semi-precious stones.

While the gifts given to the groom held only social and ceremonial significance, those accepted by the bride-to-be were a source of serious problems, since according to ancient Jewish custom, a woman is "acquired" in three ways: through money, bill of purchase, or intercourse. In the 16th century it was already the practice that *qinyan* ("acquisition") was only through money. As stated above, a marriage involved two ceremonies (*qidushin* and *nisu'in*), which among the Romaniots were two completely separate rituals. Due to the time that elapsed between the two, which could be months or even years, and the chance that the couple might engage in sexual relations before the marriage, the Romaniots considered the gifts received by the bride-to-be after the *shidukhin* (agreement of future betrothal) as implied consent on her part to accept them for the purpose of *qidushin*, meaning that they in effect combined the *shidukhin* and the *qidushin*, without the elements required for the latter, namely, recitation of the formula, witnesses, etc. Thus, in practice an Istanbuli bride-to-be who accepted gifts from her future betrothed legally bound herself to him as if she had accepted *qidushin*; to be free to marry another man, she required a bill of divorcement from him as if they were actually betrothed, despite the fact that the marriage had not been concluded. Due to the large Romaniot population in Istanbul, intermarriage between them and members of other Jewish congregations was a frequent occurrence; for this reason, the Sephardim took upon themselves the practice of *sivlonot* as an additional stringency, though they did not have the same fear of intimacy between betrothed couples since their *qidushin* and *nisu'in* were held at the same time. Hence, an Istanbuli bride from a Sephardi community who accepted a gift from her intended—for example, an ivory comb or a silk scarf—was as bound to him as if *qidushin* had actually taken place, since the assumption was that she understood this as a form of *qidushin* and, by accepting the gift, declared that she was his alone.[46] On 5 December 1725, the city's rabbinical court in fact ruled that

[46] See on this issue, Rozen, *Jewish Community in Istanbul*, 132–139.

a girl could only accept *sivlonot* in the presence of one of the city's learned men.[47] This practice prevailed in Istanbul for hundreds of years, including the period under discussion.

In the case of the Matias family, the prospective couple lived under the same roof after an agreement had been reached regarding their future betrothal. This raises the question of *sivlonot*, that is, did the prospective groom give his bride-to-be gifts that consecrated her to him? This was a natural concern for the father of a young woman, since in the event of the dissolution of a match where *sivlonot* were given and accepted, she required a bill of divorcement, leaving her family vulnerable to extortion; and if she received a *get*, this reduced the choice of potential husbands to those who were not a *kohen*. (By contrast, there were several ways for the man to marry according to Jewish law.) The case before us is different, however: It was stated expressly in the rabbinical court ruling that the rabbis had studied the matter and had found that there was no concern that *sivlonot* had been accepted, that is, the young man had not given anything to his prospective bride and there was thus no reason to think that *qidushin* had taken place. Consequently, the rabbis ruled, he was entitled to marry whomever he pleased.

This last ruling is of particular interest, as it indicates two things: one, that it was the boy who wished to dissolve the *shidukh* (agreement of future betrothal); and two, that in the mid-19th century (as opposed to the mid-16th)—even in a society that was still unquestionably patriarchal—it was difficult for a Jewish man who had betrothed a woman through *qidushin* to marry another woman without giving his first wife a bill of divorcement. Stated otherwise, over the course of the generations between the mid-16th and mid-19th centuries, monogamy had become a binding norm even in Istanbul society, which was not subject to the *ḥerem* of Rabbenu Gershom (the prohibition against polygamy enacted c. 1000 CE and accepted by the Ashkenazi communities).

In the case under discussion, the future groom, and not the future bride, was vulnerable to extortion. Based on the agreement between them, her father could demand of the erstwhile groom payment of the 10,000 *kuruş* to which the latter had committed himself as a deterrent penalty; for this reason, the prospective groom required a ruling stating that he was permitted to marry another woman as part of the compromise agreement concluded between him and his uncle, the father of the future bride.

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[47] *Istanbul Rabbinical Court Records*, no. 2 (1841–1847), p. 4, sec. 4, decision from 1 Tevet 5486 copied from an old register into register no. 2.

The salient point in this discussion is that although the uncle raised Mordekhai Matias like a son, he did so in a calculated way and with the understanding that the boy would marry his daughter. The young man nonetheless had the right to decide if he wished to marry his uncle's daughter, and he chose not to. As stated, this right was not available to the bride-to-be.

Conclusion

Before summarizing our findings, it is important to recall that the cases examined here comprise several aspects, only one of which is the betrothal of male and female orphans within the family where they found refuge. Over the thirty-year period studied, we found five such instances that developed into disputes so bitter that they ended up before a religious court at the stage between the *qidushin* and the *nisu'in*. There is reason to assume that other cases, of which we are unaware, ended in marriage.

From the above cases, it would appear that the institution of marriage, at least in the Istanbul Jewish community, looked much the same in the 19th century as it had at the start of the Ottoman era. To all intents and purposes, it was a business transaction in which the emotional component—the relationship of the prospective couple; their wishes and desires—was utterly ignored. Throughout the process, which culminated in the creation of a new family, it was the financial factors that were paramount. This was especially true with regard to first marriages, which were almost always arranged before the intended bride was capable of forming an opinion. In second or third marriages, the woman had a greater voice and more decision-making power, but the constraints imposed on her by her first marriage often led to a situation where it was financial considerations that dictated her course of action. The difference between first and subsequent marriages, from the woman's perspective, was that in a first marriage her fate was determined by her father or grandfather, in much the same way they would sell an object, whereas in subsequent marriages, she was the one offering herself for sale.

The business aspect of marriage was not the only element that persisted into the first half of the 19th century. The *sivlonot* were still a factor binding the prospective bride and groom and requiring a bill of divorcement to dissolve the relationship despite the fact that they had not yet married. Child-rearing agreements following the death of a father, including nursing arrangements, also continued to be common. The other important

insight that emerges from these sources is that male and female orphans who lost their father at a young age faced an uncertain fate, perhaps even more so than earlier generations. No matter the circumstances, they were always in a position of weakness: if their father had older heirs, the children presented an obstacle to them since the inheritance had to be shared with them; and if their father did not have such heirs, and the young orphans had assets, these posed a temptation to their guardians. Being motherless could also be critical, but a good grandmother was sometimes an adequate substitute for the security provided by a mother.

The hundreds of years between the death of Süleyman the Magnificent and the start of the Tanzimat reforms (1566–1808) are considered the most stable period in the social history of the Ottoman Empire—a time that saw the continuation of patterns that had taken shape during the early centuries of its existence. From the deliberations concerning the betrothal of orphans that we studied, it is apparent that in the first third of the 19th century, the perceptions that held sway in the Jewish community were still the same ones that had prevailed in Istanbul Jewish society in the mid-16th century. Yet alongside these well-established conventions, some signs of change were beginning to emerge. The first and most conspicuous of these can be found in the dispute between the widow Matias and her son, on one side, and her brother-in-law, on the other. It is clear from the deliberations that by 1841, polygamy—a common occurrence in the 16th and even 17th centuries—was no longer considered a feasible choice if it could be avoided.

In fact, the conservative portrait presented above is incomplete without the wealth of material concerning other marriage-related disputes and differences of opinion during the period in question. Along with the image of traditionalism and continuity, we find discussions that indicate alliances for purposes of marriage initiated and concluded by young people themselves. A case in point is the young girl who was betrothed to a boy from Bursa, after which word spread that she had already accepted *qidushin* from a different boy from the Morea region. There is no evidence of a "responsible adult" who managed her affairs or those of the young men involved, and she appears to have handled the situation entirely by herself.[48]

[48] See above, n. 26.

The matter of the young girl's refusal to wait for the underage brother of her late husband to enter into a levirate marriage with her is likewise a sign of change. If the orphaned bride had indeed been a minor at the time of her marriage, where was the guardian provided by the religious court? Apparently, there wasn't one, and her mother handled the entire affair. If we assume that the bride was of marriageable age, then the entire tale that she presented to the court was based on falsehoods that the court knowingly accepted in order to free her from the obligation of *yibbum* (levirate marriage). All of this would have been unthinkable during the community's formative years. At the start of the 16th century, the Sephardi rabbis let "chained" widows wait until they were old and gray for their brother-in-law to release them, without freeing them to wed another.

In trying to comprehend the backdrop against which these changes took place, it is important to bear in mind that while these are isolated cases and the larger reality may well have been different, they did occur and, as such, demand our attention. The social developments that set the stage for these cases happened very slowly, but based on what we know of events in the latter half of the 19th century, there is no question that they eventually gathered momentum, leading in turn to growing changes in the Jewish family. The reasons for these shifts were both social and political. The social transformation was far-reaching, and seemingly unrelated to the family conflicts described above—but only at first glance. Starting in the second half of the 16th century, the process of social-economic polarization of the community intensified. The bulk of available capital became concentrated in the hands of a few, whose numbers became even smaller over time. Control of the community remained within this limited group and their coterie. What this meant in practice was the shrinking of the community's mutual support network and the weakening of social control mechanisms, which were no longer reinforced by society. This process can explain how a young girl could accept *qidushin* from a man in the Morea region and subsequently become betrothed to a man from Bursa, with only gossip ultimately bringing the situation to light. If the network of mutual support had been tighter, the girl would not have been betrothed to the first partner without the presence of a rabbi and family members—which would have prevented her betrothal to the second man. This may also help explain how the mother of the young *yevamah* married off her daughter without the involvement of a male guardian.

Yet social-economic changes are not the most important factor here. In the period under discussion, there were also major political changes in the community. Between 1819 and 1827, all heads of Jewish families

involved in business dealings with the Sultan were executed. These affluent families—Farhi, Carmona, Ajiman, and Gabbai—exerted absolute control over the Jewish communities of the Ottoman Empire: Farhi, in the communities of Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon; Carmona, Ajiman, and Gabbai, in Baghdad and Istanbul. Istanbul was of course the nucleus of these families' control, as the economic and political nerve center of the Empire. The fall of the families is tied up with Ottoman politics and the Empire's standing vis-à-vis Christian Europe, subjects that have already been dealt with at length; but the social significance of their collapse takes on a new dimension when viewed through the prism of the deliberations cited here. As long as these families ruled the community with an iron fist, deviations from the norm, the accepted, the honorable, were inconceivable. Those who did not comply with the rulings of the religious courts were taken with due respect by the community's police (*yasakçılar*, in Turkish) and placed under lock and key in the *casa negra* (Judeo-Spanish for "black house") adjacent to the Chief Rabbi's residence in Balat. The support for all this came from these major businessmen whose connections in the corridors of power allowed them to maintain the upper hand in the community. Upon their fall, the constraints of all sorts that had held the impoverished Jewish masses of Istanbul in check suddenly fell away, leading to improper sexual conduct, the consumption of meat without rabbinic certification, and threats by individuals to leave the faith if the community would not help support their families.[49] The social upheaval that rocked the Jewish community of Istanbul during these years also explains the changes that are evident in some of the deliberations cited here, which, on the face of it, deal with very personal matters.

[49] Rozen, *Last Ottoman Century*, 1: 53–63.

URBAN ENCOUNTERS: THE MUSLIM-JEWISH CASE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Yaron Ben-Naeh

First, I would like to provide some chronological and physical-geographical borders of this study. I describe a *longue durée*, extending from the late Suleymanic age in the mid-16th century to the early 19th, before the great changes of the modern period. The Ottoman world encompassed vast territories in Europe, Asia, and North Africa. At its peak, the Danube was its northern border in Europe, Tunisia its western strongpoint, the Caucasus and Iraq its border in Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula its boundary in the south. Above all local differences there was a certain cultural uniformity in the main cities, the administrative and commercial centers in which Jews tended to reside. Islam was dominant in most of the Ottoman provincial cities, defining time and constructing space. The urban lifestyle was basically Muslim in nature, and its material and cultural expressions clearly influenced the religious minorities, as we shall see further on. All eyes were turned towards the Imperial capital—Istanbul, and towards the Sultan's household.

From the mid-16th century, continuous changes and developments shaped the character of Ottoman Jewry anew. While we are able to discern substantial and significant structural and organizational modifications in Ottoman Jewish communities during the 16th through the 18th centuries, it seems that with but one exception no great change occurred in the general cultural and mental outlook of Ottoman Jewry from the late 16th until the first half of the 19th century. Ottoman Jewry was an urban society par excellence, as Jews were attracted to the major economic centers such as Istanbul, Edirne, Salonica, and Izmir, Aleppo and Damascus, Cairo and Alexandria, whose communities constituted the vast majority of this Jewry. The Jews in the Ottoman Empire underwent processes of mingling and mutual assimilation between members of different *kahal*s.

The actual size of the Jewish population remains an open question, but researchers such as Jacob Barnai (in various works) estimated it circa 150,000.[1] As the barriers between the various congregations collapsed and

[1] For demographic estimations as well as the relation between 'a house' or a single tax-payer and the number of souls see Yaron Ben-Naeh, Jews in the Realm of the Sultans

their members mixed with one other, many particularistic customs disappeared, and the pluralism in custom and *halakhah* was replaced by a new eclectic local 'Sephardi' custom. Division and tension between Jewish communities now followed other lines: Jews of Iberian descent (Sephardim) vs. those of mid-European and East European Jews (Ashkenazim), Rabbanite Jews vs. Karaites, residents of one city vs. those of another. Tensions would also arise along class and professional lines: between poor and rich, between guilds, local and itinerant merchants, and—of course—between Jews and non-Jews. Feelings of kinship and fraternity were reserved, first and foremost, for relations between an individual and his extended family and only after that for relations between the individual and other members of his ethnic-religious group, guild or other. There were close ties between the Jewish communities of the empire, manifested in family relationships, business contacts, the mobility of rabbis and correspondence on religious legal matters, the tendering of political and monetary aid, and naturally, a constant sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility. There were also ties between the Ottoman Jewish communities and those outside the empire, mainly in northern Italian cities and the western Sephardim, whose capital was Amsterdam.

The multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman state considered all taxpayers within its borders to be its protected subjects. The principle of justice guided the ruler with regard to all his subjects, and the *dhimmi* communities generally received fair treatment in accordance with the conditions established by Muslim law and tradition. The Islamic legal system determined the inferior status of the *dhimmis* and imposed upon them the poll tax (*jizye*) and other restrictions that were intended to degrade and visually mark them. There was no uniformity or consistency in the enforcement of the restrictions. As a rule, the central authorities usually did not initiate the enforcement of the restrictions, and protected the rights of the *dhimmis*. Harsh acts and monetary extortion on the part of local officials and governors were characteristic of distant provinces. The Muslim masses generally expressed contempt towards non-Muslims and strangers of all types. Greek and Armenian Christians demonstrated hatred towards Jews that had both religious and economic origins. This general state of affairs did not prevent the existence of daily peaceful

(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2008), 54–80. Amnon Cohen himself dealt with the size of an average family in Ottoman Palestine.

encounters in the economic sphere, and occasionally, also of friendship. Only rarely did hatred burst forth violently.

Cultural Attributes of Ottoman Jews

In the wake of the 17th century, a hundred years after the expulsions from Iberia, Ottoman Jewry appears to bear several cultural attributes that were maintained, in changing form and intensity, until the 19th—and even the early 20th—centuries. They can be summed up as follows.

(a) Ottoman Jewry was a traditional and a (religiously-)observant society. Judaism and Jewish heritage were central factors in defining individual and group identity and in shaping patterns of behavior and lifestyles for the majority of Jews, at least as they knew and understood it, as the aforementioned were not always absolutely compatible with Jewish religious practice. This traditional society included individuals who purposely or unintentionally transgressed religious and communal laws, and showed an ambivalent attitude towards religious scholars and erudition.

(b) Private and collective identity: A sense of local pride and identification developed side-by-side with a particularistic identity based on one's country of origin, already in the 16th century, after the first generation took root in their new homes. It may be that this was more than mere identification with a geographical location, and that the Jewish public expressed a sense of belonging to the city of its residence and of identification with the fate of the Ottoman state, in which it generally lived in peace and in relative wellbeing.[2] This local patriotism gave birth to or reinforced existing competition between communities. The autobiography of Sasson Hai Kastiel of Istanbul is a good example of one person's consciousness at the turn of the 18th century. His writing is replete with pride in his city, the glorious capital of a great and flourishing empire and the seat of the

[2] For expressions of Jewish identification with the new homeland, a sort of local patriotism, as early as the mid-16th century, see Joseph Hacker, "Local Patriotism of Spanish Exiles in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Empire," in *Me'ah She'arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky*, eds. Ezra Fleisher et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2001), 349–54 (Hebrew). The article also includes much information about Salonica. Hints of local patriotism, I believe, can also be found in folk sayings and folktales that attribute stupidity, parsimony, laziness, and other qualities to Jews residing in other cities; see Tamar Alexander-Frizer, *Words Are Better than Bread: A Study of Judeo-Spanish Proverbs* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press; Beer Sheba: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2004), 199–201 (Hebrew).

sultan's court. Kastiel is also proud of his community: "[. . .] and the mother of all cities in Rum [i.e., Europe, or the former Byzantine Empire] and all its borders is the excellent city of Istanbul, and within it are found 36,000 Jewish households[3] [. . .]." He notes Istanbul's antiquity and size and later boasts of the large number of its synagogues, their beauty, and the riches they have accumulated. He then goes on to relate the economic status of the Jews in the Empire: "[. . .] and all have wealth and honor, particularly the nation of the holy seed of Israel, for they control it verily like princes. And some of the kings [i.e., governors] who are sent by the king of Constantinople to all the lands almost all are Israelites, princes of the city of Istanbul, which is Constantinople [. . .]."[4]

Salonika's Jews, too, were proud of their city, its Jewish majority, its *yeshivot*, and famous Talmud Torah. They had good reason to call it "a city and mother in Israel" and "Jerusalem of the Balkans."[5] The Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi wrote that the Jews relate to their city as "Our Salonica".[6] Similar feelings were widespread among the Jews living in the Holy Land—especially in Jerusalem and Safed—which maintained their fabled status as centers of learning long after they had ceased to be centers of religious creativity and real influence.

An individual's identity was in practice a cluster comprising religious, ethnic-communal, family, local, class, and cultural identities. Similarly, collective identity, too, was multi-faceted. One's religious identity almost absolutely dictated lifestyle, legal status, social and familial relationships, and more. The form given to individual Jewish identity in the Ottoman Muslim environment was not unequivocal. One attitude, generally found in the rabbinic literature, displays pride in Judaism and faith in its supremacy while looking down upon others and referring to them, within closed Jewish circles, in a demeaning and humiliating manner. Thus, it is understandable why Jews were called upon to stay aloof from local non-Jews, for the Jews are superior to the others who have many vices, are lecherous, and so forth. Private and public life was conducted to a great extent on the basis of the Hebrew calendar. The annual cycle also dictated

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[3] This of course is an exaggeration. Kastiel may have referred to all mature Jews in the capital. We have the same problem with Europeans who give very high and unlikely estimations, which represent a notion more than a historic reality.

[4] Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, "The Travels of Sasson Hai of the House of Kastiel," *Sefunot* 1 (1956): 147, 163, 166–72, 182 (Hebrew).

[5] Yaron Ben-Naeh, "The City of Torah and Learning: Salonika as a Center of Learning in the Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries," *Pe'amim* 80 (1999): 62, 72–77 (Hebrew).

[6] "*Bizim Selânik*": Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatnamesi*, 2d ed. (İstanbul: n.p., 1971), 8: 162.

the rhythm of public life in the congregation. Calendars were also dotted with anniversaries: birthdays, and commemorative ceremonies for family members. To these were added state holidays and those of other religious communities, especially Muslim holy days, first and foremost among them the period of Ramadan and its concluding festival. Some days were set as festive days by the state, celebrating victories, or events in the sultans' family.

(c) The Jews were a semi-literate society, in contrast to the widely accepted image. The elementary schooling provided by the community in the framework of the Talmud Torah schools resulted in a high percentage of literate males, but most of them were at best able to read the prayers. Only some of them knew how to write; in fact many persons were even unable to sign their names. Until the mid-19th century, women received no formal education and almost all were illiterate. Not surprisingly, the great majority of the diverse types of popular literary works were oral, as was the manner in which they were handed down and used. One must also bear in mind that Jewish society was a multi-lingual, or at least a bi-lingual society (see below).

(d) Jewish culture was a hybrid, with two dominant components: Jewish-Iberian and Jewish-Ottoman, added to the early local one, of which we know little. A few more sentences about the first group: Jews whose provenance was in the Iberian Peninsula accounted for the majority of Ottoman Jewry, especially in Anatolia and the Balkans. The exiles brought their written and oral cultural heritage with them, and their descendants preserved it. The continuous stream of immigrants from the Iberian Peninsula to the Levant, and their return there to Judaism, served to reinforce the memory of the past and to preserve the ties to the old homeland among the veteran Sephardi population. Those who arrived during the 17th century undoubtedly contributed to keeping those who preceded them abreast of developments in Iberian culture, such as poetry and theater, stories, and the language. Graduates of universities in Spain and Portugal brought with them scientific knowledge, particularly in the field of medicine, together with religious skepticism and a tendency to reject rabbinical authority.[7] With time, the memory of the expulsion, murders, and persecutions faded and longing increased for their Iberian past, painted in glowing colors. The 'Spanish heritage' could be discerned in

[7] On the issues of identity and heritage see Yaron Ben-Naeh, *Jews in the Realm of the Sultans* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2008), chapter 9.

several cultural spheres: first and foremost, the Judeo-Spanish language that became one of the unifying outward signs of the Sephardi diaspora in the Orient until the 20th century. Other aspects are various genres of folklore, the literary output, *halakhah* and customs, values and manners of behavior, political and organizational patterns, and to a minor degree material culture and cuisine.

Jewish Integration and Acculturation

Whereas from the aspects of social standing and their religion the Jews were a sub-group in Ottoman society, in effect they formed an integral part of the urban population and were well-integrated into city life. The dynamic reality in the cities encouraged minority cultures' integration into the majority civilization and the process of borrowing from it. Several factors were responsible for the deep and variegated influence of Ottoman urban society and its culture on Jewish culture in the domains of Ottoman Islam, despite the fact that some of them were huge communities, centers of Torah learning, power, and wealth.

First and foremost is the daily encounter with the 'other'. Ottoman cities were definitely a Muslim space, but at the same time the larger cities were arenas of diverse religious and cultural encounters: there was a constant and ongoing social interaction in residential neighborhoods, in the markets, in the harbor, and in guild gatherings, and at the bath houses and coffee houses and other places of recreation. There are several reasons for this fruitful encounter:

(a) The economic activity of the Jews: in the absence of legal restrictions, and making full use of their abilities, Jews were involved in a wide variety of occupations. These encompassed local, national and international trade, including acting as intermediaries particularly with European traders; small manufacturers, in which textiles, were especially important; financial and other services to the authorities, among them leasing the collection of taxes and custom duties, providing supplies, minting currency, banking, diplomatic consultation and other services. Many provided more mundane services to the general public including medical care and various entertainments—as jugglers, acrobats, dancers, singers, or puppeteers; or rendered services within the Jewish congregation and its synagogue.

In my book I have already referred to the importance of the fact that Ottoman Jews were involved in diverse occupations and its implications,

one of which was creating close ties with the majority population. This has also been well attested in Amnon Cohen's works.[8] Special emphasis should be placed on the role of guilds whose members were of different religious faiths, at least until the 18th century. In addition to being the scene of social interaction, the guilds were also an agent of cultural transfer from the majority society to the minorities. Cooperation and relations between members of the guild were not limited to routine commercial negotiations; there is evidence of *dhimmi*s participating in the guilds' Muslim religious ceremonies.[9]

Two types of cultural agents can be identified among the Jews themselves: members of the economic elite with access to the sultan's court and the homes of leading members of the military and civilian establishments, and—on a completely different level—multitudes of Jewish small craftsmen and suppliers of services, especially in the areas of peddling, entertainment, and magic healing. The latter served as a viaduct for the transfer of diverse cultural influences from Ottoman urban society, the target population for most of their activities, to Jewish society, which consumed similar products and services.[10]

(b) The legal status and the social atmosphere: Though legally and politically Jews and Christians in the Middle East belonged to a social category that was set apart from and inferior to Muslims, this generally had no practical effect on daily life due to their legal status, and the ongoing obligation of the Sultan to retain the holy law in matters concerning his *dhimmi* subjects. The facts that Jews trusted the system and knew how to cope with momentary difficulties added to their sense of security and stability. While the law obligated strict observance of the religious and social class division lines, the dynamics of life blurred these divisions and there was constant social interaction when they lived together in residential neighborhoods, worked side by side in the markets and in guilds, and spent time together in coffee houses and other places of recreation.

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[8] See for example Amnon Cohen, *The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem* (Leiden: Brill, 2001); idem, *Jewish Life under Islam: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); idem and Elisheva Simon-Pikali. *Jews in the Moslem Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XVIth Century: Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1993) (Hebrew); idem, *Jews in the Moslem Court: Society, Economy and Communal Organization in the XVIIIth Century: Documents from Ottoman Jerusalem* (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1996) (Hebrew).

[9] See Ben-Naeh, *Jews in the Realm of the Sultans*, chap. 7. For guild ceremonies, see Hamilton A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, 3d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 293–94.

[10] Ben-Naeh, *Jews in the Realm of the Sultans*, chap. 7, and esp. 349–350.

In their first encounter with the preponderant culture, Jews in the major cities of the empire sensed security and stability to an extent that they allowed themselves to open up towards the Muslim environment, feel at home within it, and adopt some of its practices, customs, and beliefs. The process of assimilation was irreversible and did not end even when religious zealotry and Islamic isolationist tendencies increased, such as during the last two decades of the 17th century, or in the mid-18th century.

(c) The strong assimilating power of Ottoman civilization was an eminent force in the lives of the non-Muslims. Many, mainly in the European provinces, converted to Islam.[11] The syncretistic and pluralistic character of the Ottoman state encouraged minority religions and cultures to integrate into the majority civilization and the process of borrowing from it was accelerated. It is clear that there was a constant flow of Jewish converts to Islam, but we cannot assess the dimensions of this phenomenon—with one outstanding case, that of Sabbatean believers in the last third of the 17th century.

The elitist and monopolistic cultural outlook of Muslim Ottoman society also had a negative result: until the early 18th century, the Ottomans looked down upon anything European. Disregard of the important scientific discoveries and European achievements in science, the arts, commerce, and industry was a sure recipe for intellectual isolationism and contributed to stagnation and degeneration in several spheres among the empire's subjects.

(d) The Iberian legacy of openness towards the cultural milieu in which it lived (Islam—Christianity), and the willingness to receive, to borrow, to adopt, and to acculturate. The arrival of the exiles, and later of many former Marranos from the Iberian Peninsula and Italy, occurred during a time of economic growth, expansion, and prosperity for the Ottoman state. Their first encounter with the preponderant culture had occurred at the best timing, that is, during the heyday of the Ottomans, mainly the Suleymanic period—when culture reached new peaks in literature, music, and fine arts. We do not find restrictive orders, either in Jewish law, or in communal regulations, that forbid close contacts with non-Jews or that try to distinguish Jews from their surroundings by various barriers. The dominant Muslim character of Ottoman cities was not conceived by Jews as being as hostile as that of Christian cities, and their atmosphere was more inviting.

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[11] Marc D. Baer, *Honored by the Glory of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

The absence of a significant polemic literature (especially after the 16th century) is yet another issue. While we find anti-Christian tracts (in the 16th century against the Catholic faith, and in the 19th century, against the Protestant missionaries), we hardly know of similar works against Islam, even though there are remnants of Islamic anti-Jewish polemics.[12] These remnants might attest to the high status of Jews and Judaism in the 16th century. Throughout the period there were spontaneous discussions between laymen. The only documented high-level formal polemic was initiated by Shabbetai Zevi, who summoned Jewish rabbis to the court of Mehmed IV (r. 1648–1687).[13]

If during the first decades of encounter the Jewish immigrants looked upon Ottoman culture as something altogether foreign or inferior, by the mid-16th century things had changed.[14] During the second half of that century urban Ottoman Jewry became increasingly assimilated into Ottoman culture, so much so that by the 17th century it played a leading role in all facets of the individual's daily life. It is highly likely that processes of assimilation into Ottoman society, whose peak was conversion to Islam, were more common at the two extremes of society. The upper and lower echelons of Jewish society seem to have been more adoptive, and more apt to acculturate. Thus, increasing involvement in Ottoman society and its culture, unparalleled in Europe, had a far-reaching influence on the cultural character of Ottoman Jewry.

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[12] See for example P. Lucca, "Sabbetay Sewi and the Messianic Temptations of Ottoman Jews in the Seventeenth Century According to Christian Armenian Sources", in: C. Adang & S. Schmidtke (eds.), *Contacts and Controversies between Muslims, Jews and Christians in the Ottoman Empire and Pre-Modern Iran*, pp. 197–206; Judith Pfeiffer, "Confessiuonal Polarization in the 17th Century Ottoiman Empire and Yusuf Ibn Ebi 'Abdul-Deyyan's Kesfu'l-esrar fi ilzamil'l-Yehus ve'l-ahbar", in Adang and Schmidtke (eds.), *Contacts and Controversies*, pp. 15–55.

[13] Gershom Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi, the Mystical Messiah, 1626–1676* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), chap. 8. On the scarce anti-Jewish polemical literature I learnt from Dr. Camilla Adang in an ESF workshop on "The Position of Religious Minorities in the Ottoman Empire and early modern Iran," Istanbul 2007.

[14] As attested by the printing of Shlomo Mazal-Tov's book of songs, *Sefer shirim u-zemirot ve-tishbahot* (The book of songs, hymns, and songs of praise) (Constantinople 1545) (Hebrew). This was the first instance in which a book included Hebrew songs sung "in melodies of the Sephardim and the Ishmaelites," i.e., in Iberian and Turkish melodies. For more about this unique book, see Yitzhak D. Merkon, "R. Shlomo ben Mazaltov," in *Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume* (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950), 321–49, and references there to some earlier articles on the author and his book.

The Ottoman Legacy

Ottoman cities, particularly the larger ones, were arenas of diverse religious and cultural encounters. The intimate acquaintance of wide sectors of Jewish society with Ottoman urban institutions as well as with various strata of Ottoman culture had deep and long-ranging implications for individual lifestyles and also for Jewish society. It is these contacts that forged the Jewish public into 'Ottoman Jewry.' Recent research further reveals to what extent and how deeply Ottoman society and culture influenced Jewish society, its organizational frameworks, and individuals at all levels of the social hierarchy. Ottoman culture exerted an influence on the Jews' way of life, the language they spoke, their folk beliefs, ideals, mentality, and norms, and even on their religious practices. The following are some of the major areas of cultural influence and their most outstanding manifestations.

a. *Language*

Ottoman Jews were multi-lingual, or at least bi-lingual: Judeo-Spanish or several variants of Judeo-Arabic were used by both men and women as the common language within their ethnic group. Hebrew was the men's language of prayer, but only scholars were truly fluent in Hebrew, which served them as the language of correspondence and for writing their literary works. There is much evidence that Jewish men spoke some Turkish, and could even read and write it with various levels of proficiency. Basic command of Turkish and Greek served the men in the daily routine of their lives—in commerce, the practice of their crafts, contacts with the authorities, etc. We notice a gradual adoption of words and terms into Judeo-Spanish reflecting many aspects of daily life—foodstuffs, taxes, architectural terms, names of dresses, objects and furnishings, professions, the titles of officials, and more. Many men and women adopted Turkish and Arab names and sobriquets, as is mainly attested by hundreds of writs of divorce and documents in Ottoman Turkish. Some used Turkish curses.[15]

The high level of proficiency in Turkish among a small circle of Jewish intellectuals in the 16th to the 18th centuries is reflected in surviving

[15] As in a case in which one Jew calls another "*dinsiz imansiz*" which means a faithless person, one who could not be trusted; R. Moshe Amarillio, *Devar Moshe*, vol. 2 (Salonika 1743), §93, 100a (Hebrew).

remnants of lexicographical works and translations from Turkish to Hebrew or the opposite, including the Bible and the Qur'an, and works on astronomy, history, and medicine. Multi-lingual para-liturgical poetry (in Hebrew, Judeo-Spanish, Turkish, and Greek) was composed in the 18th century.[16] I think that historiography needs a special emphasis, as we find more and more works that were composed in this field in the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries.[17]

b. *Poetry and Literature*

The folklore of Ottoman Jewry has not been systematically collected and recorded, and with the exception of a few genres of folk literature it has scarcely been the object of academic research. Nevertheless, I may make some remarks on acculturation in this vast field (see also below).

Jewish folk literature in Judeo-Spanish borrowed folk tales, proverbs, and sayings from Turkish folk literature. Most instructive is the manner in which stories about Djoha, the counterpart of the Turkish character Nasr-ad-Din Hoja (Nasreddin Hoca), became part of the folktale repertoire of Ottoman Jews. Though it is as yet uncertain when they made their first appearance in a Jewish context, it is hard to believe that such stories came on the scene only in the 19th or 20th centuries. Their adoption almost without change points to Jewish legitimization of this aspect of Ottoman culture.[18] In this case, too, the point should be made that for Jews to be involved in various entertainment spheres such as dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, and operation of puppet theaters and shadow theaters (*Karagöz*), necessitated intimate knowledge of the language, the literary canon and the taste of the local public.[19] I suspect that the

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[16] Joseph Matsa, "Jewish Poetry in Greek," *Sefunot* 15 (1971–81): 237–366 (Hebrew); David Benvenisti, "Multi-lingual Hymns," *Sefunot* 15 (1971–1981): 205–33 (Hebrew). For some Bible translations see Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, "A Hebrew Translation of the Qur'an in the Seventeenth Century," *Pe'amim* 75 (1998): 63–74 (Hebrew); Hannah Neudecker, *The Turkish Bible Translation by Yahya bin Ishak also called Haki (1659)* (Leiden: Brill, 1994).

[17] See for example my forthcoming article on the Hebrew composition on the death of Sultan Othman (1622): Nuh Arslantaş and Yaron Ben Naeh, *Anonim Bir İbrani Kroniğe Göre 1622–1624 Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti ve İstanbul* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 2013).

[18] On the dissemination of Djoha stories see the introduction by Tamar Alexander-Frizer to Matilda Koen-Sarano, *Djoha, What Did He Say?* (Jerusalem: Kana Press, 1991) (Hebrew); Rachel Scherer, "Judeo-Spanish Folktales from the Balkans and Istanbul in Their Jewish and Non-Jewish Societal Contexts," in *From Iberia to Diaspora*, eds. Yedida K. Stillman and Norman A. Stillman (Leiden, Boston, and Köln: Brill, 1999), 328.

[19] On the theater see Metin And, *Karagöz*, 4th ed. (Istanbul: n.p., 2005), 39–42.

Ottoman milieu had some effect on creativity, especially in the field of poetry, and that its high status among Jewish intellectuals seems to have been a response to mainstream Ottoman culture. A side-comment by R. Solomon ibn Muvhar is most interesting in this respect. He criticized the increased involvement in poetry during the time of his youth, most probably around the turn of the 17th century: "And that entire generation was less involved with the Law of God and erroneously contemplating the theory of poetry, and they mock the words of God."[20] The example of a circle of poets in late 16th-century Salonika is well known.

Regarding poetry, there is one more example of parallel genres and phenomena: in the late 16th century, Jewish poets in Istanbul, Salonica, Edirne and also in provincial centers such as Damascus, Cairo and Safed, were involved in an ongoing discourse, exchanging letters which were mostly poems, thus trying to show their creativity and skill. A similar phenomenon is known in 16th-century Persian and Ottoman literary circles (*Nazire, also known as Tatabu*, which is a poem written to resemble in form and in subject, as the Redhouse dictionary explains). Besides that, I could also mention Hebrew parallels to the Ottoman *inşa* collections.

There is evidence that the new poetic genre called *coplas* was created at the beginning of the 17th century. Fragments from the Cairo Genizah suggest that it might have already appeared in the 16th century.[21] The *coplas* were not intended for use in the synagogue or religious ritual, and were diversified in content matter—dealing with family, public, and (past and present) historical events. They probably combine a tradition of 'Sephardi'-Iberian writing with a local Ottoman poetic style.[22]

c. *Music*

The influence of Ottoman culture on Jewish music appears both in form and in the melodies applied to Jewish texts. Edwin Seroussi has shown that borrowing from Ottoman music was comprehensive, including the form of the *maqam*, the modi, and technical terms. Ottoman music, particularly that performed in the court in Istanbul or in Edirne and the music of

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[20] The original Hebrew text is beautifully rhymed; see Ibn Muvhar, *Hozek yad* (Odessa 1866), 5c, 10d.

[21] I thank my friend Dr. Dov Hacohen for this information.

[22] Avner Perez, *Abraham Toledo, "Las Coplas de Yosef Ha-Tsadik": A Multiliteral Critical Comparative Study and Examination of the Place of Work in the Context of Ladino Literature* (Jerusalem: The Ben Zvi Institute, 2005), 203–10 (Hebrew). Shemuel Refael does not accept Perez's early date. See Shemuel Refael, *I Will Tell a Poem: A Study of the Judeo-Spanish (Ladino) Coplas* (Jerusalem: Carmel Press, 2004), introduction (Hebrew).

Sufi orders (*tarikat*), completely transformed the para-liturgical music and later on, the liturgical music sung in the synagogues and at other religious convocations, such as special study nights (*veglia, nocada, mishmara*) or the singing of the *maftirin* (a special choir of men who used to chant in the synagogue on Saturday afternoon), which had become standard at least from the mid-17th century. Leading examples of collections of poems written in the style of the Ottoman *maqam* are *Zemirot Yisrael* by R. Israel Najara (d. 1620; whose songs gained immense popularity and were printed in several editions during his lifetime) and *Pizmonim u-vakashot* (printed c. 1640) by a liturgical poet of the next generation, R. Joseph Ganso of Bursa.[23] Turkish and Arabic music and singing also infiltrated Jewish folk music, about which we know very little, existing side-by-side with songs and melodies of Iberian provenance. It could be that R. Eliyahu ha-Kohen's rebuke of women who sang their children songs about love and passion was directed against this type of singing, and not necessarily against the Spanish love romance.[24]

d. *Moral Norms and Values and Aesthetic Ideals*

Among the norms and values adopted by Jews were maintenance of social order and class boundaries, the values of a patriarchal family, feminine honor and the place of women in public space and society, masculine

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[23] See articles by Seroussi and Yahalom, many of them devoted to Israel Najara and his poetry: Edwin Seroussi, "Rabbi Israel Najara, Shaper of Liturgical Poetry after the Expulsion from Spain," *Asufot: Annual for Jewish Studies* 4 (1990): 285–310 (Hebrew); idem, "Between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean: Sephardic Music after the Expulsion from Spain and Portugal," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 6 (1991): 198–206; idem, "The Peşrev as a Vocal Genre In Ottoman Hebrew Sources", *Turkish Music Quarterly* 4 (1991): 1–9; idem, "Ottoman Melodies and Hebrew Hymns in the Ottoman Empire [review of A. Tietze and J. Yahalom, *Ottoman Melodies, Hebrew Hymns*]," *Pe'amim* 70 (1997): 124–28 (Hebrew); idem, "From Court and Tarikat to Synagogue: Ottoman Art Music and Hebrew Sacred Songs", in Andres Hammarlund, Tord Olsson and Elisabeth Özdalga (eds.), *Sufism, Music and Society in the Middle East* (Istanbul: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 81–96; idem, *Incipitario sefardi: El Cancionero judeoespanol en Fuentes hebreas* (*siglos XV–XIX*) (Madrid: Consejo superior des investigaciones scientificas, 2009); Joseph Yahalom, "Hebrew Mystical Poetry and Its Turkish Background," *Tarbiz* 60 (1990–91): 625–48 (Hebrew); idem, "Tensions between Sephardic Traditions and Ottoman Influences in Jewish Literary Activity," in *Between History and Literature: Studies in Honor of Isaac Barzilay*, ed. Stanley Nash (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1997), 207–17 (Hebrew); Andreas Tietze and Joseph Yahalom, *Ottoman Melodies, Hebrew Hymns: A 16th-century Cross-cultural Adventure* (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1995). See also Paméla J. Dorn Sezgin, "*Hakhamim*, Dervishes, and Court Singers: The Relationship of Ottoman Jewish Music to Classical Turkish Music," in *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Avigdor Levy (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1994), 585–632.

[24] R. Eliyahu ha-Cohen, *Shevet Mussar* (Istanbul 1712), 76a (Hebrew).

honor and the beard as a sign of virility, keeping the body covered, and so forth. Honor was an exceedingly important—and complex—social value.[25] Sometimes these norms reinforced existing Jewish values, while at other times they contradicted them. There were norms of behavior that were not commensurate with Jewish *halakhah*, especially in what related to sexual behavior—as is evident concerning homosexuality. Certain homosexual practices seem to have been widespread. Another example was cohabitation of Jewish males with female slaves, which was considered legitimate by the public at large, much to the chagrin of the rabbis.[26] A similar gap between *halakhah* and widespread behavior was already evident in Jewish society in the Iberian Peninsula, and is characteristic of Muslim urban society. Other important social values were familial and social fellowship and loyalty. Not a few proverbs and sayings deal with the importance of close and true friendship and loyalty that stand the test and prove firm. Ottoman Jewish society attached importance to common sense and, at least outwardly, to an education in religious law, but one can also discern appreciation of practical experience. Popular folk proverbs attribute experience and wisdom to the elderly (though not to all of them, of course) and teach that they should be honored and obeyed.

An example of borrowing aesthetic values is the custom of Muslim men, and evidently the habit of Jewish men as well, to shave off their body hair, against the explicit orders of some rabbis. There are hints of a similar attitude towards the definition of feminine beauty.

e. *The Political Sphere*

Intimate acquaintance of various sectors in Jewish society with the Ottoman judicial system and bureaucratic procedures[27] helped shape the communal institutions of the *kahal* and its political culture. The very fact that there was a group of men who served as heads of the congregation (*cemaat başı, kahya, ihtiyarlar*, all titled after the Turkish), or were

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[25] For an extensive discussion of honor in the lives of Ottoman Jews, see Yaron Ben-Naeh, "Honor and Its Meaning among Ottoman Jews," *Jewish Social Studies* 11, 2 (2005): 19–50.

[26] Yaron Ben-Naeh, "Moshko the Jew and His Gay Friends: Same-sex Sexual Relations in Ottoman Jewish Society," *Journal of Early Modern History* 9, 1–2 (2005): 79–105; idem, "Blond, Tall, with Honey-Colored Eyes: Jewish Ownership of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire," *Jewish History* 20 (2006): 73–90.

[27] Such acquaintance is obvious, for example, from the descriptions included by R. Shmuel Valeryo in *Hazon la-Mo'ed*, his commentary on the Book of Daniel (Venice 1586), and also in Yehuda 'Asael Mah-Tov, *Kise'ot le-vet David* (Verona 1646) (both in Hebrew).

candidates to fill such positions in the future, points to the existence of several dozen persons (at least in the larger communities) who had a good command of Turkish and were familiar with Ottoman administrative terminology and procedures. The organization of Jewish benevolent societies was influenced by that of the Ottoman guilds (*esnaf*).[28] Among examples of Ottoman influence in this sphere are the adoption of a hierarchical structure for the congregation, the functions and titles of officers of the congregation and of charitable organizations, and imitation of modes of operation, such as leasing out of the *gabella* tax just like the Ottoman state's system of *mukata'a*, by which tax collection was farmed out to the highest bidder.[29] Another institution imitated was the Muslim *waqf* (sacred trust), as Jews instituted many trusts for the benefit of the community. This had already been widespread in the Genizah world and later in Iberia prior to the expulsion, but local influence on the manner in which they operated in Ottoman lands can be discerned.

f. *Religious Practice*

Jews, Muslims, and Christians took care to exhibit their piety and practice the commandments of their religion, at least in public and in accordance with the law. Even though Muslim religious leaders preferred that the *dhimmi*s convert to Islam, for the moment they and the masses of Muslim believers looked positively upon expressions of religious piety on the part of their neighbors, most likely based on the belief that each community prays to God according to its own religion, and so they are protected from Divine wrath. Cases of public transgression of religious laws were condemned, or at least left a negative impression.

In what relates to religious practices, we find cases in which the decisors (*poskim*, who interpret the *halakhah*) were aware of Muslim religious law and of public opinion, for example relating to smoking on fast days, breaking oaths, and apparently also concerning the matter of charging interest on loans. Some of them thought the Jews should behave in accord with

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[28] Yaron Ben-Naeh, "Jewish Confraternities in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th and 18th centuries," *Zion* 63 (1998): 277–318 (Hebrew); idem, "The Benevolent Societies of the Jewish Kayikji Guild in Istanbul in the 18th and 19th Centuries," in *The Scepter Shall Not Depart From Judah: Leadership, Rabbinate and Community in Jewish History: Studies Presented to Prof. Simon Schwartzfuchs*, eds. Joseph R. Hacker and Yaron Harel (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 2011), 101–140. (Hebrew).

[29] On the *kahal* and its institutions see Ben Naeh, *Jews in the Realm*, 147–149, 182–183; idem, "Sixteenth Century Congregations and Communities of the Iberian Immigrants in the Ottoman Domains," *Hispania Judaica Bulletin* 8 (2011): 173–197. (Hebrew).

Muslim practice, e.g. considering smoking as food and thus prohibiting it on fast days. Others thought to the contrary. From time to time, a call would arise to adopt Muslim customs such as removing footwear before prayer and greater strictness in matters of ritual cleanliness.[30] Even the quiet and orderly prayers of Muslims were a source of envy on the part of Jewish religious leaders who time and again criticized their congregations in this matter. It is noteworthy that an Imperial edict of c. 1580 forbade Istanbul Jews to keep copies of the Qur'an in their houses, thus revealing that this was a common practice in certain circles.[31] Further Muslim influences may be found in additional customs. The *ziyara* (visits to holy sites) and the pilgrimage to the Holy Land were apparently encouraged by the growing importance of the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina) and the popularity of visiting tombs of Islamic holy men. Jewish financial support of holy places, religious scholars, and the poor to some extent imitated the custom of the Ottoman elite to distribute such grants (*surra*), or at least was reinforced by these practices. It is especially noteworthy that members of all religions visited holy springs that had been sites of pagan and early Christian rituals, and this most probably during Christian holidays.[32] Another source explicitly mentions the participation of Jews in a Christian religious procession in Izmir.[33] These last two cases testify to the existence of Jewish folk customs that were greatly disliked by the religious leadership, as they crossed the borderlines of what was permitted or forbidden according to Jewish law, a veritable case of religious syncretism.

We may also count here the frequent use of Shari'a courts by men and women alike, against explicit communal regulations, a phenomenon

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[30] Interestingly, in a photograph taken in Jerusalem ca. 1870 we see a collection of shoes that belong to Jews who are praying barefoot at the Western Wall.

[31] Ahmed Refik–Altınay, *Onuncu asr-ı hicri'de Istanbul Hayatı* (*1495–1591*), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: n.p., 1988), 52.

[32] At the height of the Shabbatean movement, many believers flocked to "The Spring of Our Lord" that was holy to the Orthodox Greeks, located near the cemetery of Izmir. See Scholem, *Sabbatai*, 613–14; Thomas Coenen, *Ydele verwachtinge der Joden getoont in den Persoon van Sabathai Zevi*, (Jerusalem: The Dinur Center 1998), 66. Quite similar is the common adoration by members of several religions of holy sites and tombstones in the Land of Israel that is documented in many sources and several historical periods.

[33] Lewis, *Levantine Adventurer*, 107–8, quoted by Joseph R. Hacker, "Raphael Levi, Ahmed Bashi, Louis de Bizance—The Transmutations of a Jew from Istanbul in the Seventeenth Century", *Exile and Diaspora, Studies in the History of the Jewish People Presented to Haim Beinart . . .*, eds. Aharon Mirsky, Avraham Grossman and Yosef Kaplan (Jerusalem: The Ben Zvi Institute 1988), 501. This can be explained by the presence of Marranos in that city.

to which Amnon Cohen has related again and again, condemning it as admission of the superiority of Islam in this context as well.

Formal religion did not provide appropriate answers to all the spiritual needs of the individual. Popular beliefs and demonological superstitions supplied explanations for certain phenomena and helped the individual contend with the difficulties of his day-to-day existence.[34] Many believed in the existence of demonic forces and their diverse powers, generally of a negative nature. Events that could not be explained away, or illnesses, deaths, and other difficult situations characteristic of daily life, were attributed to their powers. In order to defend oneself from these powers, or conversely to turn them to their advantage, persons turned to one of two parallel courses of action. The first was prayer or the giving of charity and the like. The second was recourse to talismans and all sorts of charms, some from kabbalistic sources and others of popular origin, that were set down in writing and passed on from generation to generation, and quack medicines, many of which were prohibited by the *halakhah*. The Jewish rabbinic and popular sources mention superstitions such as belief in supernatural forces, intensive use of talismans to ward off the evil eye or for the fulfillment of wishes, and more. Talismans and charms were supplied by persons who specialized in them, especially women. Jews did not hesitate to turn to non-Jewish practitioners, and Muslims availed themselves of the services of Jewish sorcerers.[35] Practicing or turning to sorcery was customary on all levels of Ottoman society and in other religious groups in the empire.

If we take into account that the lives of individuals were generally difficult and filled with events—both joyous and tragic—over which they had no control, it comes as no surprise that certain beliefs and practices were seen by those who had recourse to them as not being contradictory to the precepts of the formal religion, and at times even as complementing them. All these held a prominent place in the consciousness of Jews and dictated several of the conventions of their traditional-religious society

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[34] 'Superstitions' were already recorded in the late 19th century by modernists such as Danon, and later on by Gaon and Galanté. See Yaron Ben-Naeh, "Beliefs about Fate and Faith in Astrology among Jews of Salonica in the Nineteenth Century," *Mahanaim: A Review for Studies in Jewish Thought and Culture* 14 (2002): 135–36 (Hebrew) and the literature cited there; idem, "'A Tried and Tested Spell': Magic Beliefs and Acts among Ottoman Jews," *Pe'amim* 85 (2000): 89–111 (Hebrew).

[35] For cases in which Jews turned to non-Jewish sorcerers, see Ben-Naeh, " 'A Tried and Tested Spell'," esp. 102–3, 106.

until the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[36] Yet, folk beliefs shared by Jews and Muslims were not an innovation of the period under discussion, such mutual transfer of themes being known centuries earlier.

g. *Material Culture and Lifestyle*

Jewish men and women adopted the lifestyle and material culture of their neighbors together with the significance attached to various status symbols such as clothing, jewelry, ownership of slaves, etc. We have information about influence on diverse aspects of external appearance such as hairstyles, adornments on the body (i.e. with *henna*) or clothes, and the appearance of the home and its furnishings.[37] Some Jews internalized the restrictions on clothing—a well-known means of identification in Muslim lands—and valued them as an advantageous measure.[38] Most interesting is the information about attempts by Jews to escape the limitations of their Jewish identity by means of different clothing, apparel that would not disclose the wearer's religious affiliation. This they did either for the sake of security or out of a sense of inferiority, and of course, having the financial means to consume luxury items. A famous Jewish preacher explicitly denounces the practice of many men who did not grow side-locks because they were ashamed to mark themselves as Jews.[39] Another option was an effort to climb the social ladder—adopting the manner of dress of the upper classes[40] involved aspirations to display the attributes of a higher status, which is a derivative of religion, profession, and wealth.

Ottoman influence extended to the sacred sphere—the style and decoration of synagogues and the ornamentation of carpets and ritual

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[36] Moshé Cazés, *Voices from Jewish Salonika*, selected and edited by David M. Bunis (Jerusalem and Salonica: Misgav Yerushalayim; National Authority for Ladino Culture; Ets Ahaim Foundation of Thessaloniki, 1999), 205–14 (Hebrew); Benvenisti, *The Jews of Salonika*, 171–77; Ben-Naeh, "'A Tried and Tested Spell'"; idem, "Beliefs." For religious life in Jerusalem during the 19th century, see idem, "Religious Life of the Jews in Nineteenth Century Jerusalem," in *History of Jerusalem: The Late Ottoman Period*, eds. Israel Bartal and Haim Goren (Jerusalem: Yad Yizhak Ben Zvi, 2010), 315–328. (Hebrew).

[37] Ben Naeh, *Jews in the Realm*, chap. 1; Avraham Galanté, *Histoire des Juifs de Turquie* (Istanbul: Editions Isis, 1985–86), 3:110–17; Esther Juhasz (ed.), *Sephardi Jews in the Ottoman Empire: Aspects of Material Culture* (Jerusalem: The Israel Museum, 1990).

[38] See, e.g., an 18th-century source: R. Mosheh haCohen, *Kehunat Olam* (Constantinople 1740), §74, 77b.

[39] Eliyahu ha-Cohen, *Midrash Eliyahu* (Izmir 1759), 13c (Hebrew). It is uncertain whether there is any significance to the fact that Jews do not figure prominently in folktales, which at times lack any Jewish content at all. See Scherer, "Judeo-Spanish Folktales," 321.

[40] On dresses see now Esther Juhasz (ed.), *The Jewish Wardrobe: From the Collection of The Israel Museum*, Jerusalem 2012.

objects—as indicated by the studies of Esther Juhasz and Vivian Mann. There is a problem concerning the dating of influences on material culture, since very few objects have survived from before the 19th century (besides tombstones, only prayer rugs have survived), but I see no obstacle to attributing the changes to earlier periods. Minna Rozen identified a similar influence on Jewish tombstones whose general style and ornamentation are compatible with the artistic style predominant in 18th-century western Turkey.[41] In the Bill Gross collection (Tel Aviv) there is a manuscript prayer book whose artistic style, especially of the opening page, resembles that of Muslim manuscripts, and is similar to that of a rare Karaite book (*Seder ha-Tefilot le-Minhag Kehilot ha-Karaim*) printed in Kal'a in 1732.

The recreational patterns of Jewish men and women were quite similar to those of the majority society, including the fundamental insistence on gender separation. Women spent their time in the home and in the courtyard, at the bath- house, and even on occasion outside the city, drinking coffee, smoking, and partaking of sweetmeats and fruit with their female relatives and friends. Men would for the most spend their recreation time in coffee houses, where they also watched various artistic performances, or simply enjoyed each other's company.[42]

h. *Mentality*

I have pointed to a person's religious identity being the dominant factor in his or her life. But Jews, Muslims, and Christians also shared a similar outlook on life, a sense of common fate in times of duress or rejoicing, similar behavioral patterns, and even common folk superstitions, which I

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[41] See Juhasz, *Sephardi Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (the relevant chapters); Vivian B. Mann, "Jewish–Muslim Acculturation in the Ottoman Empire: The Evidence of Ceremonial Art," in *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, 559–73; id., "Sephardic Ceremonial Art: Continuity in the Diaspora," in *Crisis and Creativity in the Sephardic World*, ed. Benjamin R. Gampel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 292–99; Minna Rozen, *Hasköy Cemetery: Typology of Stones* (Tel Aviv: Center for Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania & Diaspora Research Institute, Tel Aviv University 1994). For analysis of the motifs used on tombstones, see idem, "Classical Echoes in Ottoman Istanbul," in *Hellenic and Jewish Arts—Interaction, Tradition and Renewal*, ed. Asher Ovadiah (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1998), 393–430.

[42] Yaron Ben-Naeh, "'Only One Cup of Coffee': Ordinances Concerning Luxuries and Recreation: A Chapter in the Cultural and Social History of the Jewish Community of Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century", Turcica 37 (2006): 155–185; idem; "The Lives of Jewish Women in Ottoman Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century," in *Al Prezente: Moshe David Gaon Center Studies of Sephardi Jewish Culture* 8 (2007): 179–192 (Hebrew).

mentioned earlier. All attributed every event to the will of God and believed that every event had a reason and a purpose. Catastrophes such as epidemics, fires, and starvation were believed to be Heavenly retribution for the public's sins.[43] The only defense against evils was through religious and moral correction, prayers, charity and other good deeds. Trouble and distress were to be expected; one should not struggle against fate, and nothing could forestall death. There is much similarity in the submissive manner in which those of all faiths accepted their fate—various genres of folk literature recommend and teach acceptance of one's fate, for there is no logic in bitterness and non-conciliation with the inevitable.[44] Such an outlook on life is discernible in how they related to sickness and death, which were an everyday matter, in the fact that they saw their difficulties as expressions of Divine Providence and reconciled themselves to accepting tragedies as Divine punishment for sins. To a great extent, religious belief dictated how one related to death, while religious law dictated behavior when death occurred. Preachers put forward various explanations, all traditional-religious, for death, especially in more exceptional cases such as the death of children, rabbis, and so forth.

In recent years, scholars have evinced some interest in the theme of death in Ottoman society, and Israeli researchers have made an important contribution especially through the study of wills and of deeds establishing sacred trusts.[45] In view of the lack of sufficient works on the Ottoman conception of death and coping with it, we can not measure the degree of resemblance between Jews and Muslims, but I tend to believe that it exists. With but few exceptions, all believed in the world to come, and many prepared for it by following a pious way of life, doing good deeds, and atoning for their sins. We find a common concern of the dying for

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[43] On a surprisingly similar attitude towards moral sins in the neighborhood level see Yaron Ben-Naeh, "An Adultery Scandal in Istanbul: Jewish Daily Life in an Ottoman City as Mirrored in the Responsa Literature," *East and Maghreb* 8 (2008): 37–55 (Hebrew). For an equivalent description and explanation of public behavior, see Elyse Semerdjian, *"Off the Straight Path", Illicit Sex, Law and Community in Ottoman Aleppo* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), chapter 4.

[44] Tamar Alexander-Frizer has pointed to the centrality of 'fortune' in folk stories and sayings, and to the importance of a general belief in fate. See Alexander-Frizer, *The Beloved Friend-and-a Half*, 328–38; idem, *Words*, 210–27.

[45] Gilles Veinstein (ed.), *Les Ottomans et la Mort* (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Eyal Ginio, " 'Every Soul Shall Taste Death': Dealing with Death and Afterlife in Eighteenth-Century Salonica," *Studia Islamica* 92 (2001): 113–32; Miriam Hoexter, "Waqf Studies in the Twentieth Century," *JESHO* 41 (1998): 474–95; Avriel Bar-Levav, "Death and the (Blurred) Boundaries of Magic: Strategies of Coexistence," *Kabbalah* 7 (2002): 51–64. I am about to publish a corpus of Hebrew wills from the Ottoman Empire.

their commemoration and the fate of their souls in the next world. When the day of their passing drew near, the well-to-do would will money or belongings to causes that would ensure eternal bliss for their soul: proper burial, reciting of the *kaddish* prayer for the dead, study, kindling memorial candles, and—like their neighbors—aid to the poor, and the like. Owners of slaves tended to release them from bondage.

To sum up, a sense of security and stability, the close proximity in dwellings and businesses, as well as the close relationship in the market as workers, traders, go-betweens and customers, and the cultural openness which characterized Jews in the Ottoman cities, together with the dominant status of Ottoman-Islamic culture being at its peak, all created the grounds for speedy acculturation processes which transformed Jewish culture and society in so many ways—ranging from clothing and houseware to synagogue liturgy and ritual and ceremonial objects; moreover it manifested in a few literary genres and in popular culture and entertainment. It is important to note that it was not just a one-way influence—Jewish astronomers and physicians composed scientific treatises which were used by their Muslim contemporaries. All in all, we encounter an almost unprecedented acculturation, one that might only be equaled to that of famous 'golden age' in medieval Spain during Muslim rule.

PART FOUR

SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN LANDS

SHIFTING PATTERNS OF OTTOMAN ENSLAVEMENT IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD[1]

Ehud R. Toledano

The Ottoman Empire and the Enslaved[2]

The Ottoman Empire was the last and greatest Islamic power of the early modern and modern eras. In many ways, the history of the Middle East between 1517 and 1918 is a chapter in Ottoman history, and the Ottoman heritage lingered in the eastern Mediterranean many decades after the demise of the Empire. While often viewed in the West as the paragon of conservatism and stagnation, the last two decades of intense research have shown that the Ottoman Empire was, through many periods of its long history, a complex and fascinating entity, dynamic and adaptable, pragmatic and resilient, tolerant and accommodating. There were of course periods in which it lived up—in many ways—to the negative view it has acquired, but the overall account of the teeming and diversified social web under its rule certainly defies that image. The 'decline paradigm' of Ottoman history refers to the early modern period, or more precisely to the 17th and 18th centuries. The dramatic transformation that the Empire

[1] I chose the present article for this volume because it seems to me that it touches on a number of themes that Professor Amnon Cohen, my teacher at the Hebrew University in the 1970s, has treated occasionally in his work. These include the history of the Mediterranean in the 16th to the 18th centuries, with special reference to economic and social aspects of that history. His work on the port cities of Palestine, and the use he made of the Marseilles *Chambre de Commerce* archive, provided inspiration for some of the discussion in the following pages. His thorough research on, and use of, the Shari'a court records have contributed to my own efforts, here and elsewhere, in exploiting the Nizami court records of the 19th century. An earlier, and differently structured, version of this article was published in Istituto internazionale di storia economica F. Datini, Settimana di studi (38th: 2006, Prato, Italy), *Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico, secc. XIII–XVIII: atti della "trentottesima settimana di studi" 1–5 maggio 2006* [*Europe's economic relations with the Islamic world, 13th–18th centuries*], Simonetta Cavaciocchi (ed.), (Le Monnier: Grassina, 2007), vol. ii, 699–718.

[2] Although it deals mainly with Ottoman enslavement in the "long 19th century" and not with the early modern period discussed in this article, I have occasionally drawn here on pertinent points made in my *As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007).

underwent during that period also had a profound impact upon the social institution of enslavement.

Enslavement was a universal phenomenon, present in almost every known human society and culture. The Ottomans were no exception, and in many ways they followed in the footsteps of earlier Islamic states. The legal essence of enslavement derives from Islamic law, although various Muslim societies developed their own brand of enslavement. Thus, the Ottomans had inherited the basic practice of military-administrative bondage from the caliphate of Al-Muʿtasim (r. 833–842) and later the Mamluk Sultanate (1258–1516/7), which they had defeated and replaced in the eastern Mediterranean. From fairly early on in their history, the *kul*, or the slaves of the sultan recruited by child levy in the Balkans, formed the backbone of the imperial army and government. The female cognate institution was known as *harem* slavery, and for much of the early modern period, it was the mainstay of the imperial and elite household network. But other types of bondage co-existed with the *kul/harem* system, namely agricultural, domestic, and menial enslavement.

The main source of enslaved persons in the Ottoman Empire was the large pool of captives taken as spoils of war on the various fronts, including those in Europe. From the 15th to the 18th centuries, European slaves, mostly from the north-eastern shores of the Mediterranean, i.e., Greece and the Balkans, were forcibly transported into the Ottoman Empire and employed there in different occupations. While many of the male captives were used on agricultural estates, others were employed on smaller farms, gardens, vineyards, and orchards. A large number of women reached the harems of the imperial elite and were engaged in domestic service or—in smaller numbers than fantasized by European travelers—used as concubines. The enslaved tended to livestock and fisheries, and worked in bakeries, cotton mills, shipyards and ports. Some of the servants were trusted with trade and finances, but most of those who labored in an urban setting were simply servants.[3]

In general, the Ottoman system did not favor agricultural enslavement, and the advent of Ottoman rule, as in the case of Cyprus, normally meant the extinction of land cultivation by enslaved persons.[4] One of the few

[3] Yvonne Seng, "A Liminal State: Slavery in Sixteenth-Century Istanbul," in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East*, ed. Shaun E. Marmon (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999), 25–42 (more specifically for our purposes here—30).

[4] Ronald C. Jennings, *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean world, 1571–1640* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 240–241.

scholars to have studied Ottoman agricultural enslavement is Halil Inalcik, who showed that enslaved captives were employed on large Ottoman estates up to the 16th century, being mainly used in rice fields and other cash crop farms.[5] But with the major transformations that the Ottoman Empire underwent in the 17th century, agricultural production—alongside the restructuring of other aspects of government, society, and the economy—was reorganized into smaller units, abandoning the great estates and their large-scale methods of labor exploitation. In the evolving realities of the Ottoman countryside, agricultural labor in most regions was now organized around a free peasantry, cultivating small tracts of land under several tax-regimes. Much of the newly acquired territories was parceled out to low and high-level military officers in return for taxes and military service as part of the *timar* system. In the early modern period, that system evolved into short-term tax farming by auction (*iltizam*) and later—larger long-term and lifetime tax farms (*malikâne*).[6]

Agricultural enslavement was to be seen again in the Ottoman Empire only in the second half of the 19th century, when it was introduced from the outside either as an imported formation or as a local response to an external market stimulant. The first instance occurred when the Circassians were deported—in today's parlance, ethnically cleansed—from the Caucasus by Russia during the 1850s and 1860s. The refugees were allowed to bring with them to the Ottoman Empire their enserfed farm laborers, who entered as families and were settled on land provided by the government. The other case of agricultural slavery was the temporary rise in the use of enslaved Africans, mostly Sudanese, on the cotton fields in Egypt during the cotton boom of the 1860s, caused by the American Civil War. But these two cases lie well beyond the chronological scope of this paper, as they occurred in the second half of the 19th century.[7]

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[5] Halil Inalcik, "Servile Labor in the Ottoman Empire," in *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: the East European Pattern*, eds. Abraham Ascher, Tibor Halasi-Kun, and Bela K. Kiraly (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), 25–52, especially 30–35; and idem, "Rice Cultivation and the Çeltukci-Re'âyâ System in the Ottoman Empire," *Turcica* 14 (1982): 69–141, especially 88–94.

[6] For an introduction-level survey of the *timar* system, see Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300–1600* (New Rochelle, NY: A.D. Caratzas, 1989); for a monographic treatment of the transformation into *iltizam* and *malikâne*, see Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman empire: Mosul, 1540–1834* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and the references to Ariel Salzmann's articles contained therein.

[7] For agricultural enslavement among the Circassians in the Empire, see Toledano, *Slavery and Abolition*, Chapter 3. For agricultural enslavement in Egypt, see Gabriel Baer, "Slavery and Its Abolition," in idem, *Studies in the social history of modern Egypt*

Thus, the other forms of enslavement in the Empire towards the early modern period included domestic service in urban elite households, largely performed by women who were either captured or purchased from south-eastern Europe, lands lying north of the Black Sea, and increasingly in the 18th century—from the regions between the Caspian and the Black Seas, i.e., Georgia and Circassia. Enslaved men from all those regions performed menial tasks such as mining and occasional public works. This variety of functions performed by enslaved persons in Ottoman societies, coupled with the equally varied places of origin from whence the enslaved were wrenched, constitute the fabric of Ottoman enslavement as a subject of research and study. Rather than think of these as unrelated, disjointed types, we should rather see them all inhabiting a *continuum*, with varying origins, cultures, functions, and statuses.[8] Indeed, the complexity of the practice makes it necessary to look for a differentiated approach that can accommodate its internal contradictions and seeming intractability: even to a trained eye in non-Ottoman, non-Islamic forms of enslavement, this mixture of high and low status, as of honor and shame, must look perplexing.

To better understand the spectrum of enslavement, we may examine the experience of *enslaved persons in the Empire from six angles*, which in turn affected their treatment and shaoped their fortunes:

- the *tasks the enslaved* performed—whether domestic, agricultural, menial, or *kul*/harem;
- the *stratum of the slavers*—whether an urban elite, rural notability, smallhold cultivators, artisans, or merchants;
- *location*—whether in the core or the peripheral areas;
- *type of habitat*—whether urban, village, or nomad;
- *gender*—whether male, female, or eunuch;
- *ethnicity*—whether European or Caucasian (and later African).

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 161–189. For a related discussion, see also Ehud R. Toledano, "Where Have All the Egyptian *Fallahin* Gone to? Labor in Mersin and Çukurova during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," in Mersin University, Center for Urban Studies, *Mersin, the Mediterranean, and Modernity: Heritage of the Long-Nineteenth Century* (Mersin: Mersin University Press, 2002), 21–28.

[8] A model for understanding Ottoman enslavement is suggested in my article "The Concept of Slavery in Ottoman and Other Muslim Societies: Dichotomy or Continuum?," in *Slave Elites in the Middle East and Africa: A Comparative Study*, eds. Miura Toru and John Edward Philips (London and NY: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 159–176.

For the late 18th century and after, the following impression clearly emerges from the sources:

- enslaved *domestic* workers in *urban elite households* were better treated than enslaved people in other settings and predicaments;
- the *farther* from the core, the *lower* on the strata scale, and the *less densely-populated* the habitat, the *greater* the chances the enslaved had to receive *worse* treatment.

Before we move on, however, we need to address briefly the question of whether the category of *kul*/harem should be discussed as a legitimate form of enslavement. Leading Ottomanists have suggested alternative terms to describe the predicament of people in that group, feeling that they cannot properly be lumped together with members of the less privileged groups of domestic and agricultural slaves in Ottoman societies. Metin Kunt refers to the *kul* as "the sultan's servants," whereas Suraiya Faroqhi prefers to call them "servitors."[9] As against that, in her recent book *Morality Tales*, Leslie Peirce firmly asserts that "the privileges of elite slavery were temporary." For one thing, she adds, elite slaves were not allowed to bequeath their wealth—nor status, I would add—to their offspring, and their wealth reverted to the treasury upon their death (to an extent a loophole was available to them through the mechanism of charitable endowment known as *vakıf/waqf*). Just as the sultan "controlled his enslaved servants' religious and cultural identity and their material environment," Peirce argues, he also "controlled their right to life, taking it if they were judged to have violated their bond of servitude." She then defines what in her view is "a paradox at the heart of the Ottoman system—that ordinary subjects enjoyed rights denied to those by whom they were governed. One of their rights was immunity from the sultan's direct power of life and death."[10]

Despite the fact that, over the centuries of Ottoman imperial rule, certain aspects of *kul* servitude were gradually being mitigated in practice, Peirce is certainly correct in her observations. In fact, the main changes

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[9] See Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550–1650* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1983); Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Ruling Elite between Politics and 'the Economy'," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1914*, eds. Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 564 ff.

[10] Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (Berkeley, CL: University of California Press, 2003). All quotes are from page 315.

in the status of *kul*/harem slaves came only in the 19th century, whereas in the early modern period we can safely assume their bondage to have been real in the terms described above. As in previous works, here too, my view is that all legally bonded subjects of the sultan should be treated as enslaved persons for the purpose of social analysis, also. This is an integrated, inclusive position, i.e., that there was no *difference of kind* between *kul*/harem slaves and other types of Ottoman slaves, although there certainly was *a difference of degree* of enslavement between them *within* the category of Ottoman slavery.

Finally, we should say a few words about the number of persons enslaved within the Ottoman Empire. Clearly, we still need further research before the picture becomes full and clear. Madeline Zilfi rightly observes for the end of the 19th century that the size of the enslaved population hovered around five percent, and enslavement was "the practice of a small, privileged minority and as such scarcely reflected the experience of the majority."[11] The overwhelming number of families, she adds, were monogamous, and did not own slaves nor employ free servants. This was probably true also for the early modern period, though we still do not possess reliable data for the volume and precise nature of Ottoman enslavement during that time. However, it does seem plausible to assume that the demise of agricultural enslavement reduced the overall number of enslaved persons in the Empire, whereas urban household bondage continued to remain on the same level. At the same time, households became much more important from the 17th century onward, both in the metropolitan center and the provinces, forming the backbone of political-social-economic life in Ottoman societies.[12]

It is also very difficult to project backwards the 19th-century figures given for the volume of the slave trade into the Ottoman Empire or the size of the enslaved population within its borders. Much of the work for the last hundred years of the Empire has been done and published, and despite some legitimate differences, the picture is fairly clear. Scattered data and reasonable extrapolations regarding the volume of the slave trade from Africa to the Ottoman Empire yield an estimated number of

[11] Madeline C. Zilfi, "Servants, Slaves, and the Domestic Order in the Ottoman Middle East," *Hawwa* 2/1 (2004), 29.

[12] On that, see Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700–1800): A Framework for Research," in *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from within*, eds. I. Pappé and M. Maʿoz (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 145–162, and the literature on Ottoman-local elites contained therein.

approximately 16,000 to 18,000 men and women who were being transported into the Empire per annum during much of the 19th century. Ralph Austen's estimates for the total volume of coerced migration from Africa into Ottoman territories are as follows:[13] from the Swahili coasts to the Ottoman Middle East and India—313,000, across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden—492,000, into Ottoman Egypt—362,000, and into Ottoman North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya)—350,000. If we exclude the numbers going to India, a rough estimate of this mass population movement would amount to more than 1.3 million people. During the middle decades of the 19th century, the shrinking Atlantic traffic swelled the numbers of enslaved Africans coerced into domestic African markets, as well as into Ottoman ones.

Although the regions whence enslaved persons were being captured and sold into the Ottoman Empire had changed dramatically, as we shall see below, it might be reasonable to argue that—allowing for the expected population growth—overall demand remained fairly steady. With the end of agricultural enslavement in the 16th century, the internal market restructured itself around stable demand for unfree labor in domestic, menial, and household service. Following the significant rise during the 16th century in the number of *kul* required by the imperial government, and later the changing structure and functions of the imperial army in the 17th, much of the force was no longer servile. Increasingly, the recruitment and socialization of actual *kul* devolved from the sultan's household-court to leading members—*kul* and non-*kul*—in both his central and provincial administration. All in all, the size of the *kul*/harem group was shrinking towards the end of the early modern period.

So we may perhaps venture an educated guess that already in the 18th century, *kul*/harem slaves no longer formed a significant part of the enslaved population in the Empire. While many of the leading officeholders in the military and administration were still *kul*, the bulk of both the army and the bureaucracy consisted of free men. If we also allow for a 17th to 18th centuries lull in agricultural enslavement, then the rest of the unfree labor market should have remained the same going into the

[13] The following figures are derived from his two articles: "The 19th Century Islamic Slave Trade from East Africa (Swahili and Red Sea Coasts): A Tentative Census," in *The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Special Issue of *Slavery and Abolition*, 9/3 (1988): 21–44, and "The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade out of Africa: A Tentative Census," *Slavery and Abolition* 13/1 (1992): 214–248.

19th century as well. Many of the women in urban elite households were still *harem*-enslaved, but they would now be taken from different regions. Thus, we may have at least a rudimentary method of reckoning backward the numbers of enslaved persons that were being transported into Ottoman territories during the early modern period; we could then attempt to estimate the size of the enslaved population. However, until reliable figures can be obtained from archival sources of the early modern period, any estimates will have to begin with the figures and estimates we already have for the 19th century.

As for the ethnic composition of the enslaved population, Yvonne Seng's work is especially useful as she maps the ethnic landscape in Üsküdar, what is now the Asian part of Istanbul.[14] She writes that at the beginning of the 16th century, approximately fifteen percent of that town's 30,000 inhabitants were non-Muslim, and that in public places and commercial areas, the languages often heard included "Greek, Armenian, Turkish, Farsi, Kurdish, Slavic, and Central Asian dialects." Greek and Slavic obviously represented people who came from south-eastern Europe, but whereas we cannot assume all of them to have been enslaved, it stands to reason that not a few were. Most of the enslaved persons who appear in court records—mainly because they had absconded—point out that they had been captured in the Ottoman campaigns in the Balkans, but also in the Crimean Khanate's incursions into Russia and Poland. Origins of captives listed in court records include Russian (39 percent), Croatian (31 percent), and Bosnian (11 percent), with the remaining 19 percent coming from Hungary, Walachia, and Bulgaria; enslaved Greeks, Circassians, Albanians, and Africans were rare at the time.

The Pattern Shift of the Early Modern Period

As far as enslavement in the Ottoman Empire was concerned, the decades bridging the 18th and the 19th centuries witnessed a major shift in slave trading patterns. What was a mostly European traffic gradually turned into a mostly African phenomenon, and a pool of enslaved Europeans could no longer be replenished by conquest and prisoner taking. Trade replaced the spoils of war, and the Ottomans, like the Europeans and Americans before them, turned to Africa, where internal strife and poverty placed

[14] Seng, "A Liminal State," 27–28.

enslaved women and men on the markets in large numbers. Whereas the Atlantic world was mostly interested in the male population for agricultural labor, the Ottoman world, to a large extent like the Indian Ocean world, looked for females for domestic service in urban households.

There is still precious little research on Ottoman enslavement in the period preceding the 19th century. Whereas the past two decades have seen an impressive growth in the literature dealing with enslavement and the slave trade in the Empire during the last century of Ottoman rule, only very few studies, all in article format, have appeared on the early modern period. Here we have to rely on the pioneering work of scholars like Halil Sahillioğlu, Halil Inalcik, Ronald Jennings, Alan Fisher, Jane Hathaway, Yvonne Seng, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Madeline Zilfi.[15] Much ground still needs to be covered before a satisfactory picture can emerge, but the good news is that there is no shortage of first-hand and first-rate sources—from court records and government correspondence to narrative accounts. For the early modern period—contrary to the 19th century—these have been only very partially tapped: one need only count the small number of court cases adduced in all these studies together in order to realize the task ahead and the promising potential for future research.

I would like to begin this section with three stories that reflect the dramatic change over time we wish to explore here. These stories come from the contact regions between south-eastern Europe and the Ottoman

[15] For full references to these works, see notes 6–9, and 14. See also: Halil Sahillioğlu, "Slaves in the Social and Economic Life of Bursa in the Late 15th and Early 16th Centuries," *Turcica* 17 (1985): 7–42; Alan Fisher, "The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire: Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales," *Boğaziçi University Journal* 6 (1978): 149–174; idem, "Studies in Ottoman Slavery and Slave Trade, II: Manumission," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 4 (1980): 49–56; R. Jennings, "Black Slaves and Free Slaves in Ottoman Cyprus, 1590–1640," *JESHO* 30/3 (1987): 286–302; M. Zilfi, "Goods in the *Mahalle*: Distributional Encounters in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul," in *Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550–1922: An Introduction*, ed. Donald Quataert (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000), 289–311; John Hunwick, "Islamic Law and Polemics Over Race and Slavery in North and West Africa (16th–19th Century)," in *Slavery in the Islamic Middle East* 43–68; Yvonne J. Seng, "Fugitives and Factotums: Slaves in Early Sixteenth-Century Istanbul," *JESHO* 39/2 (1996): 136–167; Hasan Ferit Ertuğ, "Musahib-i Sani-i Hazret-i Şehr-Yari Nadir Ağa'nın Hatıratı-I," *Toplumsal Tarih* 49 (October 1998): 7–15; Suraiya Faroqhi, *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women* (Istanbul: Eren, 2002) (this is a collection of previously published articles, of which nos 4, 6, and 13 (published between 1997 and 2001) are relevant to our discussion; Erdem (full citation in note 22 below) also has some interesting observations about pre-19th century enslavement. On *kul*/harem enslavement in Ottoman Egypt, see Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: the Rise of the Qazdaglis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and idem., *A Tale of Two Factions: Myth, Memory, and Identity in Ottoman Egypt and Yemen* (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2003).

Empire, and they are all culled from Ottoman court records dating from the late 16th to the early 19th century. It is far from my intention to lift them out of their historical context in order to draw an imaginary line of development; rather, these have been selected only in order to put a human face on the shift in trade patterns that we have already noticed. The stories will first be told, followed by an attempt to put them in the relevant context.

The first story comes from the *Şeriat* court in Ottoman Cyprus in mid-1594, and the main protagonist was an enslaved white woman, most probably of European descent, named Rahime bint Abdüllah, from her name clearly a convert to Islam.[16] The slaver who purchased Rahime was a district governor on the island, and he obviously held her in great esteem and confidence since she served as his treasurer or accountant. So much so, that Rahime was entrusted with delivering four loads of jewels, goods, and cash, all valued at the large amount of 15,000 gold coins, from the district to the provincial treasury in Nicosia (Ottoman Lefkoşa). But, following the death of the governor, and scheming with one of the province's high financial officers, Rahime and the latter, named Mustafa, absconded with the cargo and were never found. For us, the story indicates the fact that enslaved Europeans were commonly present in Ottoman Mediterranean societies, and that some of them enjoyed a high degree of trust; at times, as here, this trust was violated.

The second story takes us to Istanbul towards the end of the 18th century.[17] On 17 June 1786, Ahmet Hasbi, the kadi of Bursa, signed a legal notice reporting the arrival in the city of two unmarried female slave dealers, said to have their respective origins in Bursa and in Syria. The head of the slave dealers' guild and police officers alleged that the two had engaged in activities that contravened the acceptable norms of the trade, as enshrined in the imperial edict and regulations governing the purchase and sale of enslaved persons. The women were banished from Istanbul as an example to the rest, and in order to protect the code of the slave dealers' guild, explained the order which was delivered to the kadi by a special courier of the Imperial Council. Although this was not spelled out in the kadi's memo, it seems safe to assume that the kind of transgression attributed to the two was of a sexual nature, i.e., exposing

[16] For the text of the court record, see Jennings, *Christians and Muslims*, 240. The case was reviewed by the *Şeriat* court in Nicosia in Şaban 1002, which fell between 22 April and 21 May 1594.

[17] BOA/Cevdet/Zaptiye/4327.

enslaved females to male clients under the guise of displaying them in a private house as if for sale.

Finally, the third story is situated in the Bulgarian port city of Varna, on the western shores of the Black Sea. On 14 August 1827, the registrar of the local *Şeriat* court recorded the arrival of seven female African lodge leaders, called in Ottoman Turkish *kolbaşı*s (see further below for details) who had been exiled from Istanbul.[18] The seven women, he wrote, were accused of conducting in their lodges, where they lived, what was termed "African wedding" events. On those occasions, lodge members assembled, musical instruments were played, fire tricks were displayed, and other kinds of "abominations" and unacceptable actions were performed as part of a healing process for demon-possessed Africans. Echoing the expulsion edict, the report stated that the women were banished to Varna in order to save their communities from that evil and harm. The seven, all mentioned by name and address, were collected from different quarters of the city and the sultan's chief halberdier appointed one of his officers to accompany them from Istanbul to Varna. They were to remain under detention in Varna and not allowed "to take [even] one step" towards another location until a further edict was issued in their matter.

What, then, do these stories tell us? What connects Cyprus, Istanbul, and Varna? How came African women to end up in Bulgaria? What course of history do the stories chart for us? Do they reflect a pattern of enslavement that connected Europe and the Ottoman Empire? In order to answer these questions, we need to situate the stories in their *longue durée* historical context, which must begin with a brief account of Ottoman enslavement in the early modern period.

In the first, Rahime, an enslaved European woman in Ottoman Cyprus, appears very much as an integral part of Ottoman Cypriot society at the end of the 16th century. There was nothing unusual about her being there, about her enjoying the trust of the district governor, and about her agility in plotting with yet another official to embezzle the money she was supposed to bring to the Nicosia treasury. Thus, for our purposes here, both the trust and its violation represent the routinization of a European enslaved presence in Ottoman Mediterranean societies; they both indicate the fact that enslavement was an integral part of a European-Ottoman relationship, which of course was far more multi-faceted and

[18] BOA/Cevdet/Zaptiye/Dahiliye/92.

complex than just that. Indeed, it also reflected the power relations that made the presence of Rahime in Cyprus possible.

The second story represents an interim position: two slave dealers were banished from Istanbul because they were alleged to have been engaged in prostituting enslaved women in private houses. The two women were from Bursa and Syria, not from European territories, but the enslaved women they were exposing to clients would now come from a mixture of sources—south-east European, Caucasian—i.e., from the Caucasus—and African. That exploited population represents the shifting patterns of trade in enslaved persons transported into the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the 18th century. It was in that period, as mentioned above, that European sources of enslaveable persons were dwindling to the point of drying up, only to be replaced by African and Caucasian ones. The story may also serve to point out that, as we approach the modern period, while enslavement was still sanctioned by the Ottoman state, the government was already intervening to check the level of abuse. This trend would become a major feature of 19th-century reforms, in which the *Tanzimat*-state (1830s–1880s) entered decidedly into the enslaver-enslaved relationship in order to limit the enslavers' entitlement to the labor and body of the enslaved.[19] It not only turned its attention to the enslaved, but sought also to limit abuse of the powerless in general, and protect the weak and needy in society.

When we use the term "state" in the Ottoman context of the early modern period, we do not mean a well-integrated, modern entity, much in the way we think of present-day, or even late 19th-century European, states. Rather, the Ottoman variant was a "compound" polity, made up of a coalition of the interest groups that formed its imperial elite. That elite was mostly male and Muslim, multi-ethnic, *kul*/harem and freeborn, military-administrative-legal-learned, urban and rural, officeholding and propertied, Ottoman-imperial and Ottoman-local. The center of that "composite" polity moved with changing political circumstances from the palace to the seat of the grand vezir and back, with shifting coalitions forming, collapsing, and re-forming among interest groups and leading elite members. This composite polity is reminiscent of the notion of a "classical tributary

[19] On this, see Toledano, *As If Silent and Absent*, Chapter Three: Turning to the "Patron State" for Redress, 108 ff.

empire," i.e., "segmented, loosely integrated, and partly overlapping forms of power and authority."[20]

In a similar manner to other "societies with slaves" and "slave societies," the Ottoman state upheld the rights of enslavers and refrained as much as possible from intervening in their relationships with the enslaved. When it intervened, this was in most cases to help enslavers recover their absconding slaves, or, conversely, to liberate severely-abused enslaved persons from abusive enslavers. Until 1845, the *Tanzimat*-state was also reluctant to impose its criminal system upon enslaved persons, leaving the responsibility in the hands of enslavers. However, that changed as part of the growing role the state assumed in criminal matters in general. In August of that year, while reviewing a theft case in which an enslaved African male was accused of stealing from his master, a certain Mustafa Bey, the Council of Ministers decided that unfree offenders should be treated as free ones.[21] They, too, were henceforth to be handled by the state—not by the enslavers as stipulated in the *Şeriat*—and receive the same penalties as free offenders. Having served their term in prison, such enslaved convicts should be returned to their enslavers, the Council ruled.

The third story completes our account of the transformation that shifted the patterns of Ottoman enslavement during the early modern period. Although it took place in 1827, the trend is noticeable already during the second half of the 18th century and the case was chosen because it provides more details than earlier ones. The arrival of the seven African heads of lodges in Varna is strikingly emblematic in several senses. The women represent not merely the well-established presence of enslaved Africans in the Ottoman Empire, but their having deep roots in actual Ottoman societies. That communities of enslaved Africans were so entrenched in the Ottoman urban landscape by the close of the 18th century is attested to by the fact that they had established a series of lodges to care for the communal needs of both the enslaved and the freed. This was done with government support, and for the most part, lodges were allowed to exist even when various un-Islamic practices were taking root in them. The banishing of those African community leaders would happen only when orthodox pressure from Islamic clerics became persistent.

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[20] See conference on "Royal Courts and Capitals," Sabanci University, Istanbul, 14–16 October 2005, part of the COST Action "Tributary Empires Compared: Romans, Mughals and Ottomans in the Pre-Industrial World From Antiquity Till the Transition to Modernity."

[21] İrade/Meclis-i Vala/1280/*Mazbata*, 23.7.1845, the Grand Vezir to the Sultan, 5.8.1845.

Full exploitation of the available archival material remains yet to be accomplished, and the evidence for the existence of lodges involving freed and enslaved Africans comes mainly from 19th-century Istanbul, and is drawn from travel accounts and contemporary informants. That literature was studied and interpreted by Y. Hakan Erdem,[22] whose summary of accounts composed by Z. Duckett Ferriman, Lucy Garnett, Richard Davey, Leyla Saz, George Young, Halide Edip, and Emine Foat Tugay yields an intriguing description of a loosely defined network of lodges, located mainly in Istanbul and other large cities. Each of these lodges was run by a female African freed slave, called *kolbaşı* or sometimes *godya*/*godiya*. Erdem aptly describes her functions as those of both "union leader and priestess of a religious cult." The *kolbaşı*, who served in her capacity for life, was charged with caring for sick and unemployed freed Africans and placing them in gainful jobs. At times, the *kolbaşı* would purchase the freedom of enslaved persons in special need of rescue. An Ottoman document cited by Erdem suggests that the organization was actually yet another instrument of government service and control, similar to guilds, Sufi orders, urban quarters, and other intermediary formations.

For most of the time, the state turned a blind eye on *Zar-Bori* healing rituals, which served as an adjustment mechanism for the uprooted and re-acculturated enslaved communities in the Empire. The fascinating thing about these African cultural retentions in Ottoman societies is the way in which they were transformed by, and absorbed into, local Islamic practices. In the Ottoman core regions, the ritual performed by African lodge members consisted of dance, gestures, music, loud vocal utterances, periodic use of incense, and object worship.[23] Dancing was normally done in a circle with one or two persons dancing in the middle, leading and stimulating the others round about. The instruments played were made of materials that could be found in the new environment into which the enslaved were interjected, but followed the models seen and heard in their places of origin. It appears that while such rituals resembled scenes from Sufi *zikr* rituals, going into *individual* trance was a more common occurrence in the African synthesized version.

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[22] *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800–1909* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 173–176. For a similar account of these Istanbul lodges (which ignores Erdem's work but adds some untapped sources), see John Hunwick, "The Religious Practices of Black Slaves in the Mediterranean Islamic World," in *Slavery on the Frontiers of Islam*, ed. Paul E. Lovejoy (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004), 160–162.

[23] Summed up by Erdem, 175, and described by Boratav, 87–88. This is also stated in a court record at BOA/Cev Dahiliye/92.

Not infrequently, participants would clean themselves before *Zar* rituals as before prayer (Arabic, *wudu'*). Following the initial stage of dancing and trance, the *kudya* would calm down the women, then lead the participants in reciting the *Fatiha*, i.e., the opening chapter (Arabic, *sura*) of the Koran. As the ritual progressed, the *Fatiha* would be recited many times, on each occasion in honor of another Islamic personage, beginning with the Prophet, his family, and various leading and local Sufi saints and other public figures. This infusion of Islamic elements into the *Zar-Bori* ritual is reminiscent of what Kathryn McKnight calls "African-Catholic syncretism."[24] In the African-Ottoman *Zar-Bori* ritual, invocations of the *Fatiha* were followed by singing and playing of musical instruments, to please and pacify the possessing spirits. These spirits were of several types and categories, but most of them were male. The most intriguing category for us here is the one that included contemporary figures such as various Ottoman officeholders—governors, ministers, men of religion.[25] Despite all that, syncretism did not win the African lodge leaders acceptance by the official, state Islamic doctrine, hence they occasionally had to face censoring and exile, as in our third story.

The circle described in this paper was thus complete with the arrival on European soil, in our case the Bulgarian town of Varna, of seven African women banished from Istanbul for having practiced *Zar-Bori* infused with popular Islamic rituals. By the end of the early modern period, Africans constituted the vast majority of the enslaved population in the Ottoman Empire. Women were the overwhelming majority among the enslaved, and most of them served in urban elite households as domestic servants. Within about a century and a half, African women—and to a lesser extent, also Circassian and Georgian ones—replaced European men in the Ottoman servile workforce, and agricultural enslavement gave way to household and menial servitude. All that is left for us to do now is to explain how and why it all happened.

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[24] Kathryn Joy McKnight, "*'En su tierra lo aprendió'*: An African Curandero's Defense before the Cartagena Inquisition," *Colonial Latin American Review* 12/1 (June 2003), 79. Referring to 17th-century Cartagena de Indias, she describes a common phenomenon of injecting prayer components into indigenous healing practices. Specifically in the case of Mateo de Arará, brought before the Inquisition Tribunal in mid-century, the man was accused of performing a ritual considered to have been diabolical. The action was well grounded in a shamanic African ritual intended to extract from a group of people a *yerbatero* (a person using herbs to cause harm). This was done by uttering words and the movement of a manipulated little broom, but during the ritual Mateo invoked "the Virgin Mary and Our Lord Jesus Christ."

[25] Sengers, 69–71, 259–263.

As already mentioned above, the main source for enslaved persons at the beginning of the early modern period was war captives. Both the state and individual officers on the battlefield appropriated the defeated enemy's manpower accessible to them, and then redistributed it on the domestic unfree market. Most of the captives came from south-east European powers, including present-day Russia and Ukraine, but on the eastern fronts, Iranian and Caucasian captives also fell victim to war-related enslavement. Owing to the end of Ottoman expansion in Europe towards the beginning of the 18th century—except for few and brief interludes—the supply of enslaveable European men and women dried up. Similarly on the Iranian front, the 1736 treaty ending the Ottoman-Iranian war also provided for the release of war captives by the Ottomans and the repatriation of enslaved Iranian subjects (which proved quite difficult to enforce internally).[26] With occasional Crimean Tatar raids into Russian and Ukrainian territories, and with Ottoman activities to stabilize control over the western Caucasus, those areas now replaced the former sources for unfree labor in the Empire.

This changing trade pattern can also be seen in the geographic origins of the slave dealers who carried out the traffic. Faroqhi argues that in the second half of the 18th century, many of them came from central and east Anatolian towns, indicating that the importation areas had shifted to the Caucasus and the regions north of the Black Sea.[27] But the most significant transformation of the trade patterns in enslaved persons reaching southwards from European and eastern sources—it was the rise, gradual at first, of African lands as the main enslaveable human reservoir for Ottoman markets. This trend peaked towards the middle decades of the 19th century, but it was already in evidence during the last quarter of the 18th.[28] As our third story clearly shows, communities of enslaved Africans existed already then on Ottoman soil. The interesting point, however, is why free labor had not replaced servile, in contrast to what had happened when agricultural enslavement disintegrated in the 16th century. The reason lies, for the most part, in the structure of the Ottoman-imperial and Ottoman-local elites, at whose heart lay the Ottoman elite household.

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[26] On this, see also Faroqhi, *Stories of Ottoman*, 101.

[27] Ibid., 259–260.

[28] See, for example, Dr Frank's eye-witness account of the trans-Saharan slave trade into Egypt at the close of the 18th century: Michel Le Gall, "Translation of Louis Frank's *Mémoire sur le commerce des nègres au Kaire, et sur les maladies auxquelles ils sont sujets en y arrivant* (1802)," in *Slavery in the Islamic World*, 69–88.

Household, Status, and Demand: Economic or Socio-Cultural?

During the 17th and 18th centuries, the household emerged as the basic unit of belonging or attachment throughout the Ottoman lands. Although households surely existed before that period, they nonetheless came to play a distinct role in Ottoman societies as a result of the large-scale transformation that took place in the Empire from the end of the 16th century onwards. We need not go into the various reasons that caused the transformation, as they have been amply discussed in the literature.[29] Suffice it here to note that a dual process of localization and Ottomanization was taking hold in the provinces, producing Ottoman-local elites throughout the Empire.[30] In this process, the Ottoman imperial elite was becoming less mobile, with posts being assigned within limited regions, so that specialization according to needs of specific provincial "clusters" were developing within the military and the bureaucracy. The local elites developed strong ties to the local economy, society, and culture, and linked their and their children's future to one province, often to one city. At the same time, local elites—urban and rural notables, *ulema*, and merchants—were seeking to become part of the imperial administration, trying to attain government offices and being Ottomanized in the process. The localizing imperial elite and the Ottomanizing local elites gradually merged into Ottoman-local elites, which better served the interests of both sides.

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[29] The main contributors to the debate over the transformation of the Empire's governance in that period are Islamoğlu and Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History," in *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, ed. Huri Islamoğlu-Inan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 42–62; Roger Owen, *The Middle East and the World Economy, 1800–1914*, rev. ed. (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993) (first ed., 1981), "Introduction: The Middle East economy in the period of so-called 'decline', 1500–1800," 1–23, 294–299 (notes); Metin Kunt, *All the Sultan's Servants: the Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government 1550–1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Ruling Elite between Politics and 'the Economy'," in *An Economic and Social History*, 545–575 (especially 552–556); Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State: the Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991); Jane Hathaway, *The Politics*, 1, 14, 24 (and throughout the book); idem, *A Tale of Two Factions*, 4–6; and Oktay Özel, "Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The 'Demographic Crisis' Reconsidered," *IJMES* 36/2 (May 2004): 183–205, on demographic and economic pressures during the 16th and 17th centuries. This debate has consequently helped to revise the 'decline paradigm,' which is now virtually defunct in Ottomanist discourse, though unfortunately still quite alive outside the field of Middle East Studies, and even to some extent within sections thereof.

[30] The arguments put forth in the following paragraphs are fully developed in my forthcoming book on Ottoman-local elites, but in part have already been published in Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites," 145–162.

Of major importance in this process was the household, or rather more specifically in our case, the Ottoman-local household, which served as the social, economic, political, and even cultural unit that facilitated and promoted Ottoman-local integration. In the 17th century, households were being created around leading officeholders in the bureaucracy and within the military. While forming initially around the nuclear and extended family of the founder, from the outset they relied on patronage relationships between the head of the household and a broad array of clients. The essential components of any household were the founder's retainers, who were a sort of militia force, often small, armed, and protecting the interests of the household. A concomitant component was the producers of the household wealth, which enabled its expansion through recruitment and networking. Marriage among the various households was another essential element for forming inter-household alliances to promote common causes and take over income-producing economic assets. Conjugal arrangements provided the socio-political cement that bonded household coalitions, or factions as they were often called, and made networking possible. Although essentially a constructed notion, households also had a physical dimension, located in estates, often one or several complexes that housed dozens of individuals, hundreds in the larger ones, who performed a wide variety of functions including command and control, enforcement, finances, service, and trade.

Household heads vied for resources and coalesced locally, usually in a provincial town, where the local governor resided, but they soon realized that it was essential to build a network that would transcend subdistrict, district, and even provincial bounds. Truly successful household coalitions had to be also connected to the imperial capital, where officeholders were consolidating their patronage networks through that new-type household. In the 17th century, the crucial stepping-stone towards household consolidation—i.e., its social reproduction—was the ability to survive the founder's demise, that is to entrench a multi-generational structure. Until the latter part of the century, many households disintegrated at that stage, leaving the provincial scene to new households and new factions. However, gradually, some households and some factions proved more resilient, better adapted to the changing circumstances at the center and the provinces, and more capable of sustaining the incessant competition over resources. By the end of the first quarter of the 18th century, in provinces throughout the Empire, a single household, or rather faction of households, usually emerged as hegemonic, securing for its leader and his lieutenants near-full control of the body politic and the

economy. The main offices of state, hence also access to, and appropriation of, the main income-generating assets, would fall into the hands of members of that household.

All this occurred in a world of intense political struggles that were led and directed—through active networking and by skillful deployment of balancing acts—by members of the imperial and Ottoman-local elites: men and women, both *kul*/harem and freeborn, both in Istanbul and in the provinces. Among the most famous of these households we may mention the Kazdağlıs of Egypt, the Eyübizades of Iraq (mainly in Bagdad and Basra), the Azms of Syria, the Husaynis of Tunis, and the Karamanlıs of Libya. In some cases, hegemonic households would turn in the 19th century into local dynasties (Egypt, Tunisia), in others the Tanzimat-state would remove them and take their place (Syria, Iraq). Ottoman political culture was heavily influenced by patterns that evolved during the last two and a half centuries of imperial rule, leaving their mark on political interaction in the successor states of the Middle East for decades after the Empire's demise. The strong link between political and economic interaction, the belief in diversification through placement of family members in competing networks to minimize risk and increase security, the overwhelming impact of patronage politics, the lingering effect of "grandee families," and the presence of both formal and informal dynastic orders are some of the salient features that the Ottoman system bequeathed to modern Middle Eastern and North African societies.

For our purposes here, it is important to examine the ways in which households recruited and socialized new members. The purchase of enslaved persons for various roles was one of the four most important channels of recruitment to imperial-center and Ottoman-local households. The other three modes of recruitment-cum-bonding to a household were biological-kin relationships, marriage, and voluntary offer of loyalty and services in return for patronage. Less prevalent were adoption and suckling relationships, but the sources occasionally do mention them, too. Bonding ensured that loyalty and patronage would flow from top to bottom and from the bottom up in households across Ottoman societies, linking people from various elites to non-elite groups and individuals. In that way, society was cohesively undergirded both vertically (within a household) and horizontally (alliances among households). Not infrequently, individuals were bonded to a household through more than one of these ties, as, for example, when one was the purchased *kul*-type (Arabic, *mamluk*) retainer of the household head and was also married to his daughter. Attachment to a household gave an individual protection,

employment, and social status. But not less significantly, it gave household members (*kapı halkı*) a sense of belonging and an identity, both social and political.

* * *

Thus, this system, which encompassed Ottoman political, social, and economic life, kept alive the demand for enslaved persons, whether as its *kul*/harem leadership or its household workforce.[31] To be sure, already during the early modern period, much of the labor in elite households was free, not bonded, but the remaining servility was still so engrained in the system and so indispensable culturally, i.e., mainly as status symbol, that it ensured the continuation of demand for enslaved persons in the Ottoman Empire well into the 19th century. Despite the major reforms of the Tanzimat, and the prohibition of the slave trade—enforced in earnest only in the last quarter of the century—slavery was not legally abolished until the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish Republic.[32]

So, we end up with an open question: what was the value for Ottoman enslavers of sustaining that constant demand for enslaved labor in urban elite households? It is doubtful that the real reason was economic: there was a ready and active market for free labor in domestic service, in fact it constituted the lion's share of the labor market as a whole. As previously observed, in the Ottoman social structure of the early modern and modern periods, the basic building block of social, political, and economic networking was the elite household, both at the imperial center and in the provinces. Within that system, elite households emulated the sultan's household-court as much as they could afford to. As long as an essential component of the sultan's household-court continued to include *kul*/harem and domestic enslavement, so did—albeit to a lesser degree—the households of his military-administrative officeholding elite, which served him and his composite state. As long as the size of harems, the presence of eunuchs, and the pattern of socio-political marriages within the elite persisted, the demand for enslaved persons remained stable. In that sense, we can say that what perpetuated Ottoman enslavement throughout the early modern period and into the modern era was its socio-cultural value, not its economic worth.

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[31] For a similar view, though cast in somewhat different terms, see Faroqhi, *Stories of Ottoman*, 149.

[32] On the last phase see Erdem, and on the suppression of the traffic, see Toledano, *Suppression*.

THE LAST IMARET? AN IMPERIAL OTTOMAN FIRMAN FROM 1308/1890[1]

Amy Singer

Ottoman *imaret*s or public kitchens are usually described as one of a complex of buildings centered on a mosque and including other institutions like schools, the founder's tomb, a caravansaray, or a bath. They were built throughout the empire, mostly in towns, in larger numbers in Anatolia and the Balkans than in the Arab provinces. The majority were built before the year 1600, and some continued to function for decades and even centuries. All imarets prepared meals to distribute at no charge to a mixed clientele of mosque employees, *medrese* teachers and students, Sufis, government officials on the move, travelers of other types, and local indigents. In some places, non-Muslims received food as well, a fact mentioned both in Muslim Ottoman sources and in the accounts of non-Muslims. However, imarets do not appear to have served food to military units, nor to have been incorporated into military operations in any way. The longstanding and widespread occurrence of imarets, as well as the variety of their clients and the longevity of their operations, all suggest that closer and more extensive research on the establishment and maintenance of these kitchens will lead to new understandings of Ottoman policies of expansion, settlement and governance.[2]

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[1] This article is based on a paper presented at a colloquium in May 2008 honoring the fortieth anniversary of the death of Professor Uriel Heyd. It is most appropriate that it should be included in this volume in honor of Professor Amnon Cohen, since Heyd was one of Cohen's teachers, and Cohen was one of mine. Heyd's work taught me to read Ottoman firmans closely, even though I never was fortunate enough to study with him directly (See Uriel Heyd, *Ottoman Documents on Palestine 1552–1615* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960]). Amnon Cohen first introduced me to the study of Middle Eastern history and, years later, guided me through the complexities of reading Ottoman *kadı sicilleri*. This article is dedicated to him in thanks for many years of collegial support and friendship. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (Grant # 657/07).

[2] For a general discussion of imarets, see Amy Singer, "Imarets," in *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2011), 72–85, and for an in-depth study of one particular institution, see idem, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002). A discussion of the imarets founded during the 14th to 16th centuries as part of the Ottoman conquest of Thrace and Macedonia, appears in Heath W. Lowry, *The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1350–1500: The Conquest, Settlement & Infrastructural Development of Northern Greece*

For much of Ottoman history imarets served meals to a wide variety of diners, yet they were not open to all comers. Rather, most of their clients were people to whom the right to eat in a particular institution had been assigned specifically, or whose professional or social status allowed them to claim such a right temporarily when they came within the proximity of an imaret. Often, the endowment deeds that described the conditions of a kitchen's establishment and terms of operation specified what groups of people would have a right to a meal. By the late 19th century, however, the reform initiatives of the Tanzimat, begun under Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839) and continued by his successors, had altered—to a greater or lesser extent—the character and form of institutions associated with the dynasty and Ottoman administration, including those providing social and welfare services. Modern government offices were created to undertake the functions once provided through private endowments and began to compete with the latter, if not replace them. Moreover, notions of entitlement and cultural practices were changing. All these developments affected the public kitchens as well.

During the last quarter of the 19th century, however, the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) was characterized by a renewed emphasis on the personal beneficence of the sultan and by his various and widespread charitable endeavors.[3] The present article discusses the establishment of one imaret in late 19th-century Istanbul, the last one known thus for to have been planned during the Ottoman era. A document dated A.H. 1308/1890 CE, found by chance in the Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) in Istanbul, contains detailed plans for the construction and operation of a public kitchen to be built in the Beşiktaş neighborhood of Istanbul.[4] This foundation document reveals continuities

(Istanbul: Bahçeşehir University Publications, 2008), 66–94. Aptullah Kuran, "A Spatial Study of Three Ottoman Capitals: Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul," *Muqarnas* 13 (1996): n. 1, gives a succinct description of the evolution of imarets over the course of Ottoman history, unfortunately without references.

[3] On the beneficence of the Hamidian period, see the works of Nadir Özbek: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet 1876–1914* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002); "Imperial Gifts and Sultanic Legislation in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909," in *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts*, ed. Michael Bonner, Mine Ener, and Amy Singer (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 203–20; and "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876–1909," *IJMES* 37 (2005): 59–81.

[4] BOA.Y.PRK.BŞK 19/25, 25 Muharrem 1308 (10 Sept. 1890), described in the catalogue as: *Hamidiye Camii ile Ertuğrul Tekkesi arasında padişah tarafından yapılacak imaretin nizamnamesi ile müsveddesi.*

with much earlier imarets but also describes a number of innovations that reflect how broader changes in public policy and material culture in the late 19th century were transmitted and interpreted in the context of a traditional institution.

At the time of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, Beşiktaş was a small settlement, but as early as the time of Sultan Bayezid II (1481–1512) a royal palace was built in the neighborhood, beside the Bosphorus. The area began to develop into a more significant site after Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha (d. 1546), the Ottoman admiral who served Sultan Süleyman I (1520–1566), built a residence there and also founded a mosque, medrese and primary school; upon his death, the admiral was buried beside his mosque. From that time on, Beşiktaş became identified closely with the Ottoman navy and served as a place of pilgrimage in its ceremony of setting sail from Istanbul, meanwhile attracting naval residents and their endowments over the years.[5]

With its genial shore-side location, Beşiktaş also attracted members of the Ottoman court to establish residences, and it became famous for its gardens as well. By the 18th century, both gardens and palaces were expanding, while new residences were gradually added. The renewed investment in Istanbul that marked the return of the imperial court from Edirne after 1703 affected Beşiktaş as well. After the destruction of the janissaries in 1826, Sultan Mahmud II moved his residence to the palace called Sahilsaray, which was later torn down and rebuilt by Sultan Abdülmecid (1839–1861) as the Dolmabahçe Palace, completed in 1855. When Sultan Abdülhamid II moved to the Yıldız Palace in 1878, he was not leaving the neighborhood, but only retreating to the more secluded heights above the shore. The sultans continued to live in various Beşiktaş palaces until the end of the empire, and their presence attracted additional residents and prompted a proliferation of residential buildings that included palaces and more modest houses alike, as well as a number of small businesses.[6] Thus, by the time the imaret was planned in 1890, Beşiktaş was no longer a distant suburb of the old walled city and of Pera, which lay north of it across the Golden Horn, but a neighborhood incorporated into the

[5] Tülay Artan, "Beşiktaş," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993–95), 1: 162.

[6] See Shirine Hamadeh, *The City's Pleasures: Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 37–42; Selim Somçağ, "1866'dan Günümüze Beşiktaş," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993–95), 1: 163–64 and Tülay Artan, "Beşiktaş Sarayı," in ibid., 1: 171–73.

fabric of Istanbul's urban life. Today, Beşiktaş is a busy commercial, cultural, and residential area that also serves as a central transportation hub. Major roads intersect there, and boats from up and across the Bosphorus and around the Sea of Marmara discharge and take on passengers all day and late into the night.

Until the discovery of the document presently under discussion, the imaret of Muhammad ʿAli/Mehmed ʿAli Pasha (d. 1849), ruler of Ottoman Egypt, appeared to be the latest new imaret established in the empire. It was built between 1817–1821 as part of an impressive mosque-medrese complex on the north Aegean shore, in the town of Kavala in eastern Macedonia. Like many high-ranking Ottoman officials before him, Mehmed ʿAli Pasha invested some of the wealth he had acquired as a successful commander and ruler to provide for socio-economic improvements in his hometown, despite the fact that he spent most of his life in places far removed from it.[7] Not much is known yet of the specific operation of the Kavala imaret, however its location in a small town, as part of a complex that contained a medrese, suggests that it resembled earlier endowments in modest towns, planned to serve a varied clientele, including a community of scholars. Muhammad ʿAli's imaret may also have been intended to fill a void created by the lapsed functioning of the nearby imaret founded as part of a complex by Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha (d. 1536), some 300 meters north of the new one.

As for imarets in the Beşiktaş quarter, Evliya Çelebi, the famous Ottoman traveler and chronicler, reported in the mid-17th century that there was one belonging to the mosque complex established in the previous century by the Grand Admiral (*kapudan-i derya*) Koca Sinan Pasha (d. 1596). This imaret apparently had had some problems, because Evliya said that in

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[7] For an introduction to the vast literature on this key personality of the early nineteenth century, see: E.R. Toledano, "Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 7 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954–2003), 423–31. On the imaret of Kavala, see: Emilia Stefanidou-Fotiadou, "To Imaret Tes Kavalas (The Imaret of Kavala)," *Makedonika* (*Thessalonika*) 25 (1985–86): 203–65 [Greek]; Barbara Bruni, *La Külliye di Kavála. Storia di un'istitutione*, Quaderni di Semitistica (Firenze: Dipartimento di Linguistica, Università di Firenze, 2003); Machiel Kiel, "Ottoman Building Activity Along the Via Egnatia, the Cases of Pazargah, Kavala and Ferecik," in *The Via Egnatia Under Ottoman Rule, 1380–1699*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1996), 145–58; and Haluk Sezgin, "Kavala'da Mehmed Ali Paşa Külliyesi," *Arkitekt* (1976): 65–69. For earlier examples of the extensive building activities of high-ranking Ottoman officials, see, for example: Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire*, photographs and drawings by Arben N. Arapi and Reha Günay (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), Chapters 8–14 and Theoharis Stavrides, *The Sultan of Vezirs: The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelovic (1453–1474)* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

his time it was "once again" (*yine*) providing food as a result of the efforts of a few managers, presumably more successful than some of the previous ones. Evliya was somewhat particular about mentioning the existence of imarets where he found them (perhaps as a regular client?), and they were clearly among the institutions he expected to find, since he also noted their absence.[8] Ayvansarayı, author of a late-18th-century compendium of Islamic monuments in Istanbul, does not mention any imaret at all as part of Sinan Pasha's complex, nor, in fact, does he mention any imarets in Beşiktaş. Yet he does include imarets in his lists of buildings affiliated to other mosques in the city. Ayvansarayı also notes that the Mevlevi *tekke* of Beşiktaş, built in the early 18th century, had only a *semahane* but no kitchen. Thus he clearly did not consider kitchens unworthy of mention in his catalogue, and one therefore expects he would have included any that existed in Beşiktaş.[9]

It is in the overlapping contexts of Ottoman imaret building, changing notions and forms of philanthropy, the flourishing of the Beşiktaş neighborhood as an imperial center, and the specific conditions of late 19th-century Istanbul that the present *nizamname* (regulation) describing the organization of a new imaret in 1890, should be read. Thus far, this single document is the only evidence recovered for the existence of this imaret, leaving open the possibility that it may never have been built at all. According to the *nizamname*, the new imaret was to be located on the steep slope of Beşiktaş, between the Ertuğrul *tekke* (dervish lodge) and the Hamidiye mosque further up the hill at the edge of Yıldız Park. The Ertuğrul *tekke* was founded in 1887 by Sultan Abdülhamid II, named for Ertuğrul Gazi, father of Osman, the first Ottoman sultan. It was intended for the particular use of the Ertuğrul regiment, manned by Türkmen from the Domaniç region of Anatolia near Kütahya, and to be the home of the Şazelî (Arabic: Shādhilī) dervish order, most widespread in North Africa. While the Şazelîs were not particularly numerous in Istanbul, this gesture

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[8] Evliya says: "*mā-takaddem ʿimāreti işlermiş yine baʿżı mütevelli istikāmet idüp niʿmeti mebzūl olur*," (Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi, 1. Kitap: İstanbul*, prepared by Orhan Şaik Gökyay (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996; revised 2006), 192); see also Artan, "Beşiktaş," 4:162 and Amy Singer, "Evliya Çelebi on "*imarets*," in *Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter*, eds. David J. Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon (London: Routledge, 2006), 123–134.

[9] Hafiz Hüseyin bin Ismail Ayvansarayı, *The Garden of the Mosques: Hafiz Hüseyin al-Ayvansarayı's Guide to the Muslim Monuments of Ottoman Istanbul*, ed. and trans. Howard Crane (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 421. This work was completed in 1195/1780 and emended in 1248/1832–33 to 1253/1838 before being printed in 1281/1865.

of support may be seen as part of Abdülhamid II's pan-Islamist politics, aimed at enhancing the imperial image in the empire's North African provinces.[10]

The Yıldız Hamidiye mosque was built by Abdülhamid II in 1885–86, just outside the grounds of the Yıldız Palace. This mosque was Abdülhamid II's preferred venue for Friday prayers and other holiday ceremonies, and he rarely made a formal procession to the older imperial mosques, located farther away on the historic Istanbul peninsula across the Golden Horn. The Hamidiye mosque was not part of a complex of buildings offering social services, as were so many of the earlier Ottoman mosques. Rather, it exemplified the trend visible from the 18th century, from which time imperial mosques gradually came to resemble court chapels, more private places of worship for the sultans than theaters of imperial ceremony and symbols of Ottoman might.[11] Although both the Hamidiye mosque and the Ertuğrul *tekke* are clearly marked on contemporary and historical maps, the imaret does not appear.[12]

1. *The* nizamname

The document describing the foundation of the imaret calls itself a "regulation" (*nizamname*). It includes some elements of a traditional *vakfiye* (endowment deed), such as a concrete and detailed plan for the building and how it was expected to function. Inasmuch as *vakfiye*s reflected how people conceived that their endowments should be organized and operate, this regulation did much the same. However, it contained no provisions for revenues that would sustain the operations of the imaret, neither listing endowed properties nor otherwise stating an annual budget. There is one single reference to monies endowed and in a few places the sums to

[10] M. Baha Tanman, "Ertuğrul Tekkesi," in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993–95), 3: 196–98. On the Şazeli dervish order, see P. Lory, "Shādhiliyya," *EI²*, 9:172–175 and on the order specifically in Istanbul, see M. Baha Tanman, "Şazelilik," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*), 7: 139–141.

[11] On this transformation, see Howard Crane, "The Ottoman Sultan's Mosques: Icons of Imperial Legitimacy," in *The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order*, ed. Irene A. Bierman, Rifa'at Abou-el-Haj, and Donald Preziosi (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991), 173–243, and especially p. 190. On the Hamidiye mosque, see Selçuk Batur, "Yıldız Camii," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, 7: 514–515.

[12] The building is not marked on the detailed Pervititch fire insurance map of Beşiktaş drawn up in 1922, see Seden Ersony and Çağatay Anadol (comps.), *Jacques Pervitich Sigorta Haritaları/Istanbul in the Insurance Maps of Jacques Pervititch* (Istanbul: AXA OYAK Holding & Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000), 33, 37, 40.

be spent for specific expenses are noted. Otherwise, the *nizamname* gives no fiscal guidelines to managers of the kitchen: no budget for foodstuffs, no recipes, and no salaries for the personnel employed. The *nizamname* also lacks any of the formal literary characteristics of a *vakfiye*, which would have included an introductory section, citing Qur'an and *hadith* to frame the act in the context of Muslim beneficence and praising the founder as a devout Muslim and a generous person. In fact, the document seems more akin to an official memo, issued with proper, if minimal, imperial titulature but otherwise focused on the matter at hand. Its interest lies in the many insights it offers into the changing nature of Ottoman imarets, as well as developments in technology, attitude, and taste that can be associated with the larger processes of reform and modernization in which the empire was engaged throughout the 19th century.

The *nizamname* comprises eight leaves. Six of these contain the text of the regulation, written on printed imperial administrative forms. However, these pages with their many corrections do not constitute a fair copy of the *nizamname*. The date "25 Muharrem 1308" (10 September 1890) is noted at the top of each page, written in the space headed "*tarih*" (date), but there is no date in the space headed "*tarih-i tebyiz*" (date of fair copy). The remaining two pages of the document are written on both sides, on unheaded paper, and seemingly constitute a preliminary, even more heavily corrected (and less legible) draft text than the other six leaves. The order of the paragraphs in the earlier draft differs from the later one. Similarly, the language has been edited and corrected in the later version, eliminating some errors.[13] Finally, the document includes a simple sketch plan of the building, seen in two views, from above and in elevation. The number of rooms and relative size seem to agree with the description of rooms in the text.

1a. *Clients*

The regulation is divided into three sections, containing a total of 21 numbered topics (*madde*). This imaret is planned as a stand-alone public kitchen, not explicitly attached to either a larger complex nor, apparently, to any other existing institution. While it was to be located between the Hamidiye mosque and the Ertuğrul tekke, there is no indication that

[13] A scholar specializing in Turkish language might find the comparison of the two texts interesting, for what they may reveal about preferred syntax and usage in the late 19th century.

it belonged to either one, nor was it meant especially to serve people attached to either of them. Other than to locate the imaret, no mention of the tekke or its dervishes appears in the document, though one might have expected that tekke residents or people who frequented it for *zikr* (Sufi ritual) would have the right to a meal. Imarets sometimes fed local medrese students and the residents and guests of a nearby tekke, even if there was no direct institutional affiliation.[14] The fact that people from the tekke did not eat at the imaret suggests that the tekke had its own kitchen and took care of its own needs. Nor were employees of the Hamidiye mosque given dining privileges at the imaret. Their only connection to it was at the *Mevlud* festival, the annual celebration of the Prophet's birthday, as will be discussed below.

In fact, the Beşiktaş imaret was specifically intended to feed only people who were afflicted by calamity, unable to work in any way, and unable to procure food sufficient to stave off death. (*İşbu imarette itʿam olunacak eşhas münhasıran alaʾl-vücud ve fevk el-ʿada muṣāb olarak her halde ʿamelden saḳıṭ ve ḳut lā yamūtunu tedaruktan ʿaciz olanlardan ʿibaret olacaktır*.) In this, the new imaret differed notably from its ancestors established in the classical Ottoman era. In the foundation deeds for public kitchens like those of the Fatih, Süleymaniye and Atik Valide complexes in Istanbul, that of Hürrem Sultan in Jerusalem, or the imaret built by Bayezid II in Edirne, indigents were not the principal clients.[15] However, like the earlier endowment deeds, the *nizamname* did fix the number of diners: fifty people were to be fed each morning and evening, although it is unclear whether these should be the same fifty or two different groups.

No instructions were given as to how the diners were to be selected nor who was to judge that they met the criteria of need as stipulated. One clue about these matters comes in the final paragraph of the regulation. As in older imarets, it was explicitly forbidden to remove any food (*imaretʾten yemek ihracı memnuʿdur*). If necessary, someone could come and take two portions of food out to a sick person at home. Similar exceptions for the sick, and sometimes for special groups of people, existed in earlier

[14] Such was the case with the Fatih imaret, for example, on which see: Osman N. Ergin, *Fatih İmareti Vakfiyesi* (Istanbul, 1945) or the imaret of Haseki Sultan in Jerusalem, on which see: Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence*, 120–21.

[15] On these imarets see Ergin, *Fatih İmareti Vakfiyesi*, Kemal Edib Kürkçüoğlu, *Süleymaniye Vakfiyesi* (Ankara: Resimli Posta Matbaası, 1962), Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence*, and Fatih Müderrisoğlu, "Edirne II. Bayezid Külliyesi," *Vakıflar Dergisi* 22 (1991): 151–98.

imarets.[16] However, in the new imaret, such a case had to be duly authorized by the local *imam* and the *muhtar* of the quarter (*mahalle imamı ve muhtar ağa tarafından memhur bir ʿilmühaber*). The need to bring some form of certification from the local authorities that a person really was sick at home seems to represent a change from earlier times. However, the practice is familiar in contemporary Istanbul: a person who receives food daily from the imaret at Eyüp, one of the few historic imarets that has maintained its original function, must obtain a certificate from the local *muhtar* confirming that the person in question meets some test of neediness.[17] The incorporation of this practice into the regulations of the new imaret was one clear indication that it was not a mere throwback to earlier Ottoman beneficent institutions, but rather part of a new era of poor relief practices.

Formal tests and certifications of need are signs of the modern administrative practices of welfare distribution. The bureaucratization and standardization reflected in the issuing of official certificates belong to processes underway in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century. In general, there was an increased attempt to control the movement and record the particulars of indigent people. This has been documented in the works of Nadir Özbek and Mine Ener for 19th-century Istanbul and Cairo, respectively. Moreover, the introduction of new modes of organization and control were aspects of the reorganization of municipal government connected to the 19th-century Ottoman reforms.[18]

Clues are only just beginning to emerge about the micro-management of food preparation, distribution, and clients at imarets in earlier times. Account books of kitchen expenditures and receipts also exist for imarets from various places and periods. Lists exist of people receiving food and bread at imarets, the amount of food they received, and the cases in which they received cash supplements or substitutes. Moreover, the same lists make clear that most people had the privilege of eating either due to their position as employees in the imaret or their attachment to another institution in the larger complex to which the imaret belonged. Others held certificates (*temessük, hüccet, berat*) testifying to their right to eat. Something of their identity may be ascertained by the descriptors attached to their

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[16] See the *vakfiye*s referred to in the preceding note.

[17] As communicated to me by the director of this imaret in an interview in August 2003.

[18] See note 3 above, and Mine Ener, *Managing Egypt's Poor and the Politics of Benevolence, 1800–1952* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

names, but as yet no complete picture exists of the ways in which they were nominated or claimed rights, nor the accompanying certification process.[19]

1b. *Building and Equipment*

The new imaret was to be a one-storey building with a refectory (*yemek salonu*), a cement-paved foyer and waiting room where the poor people (*fukara*) coming to eat could gather, a room each for the director and steward, another two-person room beside them for the doorkeeper (*kapıcı*), two policemen (*zabtiye*) and a few municipal guards (*belediye çavuş*), a kitchen (*matbah*), a pantry (*kilar*) with a capacity to hold one year's worth of foodstuffs, a small washroom (*guslhane*), a privy (*hala*), and a space for horses. In addition, there should be an oven (*fırın*) for cooking food and baking bread for the imaret. In order that people not catch cold in the refectory and in the waiting room, both were to be heated.

Building specifications give the impression of a solid and high-quality facility: only superior building materials were to be used: stone, brick, and iron. The roof should be covered with red roof tiles, the interior doors made of oak, the external ones of iron with well-fitted frames, and the floors made of resinous Galatz wood laid on vaults. The refectory was to be large enough to hold fifty people at a time, presumably so that everyone would eat at once. There, people were to take their meals seated on chairs (*sandalye*) around a large table (*sofra*). The furniture was to be made from oak—the table with a marble top and iron legs and the chairs with iron legs. In addition to the construction of a table and chairs, the room was to be furnished with large stone jugs, shaped like a vase (*vazo şeklinde*) with a spigot, placed at each end of the table and presumably for dispensing water. Close by the refectory a large oak cupboard would be used to store the serving dish of food and the bread before meals. Fifty copper dishes would hold the soup and other food served, while fifty sets of spoons and forks, and one water mug apiece were to be furnished as

[19] On how food and the rights to it were distributed, see some examples in: Kayhan Orbay, "Distributing Food, Bread and Cash: *Vakıf Taamhoran* and *Fodulahoran* Registers as Archival Sources for Imarets," in *Feeding People, Feeding Power: Imarets in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Nina Ergin, Christoph K. Neumann, and Amy Singer (Istanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2007), 171–96; Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 149; and Amy Singer, "The Privileged Poor of Ottoman Jerusalem," in *Pauvreté et Richesse dans le Monde Musulman Méditerranéen/Poverty and Wealth in the Muslim Mediterranean World*, ed. Jean-Paul Pascual (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2003), 257–69.

utensils. In addition, food would be dished out with a ladle that would be of a size to fill a bowl in a single serving. The numbers from 1 to 50 were to be engraved on the chairs, spoons and forks.

The furniture for the imaret was to be made in the *Mekteb-i Sanayı*, the School of Industrial Arts. The specification of furnishings and the materials to be used in an imaret was not new. Foundation deeds and accounts registers for the imarets of Fatih, Bayezid II, Süleyman, Hürrem Sultan, and Atik Valide, built over a period of some two hundred years, sometimes listed copper cooking pots for soup and rice, serving trays for baklava, baskets for carrying grain or holding fresh bread, and ladles for serving.[20] However, they did not describe in detail the venue in which the food was served. Moreover, the explicit reference to the Mekteb-i Sanayı drew a direct connection between two institutions founded to serve groups of needy and deserving people in Istanbul. The Mekteb-i Sanayı in Istanbul opened in 1868 in Sultanahmet. It was the Ottoman governor Midhat Pasha who created the model for such vocational schools during his tenure in the Tuna (Danube) province. They were intended to offer basic elementary education and training as artisans to poor and orphan boys, and, as a by-product, to encourage local Ottoman industry. The Sultanahmet school opened with fifty pupils under the age of thirteen and has continued to function in various incarnations until the present day, at the south end of the Hippodrome.[21]

This connection is important since it further emphasizes the reorganization of social welfare services into discrete categories defined by their clients. Thus the imaret and Sanayı Mektebi articulate new goals for institutions established for the poor and needy among the Istanbul population. In earlier times, each institution would have been framed in a different context. Orphan or poor boys might have been apprenticed to different craftsmen, controlled by the rules that regulated guild association and the performance of specific crafts. A public kitchen was once part of a complex that served the whole population of an area or quarter, providing spiritual and social services, as well as feeding several population groups simultaneously, each deemed deserving of a meal for distinct reasons. It is thus curious to note that the contemporary walled perimeter

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[20] See, for example: Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence*, 120.

[21] See Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976–77), 2: 110–11; Emre Döken, "Sanayı Mektebi," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, 6: 443–444; and Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet*, 248–49.

of the Sanayı Mektebi school grounds includes the building that once served as the imaret of the Sultanahmet mosque complex. This functional specialization is an additional feature of the process Crane describes for the imperial mosques, whereby they gradually shed their appendage institutions and became mostly places of public worship for sultans.[22] The various functions were becoming the responsibility of separate authorities—education and social welfare ministries—as part of the modernization process that organized public services according to another logic.

Detailed instructions for the organization and management of imarets had existed in endowment deeds in the centuries prior to the *nizamname* under study here. The attempt to control movement and regulate consumption of people at the imaret were familiar, a consistent aspect of the way such institutions were conceived, at least on paper. Yet the specific provisions for the building, furniture and dishes are strikingly different from those in earlier endowment deeds and reflect a large number of developments underway in late Ottoman Istanbul. The mention of a built table and chairs to be provided in the new imaret is notably different. Earlier *vakfiye*s had described how to set up a room at an *imaret* in order to entertain important guests. A *sofra* in the 16th century would not have referred to a table, but more likely to a square of textile or leather placed on the floor with or without a low stand on which was placed a tray containing food dishes. The stipulation that all utensils be numbered as well as the chairs suggests that people had fixed places assigned to them (or to the number they received), and the numbers enabled the dining-room attendant to keep close track of both the diners and the dishes. That the Ottomans numbered the implements is not so surprising, given their habits of record-keeping and organization. Surviving plates, bowls and ladles, found in museums or even in the bazaars of Istanbul today, sometimes bear inscriptions identifying their owners, though I know of none that belonged specifically to an imaret, nor have I seen any with numbers. It remains to be discovered when the practice of numbering the equipment began and how it was explained at the time.

In earlier times, meals were to be served morning and evening (*sabah, akşam*) At the newly-planned imaret, meals were to be served at times called four o'clock and eleven o'clock (*Sabah yemeği saat dörtte ve akşam yemeği onbir de verilecekdir*.) By the late 19th century, the Ottomans were keeping time according to two twelve-hour periods beginning at dusk.

[22] See note 11.

Thus, the imaret meals were apparently to be served in the second of the twelve-hour periods, roughly at mid-late morning and late afternoon, varying somewhat according to the season.[23] It is interesting that a mid-19th-century English account of the culinary habits of Sultan Mahmud II notes that he ate customarily at 11 a.m. and sunset, sitting at a table on a chair.[24] By the end of the century, what was cited as a novel practice for a sultan had become routine and familiar enough to be implemented as common custom for a very different population.

1c. *Staff*

Employees of the imaret were to be responsible for food preparation and distribution, as well as for the orderly and upstanding behavior of everyone in the place. The staff was to include a director (*müdir*) and head cook, as well as a steward (*vekilharc*), four additional cooks, two bakers, one person to oversee the dining table (*sofracı*) and two doormen. All were to have impeccable manners and be models of integrity, pious and of firm character. At the beginning of their employment they were to take an oath that they would not steal, would maintain the conditions set down in the *nizamname* and pay careful attention that no wasteful spending occur, nothing unsuitable for eating be served, and that the place be kept clean. Earlier *vakfiye*s also sometimes described the character desired of employees at an endowment, including the kitchen staff at imarets. However, the stipulation here that they should take an oath (*ma'alkasem*) may be new.[25]

The employees were also responsible for protecting the people who came to eat from any mistreatment. This provision recognized the basic vulnerability of needy people, together with the responsibility to shield them from aggression and ridicule, as well as a more general need to

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[23] For a discussion on Ottoman time-keeping, see Avner Wishnitzer, "'Our Time:' On the Durability of the *Alaturka* Hour System in the Late Ottoman Period," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 16, 1–2 (2010): 48–50.

[24] H. Tyrell, *The History of the Present War with Russia* (London, 1855), 1: 112, as cited in Özge Samancı, "Culinary Consumption Patterns of the Ottoman Elite During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," in *The Illuminated Table, the Properous House: Food and Shelter in Ottoman Material Culture*, eds. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2003), 161–62.

[25] See, for example, the text of the Haseki Sultan *vakfiye*, which states the preferred characteristics for its various personnel: St. H. Stephan, "An Endowment Deed of Khâsseki Sultân, Dated 24th May 1552," *Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine* 10 (1944): 187–89.

ensure that those who came to eat did not quarrel among themselves nor behave improperly. This last clause reflected a practical appreciation that the gathering of a large number of hungry people in anticipation of receiving a meal might provoke some to disruptive or unruly behavior. (One has only to think of how well-dressed guests may, at times, comport themselves at a large buffet table.) Two persons from the municipality and two policemen were to be on duty, and they were to eat together with the imaret staff. This is the only point at which any mention is made in the *nizamname* of the imaret staff eating at the imaret. In older imarets, this was a regular practice, probably seen as a fixed component of imaret employees' compensation. Moreover, the mention of municipal authorities posted at the imaret (perhaps only for a few hours each day) is also a small clue about how the creation of municipalities affected the broader fabric of life in late-19th-century Istanbul. Further research is needed to discover whether all existing imarets had similar additions to their traditional complement of staff, to learn in what sense operating styles may have changed over time.

1d. *Food*

The daily menu included two dishes: a meat-and-rice soup and a dish of boiled vegetables and meat. On Friday and *Kandil* evenings, the menu was to include *aşure* pudding. Once a year, forty Ottoman lira worth of sweets and sorbet were to be served as part of the celebrations of the Prophet's birthday, *mevlud el-nabi*. The reading of the *mevlud* text was to take place at the imaret itself, done by the imam of the Hamidiye mosque attended by the *muezzin*s. Apparently, this reading was intended for the edification and entertainment of the diners. There is little ground for comparing the mevlud activity described here with what took place in earlier eras. It seems that imarets were more usually intended as spaces for cooking and eating, with prayer, ritual, and study taking place elsewhere. In the classical mosque complexes, discrete buildings separated activities into distinct spaces. However, in the *zaviye-imaret*s of the 14th and 15th centuries, as well as in Sufi tekkes of various eras, ritual and eating may have been intertwined phenomena. Mevlevi novices at the central tekke in Konya apparently practiced their turning in the space of the kitchen, while the person responsible for novices in the Bektaşi order was called *aşçı dede* or *ser tabbah* (head cook).[26]

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[26] M. Baha Tanman, "Kitchens of Ottoman *Tekke*s as Reflections of Imarets in Sufi Architecture," in *Feeding People, Feeding Power: Imarets in the Ottoman Empire*, 211–39.

For the festivities of the tenth of Muharram, *aşure* pudding was to be cooked, as it was in many other parts of the Muslim world. Thirty lira were budgeted for this purpose. On the evening of *ʿid al-aḍḥa* (*kurban bayramı*), the sacrifice festival on the tenth day of the *hajj* pilgrimage month, eleven sheep were to be sacrificed and the meat distributed to the poor. The sums mentioned above for holiday expenses are interesting because they are the only details of anticipated expenditure provided in this document. In the absence of other specific budgetary notations, one wonders about the projected operating expenditures of the imaret on foodstuffs, salaries, and repairs.

In comparison with the fare described in earlier imarets, the food continued to comprise one dish of hot cooked food, a soup or stew, and bread. The meals were meant to be nourishing if not lavish, and moderately tasty, making allowances for the varying talents of the cooks, the availability of ingredients of reasonable quality, and the honesty of the imaret staff. Sweets had always been on the holiday menu at imarets, including *aşure* pudding and sometimes *baklava*. However, no *dane* or *zerde* were mentioned at the new imaret, although these savory and sweet rice dishes were standard holiday fare in all imarets and at imperial feasts alike in earlier centuries. The new imaret in Beşiktaş did not make any provision for special fare to be served to select clients. Imarets like those of Fatih and Süleymaniye had anticipated the presence of diners of different classes, and so made plans to serve higher-ranking clients with more luxurious dishes, in fitting surroundings. Probably because the Beşiktaş imaret was intended to serve only the poor, no additional or special provisions were made.

Although no specific budget was described (other than the few sums already noted), the *nizamname* was explicit in directing the manager and steward about how to manage purchasing and bookkeeping. Raw supplies bought for the imaret were to be bought at the appropriate and appointed times, and annual expenditures recorded in a budget statement. These were long-familiar admonitions and procedures, designed to encourage managers to acquire provisions when prices were not at their highest, as well as to keep careful accounts of all expenditures. Supplies for bread-making were to be ensured for six months at a time. Curiously, the bread was not to be baked as flat fodula loaves as typical in earlier imarets, but in portions weighed to suit the average man's consumption (*etmeği fodula olmayarak her biri be-hisab-i vusta bir adamın doyacağı miktar dirhemlik olmak üzere tabh edilmiş olacak*.) Perhaps this was a way to increase the size of bread portions, or perhaps there were changing habits of bread consumption that affected everyone.

2. *Conclusions*

The present discussion is a preliminary investigation of the Beşiktaş imaret, and an initial step in research on imarets in the later Ottoman period. As such, it has provided some clear indications about the impact of administrative reforms, new institutions, and changing notions of entitlements on one traditional mechanism for distributing free meals. The above observations about the imaret suggest that an expanded study of imaret *vakfiye*s might be a productive methodology for tracing changes in consumption habits in the Ottoman Empire. Significantly, such studies shed light on the living standards and habits of the non-elites of the empire, the majority of the population whose lifestyles are often difficult to access, describe and therefore incorporate into any broader depiction of Ottoman society and culture.

A wide array of institutions may be usefully studied to understand the nature and scope of change in the Ottoman empire: sultanate and soup kitchen alike offering significant insights.

The imarets retained their relevance even hundreds of years after the Ottomans began to build them. The fact that a new public kitchen was conceived and planned in the year 1890 suggests that the imaret was still seen as a valid institution for distributing basic food assistance. At the same time, other government-funded institutions were taking over welfare functions traditionally provided through private endowments. The influx of refugees to Istanbul following the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877–78, for example, created increased demand for food relief, likely on a scale rarely encountered in the capital. Perhaps the new imaret was in some way a response to this need, although one institution serving a hundred meals per day would have been a meager—even if highly visible and symbolically loaded—contribution to the relief of refugee needs. Two decades after it was planned, the Young Turks issued an order in 1911 to close down all but two of the remaining imarets in Istanbul as part of their general policy of eliminating institutions affiliated with the sultanate and with Sultan Abdülhamid II in particular. However, they reopened them a scant three years later when the press of refugees and war-induced impoverishment in the Ottoman capital made it imperative to use all means available to relieve hunger.[27]

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[27] Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (Istanbul: n.p., 1946–56), 2: 62; Nadir Özbek, "Osmanli İmparatorluğu'nda 'Sosyal Yardim' Uygulamaları: 1839–1918," *Toplum ve Bilim*, 83 (1999/2000): 125–29.

The imaret in Beşiktaş was an imperial endeavor, quite of a piece with the extensive charitable programme of Abdülhamid II, which included a poorhouse (*darülaceze*) established several months before the imaret. The new kitchen was to be built on the slope below Yıldız Palace, where it might have been easily visible. It was to be well made of good materials, and to provide simple fare in a warm and secure setting, all of which were physical metaphors of the sultan's ability to ensure the well-being of his subjects. One wonders whether the initiative to build a new imaret was realized, whether it was a single occurrence, or whether it was intended (or was) to be only one of many such new kitchens. Moreover, one might ask who was the audience for this undertaking beyond the immediate beneficiaries and the residents of Beşiktaş who could observe it at work.

As suggested above, the plan of this imaret also indicates the directions of change in the late Ottoman empire with regard to poor relief and social welfare distribution. By the end of the 19th century, benefits from charitable institutions seemed to be more directly aimed at the indigent, with people who deserved meals for other reasons separated out and served in different facilities or by other means. A public kitchen at this time comes to resemble more closely the soup kitchens for the poor, who are more stereotypically envisaged as the beneficiaries of large-scale charitable dining rooms. The question remains as to how the other people who had previously eaten at imarets—imams, scholars, students, Sufis, officials, and travelers—received meals. Were they now fed at subsidized work-place canteens? Had cash wages entirely supplanted the earlier cash-and-kind mix? And had the hotel and restaurant completely replaced the *kervansaray* and imaret? These, too, remain topics for further investigation.

PROF. AMNON COHEN—LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

A. *Books*

English and French

1. *Palestine in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns of Government and Administration*. Jerusalem: Magnes University Press, 1973.
2. *Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the 16th Century* (with B. Lewis). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.
3. *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime* (1949–1967). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
4. *Jewish Life under Islam. Jerusalem in the 16th Century*. Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1984.
5. *Egypt and Palestine. A Millennium of Association* (*868–1948*), (eds., with G. Baer). Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
6. *Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
7. *Scripta Hierosolymitana, vol. XXXV—Aspects of Ottoman History*, (eds. with A. Singer). Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1994.
8. *A World Within*. Philadelphia: Center for Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 1994, 2 vols.
9. *The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem*. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
10. *Israel, the Middle East and Islam—Weighing the Risks and Prospects* (eds., with O. Eran). Jerusalem: The Harry S. Truman Institute, 2003.
11. World Powers and the Middle East (series editor)
    (a) *Germany in the Middle East—Past, Present and Future* (H. Goren, ed.). Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2003.
    (b) *France in the Middle East* (M. Abitbol, ed.). Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2004.
12. *Democracy, Islam and the Middle East* (editor). Jerusalem: The Harry S. Truman Institute, 2005.
13. *Studies on Ottoman Palestine*. Aldershot: Ashgate, Variorum, 2011.
14. *Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing Patterns* (eds., with N. Efrati). Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011.
15. *Juifs et Arabes en Palestine/Israel*. In Michel Abitbol (ed.), *Juifs et musulmans histoires partagées. Projet Aladin*. Paris (forthcoming).

Turkish

16. *Osmanlı Kudüsünde Loncalar*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003.

Arabic

17. القدس—دراسات في تاريخ المدينة [Jerusalem: Historical Studies] (محرر). القدس: ياد يتسحاق بن تسفي، ١٩٩٠.
18. الاحزاب السياسية في الضفة الغربية في ظل النظام الاردني ١٩٤٩-١٩٦٧ [Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime (1949–1967)]. الرام—القدس: مطبعة القادسية، ١٩٨٨.

B. *Articles*

1. "'Allal al-Fasi: his Ideas and his Contribution towards Morocco's Independence." *Asian and African Studies*, 3 (1967), 121–164.
2. "The Army in Palestine in the 18th Century—Sources of its Weakness and Strength." *Bulletin of the School of Asian and African Studies* 34: 1 (1971), 36–55.
3. "The Jordanian Communist Party in the West Bank, 1950–1960." In M. Confino and Sh. Shamir (eds.), *The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East*. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973, 419–438.
4. "Some Notes on the Marseille Archives as a Source for the History of Palestine." In M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975, 578–582.
5. "West Bank Sentiments: 1967–1973." In M. Curtis, J. Neyer, C. Waxman and A. Pollak (eds.), *The Palestinians—People, History, Politics*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1975, 88–93.
6. "Political Parties under the Hashemite Regime." In M. Ma'oz (ed.), *Palestinian Arab Politics*. Jerusalem: Truman Institute Studies, 1975, 21–49.
7. "The Changing Patterns of West Bank Politics." *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 5 (1977), 105–113.
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א. ספרים

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